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Beyond the Spanish state? Relations between the EU, Central Government and 
Domestic Actors in Spain 
Abstract 
This thesis examines relations between domestic actors and central government or the 
state during the EC accession negotiations and EC/EU membership in Spain. It 
presents three theoretical perspectives on the role of the state: a state-centric approach 
which focuses on the state as autonomous actor; a two-level game framework which 
considers the state as gatekeeper between the European and domestic arenas; and a 
multi-level governance perspective where the state becomes an arena in which a 
number of different actors participate. A dynamic approach to the analysis is adopted, 
highlighting sets of changing conditions in the Spanish political system expected to 
influence the access to policy-making for actors other than central government, which 
it terms the domestic opportunity structure. The analysis of the high level of state 
autonomy during the EC accession negotiations acts as an essential baseline for an 
examination of the policy process during EC/EU membership when the state's 
autonomy is expected to be reduced by a more open opportunity structure. This 
changed context is explored in the specific areas of cohesion policy and fisheries, 
when the input of domestic actors is seen to depend on the particular policy setting, 
the policy-making stage and the type of decision, termed the EU opportunity 
structure. A combination of theoretical approaches is considered necessary to explain 
the changing levels of opportunity. Given that considerable evidence exists for the 
state's retention of its role as key decision-maker in the policy process, this thesis 
concludes that the state-centric approach is still relevant to the case of Spain. 
However, at certain stages o,f the' process, particular sets of actors have gained greater 
access to policy-making duhng EC/EU membership, as illustrated by the increasing 
involvement of regional authorities in the implementation of the structural funds, thus 
indicating that theoretical insights which place greater emphasis on the influence of 
domestic actors other than. the state may be needed to supplement a purely statist 
approach. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
This thesis examines the role of the Spanish state or central government and its 
. relations with key domestic actors in the European Union (EU) policy-making 
process. This is not a new topic for research. A shift has occurred in the literature on 
European integration in the 1990s from a focus on national governments in the policy 
process towards a greater emphasis on the roles of domestic actors other than the 
state. Although the literature has thus moved away from traditional state-centred 
analysis, and adopted diverse approaches, new angles or different 'conceptual lenses'! 
(Allison, 1971, p. 253), the role of the state remains a key focus in view of the many 
unanswered questions about its relations with domestic actors. A dynamic approach is 
adopted in this thesis which centres neither wholly on the central government nor on 
domestic actors, but on the changing interaction between the two. This analytical 
approach is applied to the case of the Spanish policy-making process, thus 
representing a shift from the predominant focus of existing studies of Spain on the 
role ofthe state (see Chapter 2). 
The state-centric focus of the literature reflects Spain's historical legacy, namely its 
relatively late transition to democratic, participative society due to the imposition of 
the authoritarian Francoist state until1975. Michael Keating (1993, p. 337) highlights 
the fact that 'Spain has long been notable for the relative weakness of its civil society, 
that is the network of organized groups and institutions outside the state apparatus. 
This is reflected in the small number and membership of interest groups and the 
weakness of most of them'. Policy networks and communities have been slower to 
develop in Spain during EU membership than in other EU countries. However, 
considerable changes in the relations between central government and key domestic 
actors during the negotiations for accession to the European Community (EC) and 
membership cannot be adequately analysed by using the statist emphases of existing 
literature. The more dynamic perspective of this analysis is expected to provide a 
fuller picture of the Spanish policy-making process. 
Despite the wealth of studies of EU policy-making in key member states, relatively 
few analyses exist in the case of Spain, as illustrated in Chapter 2. The strongly pro-
European position of the government, and the highly positive public attitudes to 
incorporation into the Community framework, may have tended to minimise 
I Allison's concept of using different 'conceptual lenses' has since been used to view the European 
integration process by other theorists, for example Laura Cram (1997). 
2 
discussion about Spain's integration into the European framework. Three key aspects 
which distinguish the Spanish case are: 
• its relatively late incorporation into the EC and its rapid adaptation to 
membership; the Spanish government learned quickly how to 'play the game' 
within the Community, as illustrated by its successful first EC Presidency in 1989 
and its skilful negotiation of EC/EU funding for its economically underdeveloped 
regions. 
• the scale of change in Spanish society given the simultaneous processes of 
democratisation, Europeanisation and decentralisation occurring during the period 
of study; the unscrambling of the autonomous effects on Spanish society of each 
of these processes represents a considerable challenge to the researcher, but also 
offers an important area for further study. 
• the development of relations between the Spanish government and domestic 
actors; it is likely that domestic actors will be relatively weak in a newly 
established democratic society. 
The starting point for the study is the beginning of a new democratic era for the 
Spanish state after the death of Franco in 1975. It centres on Spain's attitude to 
Europe, the long, protracted EC accession negotiations from 1979 to 1986, and 
Spain's EC/EU membership. The focus is largely on the period up to March 1996 
when the main opposition party won the elections, although referring to key 
developments since 1996 where relevant to the analysis. 
Objectives 
The main objective of this thesis is to examine the extent to which the central role of 
the Spanish state has been reinforced or constrained by key factors expected to affect 
the level of state autonomy vis-a-vis domestic actors. Important factors are considered 
to be: the level of access to policy-making for domestic groups, their capacity to 
exploit available opportunities for participation, and the government's ability to 
control the level of domestic input, thus highlighting the key issues of access, 
resources and control. Rather than a purely static examination of objectives and 
achievements at European level, the analysis also seeks to focus on the process of 
ratifying EU policies in the domestic arena. Although the government may ultimately 
determine the formulation of the Spanish bargaining position, it is expected to be 
increasingly obliged to obtain the approval of key domestic actors for its policy 
decisions. A key objective is thus to explore the changing nature of the domestic 
ratification process. This allows a study of the changing relations between the state 
.! 
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and key domestic actors, and an evaluation of the state's strategies for adapting to a 
potentially new context. 
Many studies of Spanish politics have highlighted the lack of research on policy 
networks and communities and their relations with government, even if they are less 
developed in Spain than in other EU member states; this thesis is a contribution 
towards filling the gap in the literature. Through viewing Spanish policy-making from 
a different angle, it seeks to enrich the debate on decision-making in Spain which 
tends to rest on the assumption of a fixed, unequal distribution of resources between 
government and domestic actors. The possibility that the research will merely 
reinforce the view of the central role played by the state is not ruled out, but a less 
static approach might be expected to yield a more fruitful analysis of the Spanish 
policy process. 
Research questions 
In view of the hypothesis that policy decisions are not purely the outcome of 
bargaining positions formulated by the national government, but may involve the 
participation of domestic actors, the study seeks to identify factors influencing 
relations between the state and domestic actors in the case of Spain. Key research 
questions which arise from this focus are: 
• Has the level of access to the policy process for key domestic actors increased 
during EC/EU membership? 
• Have domestic actors directly affected by negotiations at EC/EU level developed 
the capacity to exploit opportunities for greater access to policy-making? 
• To what extent has the state retained its control of the policy process? 
Addressing these key questions enables this thesis to evaluate the level of access to 
the policy process for particular groups of domestic actors, and the extent to which 
this can be expected to have an impact on the state's autonomy. The potential for 
increasing domestic involvement is likely to make the state's control over the policy-
making process more problematic during EC/EU membership. This is expected to be 
influenced both by changes in the specific character of the Spanish political system, 
and by the effects of its incorporation into the European framework. The analysis 
does not seek to provide a clear-cut explanation of state development in the EU 
policy-making process as a whole, but selects specific policy areas for empirical case 
studies in which relations between the state and domestic actors are explored. 
4 
Case studies 
A detailed analysis of Spain's EC accession negotiations allows a series of factors to 
be established at the outset of this thesis which characterise relations between the 
Spanish government and domestic actors. The potential for a changed context in the 
domestic arena after Spain's EC entry is considered, given that the overwhelming 
consensus in favour of incorporation into a European democratic framework could 
not be assumed once integration had been achieved. The examination of the role of 
the state and key domestic actors during the accession negotiations and EC/EU 
membership provides a broad perspective prior to testing the assumptions made in 
two specific case studies. 
Cohesion policy, which seeks to reduce economic disparities between European 
regions, was selected as a first policy area since its development potentially illustrated 
a considerable change in the roles of state and domestic actors. The increased 
participation of regional or subnational authorities in the EU policy process, 
particularly in the implementation of Community-funded projects, raised many 
fundamental questions about the roles of central government and key domestic actors. 
Although the net positive effects of an inflow of EC/EU funding made the negotiation 
of cohesion policy for the Spanish government at European level relatively 
unproblematic, the distribution of funding in the national arena was likely to cause 
considerable tensions between the different administrative levels. An analysis of the 
Spanish government's role in negotiating the optimal deal for its domestic interests at 
EU level was expected to yield significant findings about the interaction between the 
EU and domestic arenas. 
Given the consensus in favour of the government's policy on cohesion, the second 
empirical case was chosen with a view to focusing on an area more likely to lead to 
tensions between the state and domestic actors. Although the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) enlargement negotiations were initially selected for further 
analysis, an interviewee directly involved in the talks2 considered that the strategies 
adopted by the Spanish government caused little tension in the domestic arena. When 
aware of high-level bargaining at EC level, domestic actors generally gave their full 
support to the Spanish position. Interviews with government officials and sectoral and 
regional representatives (see primary sources in Bibliography) led to the suggestion of 
a policy area where a consensus on European policy was less assured, namely 
fisheries. Even during the EC accession negotiations, fisheries caused considerable 
2Interview with official in Spanish Permanent Representation, Brussels, 22 February 1996. 
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discontent and accusations of inadequate government support for the sector, thus 
providing a contrast to areas where full domestic support for the state's position was 
unquestioned. As the fishing sector sought to maximise its involvement in EU-level 
negotiations when permitted by national and Community structures, the case study 
offered wider scope to investigate the changing relations between the state and 
domestic actors. Within the area of fisheries, the episode of the re-negotiation of the 
EU-Morocco fisheries agreement in 1995 was selected in view of its high visibility, 
the direct involvement of the fishing sector, and strong public support for sectoral 
demands. The detailed examination of relations between the state and domestic actors 
in one specific episode was a necessary restriction on the range of the research. 
However, the analysis was also intended to raise more general questions about the 
policy area and the involvement of the fishing sector. 
The focus of the fisheries study is the region most directly affected economically by 
the negotiation, namely Andalusia, which is also the main focus of the case study on 
cohesion policy as the principal recipient of European funding in Spain. The Spanish 
government has been a key protagonist in both areas during EC/EU membership, 
which may indicate a stronger role for the Spanish state than in other policy areas. 
Despite this parallel between the two case studies, a number of key factors clearly 
distinguish them. The case study on cohesion highlights the changing nature of the 
policy area during the 1989-93 and 1994-99 funding cycles, with a particular focus 
on subnational authorities. Cohesion policy is characterised by a series of negotiating 
rounds creating distributional tensions, which obliges the state to ratify its initiatives 
and negotiating positions at EU level in the domestic arena. The study within the area 
of fisheries examines a particular episode in a specific context, although the 
negotiating rounds of one of the EU's most significant fishing agreements with a non-
EU Third country can also be located within a broader cycle of accords with 
Morocco, where Spain is clearly the most affected member state. In contrast to 
cohesion policy, the fisheries episode represents a short-term, localised crisis 
management issue for the Spanish state, where high involvement of the most directly 
affected domestic actors at regional level would be expected. The choice of case 
studies, therefore, provides .the opportunity to analyse relations between the state and 
domestic actors in distinct issue areas, considering different episodes, and at varying 
stages of the process. 
Evidence of the involvement of key domestic actors in the policy process is examined 
in each empirical case study with a view to identifying the key factors influencing 
their participation, taking into account the history of the specific issue in question. 
The level of negotiation and consultation between the state and domestic actors might 
6 
be expected to depend on the particular policy area. Furthermore, the degree of 
dependence of national government and EU officials on the skills and resources of 
regional and sectoral actors is considered likely to vary. Although effective 
implementation of policy at subnational level may require greater involvement of 
regional actors, the access of domestic actors to other stages of the policy process, for 
example the decision-making phase at EU level, may be problematic. This is further 
explored in Chapter 2. 
Structure and content 
Following an introduction to the key objectives of the thesis in Chapter I, Chapter 2 
consists of a critical review of the literature, both specifically on Spain, and on the 
wider questions raised about the role of national governments in the EU decision-
making process. A clear theoretical framework for this thesis is thus developed in the 
first two chapters. Chapter 3 focuses on Spain's EC accession negotiations, exploring 
key factors influencing relations between the Spanish state and domestic actors during 
the negotiating process, and the extent to which the state was able to retain its 
autonomy in the domestic arena. Following the focus on the Spanish state as EC 
applicant, Chapter 4 centres on Spain as EC/EU member, analysing the development 
of the institutional structure established for EU policy-making, and the issue of access 
to the policy process for domestic actors. Chapters 3 and 4 establish the broad 
conditions determining the nature of relations between the government and domestic 
actors in the policy process. The validity of these macro-conditions is then considered 
in an analysis of the micro-conditions existing in specific policy areas, namely in the 
two empirical case studies in Chapters 5-8, which act as tests of the assumptions 
made in earlier chapters. 
The structure of the two case studies reflects the focus of the thesis on the role of the 
state and domestic actors in the policy process. Each case is divided into two 
chapters, the first of which focuses on the intergovernmental level, thus putting a 
premium on the role of the state in the policy process, while the second focuses on the 
input of domestic actors and their relations with central government. The structure of 
the case studies is intended to demonstrate that an analysis going beyond a purely 
state-centred view explains more adequately changing relations between the state and 
domestic actors in specific policy areas. In view of the lack of emphasis on domestic 
actors in previous literature, the limited material on their role in the policy process led 
to the wide use of primary empirical and documentary material. Interviews were also 
essential for obtaining a fuller picture of the policy process (see Methodological note 
in Annex 3). 
.I 
I 
7 
The final chapter evaluates key research findings related to both the broader 
framework, and the specific issue areas, and draws conclusions based on the 
theoretical framework established about the changing EU policy-making process in 
Spain. 
Key definitions 
For the purposes of this thesis, the term 'state' refers to the Spanish central 
government, and the term 'domestic actors' to actors other than central government in 
Spain. Regional or subnational governments are thus referred to as domestic actors 
rather than as part of the state. In addition to regional authorities, the analysis includes 
the Spanish parliament (also referring to the input of key political parties where 
relevant to the analysis), and trade unions and employers, collectively termed socio-
economic actors. The study of the trade unions focuses on the two main unions in 
Spain, while the examination of employers is largely based on the principal 
employers' confederation (see Chapter 3). The particular sector which forms a key 
focus of the thesis, namely the fisheries sector, has its own individual structure 
incorporating trade unions, shipowners' associations and local associations. The 
organisation of the fishing sector is explained in Chapter 8 prior to the analysis of its 
relations with central government during EU-level negotiations. 
The concept of 'autonomy' mainly refers to the autonomy of the state vis-a-vis 
domestic actors, rather than in relation to the EU, and alludes to the extent to which 
the government can act regardless of domestic constraints when formulating its 
bargaining position and implementing EU policy. Autonomy can be defined as 'the 
ability of a given actor to pursue its desired policy independently of, and without 
pressure from, another political actor' (Fioretos, 1997, p. 297). 
The term EU is used when referring to events after November 1993 and to the 
European context more generally, whereas EC is reserved for events prior to the 
enactment of the Treaty on European Union. EC/EU is used to refer to the whole 
period of Spanish membership of the Community. 
Research claims 
Even if studies of European integration in the 1990s have increasingly highlighted 
organised interests and networks of non-state actors, studies of Spanish EU policy-
making have tended to focus on the state in a generally static institutional framework. 
This may reflect the dominance of the executive in Spanish policy-making, but it 
8 
plays down any potential for evolution. The empirical research carried out for this 
thesis addresses key questions about the Spanish state which, previously, have been 
relatively unexplored, thus challenging the traditional conceptualisation of the 
Spanish policy process, and considering whether approaches other than a purely state-
centred perspective can offer a greater insight into the policy process. The key 
rationale behind this study is that, if wider conclusions are to be drawn about the 
decision-making process, the dynamics of relations between governments and 
domestic actors need to be understood. The analysis thus seeks not only to be a useful 
contribution to the literature on Spain and the EU, but also to enrich the ongoing 
debate about the nature of EU decision-making processes. 
9 
Chapter2 
THE SPANISH STATE AND THE EU: APPROACHES TO ANALYSIS 
EU membership has raised fundamental questions about the distribution of authority 
and decision-making power between EU institutions and member states, and between 
national governments and domestic actors. Although it could be argued that 'evidence 
from both the EU policy process and from major treaty negotiations has consistently 
reinforced ... the critical role which national governments have played in the decision-
making process' (Cram, 1997, p. 170), this thesis seeks to take into account changes 
in the nature of policy-making which may have an impact on the level of autonomy of 
the state, and on its interaction with key domestic actors. 
The issue of the role of governments in policy-making remains problematic. The 
framework for this analysis covers a spectrum of roles offered by theoretical 
perspectives, whereby governments can be considered as autonomous actors, or as 
national gatekeepers between the EU and national arenas, or as only one of a number 
of levels in the domestic negotiation of European policy. In the case of Spain, Paul 
Heywood (1995, p. 241) refers to the policy-making process as one of the least 
researched elements of Spanish politics, rendering it 'difficult to locate policy-making 
in Spain within analytical categories familiar from the study of other west European 
polities'. A review of literature on Spain during the EC accession negotiations and 
membership examines the way in which relations between the government and 
domestic actors have been conceptualised in previous studies. 
Spain and the EC/EU 
Although Spain has had close economic links with Europe since the early 1960s, its 
political integration into the Community did not occur until 1986. EC accession was 
of fundamental importance for the newly established democracy, as illustrated by the 
analysis of the negotiations from 1979-86 in Chapter 3. This review of the literature 
identifies the key focus of existing studies of Spain prior to ECIEU membership, with 
particular reference to the accession negotiations. 
Spain during EC accession negotiations 
Early works on Spain's EC entry tend to discuss the application to join the 
Community in terms of tbe re-orientation of the foreign policy interests of the Spanish 
state, namely the shift from an isolationist policy line to a greater focus on the 
European context in the 1970s (for example Cortada, 1980; Minet et al., 1981). 
Although the impact ofthe EC on the transition ofpost-Franco Spain in the 1970s and 
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1980s is covered in other works, the focus continues to be on Spain's overall foreign 
policy objectives (Preston and Smyth, 1984; Pollack and Hunter, 1987). EC accession 
is examined as a key element of Spain's modernisation process alongside entry into 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the perspectives adopted tend to 
highlight global decisions taken by the state without referring to their ratification in 
the domestic arena. The existing literature thus provides an overview of the essential 
elements of the accession negotiations at interstate level, including the positions of 
key member states vis-a-vis Spain's application, and the overall impact of the second 
enlargement on the Community, but does not problematise key questions about the 
relations between the Spanish state and key domestic actors (for example George, 
1985). 
The predominantly economic focus of much of the literature has resulted in a relative 
neglect of political aspects of the process, as illustrated by the numerous studies of the 
likely effects of accession on the Spanish economy and the attitude of other member 
states to the economic consequences of Spain's EC entry (for example Holmes, 1983; 
Sampedro and Payno, 1983; Tamames, 1986). Detailed chronological accounts of 
each technical stage of the accession process also tend to pay little attention to the 
broader political impact of EC entry, a key example being the series of articles by 
Enrique Gonzalez Sanchez, a government official during the negotiations (see articles 
from 1978-86). The economic bias indicates a significant gap in the literature in view 
of the fact that the rationale behind Spain's application for membership was largely 
political rather than economic. 
Given that analyses of political aspects of the accession process are less common, the 
researcher is obliged to depend on partisan views of the government's negotiation of 
EC entry to inform the analysis of the accession process undertaken in this thesis. 
Studies by politicians from the main opposition parties tend to reiterate key criticisms 
of the negotiating strategies of the Partido Socialista Obrero Espafiol (Spanish 
Socialist Workers' Party, PSOE) government, such as the negative terms of entry for 
sectors such as agriculture and fisheries, and the speed of accession being driven by 
the proximity of the elections and the linkage with the NATO referendum. For 
example, in addition to providing an outline of the government's negotiating tactics, 
Angel G6mez Fuentes (1986) expresses the views of many opposition politicians 
when he criticises the lack of information about the implications of the Accession 
Treaty for key sectors. Although such political viewpoints cannot be considered 
entirely objective analyses of the situation, the frequent criticism of the minimal 
domestic debate seems to be an indication of the lack of awareness of the implications 
ofEC entry in Spanish society (for example Herrero de Mifi6n, 1986; Arrnero, 1989). 
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Studies written by officials involved in the early years of the accession process 
attempt to counter the notion that the negotiations only commenced in 1982 when the 
PSOE came to power, the most notable being that of Raimundo Bassols (1995), 
former ambassador in Brussels, and Secretary of State for the EC from 1981-82, who 
provides the first comprehensive account of the early negotiating period under the 
newly formed Union de Centro Democratico (Union of the Democratic Centre, 
UCD). His study incorporates a wealth of information on internal negotiations, 
ministerial meetings and the opinions of key politicians during his term of office in 
Brussels from 1976-81 which previously had not been published. The detailed nature 
of the study, illustrated by the inclusion of the exact number of meetings held 
between the government and domestic groups, is an important source of information 
on the dialogue in the domestic arena during the early negotiations. 
In view of the lack of analytical studies of EC accession, the researcher is also obliged 
to rely on the memoirs of key politicians for detail on the negotiating strategies of the 
government and its relations with domestic actors, for example the autobiography of 
former Prime Minister (PM) Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo (1990). Although they are 
personal viewpoints, the rationale behind the government's objectives can frequently 
be clarified by their accounts. Socialist politicians naturally focus on the period 
following their election victory in 1982, which they regard as the true starting point of 
the negotiating process. They generally give a positive, almost self-congratulatory 
account of the negotiations; a key example is the focus of former Foreign Minister, 
Fernando Monin, on the 1982-86 period (for example 1980, 1984, 1990). In his study 
of the accession process (1990), he describes the skilful bargaining tactics of the 
Socialist government which led to the achievement of the goal of EC membership. 
The study provides detail on the negotiations which is difficult to access in other 
sources, but is a personal account of his role, for example in unblocking the stalemate 
caused by French obstruction of enlargement, rather than an objective analysis. This 
body of literature provides empirical detail on the strategies of the Spanish 
government vis-a-vis the EC rather than a critical evaluation of the policy process. 
However, the works of Moran facilitate an understanding of the pro-European 
consensus in Spain during the negotiations by providing an analysis of the process of 
Europeanisation, the acritical unanimity of all political forces, and Spain's 
modernisation in the post-Franco era. 
An indication of the involvement of domestic actors in the negotiations is provided by 
only a minority of studies of the second enlargement, for example the focus of Loukas 
Tsoukalis (1981) on the internal debate in Spain, and the limit to the level of 
discussion as a result of the consensus in favour of entry. His brief examination of the 
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relatively underdeveloped Spanish civil society and the inexperienced political class 
thus addresses the question ofthe awareness of EC entry at domestic level. However, 
the position of domestic actors such as Spanish political parties, trade unions and 
pressure groups vis-a-vis EC accession is rarely evaluated. The study by Beate 
Kohler-Koch (1982) of the alignment of political forces in the post-Franco era was 
written at too early a stage in the negotiations to form a full evaluation of the 
domestic arena, and studies generally refer to the overall pro-European position in 
Spanish domestic society without evaluating its origins or significance. One exception 
is the study of Berta Alvarez-Miranda Navarro (1995), which provides a helpful 
analytical insight into the rationale behind the Spanish cross-party consensus in 
comparison with Portugal and Greece. Studies of the interaction between the 
development of the public sphere and economic and political liberalisation provide an 
important contribution to the literature on Spain. However, the EC remains largely a 
sub-theme in works focused on the development of Spanish civil society, for example 
by a recognised authority in this area Vfctor Perez-Dfaz (1993). In view of these 
significant gaps in the literature, evidence of the internal debate during the 
negotiations can generally only be found in the few works written by representatives 
of key domestic groups, for example in the evaluation of the main Spanish business 
confederation by Antonio Alonso (1985), who describes the tensions between the 
interests of EC negotiators and those of Spanish business. 
Spain's EC application has frequently been examined in the literature in relation to 
the transition to democracy and the redefinition of its external relations (see Pridham, 
1991, 1995). For example, well-documented analyses of the linkage between the 
domestic and international arenas analyse the government's use of external exigencies 
to enforce domestic policy decisions (Story and Pollack, 1991; Powell, 1993; Story, 
1993, 1995). Although the evaluation of the impact of EC institutions and 
transnational organisations on Spanish society contributes to the analysis of the 
domestic arena in this thesis, existing studies of Spain's EC entry clearly focus on the 
global objectives of the Spanish state during the negotiating period. This relative 
neglect of the input of actors other than central government in the policy process is 
also evident from a review of the literature on Spain's EC/EU membership. 
Spain during EC/EU membership 
Studies of Spain as an established EU member state are relatively rare compared with 
the wealth of literature on Spain's transition to democracy. Although surveys of 
political science research (for example Ciavarini Azzi, 1994) note an important 
increase in both the quantity and quality of studies of Europe in Spain during its EU 
membership, the number of political studies is small when compared to economic 
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analyses, as was the case in the earlier discussion of studies of EC accession. 
According to the survey data, the ratio is approximately 50 per cent economic studies, 
35 per cent political studies, and 15 per cent legal studies. The guide to studies of 
Southern Europe edited by John Loughlin (1993) also acknowledges the increasing 
amount of research on the Southern European region, but similarly concludes that 
economic analyses predominate. Studies of the influence of the EU on individual 
sectors in Spain, of the developing Spanish economy, including trade patterns and the 
impact on investment, and of Spain's role in the world economy are thus relatively 
common (for example, Hudson and Rudcenko, 1988; Ruesga, 1989; Tamames, 1991; 
Harrison, 1992; Salmon, 1995a, 1995b; Tovias, 1995; and a comparative study of 
European economies by Somers, 1991). Similarly, evaluation of the effects of the 
Maastricht Treaty on Spain has largely focused on its economic rather than political 
impact (for example, Circulo de Lectores, 1992). Heywood (1995, p. 6) highlights the 
fact that the study of politics in Spain is also shaped by its location within the 
discipline of law, which has encouraged its focus on constitutional and legal issues, 
for example works analysing the Spanish legal framework (see Mangas, 1987), and 
those outlining the constitutional basis of Spain's foreign policy (see Remiro Brot6ns, 
1984). 
Overviews of the government and politics of Spain written in the 1990s, generally 
centring on the broad outlines of its political transformation, the economic and social 
changes in post-Franco Spanish society, and Spain's emergence as a significant voice 
in international affairs, are an acknowledgement of the significant gap in the 
literature, and an indication of a greater academic interest in the Spanish case (see 
Heywood, 1995; Gunther, 1996; Ross, 1997). However, studies of the Spanish 
political system, relatively recently written in comparison with other EU countries, 
tend to be introductory rather than an in-depth evaluation of key issues, and analogies 
with policy-making in other EU member states are rarely made. The focus on 
distinctive elements of the Spanish case in an examination of policy-making style in 
Spain by Joan Subirats (1992) is an important addition to the literature in this respect, 
although the author acknowledges that it only represents the groundwork for further 
study. Recent works have included an analysis of Spanish politics after March 1996, 
when the centre-right party, the Partido Popular (Popular Party, PP)1 won the 
elections, as in the comprehensive guide to the Spanish political system by Michael 
Newton (1997). Such studies act as important reference works, but issues such as the 
autonomy of central government, and the development of Spanish interest groups, 
1 The centre-right Popular Party is the successor to the Popular Coalition, which lost to the PSOE in the 
1982 and 1986 elections, and the Popular Alliance founded in 1976. 
14 
have only recently been identified as important areas for academic study, and the 
literature can thus only provide a starting point for further analytical development. 
Studies of Spain's EU membership tend to consist of descriptive outlines of the 
institutional structure at national and EU level, rather than detailed evaluation of the 
impact of membership, as illustrated by works on the policy process (Salas Hemandez 
and Betancor Rodrfguez, 1991 ), and more specific studies of the key Spanish 
institutions dealing with EU policy, namely the Spanish Permanent Representation in 
Brussels (Hayes-Renshaw et al., 1989), the Secretariat of State for Foreign Policy and 
the EU (Dastis, 1995), and the Spanish parliament (Martfn Martfnez, 1995; Closa, 
1996) (see Chapter 4 for an analysis of the institutional framework in Spain). Existing 
studies of Spanish EU policy are a source of useful empirical data (see Almarcha 
Barbado, 1993), but rarely provide in-depth analysis of the impact of the EU on 
Spain. An exception is the study of Eduardo Zapico Gofii (1995) of the changing 
nature of the Spanish policy-making process, which represents one of the few 
attempts in the literature to adopt a more dynamic and analytical approach to the 
study ofEU policy-making. Although works by Francesc Morata (1996, 1997, 1998) 
also provide an analysis of Spain's EU membership, the focus is on Spanish 
representation in EU institutions, the remit of key organs dealing with European 
policy in the domestic arena, and political and administrative adaptation to the 
European context. His studies do not seek to analyse in any detail the nature of 
interaction between key domestic actors in the policy-making process. 
Keating (1993, p. 341) refers to views of Spanish policy-making being seen 'almost 
exclusively in terms of the state, which is given an exalted role in Spanish political 
culture'. A state-centric perspective is prevalent in the majority of studies of the key 
developments in Spanish politics in the 1980s and 1990s, where the focus on 
strategies at interstate level tends to neglect the changing relations between the state 
and domestic actors. The issue of EU membership is generally included as a success 
of the PSOE government in a wider analysis of Spain's international role (see Alonso 
Zaldfvar and Castells, 1992; Guerra and Tezanos, 1992), while literature which 
focuses exclusively on Spain in the EU primarily evaluates key achievements at 
European level with little reference to the formulation of policies in the domestic 
arena (Barbe, 1996; Story, 199la, 1991b). Similarly, works written by government 
officials and ministers only outline the key challenges of European integration at 
interstate level (see Gonzalez, 1992; Guerra, 1993). A key theme which emerges from 
these works is that of Spain's established position in the EU as a middle-order 
country with considerable international prestige, whereas relations between the 
government and domestic actors are rarely problematised. 
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Studies of Spain's contribution to specific policy areas pay greater attention to the 
potential influence on the government's position of domestic interests, as illustrated 
by the focus of Heywood (1993) on the tensions caused in the domestic arena by the 
government's commitment to EMU, and the analysis of regional participation in 
cohesion policy of Morata and Muiioz (1996). Keating (1993) also seeks to take 
account of the development of relations between the strong Spanish executive and 
relatively weak domestic groups. However, in general, little consideration is given in 
the literature to the potential for a shift in the balance between state and non-state 
actors as a result of key changes in the EU and domestic arenas. This is perhaps 
largely due to the fact that the lobbying process in Spain was at an embryonic stage 
when Spain joined the Community. The few studies of the consultation process 
between the Spanish government and lobby groups generally provide a relatively 
unsophisticated description of the key channels used for dialogue (see Molins and 
Morata, 1994). Other articles about domestic actors such as business organisations, 
trade unions or key political parties do not tend to focus on their involvement in EU 
policy, even though their input is likely to have increased substantially during Spain's 
EU membership (see Gillespie, 1989, Share, 1989 on the PSOE; Martfnez Lucio, 
1991 on the main business confederation; Gillespie, 1990 on trade unions). 
Furthermore, the inclusion of the European context in studies of key groups such as 
political parties tends to be confined to an analysis of interstate negotiation at EU 
level rather than the domestic consultation process (for example Gillespie, 1996, on 
the PSOE). The impact of EU membership on internal domestic politics thus remains 
understudied in the literature (see brief studies by Wigg, 1988; Acuiia, 1989; 
Robinson, 1992). 
The neglect of the input of key domestic actors to European policy does not extend to 
the Autonomous Communities. Increasing Spanish regional participation in EU 
policy is the focus of numerous studies which analyse the implications of institutional 
changes at national, regional and European levels for subnational participation (for 
example Keating, 1993; Gutierrez Espada, 1994; Burgorgue-Larsen, 1995; Bustos 
Gisbert, 1995; Ministerio para !as Administraciones Publicas, 1995; Perez Tremps, 
1995). Works on the more politically active regions such as the Basque Country and 
Catalonia, are particularly common (Bullain L6pez, 1990 on the Basque Country; 
Garcfa, 1995 on Catalonia). The effect of EU membership on the institutional 
framework at regional level forms a key theme in these studies. This reflects a more 
general focus in the literature on the influence on Spain's domestic transformation of 
the EC/EU, for example the work of Moxon-Browne (1989) which centres on 
political change in Spain, and the impact of EC membership on Spanish domestic 
politics. The key theme of the significance of the redefinition of Spain's external 
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relations in the literature on EC accession thus continues during membership. Linkage 
between Spain's external relations and the development of Spanish society is the 
focus of the volume edited by Richard Gillespie et al. (1995). The analysis of the 
Spanish case from a multidisciplinary perspective forms a useful contribution to the 
literature, but considers Spain's EU membership alongside other key developments, 
such as full entry into the Euro-Atlantic system and increasing interdependency with 
the world economy. This indicates its broad view of the transformation of the role of 
the Spanish state in the international system, rather than its specific role within the 
EU and its relations with domestic actors. 
Existing studies of the role of the Spanish state within the EU tend to assume its high 
level of autonomy, and do not consider its changing role during EU membership. An 
exception is the study of Carlos Closa (1995) which explores the potential for a 
reduced level of autonomy of the Spanish state. He focuses on the limits of adherence 
to EU policy to legitimise the government's demands in the domestic arena, 
indicating that the state's monopoly of the policy process has become more 
problematic. The study does not extend to an exploration of the relations between the 
government and groups of domestic actors in different policy settings, but is an 
important contribution to the literature, and a useful starting point for further 
development in this thesis. Other analytical approaches to the role of the Spanish state 
tend to assume its full control of the policy process, and its continued capacity to 
shape demands in the domestic arena during membership, for example studies which 
focus on the internationalisation of domestic policies during EC accession 
negotiations and membership (Holman, 1996), and on the impact of ideas and 
knowledge on the changing preferences of the Spanish state within the EU (Marks, 
M., 1997). 
This review of studies of Spain's EC accession and EC/EU membership has revealed 
the predominantly economic focus of the literature, while political analyses of the 
policy process remain underdeveloped. The few existing analytical studies of the 
Spanish political system generally provide a static view of negotiations and 
achievements at EU level, and pay little attention to the changing domestic context. 
Relations between the state and domestic actors, and the impact of increased domestic 
access to policy-making on the level of autonomy of the government, have thus not 
been problematised in the case of Spain. The use of key theoretical approaches in the 
next section therefore seeks to reconsider or develop many of the existing static 
interpretations of Spain's EU membership. 
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Theoretical approaches 
Given the gaps identified in the literature on Spain, theoretical approaches used for 
the analysis of relations between the state and domestic actors in the EU policy-
making process more generally are considered, with a view to establishing a 
framework for the Spanish case. Three sets of analytical insights which each delineate 
different roles for the state are examined, namely state-centric, two-level game and 
multi-level game frameworks. Although no definite boundaries can be drawn between 
the three approaches, the perspectives act as the organising focus for a review of the 
literature and form a clear framework for this thesis. The evaluation of the central 
tenets of each approach seeks to provide an indication of their validity for the Spanish 
case. 
A state-centric perspective: the state as autonomous actor 
According to proponents of a realist or neo-realist approach, the unitary state 
responds to external influences in the international system, and can make and remake 
the rules by which other actors operate. It is thus that a theory that denies the key role 
of states will be needed 'only if nonstate actors develop to the point of rivalling or 
surpassing the great powers' (Waltz, 1979, p. 95). Kenneth Waltz emphasises the 
importance of enduring structural factors in the international system which result in a 
similarity of outcomes despite changes in the agents which produce them, assuming 
that the state acts largely autonomously of domestic interests. The approach thus 
focuses on the 'purely positional derivation of interest shared by classical realism' 
(Caporaso and Keeler, 1995, p. 43). Although neo-functionalists do not give the state 
a central role in the EU policy process (for example, Lindberg, 1963, and the standard 
reference work of neo-functionalist thought, Haas, 1958), it is significant that Erns! 
Haas (1968) later acknow !edged that the sovereign national state is a distinct entity 
with the potential to react differently to external challenges depending on specific 
national factors. A sovereign national state has been defined as 'a political 
organization which has fixed territorial boundaries that are in principle impermeable, 
a unified structure of political authority encompassing all state institutions, and a 
legitimate monopoly of ultimate control over societal organizations in the same 
territory as well as over their external relations' (Hooghe, 1996a, p. 16). 
Contemporary versions of the statist model reflect the realist emphasis on national 
governments as ultimate decision-makers, but also allow for the fact that state 
executives are located in domestic political arenas. A state-centric approach which 
highlights the fact that decision-making does not exist in a political vacuum would 
seem to be more valid for an analysis of EU member states than traditional realist 
conceptions of the state's role in the international system. 
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A key tenet of the state-centric approach is that decision-making is determined by 
bargaining among state executives which has enabled the nation-state to survive as 
the centre of political power. This can be seen in the work of a key advocate of the 
approach, Stanley Hoffmann (1982, p. 27), who defines state autonomy as its capacity 
to resist particular pressures, to produce its own ideas and goals, and to turn its 
preferences into decisions. He sets out a positive-sum relationship between European 
integration and the maintenance of national legitimacy and autonomy, an assumption 
made by other key theorists (for example, Taylor, 1991, 1996; Milward, 1992; Mann, 
1993). For example, Michael Mann (1993, p. 116) argues that 'West European 
weakenings of the nation-state are slight, ad hoc, uneven, and unique', concluding 
that European integration represents little threat to the state's position. The line of 
reasoning developed is that the EC/EU has consolidated the power and autonomy of 
the nation-state vis-a-vis domestic actors. This is most evident in the work of Alan 
Milward (1992, pp. 2-3), who considers that the process of European integration has 
been 'an integral part of the reassertion of the nation-state as an organizational 
concept'. The underlying theme of the 'modified intergovernmentalist' or 
consociational approach of Paul Taylor (1991, 1996) is also the enhancement of state 
autonomy through participation in a common decision-making process. His model of 
consociationalism seeks to explain how state sovereignty can be fully retained while 
the EU develops its own distinctive level of political activity, which offers a useful 
means of understanding the strategies adopted by governments to retain their key role 
in the policy-making process in this thesis. Taylor (1996, pp. 82-3) considers that 
interstate bargains are often based on deals which suit the interests of their main 
supporters in particular sectors, but which may conflict with other 'segments' of 
society which the state is supposed to represent. Milward (1992, p. 3) goes beyond 
other statist theorists when he argues that the European nation-state would not have 
retained the allegiance of its citizens without the process of integration, which is 
described as rescuing it. He argues that 'the choice between interdependence and 
integration was made according to the capacity of either system of international order 
to advance domestic policy choices' (Milward, 1992, p. 437), thus indicating that the 
state pursues integration as a way of formalising and regulating interdependence 
without forfeiting its autonomy. 
One key feature clearly suggested by a state-centric approach is the importance of the 
influence of national leaders and their bargaining strategies in interstate negotiations. 
Andrew Moravscik (1991) emphasises the importance of interstate bargaining 
between key member states in the negotiation of the Single European Act (SEA) 
when he views the state as the principal actor whose changing interests determine the 
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outcomes of bargaining in the EU arena. Despite the responsibility to domestic 
constituencies, political leaders are considered to possess a high level of autonomy 
from bureaucracies, political parties and interest groups in the domestic arena. The 
importance of interstate bargaining is also acknowledged by Keohane and Hoffmann 
(1990, p. 277) who consider that 'the expansion of Community tasks depends 
ultimately on the bargains between major governments'. However, other theorists 
such as Carlos Closa (1995, p. 294) highlight the fact that Moravscik's model seems 
to be applicable only to a single, concrete case, the SEA, which makes its explanatory 
value dubious until additional cases are analysed. The decisive role played by national 
governments may be most visible in the case of the biggest leaps of integration 
(Milward, 1992), but the analysis of an intergovernmental negotiation, where national 
governments are the only negotiators with decision-making powers, can be logically 
viewed as validating a state-centric approach (Ciosa, 1995, p. 294). Interstate 
negotiations are described by John Peterson (1995) as largely consisting of history-
making decisions which tend to be the exclusive domain of the state, although he 
considers alternative perspectives more relevant for an evaluation of other stages in 
the policy-making process. However, state-centric theorists tend to assume that 
subsequent negotiations are only the final working out of the initial interstate deal and 
thus do not represent a significant part of the process. 
Despite the importance attributed to interstate bargaining, intergovernmentalist 
approaches do not all assume that the state can retain its high level of autonomy as 
European integration proceeds. For example, the threat to state autonomy in the 1990s 
is recognised by William Wallace (1994, p. 76) when he describes how states may 
have adapted successfully to the requirements of shared policy-making, but at the cost 
of losing the confidence of a rising proportion of their national publics in their ability 
to meet domestic demands. His conclusion that 'the European nation-state is in 
retreat' is an important consideration in this analysis of the changing role of the 
Spanish state. Despite his emphasis on the biggest threat to government autonomy 
probably being from within the nation state, and his acknowledgement that an 
assessment of the level of state autonomy depends on the distinctive historical 
experience of different European countries, he does not elaborate on the nature of the 
variation between member states nor on the impact of domestic forces (Wallace, 
1994, p. 55). Greater emphasis is placed on the differences between national 
institutional frameworks in works adopting a unit-level approach, where the basic unit 
of analysis is the domestic structure (for example Katzenstein, 1978; Krasner, 1978). 
This emphasis is significant in view of the fact that a state-centric approach may be 
less relevant to countries with a more established pluralist tradition. 
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Peter Katzenstein (1978) links national preferences to the structure of domestic 
groups and to their interaction with the state, distinguishing between 'weak' and 
'strong' states depending on the level of autonomy in pursuing their own goals 
regardless of domestic interests. Although the state-centric perspective is generally 
considered to neglect domestic demands, reference is frequently made to the potential 
impact on policy preferences of the domestic arena (for example Nordlinger, 1981; 
Smith, I 993). However, the state is generally assumed to be an autonomous entity 
with authority to determine policy preferences, even when decisions taken diverge 
from the demands of the most powerful groups. The inclusion of domestic interests in 
the analytical framework does not therefore necessarily represent a greater threat to 
state autonomy. In fact, Martin Smith (1993, pp. 53-4) considers that, under certain 
circumstances, a close relationship between the government and domestic groups can 
seal off the policy process from other actors, and ultimately increase central 
government's autonomy. The potential for domestic demands to strengthen the 
government's position is also a key element of the study of Peter Haas (1992), who 
highlights the privileged access to the policy process of groups of experts or 
'epistemic communities'. The provision of information to negotiators may allow 
domestic groups to shape international policy decisions, particularly under conditions 
of uncertainty. This is a key consideration in an analysis of specific policy areas, 
where the state could be expected to rely on the high level of expertise accumulated 
over time by domestic actors. 
Jarnes Caporaso and John Keeler (1995, p. 44) criticise the fact that domestic interests 
are a given and remain theoretically unexplained in these approaches. For example, 
Simon Bulmer (1983) advocated 'disaggregating' the national position without 
elaborating on how this could be achieved, and Helen Milner (1992, p. 491) refers to 
the aggregation of domestic preferences as a 'difficult theoretical and practical issue'. 
The increasing importance of domestic factors is acknowledged by statist approaches, 
but a theoretical structure for the analysis of their effect on negotiations is generally 
absent (Sanchez-Cuenca Rodrfguez, 1995, p. 6). Moravscik (1993b, p. 5) criticises the 
presumption of the realist tradition that 'states are assumed to have stable and broadly 
similar domestic preferences, decision-making procedures, and abilities to extract 
resources from society'. The liberal perspective adopted by Moravscik (1993a) 
represents a more systematic approach to domestic influences on decision-making, 
which is of particular relevance to an evaluation of relations between national 
governments and domestic actors. He regards the identity of domestic groups, the 
nature of their interests, and their influence on policy decisions as essential for a fuller 
understanding of the policy process, although still emphasising the bargaining power 
and autonomy of national governments. While other state-centric approaches are 
_j 
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generally based on the state's complete control of the process, and do not elaborate on 
policy choices in the domestic arena, Moravcsik thus considers that the role played by 
domestic interests needs to be more clearly identified. Although Wayne Sandholtz 
and John Zysman (1989) attempt to incorporate domestic politics into their 
explanation of changes in the international economy, their overall approach is 
systemic; even when included as determinants of national and European policy, the 
impact of domestic forces tends to be underestimated (see Bulmer, 1983). Moravcsik 
(1993a) argues that EU institutions can be used by the state to increase its autonomy 
in relation to domestic interests. This is facilitated where domestic interests are weak 
or ambiguous, described as 'agency slack', while stronger interests may lead to a 
greater constraint on central government's autonomy. His acknowledgement of the 
potential impact of domestic interests on the government's position distinguishes his 
approach from that of other statist theorists, although, in a later paper, he argues that 
'international co-operation ... tends on balance to strengthen the domestic power of 
executives vis-a-vis opposition groups' (Moravscik, 1994, p. 7). 
The core presumption of the state-centric approach is clearly the continued autonomy 
and initiative of central government. As expressed by Mark Pollack (1995, p. 385), 
'the interests and tenacity of the member states, and the institutional rules they 
establish to govern EC policy-making, should remain at the center of the picture'. 
Likewise, Fritz Scharpf (1988) argues that national governments resist any reduction 
in their powers, even if leading to potentially sub-optimal policy outcomes in the EU 
negotiating arena. In light of the predominantly statist approach to the analysis of the 
Spanish policy process of the literature, the applicability of the state-centric 
perspective to the Spanish case would seem plausible. However, despite the attempt 
to incorporate domestic interests, the unquestioned autonomy of the state makes the 
validity of the approach questionable for all stages of the policy process. Even if 
Moravscik' s (1993a) focus on national preference formation as well as the relative 
bargaining power of governments would seem to enhance the perspective as a tool for 
analysing decision-making, the ratification in the domestic arena of the government's 
key policy decisions is still regarded as relatively unproblematic. This may indicate 
the need for other analytical approaches to supplement a purely statist perspective for 
a fuller analysis of the EU decision-making process. 
The two-level game approach: the state as gatekeeper 
The two-level game approach also considers that the state retains its autonomy and 
initiative in the policy process. However, its attempt to explain state behaviour pays 
more attention to the impact of domestic forces on international policies, namely the 
government's construction of winning coalitions to support its policy decisions. The 
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concept of the two-level game advocated by Robert Putnam (1993) assumes that 
domestic and international games are fully integrated and must be analysed 
simultaneously. The approach suggests that the domestic ratification process is the 
key to understanding negotiation in the international arena, as it clarifies the choice of 
strategies adopted by states to achieve their goals (Milner, 1992, p. 493). Its focus on 
the aggregation of domestic preferences thus moves beyond a purely state-centric 
perspective, and may be expected to enhance an understanding of relations between 
the state and domestic actors. The view of international negotiation as the product of 
politically mediated coalition bargaining in the domestic arena can be seen in the 
work of Charles Lipson (1984). This is supported by Peter Evans (1993, p. 404), who 
considers that an examination of the state level may be sufficient for general security 
issues, but that an analysis of the domestic level of negotiation is necessary for 
understanding the distributive bargaining involved in constituency-driven, economic 
issues. 
The basic elements of the two-level perspective formulated by Putnam (1993) are 
discussed here with a view to evaluating its appropriateness for the analytical 
framework of this thesis. He considers that previous frameworks had not moved 
beyond the observation that domestic factors influence international affairs. In his 
framework, variations in domestic circumstances become part of the specification of 
the bargaining ability of states, and trade-offs must be made between international 
and domestic goals. He describes the second set of domestic negotiations nested 
within the first level of international negotiations. At national level, domestic groups 
pressurise the government into adopting policies favourable to their interests, and 
state actors aim to construct coalitions to consolidate their power. At international 
level, national governments seek to maximise their ability to satisfy domestic 
pressures, while minimising any adverse consequences at the EU negotiating table. 
The framework can be viewed in terms of two playing boards, representing the 
domestic and international negotiating arenas, where a move on one board can trigger 
realignments on the other, and a package acceptable to both must be found. As the 
negotiator needs acceptance of the state's position domestically (level II), a 
ratification process is necessary in order to negotiate effectively at international level 
(level I), and to consolidate power in the domestic arena. Ratification refers to 'any 
decision-making process at Level II that is required to endorse or implement a Level I 
agreement, whether formally or informally' (Putnam, 1993, p. 438). The two-level 
approach thus regards negotiations at EU level as an attempt to find overlap between 
negotiated domestic 'win-sets' which can evolve during negotiations, where the win-
set is the set of all possible level I agreements that would gain the necessary majority 
support at level II (that would 'win'). According to this framework, the state retains 
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its full role as national gatekeeper between the international and domestic arenas 
throughout the process, indicating that domestic interests remain firmly nested within 
the national arena. Given the greater emphasis on the impact of domestic interests 
than a purely state-centric perspective, this approach seems to be a useful way in 
which to analyse relations between the government and domestic actors in EU 
member states in this thesis. 
The nature of the ratification of government policies in the domestic arena forms the 
crucial link between domestic and international politics, and is considered by Putnam 
(1993) to determine the level of state autonomy. The approach highlights key factors 
which are considered to have an impact on the policy process, such as the level of 
mobilisation of domestic groups, their know ledge of the issues, and the institutional 
arrangements for ratification. Although it is argued that a more restrictive ratification 
process in the domestic arena may have an impact on the state's position, domestic 
constraints are not necessarily regarded as reducing government autonomy. Issue-
linkage, side-payments and shaping the ratification procedure are all strategies which 
can be exploited by the state to retain control of the policy process. Domestic 
constraints can thus result in a smaller domestic win-set which can be used in the EU 
arena to gain a better deal (a strategy described as 'tying hands' by Putnam, 1993), 
illustrating the potential for manipulation of domestic constraints to increase state 
autonomy. Furthermore, international pressures may allow policies to be 'sold' 
domestically that would not have been feasible otherwise. The focus of the 
framework thus remains the role of the 'active state' (Ikenberry, 1986) as in the state-
centric approach. Putnam's view of the state could be compared with the notion of 
'creative statecraft' advocated by Moravcsik (1993b), which describes the use ofEU-
level rationales to enforce the government's policy decisions in the domestic arena, 
and with the concept of autonomy-enhancing actions vis-i\-vis domestic groups 
proposed by Nordlinger (1981). Key elements of the two-level game framework can 
also be found in the study of established policy communities, where the restricted, 
elite nature of bargaining is considered to limit access to certain privileged groups 
which ultimately increases state autonomy (for example Smith, 1993; and the study of 
'epistemic communities' of Haas, 1992). Putnam thus accepts and builds on the key 
tenets of the state-centric view of national governments, although placing greater 
emphasis on the constant bargaining relationship between the state and society, and 
on the state as gatekeeper between the domestic and international arenas. 
Given that it provides a means of exploring relations between the government and 
domestic actors, the two-level approach has formed a useful framework for the 
analysis of the ratification of policy decisions in the domestic arena (see Lehman and 
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McCoy, 1992; Goldstein, 1996). However, the use of the approach for the analysis of 
policy-making in EU member states is not unproblematic in view of the fact that the 
focus on domestic factors is inevitably too descriptive and ad hoc to form a clear 
analytical framework. Sanchez-Cuenca Rodriguez (1995, p. 12) criticises the lack of 
formalisation of the determinants of win-sets, which leads to concepts such as the 
linkage between issue areas (described by Putnam as synergistic issue linkage) 
becoming ad hoc illustrations of possible interaction rather than a systematic 
evaluation of their importance. Other theorists expose shortcomings of Putnam' s 
explanatory approach when applied to the analysis of the domestic negotiating arena. 
Frederick Mayer (1992) criticises the lack of clear definition of the win-set or 
bargaining set, which may only represent a win for a select number of powerful 
domestic actors rather than for the nation as a whole. Putnam does not specify the 
conditions required for different bargaining situations, nor the choice of the type of 
bargaining tactics used. Attempts have been made to develop a more precise 
evaluation of key concepts of the approach. Mayer focuses on clarifying the 
conditions under which domestic divisions are an asset or become a liability in 
international negotiations. He attempts to specify the key structural attributes of the 
bargain: the characteristics of domestic factions, the rules of the domestic game, and 
the nature of the external bargain (Mayer, 1992, p. 798). However, his focus is limited 
to one narrow issue, the strategic use of internal side-payments. Richard Friman 
(1993, p. 388) similarly seeks to provide 'a partial corrective' to the framework by 
focusing on two bargaining tactics, side-payments and issue redefinition, examining 
more precise! y the conditions under which particular tactics are used through drawing 
on bargaining and negotiation literature. Although such analyses raise key questions 
about the two-level game approach, they are limited to the reconsideration of one or 
two bargaining strategies in specific areas, and do not necessarily enhance the use of 
the model for other empirical cases. Furthermore, efforts to increase the precision of 
the framework by adding further levels to the analysis (for example attempts to 
specify three levels of interaction by Knopf, 1993, and Patterson, 1997) do not seem 
to increase its validity for the EU context. 
Despite limitations on the model's capacity to act as a full framework for EU 
decision-making, key questions about relations between the state and domestic actors 
which it addresses are significant for the exploration in this thesis. Even if the two-
level approach does not accurately specify how its key concepts can be applied in 
concrete cases, it is an important attempt to create a single theoretical framework for 
observations about the interaction between the domestic and international arenas 
(Knopf, 1993, pp. 601-3). The fuller incorporation of domestic politics, and the 
greater emphasis on the state's need to ratify policy decisions in the domestic arena, 
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means that it allows a more dynamic approach to the analysis of policy-making. If it 
is considered that the increased legitimacy of actors other than central government is 
an important issue in this analysis, other theoretical approaches may also enhance an 
understanding of key developments, hence the consideration of the multi-level 
governance perspective in the next section. 
The multi-level governance model: the state as arena 
The multi-level approach could be considered to represent the other end of the 
spectrum from traditional, realist frameworks as it assumes that the centre of political 
control no longer fully lies in national governments. A view of the state retaining full 
control over the domestic arena is considered one-dimensional, and in danger of 
failing to take sufficient account of changing networks of actors in the bargaining 
process (John, 1997, p. 137). The approach moves beyond the two-level game model, 
in that the latter still considers central government to be the key decision-maker in the 
policy process, and rests on the assumption that the state can no longer form an 
exclusive link between domestic politics and international bargaining given that 
control over European policy is shared with other key actors. The multi-level 
governance approach has been adopted by a core group of analysts, the main advocate 
being Gary Marks (1992, 1993; Marks and McAdam, 1996; Marks et al., 1996a; 
Marks et al., 1996b, Marks, 1996; Marks, 1997). Whereas the state-centric model 
argues that state decision-makers respond to political pressures that are nested within 
each state, the multi-level perspective goes beyond areas that are dominated by 
member states, and incorporates the increasing importance of actors at several 
territorial tiers within the EU and domestic arenas (Marks, 1993, p. 392). 
Marks et al. (1996a) provide a useful evaluation of the contending multi-level and 
state-centric models of EU governance. While accepting that state-centric approaches 
argue convincingly that the importance of the state executive is undeniable, multi-
level theorists consider that the sovereignty of states is being diluted in a process 
where authority and influence are increasingly shared across subnational, national, 
and supranationallevels. Although acknowledging the state's authoritative control in 
the policy-making process, the approach argues that a range of actors other than the 
government can now gain opportunities to participate. In brief, the locus of political 
control is considered to have changed. Kohler-Koch (1996, p. 371) describes the state 
as 'no longer an actor in its own right. Its role has changed from authoritative 
allocation and regulation 'from above' to the role of partner and mediator'. The state 
is thus considered as an arena where new patterns of interaction can develop, for 
example the establishment of networks which are able to resist the guidance of central 
government. Whereas theorists such as Moravscik (1993a, 1993b) argue that the state 
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monopolises the interface between the separated EU and domestic arenas, multi-level 
theorists consider that central government is no longer the exclusive channel for the 
representation of domestic interests. Their rejection of the separation between 
domestic and international politics is significant, and distinguishes the perspective 
from other approaches to the policy-making process. 
The appropriateness of key theoretical approaches is expected to vary according to the 
particular group of domestic actors and the policy area. Multi-level governance theory 
would seem to be at its most convincing in its focus on regional mobilisation as 
evidence of the potential challenge to the monopoly of central government over 
European policy (for example in Marks, 1992; Hooghe and Keating, 1994; Hooghe, 
1995). Marks (1992, p. 214) describes the regions as 'the new interlocutors of the 
Commission, a role that challenges the traditional monopoly of national governments 
to mediate between domestic and international affairs'. Charlie Jeffery (1997, pp. 
217-8) also focuses on the increasing importance of the 'Third level', namely the 
involvement of subnational governments in external matters within their internal 
competencies. The potential for the creation of 'a new political game' (Keating, 1997, 
p. 26), as a result of devolution of power to the subnationallevel, is thus a key theme 
in the multi-level literature. Regional involvement is considered dependent on the 
level of decentralisation at domestic level which will not occur uniformly across the 
EU, and insufficient comparative research exists to evaluate the developments in 
different member states. Participation may be expected to be restricted to a select sub-
set of regional actors, which limits the applicability of the multi-level approach. 
Furthermore, multi-level theorists refer to eo-decision-making across several tiers of 
government without always considering the role of non-governmental actors; this has 
resulted in a neglect of the influence of other key domestic actors such as trade 
unions, business associations and interest groups. The urgent need for more empirical 
case studies to demonstrate the changed balance of relations between the state and a 
range of domestic groups in European policy-making is evident (Grande, 1996, p. 
333), and this thesis demonstrates that the gap in empirical research is particularly 
significant in the case of Spain. 
The multi-level approach highlights the growing access to the policy process of key 
domestic actors, as illustrated by the evaluation of Hooghe (1995) of the formal and 
informal channels used by regional authorities to promote their interests in the 
European arena. She concludes that institutionalised channels are generally more 
effective access points to the policy process than informal mechanisms, and that these 
are mostly used by an elite of regional actors who have a greater capacity to exploit 
the opportunities offered. The impact of key supranational institutions on the policy 
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process is also highlighted, for example the entrepreneurial role of the European 
Commission (hereafter, Commission), and its encouragement of a multi-level model 
of policy-making involving regional authorities (Hooghe, 1996b, 1997). Marks and 
Doug McAdam (1996) refer to the level of opportunity for domestic actors at EU 
level, or the EU opportunity structure, as an important determinant of the level of 
domestic input. The concept of the political opportunity structure is a notion 
developed by Herbert Kitschelt (1986) to refer to the level of access to national 
policy-making for key domestic actors (in his case, protest groups). Key studies by 
multi-level theorists provide illustrations of the changing opportunity structure which 
allows increasing regional access, for example the widespread analysis of the 
principle of partnership within the 1988 reform of the structural funds (see Chapter 6). 
Specific cases of regional mobilisation in the literature strengthen the case for a multi-
level framework, one example being the study of Paul McAleavey and lames 
Mitchell (1994) of the lobby organisation for economically declining industrial 
regions which pressurised EU institutions to maintain existing levels of funding. 
Accounts of enhanced regional mobilisation are an attempt to demonstrate that it is 
with a multi-level perspective rather than a state-centric approach that the evidence 
presented lies most comfortably. 
Despite the emphasis on the increasing participation of subnational actors, theorists 
are obliged to acknowledge the importance in all countries of the central, moderating 
influence of the state in reconciling conflicting regional interests (for example, 
Bachtler, 1997, p. 89). Furthermore, a multi-level governance approach to areas other 
than cohesion policy could not be expected to come to such firm conclusions, which 
is an important consideration in the analysis of other policy settings in this thesis. 
Multi-level theorists have recognised that, even in the area of cohesion policy, 
regional mobilisation could be considered largely symbolic. It is significant that, in 
the 1993 reforms of the structural funds, member states were considered to have 
regained much of the autonomy that they had formerly lost vis-a-vis subnational 
authorities (Hooghe and Keating, 1994 ), which casts doubt on the greatly increased 
impact of regional actors. Although the transformation of the European policy process 
outlined is plausible, clear evidence to support arguments for the development of a 
multi-level game is not always presented. The perspective is thus in danger of 
becoming more ad hoc and anecdotal than systematic, and its use as a tool for 
analysing EU decision-making is therefore not unproblematic. A study of regional 
influence on EU funding found it was difficult to provide firm evidence of the 
relation between financial resources and regional representation in Brussels (Marks et 
al., 1996b). Similarly, McAleavey and Mitchell (1994) acknowledge that the actual 
impact of regional lobbying is impossible to determine, which highlights the gap 
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between the illustration of increased domestic mobilisation, and evidence of its actual 
impact on the policy process. Multi-level theorists themselves admit that 'apart from a 
generalized presumption of increasing mobilization across levels, they provide no 
systematic set of expectations about which actors should mobilize and why' (Marks et 
al., 1996b, p. 42), thus indicating that a focus on piece-meal, domestic factors, rather 
than overall, systemic developments, is inevitably less rigorous. Similarly, a review of 
studies of European integration in the 1990s considered that 'promoters of the notion 
of multi-level governance need to explicate the term in more detail, and need to 
formulate propositions, explicit assumptions, causal and other relationships. In short, 
they have to provide all the stuff theory is made of' (Christiansen, 1997, p. 487). In 
view of the lack of clear evidence of an impact on the role of the state of increased 
domestic mobilisation, many theorists are critical of the claims of the multi-level 
approach. The role and power of national governments have been re-established, even 
in policy areas which frequently have been used to strengthen the multi-level case. 
For example, Andy Smith (I 995, pp. 365-9) describes the key roles retained by the 
central state in the area of structural funding. 
The resilience of state political and bureaucratic elites cannot be underestimated, 
particularly during the policy initiation and decision-making phases. Multi-level 
theorists do not assume that increasing regional participation is a straightforward 
process which directly undermines state authority, and they acknowledge the key role 
played by central states which have 'proven adept at retaining their "gatekeeper" 
status' (Pollack, 1995, p. 363). Redistributive decisions taken at EU level are 
generally recognised as side-payments in larger intergovernmental bargains, but it 
becomes easier to illustrate a clear development of the multi-level game during the 
implementation phase, although dependent on the nature of the institutional structures 
established at domestic level. Key advocates of the approach argue that the 
negotiation of EU Treaties is only a starting point for analysis, and not representative 
of EU policy-making in view of the increasing involvement of domestic actors in the 
subsequent policy process (Marks, 1993). The multi-level perspective maintains that 
an examination of European policy-making cannot begin and end with 
intergovernmentalist analysis. It may thus be expected to be relevant to the Spanish 
case at stages of the policy process when full state autonomy cannot be assumed. 
Beyond the nation state? An evaluation of key theoretical insights 
Key differences distinguish the three analytical approaches considered in this thesis. 
A purely state-centric approach differs from the other perspectives on account of its 
static view of the policy process, which assumes the state's ultimate control 
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regardless of key changes in the domestic arena. While the two-level game model also 
argues that the state is able to retain its autonomy as gatekeeper between the domestic 
and EU arenas, it pays greater attention to the state's aggregation of domestic 
preferences. This is considered more problematic where strong, unambiguous 
domestic demands exist. According to the multi-level approach, the state no longer 
has the authority to regulate the policy process from above, but is obliged to share 
control over policy decisions with a range of actors at domestic and EU levels. The 
multi-level perspective could thus be realistically viewed as supplementing the state-
centric approach with a range of actors and interactive processes which a statist 
perspective regards as relatively unimportant. The three analytical insights can thus be 
seen to have divergent views of the roles of the state and key domestic actors in 
policy-making. 
All three approaches would accept the conclusion drawn by Andy Smith (1995, p. 
369) that 'I'Etat n'est certainement pas mort, mais ii est indiscutablement different' 
(the state is certainly not dead, but it is undoubtedly different), thus acknowledging 
key changes over time in the nature of the policy process. However, their concept of 
the actual impact of the changes on the roles of the state and domestic actors differs, 
particularly with regard to the extent to which responsibilities have remained 
exclusively those of the state, or whether key domestic actors can also be involved in 
the policy process. They hence have different views of the five roles of the state 
considered by Smith (1995, pp. 365-9) to allow it to retain its control over policy-
making, which are outlined here: 
• an institutional role as participant in EU-level negotiations; 
• an informational role as the direct recipient of information from EU sources; 
• an intellectual role, having accumulated a high level of expertise in specific policy 
areas; 
• a mediating role between key actors in the EU and domestic arenas; 
• a symbolic role which allows it to use the 'national interest' to place its own 
priorities firmly on the agenda. 
Multiple points of access to the policy process are assumed by the multi-level 
approach (outlined by Morton Grodzins as 'multiple crack' in Marks et al., 1996b, p. 
45), whereas two-level, and especially state-centric, approaches have a more 
restricted view of access to policy-making for domestic actors. Multi-level theorists 
would claim that changes in the policy process have enabled key domestic actors such 
as regional authorities to expand the scope of their competencies, for example as a 
result of a higher level of resources at regional level, and increased direct information 
exchange between the regions and EU institutions. In contrast, a purely state-centric 
approach regards the state's institutional and symbolic roles as a clear indication of its 
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ultimate control over policy-making, leading to the conclusion that limited 
opportunities exist for actors other than the state to gain access to the policy process. 
This limitation is also acknowledged by the two-level perspective which focuses on 
the mediating or gatekeeping role retained by the state, while recognising the 
potential influence of strong domestic interests on the government's position. The 
varying approaches of the three analytical insights to the key issues of access, 
resources and control addressed in this thesis indicate the different contributions they 
can make to the analysis. 
Towards a framework for analysis: Spain and the EC/EU 
The use of a single theoretical insight does not seem to provide an adequate 
framework for analysing the complex and changing nature of the policy process. This 
thesis considers that aspects of each perspective are required to analyse Spanish 
European policy in order to capture the dynamic nature of policy-making which 
previously has been largely neglected in the case of Spain. In this context, a key 
objective is to specify the conditions under which particular theoretical approaches 
are most valid for the analysis. 
A potentially eclectic approach is made possible through the use of the concept of the 
political opportunity structure at domestic and EU levels. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the opportunity structure describes the varying level of opportunity for actors 
other than the state to participate in policy-making. The concept was developed by 
Kitschelt (1986, p. 58) to describe the 'specific configurations of resources, 
institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization .. .', thus 
highlighting the key research questions in this thesis of the degree of access to policy-
making for domestic actors, their capacity to exploit the opportunities for increased 
involvement, and the extent to which this can be controlled by the state (see Chapter 
1). This framework enables the analysis to bring together the differing views of the 
role of the state and key domestic actors adopted by the three theoretical insights into 
a single framework. It does this by identifying sets of factors or conditions which test 
the extent to which domestic actors can gain access to the policy process, described as 
the degree to which the opportunity structure is open or closed. The focus on the 
opportunity structure is then used to determine which analytical approach is most 
valid for the analysis, depending on the degree of access or openness to policy-
making for domestic actors. 
The key conditions identified are considered those which best investigate relations 
between the state and domestic actors for the purposes of this thesis. The roles of the 
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state set out by Smith (1995, pp. 365-9) form a basis for identifying key factors, 
namely the state's participation in EU negotiations (institutional role), its monopoly 
over information from EU sources (informational role), its high level of expertise in 
specific policy areas (intellectual role), its role as mediator or gatekeeper between the 
EU and domestic arenas (mediating role), and its capacity to set the national agenda 
(symbolic role). However, the conditions outlined here also reflect the focus of this 
thesis on the potential input of domestic actors to the policy process, thus seeking to 
adopt a more dynamic approach which allows for the involvement of domestic groups 
in roles formerly exclusively those of the state. 
The institutional, gatekeeping and symbolic roles described by Smith are those most 
easily retained by the state, but are considered here to depend on key conditions 
influencing the nature of the opportunity structure, such as the extent to which the 
government can use political or economic rationales to legitimise policy decisions 
(condition 1 ), the size of the government majority (condition 2) and the level of 
decentralisation or the level of competencies of regional authorities (condition 3). 
Similarly, the extent to which the state can retain its informational and intellectual 
roles depends on the level of skills and resources of key domestic actors (condition 4), 
and on the degree of knowledge of EU policies in the domestic arena (condition 5), 
which is closely related to the length of EU membership. The identification of key 
sets of conditions (see Figure 2.1) seeks to determine the nature of the opportunity 
structure. 
Figure 2.1 Sets of conditions expected to influence the domestic opportunity 
structure 
1. rationale behind government policies: political/symbolic or 
economic/technical; 
2. size of government majority/capacity to enforce policy decisions 
domestically; 
3. level of decentralisation/centralisation of government; 
4. level of skills and resources of domestic actors; 
5. level of knowledge of the EU of domestic actors. 
The general sets of conditions in Figure 2.1 can then be adapted to the particular 
focus of this thesis, namely the case of Spain during the EC accession process and 
during EC/EU membership. During the EC accession negotiations, an overwhelming 
consensus existed in favour of the political rationale for EC entry. It might thus be 
hypothesised that this would facilitate a high level of autonomy for the state which 
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could justify policy decisions by referring to Spain's need for integration within the 
European democratic framework. Furthermore, the majority of the ruling party in 
government in Spain from 1982-86 would be expected to enhance its capacity to 
withstand domestic pressures, which was likely to be more difficult for the weaker 
1979-82 government. These factors formed key underlying themes in much of the 
literature on the accession period which focused predominantly on the role of the 
state. Although the regions began to attain increasing levels of competencies during 
the 1980s, the decentralisation process was still at an early stage. The state's key 
institutional role was thus not expected to be challenged by regional actors during the 
accession period. Furthermore, the weakness of civil society in the newly established 
democracy, another key theme in the existing literature, meant that interest groups 
would not be likely to gain a significant input to the policy process. This is linked to 
the fifth condition, namely the low level of awareness about the implications of 
accession, and the low demand in Spanish society for information about EC entry, 
which is also expected to close potential opportunities for domestic involvement. 
These sets of conditions, shown in Figure 2.2, are expected to lead to a closed 
opportunity structure and a high level of autonomy for the state during the accession 
negotiations. 
Figure 2.2 Sets of conditions during Spain's EC accession negotiations expected 
to encourage a closed domestic opportunity structure 
1. political rationale for EC accession which has a capacity to overcome 
economic or sectoral opposition; 
2. strong, majoritarian PSOE government from 1982; 
3. process of decentralisation still at an early stage; 
4. lobbying process yet to be established in a newly consolidated 
democracy/low level of resources of domestic actors; 
5. low level of demand for information about the EC. 
It can be hypothesised that sets of conditions existing in Spanish society during the 
EC accession negotiations, which facilitated broadly unopposed, centrally made 
decisions, would not necessarily continue to be prevalent during membership. An 
opening of tbe opportunity structure for key domestic groups following accession 
might be expected to result in a reduced level of autonomy for the state. The literature 
generally fails to analyse the impact of the changed domestic context on relations 
between domestic actors and the state during Spain's EC/EU membership, although 
highlighting key developments in Spanish society. For example, economic rationales 
could be expected to gain in importance following the achievement of the key 
political objective of Spain's incorporation into the Community. Furthermore, the 
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potential for considerable changes in the nature of relations between the state and 
domestic actors existed in view of the loss of majority of the PSOE government in 
1993, the advances made towards a decentralised state, and the resurgence of group 
interests in the newly established democracy. An increasing awareness of European 
policy amongst domestic actors during EU membership would also be assumed. 
Figure 2.3 sets out the factors expected to lead to an opening of the political 
opportunity structure, and to changing roles for the state and domestic actors. 
Figure 2.3 Changed sets of conditions during Spain's EC/EU membership 
expected to open the domestic opportunity structure 
1. balance in favour of economic over political rationales for policy 
decisions; 
2. loss of PSOE government majority in 1993; 
3. process of decentralisation at a more advanced stage; 
4. development of a more established lobbying process/increased level of 
resources of domestic actors; 
5. increase in demand for information about the EC/EU. 
However, even if it is hypothesised that a more open opportunity structure has 
developed in the domestic arena, access of domestic actors to the policy process 
cannot be assumed at all stages of the process and in all policy areas. Marks and 
McAdam (1996, p. 258) argue that the relative structural access a group has to EU 
institutions and the general policy receptivity of the EU shape the level of constraints 
and opportunities for any domestic group, described as the EU opportunity structure. 
Although this analysis focuses on the domestic context and regards opportunities at 
EU level as a constant factor, the degree of openness of the EU opportunity structure 
is considered to vary according to the particular policy area and, within specific areas, 
on the stage of the policy process and the type of decision. 
Policy areas 
Risse-Kappen (1996, pp. 65-6) argues that the development of networks of local, 
regional and national actors depends on the degree of Europeanisation or 
institutionalisation of the policy sector. A higher level of institutionalisation in a 
specific policy area may thus indicate an evolution towards a more open opportunity 
structure. Moravscik (1993a) also emphasises the variability of political mobilisation 
according to issue area, arguing that trade liberalisation issues involving significant 
costs may lead to a tight constraint on government policy as a result of strong 
producer interests, in contrast to areas such as social policy where the government has 
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greater autonomy in view of the relatively weak and less unified domestic interests. 
These factors are taken into account in the analysis of distinct policy settings in this 
thesis, for example in the study of fisheries where sectoral interests would be 
expected to exert a strong pressure on the government (see Chapter 8). Distinctions 
may be drawn between redistributive issues where broad gains and losses are 
negotiated by governments, for example the Spanish government's negotiation of 
structural funding at EU level (see Chapter 5), and distributive issues which 'are the 
stuff of functional politics, of sectoral interests cooperating with national and 
European administrators' (Wallace, 1996, p. 446). Governments' definition of issues 
could be viewed as a key determinant of the access of domestic actors to the policy 
process. However, Wallace (1996, p. 452) considers that 'it is possible for national 
governments to hold the gate between domestic and international politics only for a 
shrinking number of policy areas', adding that 'governments thus have to decide 
which issues they choose to define as key to the preservation of sovereignty, 
autonomy, or national idiosyncrasy'. The state's control over the definition of the 
national interest cannot therefore be assumed in all policy areas, and may also depend 
on the stage of the process. 
Stages in the policy process 
The degree of domestic participation is likely to vary across the distinct phases of 
policy-making which this thesis seeks to analyse. Policy-making stages have been 
identified as policy initiation, decision-making, implementation and adjudication 
(Marks et al., 1996a). The state may be capable of retaining a high level of autonomy 
during the policy initiation and decision-making phases when minimal access to the 
process exists for domestic actors, but the implementation stage generally relies on 
the participation of a wide range of actors other than the state. Fioretos (1997, p. 300) 
considers that adding implementation to Moravscik's model (1993a) would 'further 
undermine the intergovernmentalist assumption of state centrality'. The variation of 
the opportunity structure according to the broader phases of policy-making provides a 
parallel to the focus on a lower common unit of analysis in the policy process, the 
decision type. 
Decision types 
This analysis considers the extent of involvement of domestic actors in the 
formulation of different decision types. These can be identified as history-making 
decisions at the super-systemic level which transcend the day-to-day policy process, 
policy-setting decisions at the systemic level, and policy-shaping decisions within 
individual sectors (see Peterson, 1995). A clear distinction can thus be made at the 
outset of this thesis between history-making decisions such as Spain's accession 
35 
negotiations, and other decisions less likely to be dominated by the state. Multi-level 
governance models would seem to be less suitable for the analysis of history-making 
decisions, which are generally determined through interstate bargaining. However, as 
argued by Peterson (1995), the state-centric approach loses its explanatory power 
when applied to policy-shaping decisions in particular issue areas where actors other 
than the state are actively involved. Decisions at the meso level are often influenced 
by the need to ensure that policies can be effectively implemented, thus needing the 
input of key domestic actors. The approach adopted for the analysis of Spain thus 
takes into account the varying constellations of actors involved in distinct decision 
types, which are expected to require different analytical perspectives. However, clear 
divisions cannot be drawn between them, as illustrated by the fact that policy-shaping 
decisions frequently facilitate an explanation of history-making decisions taken by the 
state (Cram, 1997, p. 27). 
It is thus important that, in addition to its key focus on the changing domestic context 
for policy-making in Spain, this analysis also takes account of the potentially different 
roles for the state and key domestic actors according to the nature of the EU policy 
area, the stage of the policy process, and the type of decision. 
Conclusions 
Risse-Kappen (1996) specifies key conditions which determine whether the EU 
policy process is characterised by intergovernmental bargaining, or by a model more 
consistent with a multi-level governance perspective. The use of the concept of 
opportunity structures at domestic and EU levels in this thesis builds upon these 
insights. Figure 2.4 illustrates the potential pattern of the opportunity structures at 
domestic and EU levels, thus attempting to characterise in greater depth the sets of 
conditions in the domestic and EU arenas which determine the nature of relations 
between the state and domestic actors. 
It is hypothesised that the closed opportunity structure at domestic level, as during the 
EC accession negotiations (see Figure 2.2), would enhance the state's autonomy and 
limit the involvement of key domestic actors. The level of openness of the 
opportunity structure at EU level is thus not relevant while the domestic opportunity 
structure remains closed (represented by 2 and 4 in Figure 2.4). A state-centric 
perspective may thus be expected to provide the most valid approach for an analysis 
of the closed opportunity structure where the high autonomy of the state can generally 
be assumed. 
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Figure 2.4 Domestic and EU opportunity structures 
Opportunity structures Domestic/ Closed Domestic/Opening 
EO/Opening 2 I 
EU/Ciosed 4 3 
Adapted from Marks and McAdam (1996, p. 258) 
The opening of the domestic opportunity structure during EU membership (see Figure 
2.3) is not expected to reduce the state's autonomy in the domestic arena where 
opportunities for domestic input are limited at EU level, for example when the nature 
of the policy area, the stage of the process, or the decision type militate against 
domestic participation, that is when the EU opportunity structure tends to be closed 
(represented by 3 in Figure 2.4). This changing domestic context for policy-making 
during EU membership may be expected to lie most comfortably with the two-level 
game approach, which takes account of the potential influence on the state's 
bargaining position of increasingly strong domestic interests, but considers that the 
state retains its role as gatekeeper between the EU and domestic arenas where direct 
access to policy-making at EU level is limited. 
A more open opportunity structure at EU level, for example during the stage of 
implementation involving policy-shaping decisions, in addition to a relatively open 
domestic opportunity structure during EU membership, may be expected to increase 
the involvement of key domestic actors (represented by I in Figure 2.4). The 
evaluation of the changed context for decision-making may require an approach 
where the state acted more as an arena than an autonomous actor, which is consistent 
with the role of the state advocated by multi-level theorists. The implementation stage 
may thus be clarified through using an analytical insight which takes greater account 
of the potential opportunities for domestic involvement. 
The focus of this thesis on the opening of opportunity structures does not indicate an 
assumption that the role of the state is significantly reduced by the changing context. 
Although changes in the configuration of conditions in the domestic arena may 
reshape the nature of the bargaining process, both the state-centric and two-level 
perspectives rest on the assumption that the state would retain, and even be able to 
enhance, its control of the policy process during EU membership. In fact, central 
government may encourage a more open political opportunity structure, either when 
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this strengthens its bargaining position at EU level ('tying hands' strategy outlined by 
Putnam, 1993), or when it is dependent on the resources of domestic actors, for 
example during the implementation phase. Furthermore, although multi-level 
theorists consider that evidence of increased regional and sectoral participation 
generally indicates a clear influence on the level of state autonomy, a state-centric 
approach would not consider greater domestic mobilisation to have a significant 
impact on the state's role. 
Relations between the Spanish state and key domestic actors are analysed in Chapter 
3 on the EC accession negotiations, and in Chapter 4 on EC/EU membership, which 
use the sets of conditions determining the nature of the domestic political opportunity 
structure as a basis for the analysis. A reassessment of traditional approaches applied 
to the study of the Spanish state may be necessary in view of the potentially changing 
policy-making context. Detailed empirical case studies in different policy settings, 
namely cohesion policy and fisheries, then seek to evaluate the impact on state 
autonomy of developments in the decision-making process in selected areas. 
Conclusions on the role of the state are expected to be different for the two case 
studies given the key factors distinguishing the policy areas (see Chapter 1). 
Theoretical insights are used to enhance the understanding of relations between the 
state and domestic actors at different stages of the process, and for different decision 
types within these policy settings. The nature of the domestic and EU opportunity 
structures can thus be fully explored in empirical research on the Spanish case using 
the framework established in this chapter. 
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Chapter3 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SPANISH STATE AND DOMESTIC ACTORS 
DURING THE EC ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS 
The focus of the chapter is Spain's negotiations for accession to the European 
Community from 1979-86. In addition to studying the role of the Spanish state at EC 
level, it examines the input to the negotiating process of domestic actors in Spain. 
Most analyses of the accession negotiations rest on the premise of the overwhelming 
consensus in Spanish society regarding EC entry and the high level of autonomy and 
initiative retained by the state, largely dismissing any significant impact on the 
formulation of the government's negotiating position of the domestic arena. This 
assumption is tested to determine whether a less state-centric approach, lending 
greater importance to the interaction between the EC and domestic arenas as in the 
two-level game approach, allows a more complete analysis of the accession process. 
The potential for the participation of a wide range of actors in addition to the state in 
the formulation of the Spanish bargaining position is examined. Conclusions are 
drawn on the role of the state and its relations with key domestic actors in the context 
of Spain's EC accession. 
The main task of the newly elected parliament in 1977 was to draw up Spain's first 
democratic Constitution since 1931. Although the 1978 Constitution integrated the 
powers of executive and legislative, and established a firmly democratic framework, 
the primacy of the state executive was still unquestioned in Spanish society. 
However, the Constitution also led to significant changes in the longer term, namely 
provisions for the development of a decentralised state of seventeen regions or 
Autonomous Communities, and the restoration of trade unions. Representative trade 
unions, other than protected elite groups described as a 'thoroughly parasitical 
bureaucracy' (Giner and Sevil!a, 1984, p. 117), had beeri banned under the Franco 
dictatorship, while a system of official representation was developed where only large 
firms and banks enjoyed privileged links with central government. The 
institutionalisation and legitimisation of i~terest groups was thus far less developed 
than in other European countries, a consequence of the fact that weak domestic 
groups needed what Juan Linz (1981, p. 367) has described as 'prolonged periods of 
political stability' in order to create the conditions necessary for the organisation of 
their interests. 
The Spanish transition was managed by reaching a series of agreements between the 
main political and social forces, for example the Moncloa Pact signed in October 
1977 by all major political parties. The consensual style of politics is illustrated by the 
. I 
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series of pacts between the government, employers and trade unions, which led to a 
more corporatist framework in Spanish society. However, the pacts have been 
described as 'a series of elite bargains among party leaders, with little public 
participation' (Keating, 1993, p. 317), and did not therefore have a significant impact 
on the prevailing political system. This historical legacy, described as atypical by one 
Spanish analyst (Subirats, 1992), forms an essential base for an examination of 
relations between the government and domestic actors during the accession period. 
EC application 
Following his triumph in the Spanish Civil War, General Francisco Franco promoted 
the isolation of Spain from the international arena to enforce his own nationalist rule. 
Faced with a weakening Spanish economy, he later sought to re-establish diplomatic 
relations with the West, illustrated by the signing of a defence treaty with the United 
States (US) in 1953, and Spain's entry into the United Nations in 1955. Political and 
economic policy was gradually liberalised under the influence of the technocrat 
economists from the Catholic lay order, Opus Dei, in his administration. Over the 
following years, the influx into Spain of foreign investment, the increase in number of 
tourists, and the growing migration of Spanish workers to Western Europe allied to 
greater access to foreign ideas, and the end of Spain's isolation. 
The Franco regime applied for associate membership of the Community in 1962, but 
the application was rejected due to the undemocratic nature of the Spanish state'. A 
limited preferential agreement between the EC and Spain, signed in 1970, was the 
furthest advance that the Community would contemplate. Franco attempted to limit 
European influence to economic development until the end of his term, but this 
restriction of influence was problematic, especially when opposition forces knew that 
Spain's lack of democratic credentials was the reason for the EC' s rejection of its 
application for associate membership. Although opposition parties were still initially 
keen to develop links with other parts of the world such as Latin America, the 
majority viewed incorporation into the European framework as the only way to bury 
definitively the Francoist legacy and Spain's isolation. 'The idea of Europe would be 
incomplete without a reference to the presence of the Spaniard' according to King 
Juan Carlos I following Franco's death in November 1975 (Preston and Smyth, 1984, 
p. 24). The political importance of Spain's EC entry was fully illustrated by PM 
Calvo Sotelo's investiture speech on 18 February 1981 when he declared: 'quiero 
1 According to the Birklebach report of the European Parliament of 1962, a state without democratic 
legitimation could not aspire to be admitted into the EC. 
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reafirmar aquf el canicter eminentemente polftico de nuestra opci6n europea que 
constituye, ante todo, un objetivo hist6rico de primera magnitud' (I want to reaffirm 
here the eminently political character of our European option which constitutes, above 
all, an historical objective of the greatest importance) (Ministerio de Asuntos 
Exteriores, 1981, p. 104). As well as the clear objective of EC accession, Calvo 
Sotelo's government attained Spain's entry into NATO, which was approved by a 
simple majority in the Spanish parliament in May 1982. 
The Spanish Foreign Minister, Marcelino Oreja, under PM Adolfo Smirez in the UCD 
government, submitted Spain's application for EC membership on 28 July 1977. On 5 
February 1979, formal negotiations were opened following the Commission's 
Opinion (European Commission, 1978b) supporting Spain's accession in November 
1978. Spain's position seemed unproblematic. All political parties were in agreement 
with the government that 'no economically viable or politically suitable alternative to 
the European Community existed' (Pollack and Hunter, 1987, p. 138). Not only was 
Spain economically tied to the Community (in 197 6, 46% of Spain's total exports in 
value terms went to EC countries and 38% of Spain's imports came from the 
Community) (European Trends, no. 54, February 1978, p. 16), but EC entry was vital 
politically to consolidate the newly formed democratic framework. However, 
negotiations were never likely to be easy considering that the negotiation of the 1970 
preferential agreement had dragged on for eight years. The 1970 accord gave a 60% 
EC tariff reduction to Spain on industrial goods in exchange, with certain exceptions, 
for a 25% cut on Spanish industrial tariffs. The negotiation of a more balanced 
industrial agreement, involving EC concessions on Spanish agricultural exports, was 
expected to be problematic from the outset in view of the threat to existing markets, 
and the Spanish insistence on easier access to satisfy its agricultural sector. The 
application was made several months earlier than expected as the government feared 
an increase in the domestic arena of 'hesitations among sections of industry and 
commerce about the wisdom of early entry into the EEC' (The Guardian, 19 July 
1977). Political pressures in member states such as France and Italy were already 
mounting from agricultural lobbies which feared the Spanish threat to their fruit, wine 
and vegetable markets. PM Smirez was also concerned to keep up with progress made 
by fellow applicants Greece and Portugal, which were viewed as more 
straightforward than Spain by EC member states because of the lesser threat to 
existing agricultural markets. 
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Framework for negotiations 
The Council of Ministers authorised the opening of negotiations on 19 December 
1978 following its approval of the Commission opinion (European Commission, 
1978b) setting the framework for the talks. The Spanish and Portuguese applications 
confronted the EC with a set of complex issues, both in terms of specific sectoral 
areas which would cause difficulties for the EC as a whole, and for some member 
states in particular, and more generally in terms of the enlargement of the 
Community. 
European Community 
The Commission was obliged to perform the role of 'honest broker between the 
member states' (Preston, 1997, p. 72), and had responsibility for setting the agenda 
and preparing the technical detail of bargaining positions. Negotiations took place at 
ministerial level within the Council of Ministers, where the requirement of unanimity 
amongst EC member states acted as a serious limit on the progress of the talks. 
However, the formal framework established for negotiations was very different in 
practice, described by former Foreign Minister Monl.n as: 
tedioso, detallista, carente de espectacularidad. De hecho, muchas veces 
Ios ajustes en un capftulo se alcanzaban a traves de un intermediario de la 
Comisi6n o del Consejo que nos trafa a nuestro despacho un 
papei.. .. Solamente habfa sesiones plenarias cuando se habfa logrado el 
acuerdo. 
(tedious, detailed, unspectacular. In fact, adjustments to a chapter were 
frequently made through an intermediary from the Commission or Council 
who brought a paper to our office ... There were only plenary sessions when 
agreement had been reached (Moran, 1990, pp. 440-1). 
The development of bilateral relations, particularly with key member states such as 
France and Germany, informal bargaining with high-ranking EC officials, and linkage 
across issue areas generally occurred outside the main negotiating arena. The attitude 
of key EC member states determined the pace of the talks, the position of France 
having been described as 'pivotal in determining the way forward' (Preston, 1997, p. 
75). Felipe Gonzalez frequently maximised diplomatic efforts to speed up the 
negotiating process, for example in meetings with the German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl where he secured Germany's support for Spain's EC accession as a pre-
condition of NATO membership (Preston, 1997, p. 79). 
Central government 
The institutional framework initially established for the accession negotiations was a 
Ministry for Relations with the EC, responsible for the co-ordination of the Spanish 
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administration and for the dissemination of information in Spanish society. The 
Ministry was characterised by its transitory nature and its relatively simple structure, 
as it was intended only to support and co-ordinate other ministries (Westendorp, 
1980, p. 315). The small team of key officials sought to safeguard a unity of action in 
Spain's external relations. The Ministry for Relations with the EC enjoyed close 
relations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (known as the Trinidad and Santa Cruz 
respectively on account of their locations). However, the division between the 
ministries caused what former Minister for Relations with the EC as well as PM, 
Calvo Sotelo (1990, pp. 145-6), described as a 'malestar profundo' (deep uneasiness) 
amongst Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, who were concerned about not being 
fully involved in developments at EC level. In parliamentary debates at the time, 
government officials denied any tension between the two ministries; in a debate on 
EC accession in 1979, Foreign Minister Oreja referred to the establishment of clear 
responsibilities for departments, and to the existence of a Co-ordinating Committee 
(Consejo Coordinador) including representatives of both ministries in the case of 
borderline issues (Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de Diputados, hereafter Congress, 
no. 21, 27 June 1979, p. 1084). In the same 1979 debate, Calvo Sotelo highlighted the 
greater likelihood of tensions between the Ministry for Relations with the EC and 
sectora1 ministries eager to defend their own particular interests in negotiations 
(Congress, no. 21, 27 June 1979, p. 1094). The Ministry's seat in the government 
cabinet enhanced its level of autonomy and authority in the EC arena2, indicating the 
importance of the direct link between the Presidency of the government and the 
Ministry during the early accession negotiations. 
When Calvo Sotelo took over from Suarez as PM in 1981, he replaced the Ministry 
with a Secretariat of State for Relations with the EC within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. UCD government officials did not approve of the reform, describing it as 
politically motivated, unconnected with its actual functioning, and not necessarily 
positive for the government's negotiating strategy3. They considered that the Ministry 
had adopted a horizontal view of the process, which would not be possible when it 
lost its ministerial status4. It was difficult for the Secretariat of State for Relations 
with the EC to retain the same political weight and autonomy when control of the 
negotiations was passed over to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although its key role 
of co-ordination was largely the same. 
2rnterview with former official of Ministry for Relations with the EC, Madrid, 24 May 1996. 
3rnterview with official of Secretariat of State for Foreign Policy and the EU and former official of 
Ministry for Relations with the EC, Madrid, 29 May 1996. 
4rnterview with former official of Ministry for Relations with the EC, Madrid, 28 May 1996. 
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Negotiating EC accession was a centralised process involving a group of senior civil 
servants whose autonomy was enhanced by the predominant role of the executive in 
the Spanish policy-making process. Officials took decisions by consensus, the 
approval of the Presidency being required for the final decision (Zapico Goiii, 1995, 
p. 52). When the Co-ordinating Committee could not reach a decision, agreement on 
sensitive EC issues was ultimately attained in the government's cabinet committee 
(Comisi6n Delegada). Monin (1990, p. 126) denied that the Presidency (commonly 
known as the Moncloa because of its location) tried to bypass the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and thus undermine its importance. However, most officials acknowledge the 
key role played by post-Franco PMs in foreign policy, particularly in the case of 
Gonzalez. His keen interest in European affairs, and the high level of expertise of his 
international affairs team, were key factors enhancing a predominant role for the 
executive, and particularly the Presidency, in the policy process. In 1984, Moran 
showed his full support for the strong position of the PM publicly, declaring that 
'Felipe Gonzalez es un presidente fuerte con un Gobierno fuerte y es 16gico que se 
dedique a fondo a la polftica exterior' (Felipe Gonzalez is a strong President with a 
strong government and it is logical that foreign policy is a key focus for him) 
(Interview in La Vanguardia, 21 July 1984, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1984, 
p. 161 ). Regular dialogue between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency 
was assured by key individuals in the Presidency's international affairs team (Moran, 
1990, p. 126). 
Although the 1978 Constitution theoretically enhanced the role of the parliament in 
foreign policy, thus making external relations less the exclusive domain of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as during the Franco era (Pollack and Hunter, 1987, pp. 
1 04-17), little influence on Spain's international affairs was exerted by the parliament 
in practice (see Chapter 4 for role of parliament during EC/EU membership). The role 
of key ministries was also limited as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted on 
overall control of the accession process because of its higher level of expertise in EC 
negotiation, although other ministries argued for a greater degree of input when 
decision-making was in technical and economic areas. Mon1n (1990, p. 440) referred 
to the fact that key ministries were increasingly keen to intervene personally at EC 
level as negotiations progressed, whereas, formerly, they had been content to play an 
active part in the formulation of the negotiating position in the domestic arena. 
Some politicians regarded the reform of policy-making structures made imperative by 
the demands of the accession process as a positive development in view of the 
relatively antiquated structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the lack of unity 
between the PM and the Ministry, and the duplication of roles (Herrero de Miii6n, 
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1986, p. 154). Although adjustment toEC norms within government departments was 
only gradual, they were obliged to develop higher levels of flexibility and co-
ordination for the effective formulation of a strong Spanish bargaining position. 
According to one analyst of the policy-making process, Eduardo Zapico Goiii (1995, 
p. 52), administrative co-ordination in Spain was rapid, flexible and effective during 
the accession negotiations, which he attributes to three key factors, namely the 
informal nature of discussions between key government officials and domestic actors, 
the strong political support enjoyed by the Secretariat of State for Relations with the 
EC, and the overriding priority given to integration by the government. Changes in 
Spain's political regime led to alterations in the ministerial structure and to new 
appointments in high-level positions5. However, progress made was more dependent 
on the will to reach agreement at intergovernmental level than the institutional 
framework at domestic level. 
Negotiations at interstate level 
In April 1978, the Commission (European Commission, 1978a) published its so-
called 'fresco' on EC enlargement which stressed the need for a positive answer to 
both Spain and Portugal. The negotiations of the applicant countries were closely 
linked in many key areas, Portugal's relatively passive line in negotiations frequently 
leaving it vulnerable to problems encountered in the Spanish negotiations (Preston, 
1997, p. 81). The political decision on enlargement was speedily taken, although the 
Commission, while supportive of Spanish demands, highlighted the importance of the 
Community's own internal reforms and stressed the need for adjustment on both 
sides. Key member states had shown concern at the time of Spain's application, for 
example Germany's fears regarding Spanish agriculture (Europe, no. 2280, 5-6 
September 1977, p. 7), which were shared by France and Italy. However, in the 
Council of Ministers on 20 September 1977, national representatives all supported the 
political objectives ofthe Spanish application (Europe, no. 2291, 21 September 1977, 
p. 4 ). This section outlines key elements of the negotiation, focusing on Spanish 
objectives formulated in the domestic arena, and the demands placed on Spain at EC 
level. 
5Restructuring occurred in September 1980 when Eduardo Punset became Secretary of State for 
Relations with the EC after Calvo Sotelo, and Jose Pedro Perez-Llorca took over from Oreja as Foreign 
Minister. In February 1981, Bassols became Secretary of State for Relations with the EC, which 
Manuel Marin took over in 1982 following the PSOE victory. From 1982-85, under the PSOE 
government, Moran was Foreign Minister, Gabriel Ferran was the Ambassador to the EC, and Carlos 
Westendorp was President of the Executive Committee of the Coordinating Committee. 
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Negotiations did not actually begin until after the European Parliament elections in 
June 1979 and lasted until June 1985. The negotiation period can be divided into three 
phases: 5 February 1979-8 September 1980; 8 September 1980-28 October 1982; 28 
October 1982-12 June 1985 (Bassols, 1995, p. 235). During the first phase, only 
twelve negotiating sessions were held. The second phase was considerably slowed 
down by French obstructive tactics6, although the Spanish delegation tried not to let 
technical difficulties alter fundamental political objectives in the domestic arena. 
Little progress was made until the third phase on any of the controversial issue areas 
which urgently needed reform at EC level, such as agriculture, fisheries and the 
budget. 
Former ambassador in Brussels, Bassols (1995), highlights the achievements of the 
1979-82 period which he regards as undervalued in works by PSOE officials 
responsible for the negotiations from 28 October 1982. For example, Monin (1990, p. 
44) notes that when the PSOE took over, the hard core of the negotiation had not yet 
begun. Former UCD officials support the claim made by Bassols that the groundwork 
for EC entry was firmly established pre-19827; the ruling UCD party enjoyed a high 
degree of autonomy at EC level, despite its relatively weak and divided government. 
However, the slow pace of negotiations meant that agreement had only been reached 
on six of the less controversial chapters of the sixteen to be negotiated in October 
1982. 
The substantial obligations as well as benefits of EC membership were emphasised in 
negotiations, an example being the stiff rebuke to the Spanish government about the 
need to dismantle restrictions on EC exports. As this came ten days before the formal 
negotiations on entry began, it was seen by Spain as a warning of the obstacles ahead 
(Financial Times (FT), 26 January 1979). In 1980, Commission Vice-President 
Lorenzo Natali highlighted the specific problems resulting from Spain's EC entry, 
criticised Spanish industrial structure, and demanded that Value Added Tax (VAT) be 
applied from the moment of accession (Bassols, 1995, p. 241). Commission demands 
to remove tariffs and other obstacles to selling in the Spanish market, firmly backed 
by key member states, were initially ignored by the Spanish government in view of 
the fear that concessions made in advance would weaken its bargaining hand during 
the negotiation. Spain's 'failure to show any flexibility' was a result ofthe fact that its 
industry was uneasy about anything less than a ten-year transition period, and the 
6rn six months, only one session at ministerial level took place, on 25 November 1980, compared with 
five in the previous one and a half years (Bassols, 1995, p. 252). Only six ministerial negotiating 
sessions were held between February 1981 and October 1982 (Bassols, 1995, p. 261). 
7rnterview with MEP and former member of the UCD party, Brussels, 22 February 1996. 
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government feared that early concessions would lead to greater misgivings about the 
wisdom of membership (FT, 11 February 1981 ). From a Spanish perspective, 
Community policy was being conducted on two levels. Public statements by both 
Commission officials and representatives of key member states continued to support 
enlargement, while the Community's policy in specific policy areas such as 
agriculture refused to meet Spanish demands (Preston, 1997, pp. 76-7). 
A key illustration of the obligations placed on Spain by the Community is the area of 
fisheries where the expansion of waters to a 200-mile zone (see Chapter 7 on fisheries 
policy) limited the activity of fishermen who had been accustomed to liberal rights for 
centuries. The Spanish government fully supported its fishermen, but was also 
obliged to acknowledge the legitimacy of proposals at EC level even when a serious 
threat to the Spanish sector, for example the Commission's proposal on 23 September 
1976 to limit fishing rights in its waters to member states (Bassols, 1995, pp. 171-2). 
Aside from its application for EC membership, the Spanish delegation lacked any 
bargaining power in its demand for greater access to fishing waters, illustrated by the 
acknowledgement by Bassols (1995, p. 173), who was in the negotiating team, that 
'nunca me he sentado en una mesa de negociaci6n con menos argumentos en la 
mano' (I had never sat at a negotiating table with fewer arguments at my disposal). 
The framework for an annual negotiation of Spanish fishing rights was agreed in 
1980, although the Spanish government emphasised the need for a longer term 
agreement. According to a representative of the Andalusia parliamentary group, 
Alejandro Rojas Marcos, in the debate following Calvo Sotelo's investiture speech on 
19 February 1981, the government lacked any medium to long-term strategy in the 
area of fisheries, concluding that 'la actitud de nuestro Gobierno en el tema de la 
pesca realmente ha sido desastrosa' (the attitude of our government in the area of 
fisheries has really been disastrous) (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1981, p. 107). 
Spain's negotiators were accused domestically of making temporary concessions on 
agriculture to win a better deal on fisheries. Terms agreed during the negotiations 
caused further difficulties during membership (see Chapters 7 and 8), exacerbated by 
the achievement of a European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in January 1983, and 
the Community's reluctance to admit a 17,000 strong Spanish fleet which far 
exceeded the EC fleet in size. 
A key bargaining tool used by the Spanish delegation was to accuse EC negotiators of 
placing excessive demands on its relatively fragile democracy. It constantly reminded 
the EC of the dangers of overestimating the stability of the Spanish democratic 
framework, and of relying on an unquestioning internal consensus whatever the speed 
of negotiation or the conditions demanded. The pressure exerted by such arguments 
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was limited until the attempted coup by a minority in the Spanish armed forces on 23 
February 1981 provided a clear illustration of the fragility of the regime. The coup 
was followed by a Commission declaration on 24 February which firmly emphasised 
Spain's place in the EC, and an European Parliament resolution on 13 March 
stressing the Community's responsibility, and urging an acceleration of the 
negotiations (Bassols, 1995, pp. 255-6). 
The overall aim of the Spanish delegation was to obtain a balanced agreement 
between different policy areas, to ensure internal cohesion within each chapter, and to 
make sure that the accession was not subject to a hasty political decision (Monin, 
1990, p. 294). Opposition from other member states was criticised by the Spanish 
delegation. France was the key opponent of enlargement throughout the negotiations, 
although its obstructionist tactics were welcomed by other member states such as 
Italy, whose agriculture was also in direct competition with Spain, and Germany, who 
feared the free movement of Spanish workers. French President Giscard d'Estaing 
told PM Smirez in Autumn 1977 that Spain's accession would be accepted only if 
French agricultural interests faced no sacrifice as a result, and he called for a pause in 
negotiations in order to protect French markets. French concern over sectors 
threatened by Spanish entry continued to have a major impact on the accession 
process in the 1980s. On 5 June 1980, d'Estaing declared the necessity for EC reform 
before enlargement at a meeting of agricultural representatives, thus threatening a 
delay in agriculture and budgetary negotiations. The proximity of the presidential 
elections and the importance of the farming lobby in France were regarded as a key 
influence on French tactics by Spanish negotiators who feared that the French attitude 
would fuel internal anti-EC coalitions. The Spanish Secretary of State for Relations 
with the EC held bilateral talks with key leaders across Europe in November and 
December 1980 in an effort to speed up the pace of negotiations (Bassols, 1995, p. 
253). The Spanish delegation hoped that Fran9ois Mitterrand' s victory in May 1981 
would lead to a more constructive French bargaining position, although the hope was 
dampened by French opposition in 1981 to texts on customs union and agricultural 
issues (Bassols, 1995, p. 262). Other member states supported France, but at least 
offered to compromise in other chapters if Spain accepted V AT from accession. 
July 1981 was one of the lowest points in the negotiations according to key officials 
(Bassols, 1995, p. 263) and, in view of the lack of negotiating documents for the 
agricultural chapter, a breakdown in the talks was feared by Spanish officials. 
However, a greater acceptance of debate on EC reform in parallel with talks on 
enlargement meant that negotiations were unblocked on 14 September 1981. An 
illustration of the new attitude to the negotiations was the presentation of an EC 
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document on customs union prior to Spain fully committing itself to the adoption of 
VAT on accession (Bassols, 1995, pp. 270-1). With a view to unblocking talks in 
other areas, the Spanish government later committed itself to the application of VAT 
on 26 February 1982. Despite the revitalisation of the process, a further setback 
occurred when the French delegation demanded an inventory of problems related to 
enlargement. Some UCD members considered the French block to be politically 
inspired as the French government preferred an agreement to be reached under the 
new PSOE government which was likely to gain power in October 1982 (Bassols, 
1995, p. 274). Member states agreed to the French proposal to produce a report on 
outstanding issues regarding Spain and Portugal's accession, although 'fellow heads 
of government were uneasily aware that Spanish entry could be delayed far longer 
than most ofthem would wish' (The Economist, 3 July 1982, p. 55). 
The pace of negotiations began to speed up when the report, produced by the 
Commission in November 1982, asked the EC 'to reward Spain and Portugal with a 
definite date for joining the Communities if they took more drastic steps to cut back 
key crisis industries such as steel and shipbuilding' (FT, 17 November 1982, 
Keesings Contemporary Archives, no. 3, May 1985, p. 33588). In view of the 
Commission report, the Copenhagen European Council of 3 December 1982 paved 
the way for the revision of existing rules for certain Mediterranean products within 
the EC. The final communication of the Copenhagen Summit contained a 
reaffirmation of the political commitment to enlargement of the EC member states. 
The PSOE government took over control of the negotiations in October 1982, and set 
out a clear strategy for achieving EC integration before the end of its first legislature. 
Although state interests persisted despite the change of government, the PSOE's 
substantial majority gave it a strong position which had not been possible for the 
weaker UCD government. Marfn, as the new Secretary of State for Relations with the 
EC, indicated some changes in government policy towards Europe in the Foreign 
Affairs Committee of the Congress on 13 April 1983 (Ministerio de Asuntos 
Exteriores, 1983, pp. 244-72), for example the refusal to set dates for concluding 
rounds of negotiation, in view of the widespread discontent in the domestic arena 
when deadlines set by the UCD government had not been achieved. 
Although the EC and Spain agreed on the customs union in 1983, according to 
Foreign Minister Monin, only 15% of the negotiating task had been completed (FT, 
27 April 1983). EC proposals in early 1983, including rapid access for EC industrial 
goods to Spanish markets, were viewed as unacceptable by the Spanish delegation. 
Negotiations seemed once more to be at a standstill. On 28 April 1983, Moran 
expressed 'sa desillusion devant le manque de progres dans la reforme des reglements 
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agricoles mectiterraneens' (his disappointment faced with the lack of progress in the 
reform of rules for Mediterranean agriculture) (Le Monde, 28 April 1983). 
Furthermore, although supporting the enlargement, the United Kingdom (UK) and 
Germany blocked the associated increase in the agricultural budget. However, 
progress was made to establish a clear link between EC reform and enlargement 
under the German Presidency at the Stuttgart Summit, paving the way for further 
debate at the Athens Summit in December 1983 where German proposals dominated 
the budgetary negotiations. Spain approved a new agricultural agreement in October 
which placed high tariff barriers on Spanish fruit and vegetables until full integration. 
However, the tariffs were regarded as an excessive EC demand in the Spanish 
domestic arena, and Gonzalez hinted at dropping Spain's EC application 
(International Herald Tribune (IHT), 29-30 October 1983). In November, the tough 
position of the Spanish government was again revealed when Gonzalez threatened to 
cut government purchases of French goods unless Paris adopted a more favourable 
stance towards Spain (FT, 18 November 1983). The approval of larger subsidies for 
Mediterranean agriculture and the commitment to reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) persuaded the French delegation to give greater consideration to 
Spanish demands. According to Bassols (1995, p. 286), 'Ios agricultores franceses 
estaban servidos; se podfa volver a pensar en Espafia' (the French farmers had got 
their way; they could start thinking about Spain again). Gonz:Hez sought to step up 
Spanish pressure on member states when he wrote a letter to all EC Heads of 
government asking them to declare their position on enlargement prior to the Athens 
Summit. Spanish officials were optimistic about the progress made, although the 
press in Spain was critical of any triumphalism (Moran, I 990, p. 166). This criticism 
was borne out when the clash of national interests at Athens in December prevented 
any further progress in negotiations. 
Fisheries, agriculture, and the lowering of trade barriers for industrial goods were still 
unresolved issues in 1984. The debate of agricultural issues, especially regarding the 
length of the transition period to integrate goods into European markets, dominated 
the negotiations. On 21 February 1984, Spain criticised the unreasonable demands 
made by the EC declaration on agriculture. The Spanish government was prepared to 
restructure sectors such as olive oil, but considered that other member states, such as 
Italy, had to adopt similar measures (Ya, 26 February 1984, Ministerio de Asuntos 
Exteriores, 1984, p. 197). Moran called for 'a complete revision of the basic 
principles on which the negotiations are proceeding' (FT, 20 June 1984). It was not 
until the Brussels Summit in March 1984, and the Fontainebleau Summit during the 
French Presidency in June 1984, that the foundations for the CAP reform were finally 
laid, and the UK budgetary contribution was determined. In June 1984, the 
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Commission's focus on French concerns rather than Spanish olive oil and wine 
markets led to a negative reaction in Spanish sectors (Monin, 1990, pp. 48-9). 
However, Spain was ultimately forced to accept the deal on agriculture with relatively 
few EC concessions, its only victory being an increase in the transition period for free 
access for EC industrial goods into Spain from three to six years (FT, 21 June 1984). 
Spain's attempts to backtrack on these agreements, for example when it hardened its 
position in July 1984 regarding sensitive products such as olive oil, were rejected by 
the EC delegation on 23 July. The Spanish government was thus forced to make key 
concessions in problematic areas in the later years of the accession process. The final 
accord was dependent on the reform of the regulations for Mediterranean products to 
satisfy French demands. Additional agreements were made on 29 March 1985 
regarding the dismantling of EC tariffs on fruit and vegetable exports over ten years, 
and the seven-year transition period before the full customs union. The final package 
formed the basis for Spain and Portugal's integration into the Community on 1 
January 1986. 
From an economic perspective, despite the final success of the negotiations, Spain 
accepted a 'punishing treaty of accession' (Harrison, 1992, p. 205). During 
negotiations, it had been forced to accept the broad outline of EC proposals in several 
key sectors. Spain was, in many respects, an unequal partner as it opened its markets 
to the EC, and reduced the external tariff on industrial goods from Third countries to 
the EC average of 5% within seven years. Most Spanish agricultural products were 
subjected to a waiting period of ten years before being fully integrated into the 
Community, and iron and steel subsidies had to be eliminated by 1990. Restrictions 
on EC industrial imports were phased out over a two to seven year periodS (for full 
details of Spain's entry terms, see Tovias, 1995, pp. 88-92). Political criticism of the 
deal in the domestic arena highlighted the relatively tough terms agreed for Spanish 
agriculture and fisheries, considered as the outcome of the early conclusion of the 
industry chapter in December 1984. This left the Spanish delegation with little 
bargaining power in other key areas although satisfying Spanish industrial groups 
(G6mez Fuentes, 1986, p. 44). Despite strong domestic pressures, the Spanish 
government bowed to EC demands on fisheries, acknowledging the need for 
restructuring of the sector, while seeking to avoid any further decrease of the size of 
the Spanish catch in EC waters. The EC immediately took over the management of 
agreements with Third countries (as illustrated in Chapter 7) and obliged Spain to 
make concessions such as ending state subsidies on fuel for fishing boats, which led 
8Foreign industrial firms based in Spain had put pressure on their governments not to enforce a drastic 
transition period on Spanish industry, which may have influenced the outcome of negotiations. 
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to considerable discontent in the sector (Marks, M., 1997, p. 94). In the area of 
agriculture, Spanish farming would not be phased into the CAP for ten years, and, at 
this early stage, Spain was a net contributor to the budget. During the first year, Spain 
paid in 8,405 million pesetas more than it received (Miller and Barclay, 1990). 
Furthermore, EC rights on free movement of labour were withheld from Spaniards for 
seven years to restrict the flow of emigration. 
The key role of the Spanish government in the interstate bargaining framework at EC 
level was evident throughout the negotiations. Frequent discussions between 
Gonzalez and the German Head of State secured German support for Spanish 
accession, based on its trade surplus with Spain and the strong links between the 
Socialist parties in the two countries. For example, the Spanish government had direct 
contact with ministers such as the German Liberal, Hans Dietrich Genscher, in 
numerous meetings in Spring 1983 in an attempt to reach a compromise on their 
demands (Moran, 1990, p. 165). A key example of the influence of Gonzalez on the 
accession process was his negotiating skills at a Summit meeting of five Socialist 
PMs from France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain in Athens in October 1983, 
which facilitated the agreement of the Council of Agriculture Ministers on 
agricultural markets. Moran (1990) highlighted the personal role he played in 
overcoming French opposition to enlargement, such as the first meeting of Spanish 
and French ministers in Celle Saint Cloud on 10-11 January 1983, and his meetings 
with Foreign Minister Roland Dumas in March 1985. Intensive interstate bargaining 
outside the official EC accession negotiations thus formed a crucial element of the 
process, as expressed in a letter from Spanish ambassador Ferran to the Foreign 
Minister on 20 October 1983 (Bassols, 1995, p. 288), but this chapter also seeks to 
take into account the internal co-ordination of the Spanish position with key interest 
groups and political parties. 
Relations between the state and domestic actors 
Government officials claimed that domestic demands were taken into account 
throughout the negotiations, particularly in vulnerable sectors. This is illustrated by 
the statement of Gonzalez when in opposition, in the debate following Calvo Sotelo's 
investiture speech on 20 February 1981: 
El ingreso en la Comunidad Econ6mica Europea no es s6Io un problema 
del Gobierno; el Gobierno tiene que negociar el ingreso, pero tiene que 
negociar respetando y defendiendo Ios intereses de la sociedad .... yo creo 
que le puedo afirmar que si el Gobierno no coincide sustancialmente con 
Ios empresarios y con Ios sindicatos en la negociaci6n para el ingreso en la 
Comunidad, esa negociaci6n sera muy fragil, esa negociaci6n sera muy 
diffcil y esa negociaci6n sera distorsionante. 
(Entry into the European Economic Community is not only a problem for 
the government; the government has to negotiate entry, but it has to 
negotiate with respect for and in defence of the interests of society .. .I think 
I can affirm that if the government does not largely agree with business 
circles and unions in the EC accession negotiations, that negotiation will 
be very fragile, that negotiation will be very difficult and that negotiation 
will be distorted) (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1981, p. 117). 
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It is significant that, in May 1983, following the PSOE's success in local and home-
rule elections, Gonzalez referred to trade unions and employers as the 'true 
negotiating forces' through which the government could achieve social and economic 
reform (Giner and Sevilla, 1984, p. 133). However, key socio-economic actors, as 
well as the most politically active regional governments, frequently criticised their 
lack of input to the policy process in the domestic arena. 
Regional government 
The input of the majority of regional governments during the accession negotiations 
was minimal. This was to be expected in view of the fact that, even though Spain's 
newly created Autonomous Communities were fast developing a new institutional 
framework at regional level by the Summer of 1983, they still had to wait some time 
before the competencies they had inherited were officially devolved to them (Newton, 
1997, p. 123). However, a minority of the more active regions demanded information 
on the implications of EC entry and carried out detailed, sectoral studies. For 
example, the government in Catalonia formed a working group with the Secretariat of 
State for the EC, which held its first meeting on 3 April 1981 to exchange opinions on 
the negotiations. It presented a document (libro blanco) listing their demands to the 
Secretariat of State on 17 June 1982 (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1983, p. 454). 
Furthermore, the Catalonia parliament approved a motion on 11 November 1980 
which called for the setting up of a joint committee to monitor the negotiations. The 
committee was treated apprehensively initially, but became an acceptable forum for 
the serious debate of EC issues (Granell, 1982, p. 830)9. Attempts to have an input to 
the negotiations were made in other regions at a late stage in the accession process; 
the Gabinete Tecnico para asuntos relacionados con la Comunidad Econ6mica 
Europea (Technical Committee for European Economic Community Affairs) was 
established in the Basque Country on 26 June 1984 (Granell, 1984, p. 18). Although 
the more active authorities monitored carefully the implications for their region in the 
later stages of the negotiations, particularly in sensitive policy areas such as 
9The Monitoring Committee was fonnally constituted on 22 January 1985, having been approved by 
the Catalonia parliament on 27 September 1984 (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1985, p. 752). 
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agriculture and fisheries, central government retained a high level of autonomy from 
regional governments at EC level. 
Socio-economic actors 
The development of the interests of key domestic actors, namely the main trade 
unions and employers' organisations, is briefly outlined here prior to an analysis of 
the nature of consultation in the domestic arena. Perez-Dfaz (1993, p. 57) developed 
the notion of civil society which he defines as 'social institutions such as markets and 
voluntary associations and a public sphere which are outside the direct control, in a 
full or in a mitigated sense, of the state'. A more developed civil society and a 
corporatist framework (see, for example, Gin er and Se villa, 1984) was established 
during the years of democratic consolidation, gradually laying the foundation for 
greater domestic participation in the policy-making process. 
TRADE UNIONS 
Two main union organisations exist in Spain, the Comisiones Obreras (Workers' 
Commissions, CCOO), under Communist leadership, and the Union General de 
Trabajadores (General Workers' Union, UGT), established at the same time as the 
PSOE, and traditionally Socialist. Membership of smaller unions declined in the early 
1980s, as around 80% of workers who joined a union between 1978 and 1984 opted 
for either the UGT or CCOO (Perez-Dfaz, 1993, pp. 267-8). However, financial 
difficulties and legal insecurity after Franco, weak organisational structure, and 
disagreements over key policies limited the input of the two unions to the debate on 
EC entry. Paul Heywood (1995, p. 242) considers that 'the unequal distribution of 
resources which characterises the Spanish policy process is reinforced by low, and 
declining, levels of associational activity'. Although union membership briefly 
flourished in the post-Franco era, the level of membership fell dramatically between 
1978 and 1984; whereas in 1978, the level of affiliation was 57.4%, in 1984, it had 
decreased to 23% (Perez-Dfaz, 1993, p. 267) (see Chapter 4 for levels of affiliation 
during EC/EU membership). High levels of membership could not be assured in view 
of the predominance of small companies in Spain, union reliance on public funding 
rather than membership figures, and the system of workplace elections where non-
members are able to vote (Ross, 1997, p. 119). Although pacts with the government 
during the transition set a precedent for a consultation process based on a 'neo-
corporatist' frameworklO, no regular consultative role existed for the unions apart 
from infrequent negotiations with the government (Gunther, 1996, p. 52). 
IOPacts and agreements became a key element of the policy process during the transition and early 
1980s. Agreements included the Inter-Confederation Agreement in 1980 between the UGT and the 
CEOE, the National Agreement on Employment in 1981 between the government, unions and the 
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EMPLOYERS 
Under Franco, large firms had little need to organise their interests as they were 
generally offered tariff protection and state subsidies. The organisation of Spain's 
employers thus only began after 1975, also a reflection of the relatively late economic 
development in Spain. The organisation representing employers' interests at national 
level, the Confederaci6n Espaiiola de Organizaciones Empresariales (Spanish 
Confederation of Employers' Organisations, CEOE) was founded in 1977. The CEOE 
incorporates many important associations within its framework, although they remain 
relatively autonomous, including the Confederaci6n Espaiiola de Pequeiias y 
Medianas Empresas (Spanish Confederation of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, 
CEPYME), which joined in 1980, and the Association of Spanish Banks (AEB). It is 
divided into sectoral and territorial groups, which leads to conflict of interests as 
sectoral organisations tend to be more powerful than regional groupings. During the 
transition, collective bargaining between the government and business associations 
was commonplace, and the CEOE was one of the main participants in the bargaining 
process. Although the CEOE supported the right-wing coalition during the 1982 
election campaign, its President claimed in 1984 to have established good relations 
with the Socialist government (Le Monde, 12 January 1984). Despite its weaknesses, 
the CEOE was considered a key channel for communicating business interests to the 
Spanish government. 
The impact of both trade unions and employers during the accession negotiations was 
uneven as their input was not institutionalised. The development of 'civil society' was 
still only in its preliminary stages, although the most powerful domestic actors sought 
to increase their input to the negotiating process. The lack of a pluralist tradition and 
the low level of associational activity are evident from a study of the main unions, 
and, although the employers' confederation represented a growing number of 
employers, it had yet to establish access points to the policy process. This resulted in 
a Jack of awareness of negotiations at EC level in domestic society. 
Domestic awareness of negotiations 
The 1970 agreement between Spain and the EC was hardly known in the domestic 
arena despite the considerable benefits to Spain 11. At the start of the accession 
negotiations, a similarly limited knowledge of EC issues existed in Spanish society. 
CEOE, the Interconfederation Agreement in 1983 between the employers and unions, and the most far-
reaching, and the first tripartite agreement for the Gonzalez government, the Economic and Social 
Agreement in 1984. 
11 Interview with official of Secretariat of State for Foreign Policy and the EU and former official of 
Ministry for Relations with the EC, Madrid, 29 May 1996. 
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This led the Ministry for Relations with the EC to organise a series of information 
days from 2 October to 20 December 1978. The objective was to inform regional and 
sectoral actors of the implications of EC entry, to ensure their participation in the 
process, and to gauge the opinions of a wide range of actors which would be taken 
into account in the formulation of the government's position (Ministerio para las 
Relaciones con !as Comunidades Europeas, 1978). The Chambers of Commerce 
(Camaras de Comercio)12, which had a pro-active role at local and regional levels 
during the early stages of the accession process, played a key part in the organisation 
of around 500 ad hoc meetings with regional authorities, business and trade unions. 
Meetings with agricultural and business representatives took account of their 
particular concerns regarding EC entry, the final report noting the 'reacciones 
pasionales y, a veces, de espiritu nacionalista, ante la aparici6n de problemas 
especfficos, sectoriales .. .' (the passionate and sometimes nationalist reactions to the 
emergence of specific sectoral problems ... ) (Ministerio para !as Relaciones con !as 
Comunidades Europeas, 1978, p. 8). Regional concerns focused on the potential 
increase in economic inequalities, and the likelihood of greater privileges being given 
to some regions to the detriment of others, while agricultural representatives feared 
losing out to industrial interests as a result of their limited influence on the 
government. According to the organisers, the seminars were successful; one of the 
civil servants in control of publicity measures highlighted the 'esfuerzo singular y 
unico' (unusual and unique effort) made by the government administration, which 
represented a decisive change in mentality 13. The Ministry aimed to continue the 
campaign despite the change in government and the reform of institutional structure 
in 1981. In March 1982, the Secretariat produced a plan de acci6n interior (internal 
action plan) which set out its strategies for full information exchange with Spanish 
society, including regular meetings in the Trinidad with sectoral representatives and 
parliamentary spokespersons, and the publication of extensive documentation 
(Secretarfa de Estado para !as Relaciones con !as Comunidades Europeas, 1982). 
Government officials referred to the seminars in all Spanish provinces and the wide 
range of publications on EC entry in response to criticism of inadequate consultation. 
Although individual companies were relatively ignorant about the negotiations, the 
CEOE was generally regarded to be better informed. One analyst considered that the 
Spanish business community was more closely involved in negotiations than its 
counterpart in Greece, and that Spain was better prepared than either Greece or 
12The full title is Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Navigation whose statutes depend on central 
government. They date from 1911 and are organised on a provincial basis. 
13rnterview with former official of Ministry for Relations with the EC, responsible for conducting the 
information campaign from 1978-80, Madrid, 24 May 1996. 
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Portugal in terms of background work and technical studies (Tsoukalis, 1981, pp. 
126-7). The Minister for Relations with the EC, Calvo Sotelo, affirmed that meetings 
with the Head of the CEOE, Carlos Ferrer Salat, were held whenever requested 
during the early years of the negotiations, the aim being to reassure the Confederation 
about the implications of EC entry14. However, he also acknowledged the often tense 
relations resulting from the CEOE's claim that he was not adequately defending their 
interests (Calvo Sotelo, 1990, p. 163). Members of the opposition even suggested that 
the UCD government was avoiding putting EC entry to public analysis (Monin, 1980, 
p. 336). However, it was reported that the Secretariat of State for Relations with the 
EC promoted or participated in 2593 colloquia, conferences and round tables on EC 
entry, and organised 17 5 trade union and business working groups, 210 sect oral 
meetings and four journalists' seminars between 5 February 1979 and 28 October 
1982 (Bassols, 1995, p. 237). A, perhaps predictable, discrepancy thus emerges 
between the claims of UCD government officials and domestic actors regarding the 
level of information about EC accession during the early years. The opinions of UCD 
and PSOE politicians and officials also differ markedly, each claiming that adequate 
measures were taken to inform Spanish society during their term in office. 
Former UCD government officials described the negotiation as external rather than 
internal in the post-1982 period IS, illustrated by complaints in the agricultural sector 
of the minimal consultation with Spanish negotiators (FT, 27 March 1985). Members 
of the main opposition party claimed that they frequently had to read the press to find 
out about ongoing negotiations, particularly regarding the economic costs of 
concessions made to reach an agreement16. However, according to PSOE officials, 
information was widely disseminated from 1982-85, and criticism was considered to 
be largely politically inspired!?. For example, in 1984, the Secretary for Relations 
with the EC contrasted the demands for an evaluation committee for the accession 
negotiations in the Senate with the total lack of interest in negotiating documents 
when they were made available (Ya, 26 February 1984, Ministerio de Asuntos 
Exteriores, 1984, p. 196). Government officials claimed that, from January 1983 to 
August 1984, the Secretariat of State for Relations with the EC held more than 300 
meetings with representatives of Autonomous Communities, professional sectors, 
Chambers of Commerce and trade unions, the number having reached 450 by 
14seminar given by Calvo Sotelo at Fundaci6n Ortega y Gasset, Madrid, 15 April1996. 
15Interview with former official of Ministry for Relations with the EC, 28 May 1996, who advised the 
Secretariat on the issue of public information on the EC from 1980-82. 
16Interview with MEP and former member of the UCD party, Brussels, 22 February 1996. 
17Jnterview with member of Senate and former PSOE spokesperson on EC issues 1982-86, Madrid, 
27 May 1996. 
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February 1985, which represented a total of more than 2000 hours of work'S. 
Furthermore, the Secretariat organised and participated in more than 462 public 
information events and meetings between January 1983 and July 1985 (Consejo 
Superior de Camaras de Comercio, 1985, p. 5). 
Although Foreign Minister Moran (1990, p. 41) denied any lack of transparency, 
some officials referred to the highly technical and complicated nature of negotiations, 
which made it difficult to communicate full details of the negotiating process to the 
publicl9. Just before the Accession Treaty was signed, eight out of ten Spaniards 
interviewed considered themselves badly informed about EC membership, and more 
than 60% of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and 41% of bigger firms, 
complained of inadequate information about EC entry conditions according to a 
Citibank Espafia survey of 508 firms (G6mez Fuentes, 1986, pp. 17-18). The two 
main trade unions claimed they had been marginalised throughout the accession 
process, although, according to government officials, they had shown little interest in 
EC issues; one illustration is Calvo Sotelo's claim that he had contacted trade unions 
regularly to inform them of the negotiations20. In its official opinion on EC accession, 
the UGT stressed that 'ni nuestro sindicato ni ningun otro, ha sido consultado 
previamente de forma global sobre Ios distintos aspectos de la negociaci6n .. .' (neither 
our union nor any other has been previously consulted in a global way on the specific 
aspects of the negotiation ... ) (UGT, n/d, p. 6). Similarly, the CCOO was critical of 
meetings with the Secretariat of State for the EC, which were described as consisting 
of a posteriori information on the government's bargaining position without any 
evaluation of the likely socio-economic implications; the exception was the area of 
social affairs, where talks with the Secretariat were often held prior to negotiations. 
CCOO officials referred to the sporadic nature of meetings, the importance of which 
was reduced by the limited nature of information made available (CCOO, 1985a). 
Key sectoral actors and business circles seemed less marginalised from the process, 
although the President of a key business association, the Cfrculo de Empresarios 
(Business Circle) claimed in December 1984 that business representatives had been 
18unpublished letter (CCOO archive, 22 February 1985) from Secretary of State for the EC Marfn to 
the Secretary General of CCOO, Marcelino Camacho, in reply to the CCOO's letter of complaint 
regarding the Secretariat's lack of consultation with the union. The Secretary of State claimed that he 
had organised ten meetings from 1982-85 specifically with the CCOO and that, after each negotiating 
session at EC level, had forwarded the negotiating documents to the union. Significantly, he added 
that, following a working group meeting with the CCOO on 16 February 1984, the Secretariat had 
offered on numerous occasions to hold a further meeting, but the CCOO had not agreed to the proposal 
until 22 January 1985. 
19rnterview with member of Senate and former PSOE spokesperson on EC issues 1982-86, Madrid, 
27May 1996. 
20seminar given by Calve Sotelo at Fundaci6n Ortega y Gasset, Madrid, 15 April1996. 
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'someramente informados pero no en profundidad. Ni a ni vel de organizaciones 
empresariales ni a nivel de sectores han tenido acceso a la informaci6n sobre la 
march a de !as negociaciones .... ' (superficially informed but not in depth. Neither at 
the level of business organisations nor at the sectoral level has there been access to 
information on the progress of negotiations) (Diario 16, 26 December 1984). The Co-
ordinating Committee of the Chambers of Commerce held regular meetings from 
October 1983 with the Trinidad to discuss contact with regional actors throughout 
Spain (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1983, p. 743). Another illustration of the 
developing relations between the administration and key associations is CEPYME' s 
plan to inform small companies about the EC in 1981 (CEPYME, 1981), which was 
drawn up in close collaboration with the Secretariat of State for Relations with the 
EC. 
Regional authorities were generally better informed than other domestic actors about 
the EC, although the level of information varied from region to region. In the March 
1985 parliamentary debate on EC accession, Manuel Fraga of the opposition Popular 
Coalition party considered that a regular dialogue with key regional actors during the 
negotiations could have been established (Congress, no. 195, 27 March 1985, p. 
8922)21. However, the Secretary of State for the EC complained of the lack of 
attention that many regions paid to briefings passed on to them (Ya, 11 June 1984), 
claiming that only a minority of regions enquired about the implications of EC entry 
or carried out studies. Nonetheless, a growing number of economic analyses were 
carried out as the negotiations advanced, particularly by regions able to articulate 
their interests most effectively, such as Catalonia, the Basque Country and the 
Canaries. Conferences were also organised to discuss the likely effects of EC 
integration with representatives of the Autonomies, for example those held by the 
Ministry of Territorial Administration in 1984 (Ya, 11 June 1984). The Trinidad held 
a series of meetings with subnational actors, for example twenty two meetings with 
Catalonia, twenty one with Galicia and eighteen with Andalusia up to the Summer of 
1984 (Granell, 1984, p. 16). Furthermore, a technical working group with the 
Secretary of State for the EC was set up by Catalonia to lobby for its regional 
interests and demand explanations for negotiating positions (Recio Figueiras, n/d, p. 
19), and a European programme was established in Andalusia in December 1983 to 
run training courses for civil servants, and evaluate the accession negotiations. 
21 Questions about the transfer of information to the regions were regularly asked in the Spanish 
parliament prior to the 1985 debate, for example in the Congress Foreign Affairs Committee on 21 
December 1982, when a Basque representative requested more consultation with the regions prior to 
negotiations at EC level to exploit their level of expertise (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1982, p. 
229). Monin responded that EC-level negotiations were an affair for the state, but ensured full 
information exchange throughout the remaining talks. 
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Despite central government's reticence, regional authorities also made direct contact 
with EC institutions, for example the Presidents of the regional governments of 
Catalonia and Andalusia headed a delegation to the Commission in June 1983, and 
the Joint Committee in Catalonia held meetings with the Commission in October 
1983 (Granell, 1984, p. 17). However, although the EC accession process may have 
encouraged the involvement of the more active regions in the policy process, it was 
too early in the decentralisation process for the majority of regions to have any 
influence on the government's negotiating position; they thus remained largely 
sidelined from the process. 
In the first parliamentary debate on EC entry in June 1979, some opposition members 
not only advocated greater parliamentary involvement via an institutionalised 
evaluation committee for the negotiations, but proposed establishing permanent, 
formal consultation mechanisms with socio-economic actors (Congress, no. 21, 27 
June 1979, pp. 1039-1!10). The Minister for Relations with the EC responded by 
highlighting the efficient functioning of existing consultation mechanisms, even if not 
formalised. Although the creation of a forum for consultation with socio-economic 
actors was advocated in the Constitution, namely the Economic and Social Council, 
the Spanish administration had no intention of establishing it during the negotiations 
(Congress, no. 21, 27 June 1979, pp. 1093-4) (it was eventually established in 1991, 
as described in Chapter 4). Opposition MPs were concerned about the lack of 
parliamentary control of the government's negotiating positions, accusing the PSOE 
of using the excuse that making information publicly available could serve the 
interests of other EC member states. One opposition member considered that 'un 
Gobierno que goza de una amplia mayorfa parlamentaria y que, en consecuencia, no 
deberia temer a esta Camara, sino hacer de ella el foro privilegiado de su 
comunicaci6n con la opinion publica, rehUya !as posibilidades que esta Camara le 
ofrece .. .' (a government which enjoys a large parliamentary majority and which, as a 
consequence, should not fear this Chamber, but, rather, make it a privileged forum for 
its communication with public opinion, rejects the possibilities which this Chamber 
offers ... ) (Congress, no. 98, 29 February 1984, p. 4617). When the Accession Treaty 
was signed, key ministries were accused of not having met representatives from 
affected sectors for many years. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food was criticised for only consulting national farming organisations at a very 
late stage in the process (Armero, 1989, p. 168). One commentator noted that 'parece 
una gran incongruencia que quienes iban a tener que competir con Europa no fueran 
escuchados a la hora de negociar' (it seems highly incongruent that those who were 
going to have to compete in Europe were not listened to at the time of the negotiation) 
(Armero, 1989, p. 168). It is probable that the consensus in favour of EC entry in 
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Spanish society, described in practically all analyses of Spain's EC accession, made 
the government less obliged to consult domestic actors throughout the process. 
Internal consensus in favour of EC entry 
Even before negotiations began, one press article asserted that 'politically, the case 
for applying to join the EEC goes unchallenged among Spanish businessmen, union 
leaders, Government officials and all political parties' (Daily Telegraph, 2 May 
1977), and the basic consensus was not eroded throughout the negotiations. Tsoukalis 
(1981, p. 121) describes the picture in Spain at the time of the EC application as 'dull' 
as everyone seemed to agree about the desirability of accession. The politics of 
consensus among major political forces seemed to be reinforced by the question of 
EC entry. Limited discussion of economic implications occurred in key sectors, while 
political integration was accepted seemingly unquestioningly by the Spanish public. 
The loss of sovereignty which membership would entail was hardly debated in the 
Congress prior to the ratification of the Accession Treaty, and the rapidity and overall 
unanimity of the ratification, along with the generally positive press coverage, 
underlined Spanish enthusiasm for its incorporation into the European framework 
(Congress, no. 221, 25 June 1985, pp. 10177-217). The portrayal of Spain's EC 
accession as a vital historical goal by the government encouraged the almost 
instinctive acceptance of the urgent need for incorporation into the European 
framework, which tended to inhibit domestic involvement in the process. Foreign 
Minister Perez-Llorca referred in 1981 to EC entry being supported by 'la voluntad 
polftica del pueblo espafiol, de la aplastante mayorfa de !as fuerzas polfticas y 
sindicales y del gobierno (the political will of the Spanish people, the overwhelming 
majority of the political and union forces and the government) (La Libre Belgique, 16 
March 1981, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1981, p. 130). 
Although a more critical ethos in society was gradually built up after Franco, it did 
not succeed in encouraging widespread public debate of EC issues, especially at the 
outset of negotiations. The lack of Spanish tradition in the analysis of international 
affairs may have made Spain overly optimistic and unrealistic about the implications 
of EC entry (Calvo Sotelo, 1990, p. 125). The public generally recognised the 
importance of playing a full part in a democratic European framework and, as a result, 
the general consensus on Spain's policy towards Europe went unquestioned. An 
opinion poll carried out by the Public Opinion Institute (attached to the PM's office) 
in October 1979 showed that 67% of Spaniards were in favour of entry, and only 7% 
were opposed (26% did not respond), although it was reported that support for 
Spanish entry was, perhaps predictably, 'still instinctive rather than rational' (FT, 4 
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October 1979). The significance of EC membership for the Spanish public is also 
demonstrated by Eurobarometer polls: in 1984, 73% of Spanish interviewees felt 
Community affairs to be important or very important (Eurobarometer, no. 22, 1984, 
p. 97)22. The Spanish and international press played a key role in encouraging support 
for Spain's accession23, generally unanimously backing EC entry and, in some cases, 
criticising the lack of progress when negotiations came to a halt, for example on 23 
March 1985 when the French delegation blocked any further advance (G6mez 
Fuentes, 1986, p. 45). 
In the parliamentary debate on EC accession on 27 June 1979, the Minister for 
Relations with the EC stressed the importance of obtaining a consensus of all political 
forces on the final objective of EC entry, if not wholly on the methods of obtaining it 
(Congress, no. 21, 27 June 1979, p. 1042). He advised against viewing Europe as a 
magical solution to all Spain's problems, but argued that vulnerable sectors would 
ultimately benefit from accession, for example fisheries whose access to EC waters 
would only be possible via Spain's application for membership (Congress, no. 21, 27 
June 1979, p. 1048). Government officials regarded the issue of EC entry as a 'tema 
de estado, situado por encima de Jas perspectivas partidistas' (an affair for the state, 
placed above party considerations), thus maximising the parliamentary consensus on 
Europe (Monin, 1990, p. 45). Some differences in focus existed, illustrated by the 
Communist Party's hope for long-term economic and social change including 
improved rights for workers, compared with the PSOE's focus on economic 
modernisation. However, both the Socialists and Communists gave full support to the 
government's policies towards the EC from a very early stage in the process (The 
Guardian, 28 July 1977). The limited discussion of EC entry in the Spanish 
parliament was partly a reflection of the broad consensus, its input generally being 
regarded as ineffectual by government officials. According to the former Chair of the 
parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee from 1982-86, political parties were 'only 
effective by being ineffective' given that no voice of opposition to EC membership 
was raised in the Committee24. 
22A more negative response was recorded when the negotiations were delayed, for example 12% 
fewer Spaniards were in favour of accession in 1983 than three years previously in a Gallup Institute 
Poll, and only 46% considered that the EC would actually be good for Spain (The Times, 15 September 
1983). 
23However, it must be noted that many press articles also highlighted the costs ofEC membership for 
Spain once the terms had been agreed. For example, when the Treaty was signed, an article in The 
Times, cynically suggested that the Spanish government should reap the benefits ofEC accession in the 
general elections before public opinion realised the costs of membership (G6mez Fuentes, 1986, p. 
266). 
24Jnterview with Spanish MEP, Brussels, 21 February 1996. 
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Trade unions accepted the overall necessity of EC membership, forced to 
acknowledge that they had no alternative to offer to the government's medium-term 
economic policy. The UGT declared that it had expressed for a long time 'una 
posici6n claramente favorable a la adhesi6n de Espaiia a !as Comunidades Europeas' 
(a clearly favourable attitude towards Spain's accession to the European 
Communities) (UGT, n/d, p. 1), illustrated by its support for the modernisation of the 
Spanish economy and the adaptation of the labour market to the European model. 
Widespread debate about the implications of EC entry was unlikely given the 
workers' preoccupation with more immediate needs such as high unemployment, the 
level of income, and the low level of politicisation of the unions (Kohler-Koch, 1982, 
pp. 52-9). Spanish unions also voiced their overall support for EC entry via pan-
European organisations at EC level such as the European Confederation of Trade 
Unions (ETUC) in Brussels, which regularly pressurised the Commission to speed up 
negotiations, and the Economic and Social Committee25, which retained a favourable 
position regarding EC entry throughout the accession process. 
Despite some reservations regarding conditions which threatened to weaken the 
position of Spain vis-a-vis her European partners, the CEOE considered EC 
membership as a clear priority for Spain. Similarly, the Chambers of Commerce 
collaborated closely with the government's administration throughout the 
negotiations, and wholeheartedly supported the EC application. Larger, more 
competitive sectors were positive about their incorporation into a European 
framework, and retained a majority view in favour of EC entry. For example, 
successful exporting industries, such as the Barcelona-based chemicals industry, were 
keen to import raw materials for their expanding output, and some thirty Catalan 
companies had already successfully set up subsidiaries over the French border to gain 
a foot-hold inside the Community. The positive attitude of larger firms is illustrated 
by a survey carried out in 1980 where out of 1500 larger Spanish firms, 68% said they 
were prepared for EC entry in 1980, and 83% predicted that they would be by 1985 
(Fundaci6n para la Investigaci6n Econ6mica y Social y Asociaci6n para el Progreso 
de la Direcci6n, 1980, p. 3). Although less optimistic about EC entry, firms attached 
to the state industrial holding company, Institute Nacional de Industria (National 
Institute for Industry, INI), supported the application for EC entry. 
25The Economic and Social Committee was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 as a forum in 
which the major economic and social groups of EC countries could express their views to the 
Community institutions. Its members, divided into three groups representing employers, workers and 
other sectors, are appointed by member states. 
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This brief analysis of the views of key domestic actors illustrates the overwhelming 
consensus in favour of EC entry. Although this enhanced the state's strongly pro-
European position, the Spanish delegation, fearing that this might reduce their 
bargaining power at EC level, also drew attention to the serious concerns over the 
implications of EC accession expressed in specific sectors. 
Internal opposition to EC entry terms 
A press article in 1978 announced that 'the political fanfare is over and the hard 
economic bargaining is on the horizon' (The Times, 20 March 1978), although it was 
several years before any serious debate of EC entry began in Spanish society. In the 
early stages of negotiations, despite some sectoral resistance, voices of dissent did not 
threaten the domestic consensus because of the Jack of alternatives and often minimal 
awareness of the full implications of accession. However, although the Economic and 
Social Committee considered that the EC was far more aware of the difficulties than 
Spain itself, describing the Spanish as being 'unwaveringly optimistic' compared with 
the more sombre assessment in Brussels (/HT, 20 November 1978), Spanish public 
opinion developed a greater critical capacity as negotiations continued (Monin, 1984, 
p. 53). Mon!n (1990, p. 40) refers to the 'legftima impaciencia y la natural frustraci6n 
manifestadas a lo largo del proceso que se abre cuando Ios esfuerzos espafioles 
tropiezan con la cerraz6n de Ios intereses econ6micos' (the legitimate impatience and 
the natural frustration shown throughout the process which emerges when Spanish 
efforts come up against the obstacle of economic interests). Increasing reservations 
about the implications of EC entry were fuelled by the publication of in-depth sectoral 
studies. Spanish industry particularly feared that it might be weaker and less 
competitive in the short term because of its inflexible labour laws, its weak 
managerial structure, and the poor relations between management and the trade 
unions (FT, 6 February 1979)26. In January 1984, in the parliamentary assembly of 
the Council of Europe, Gonzalez referred to the government's clear objective from 
the first day of the negotiations, but also highlighted the Spanish public's waning 
enthusiasm compared with six years previously (Armero, 1989, pp. 163--4). Even 
within the Spanish administration, a consensus could no longer be assumed, for 
26 A report prepared in 1980 by the Ministry of Industry in Madrid concluded that only 25% of the 500 
companies surveyed across industrial sectors thought membership would have an immediately positive 
effect, largely because of access to cheaper imported materials. Major pre-entry re-structuring aids, 
combined with a tariff transition period of up to ten years, would be necessary according to 20% of 
companies. In sectors such as steel and textiles, 40% believed they could benefit in the long term, but 
needed aid for pre-entry restructuring. The remaining 15% had built up strong export markets, and 
believed this would compensate for increased competition (FT, 17 December 1980). 
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example the Ministry of Trade and Tourism did not always share the clearly European 
vision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Monin, 1980, p. 325). 
Although expressing the Confederation's strong support for the overall objective of 
EC entry, the Director General of International Relations of the CEOE accused the 
government in 1981 of sacrificing sectoral interests to obtain a political success 
(Calvo Sotelo, 1990, p. 166). The Confederation monitored carefully the negotiations, 
although its input was mostly reduced to criticism of terms of entry which had already 
been negotiated. The government's agreement to introduce V AT from the time of 
accession in early 1982 was particularly criticised as an unjust concession demanded 
by the EC; as leader, Ferrer declared in Brussels in 1983 that the CEOE would not 
apply V AT without adequate transition periods for industrial products. The 
declaration led to considerable tension with the Minister for Relations with the EC 
(Aionso, 1985, p. 144). In view of the likely rise in prices, the question of VAT was a 
sensitive issue in the domestic arena, which ensured strong public support for the 
CEOE's tough position. The CEOE also rejected the Commission's proposal for a 
transition period in industry of one year before a 50% reduction in tariffs, stressing 
the need for a ten-year transition period (Le Monde, 12 January 1984). This blocked 
the talks on customs union in 1984 until the EC made concessions on agriculture 
(Monin, 1990, p. 394). The CEOE slogan was 'adhesion si, pero no a cualquier 
precio' (accession yes, but not at any price), a phrase originally used by Calvo Sotelo 
when Spain's application was made in 1979. Bassols (1995, p. 236) described the 
CEOE' s opposition as 'una fisura en el bloque espano1, un signo de desconfianza 
hacia el negociador .. .' (a break in the Spanish consensus, a sign of a lack of 
confidence towards the negotiator). 
The President of the Chambers of Commerce, Jose Marfa Figueras, was less critical 
of EC entry in 1984 than the CEOE, considering that it would ultimately have less 
impact on SMEs than on large companies (El Nuevo Lunes, 4 June 1984). However, 
small, often inefficient firms were accustomed to a highly protected market, and felt 
particularly threatened by EC accession (Pollack and Hunter, 1987, p. 145). They 
were represented by CEPYME within the CEOE, although its input to the 
government's negotiating position was limited, as illustrated by its serious 
dissatisfaction with the entry terms in March 1985. The weak organisation and 
fragmentation of interests within key sectors also inhibited a significant involvement 
in the policy process. For example, the citrus fruit industry's lobbying capacity was 
described as highly underdeveloped or 'stunted', thus leaving 'more sophisticated and 
concerted sectors, though not necessarily more deserving, at the head of the queue in 
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the government's dealings with Brussels' (FT, 10 May 1979)27. Sectoral demands 
were sometimes weakened by divergent interests within sectors. For example, the 
fears expressed by the car manufacturer, Seat, of the threat to its domestic market 
were not shared by Ford, which was oriented primarily towards exports, and 
welcomed EC entry (The Times, 31 March 1977). Similarly, the variation between 
farming types reduced the influence of agricultural lobbies, who feared that their 
weak negotiating capacity, in contrast to the strong French farming lobby, would lead 
to an unacceptable deal for the sector. For example, although the tomato and banana-
growing industries in the Canaries would benefit from the fall in tariffs following 
membership, accession threatened to cause serious problems for small and relatively 
inefficient dairy farmers in Galicia and Cantabria, where a large anti-EC lobby 
resisted any change. 
Although the fragmentary nature of lobbying in both agricultural and industrial 
sectors strengthened the government's capacity to win over opposition to EC entry, 
certain sectors, such as steel, gradually developed a greater capacity to represent their 
interests, and succeeded in exerting considerable pressure on the government. Steel 
became a very tough area of negotiation as a result of the strongly opposed interests 
of producers in Spain and the EC, and the lack of willingness of the Spanish industry 
to make concessions (European Trends, no. 59, May 1979, pp. 23-33). The sector 
was particularly vulnerable as severe financial difficulties demanded efforts to 
increase its exports to the European market while EC demand was falling. The 
Spanish delegation sought to negotiate longer transition periods and limits to tariff 
barriers for the industrial sector, while still insisting on early accession (European 
Trends, no. 72, August 1982, p. 5). This position was criticised by EC negotiators, 
who insisted on long term restructuring of the industry, and were unwilling to make 
major concessions to placate sectoral interests. Awareness at EC level of the 
politically sensitive nature of restructuring in view of the inevitable job losses, made 
the negotiation of the entry terms for steel producers problematic. 
Despite domestic opposition, the Spanish government was generally able to enforce 
unpopular decisions in the domestic arena. An example of the restructuring which the 
government carried out was the modernisation of olive oil production, involving the 
disappearance of over 12% of the existing two million hectares, and a total of 16.4 
billion pesetas in credits and subsidies (FT, 15 October 1981). Previous plans had 
been viewed with reserve by the relatively powerful agricultural workers' union in 
27However, some regions had stronger lobby groups, for example the powerful Valencia orange 
exporters' lobby which protested against the gradual reduction in the EC's barriers against Spanish 
citrus products (FF, 14 August 1984). 
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Andalusia, but the PSOE government stressed that fear of an increase in 
unemployment had to be weighed against the need for adaptation, justifying tough 
policies by convincing regional constituencies that they would be compensated once 
inside the EC. The government also sought to modernise dairy farming in the North 
West, granting special credits to farmers to encourage them to form co-operatives and 
mechanise production (FT, 16 December 1981 ), and set aside 200 billion pesetas for 
the industrial sector between 1981 and 1983 to subsidise the necessary investment for 
restructuring (The Economist, 17 April 1982, p. 67). The government showed its 
determination to modernise industry when, despite widespread protest, Gonzalez 
affirmed in a television broadcast on 11 March 1984 that plans to slim down loss-
making sectors would go ahead (The Economist, 17 March 1984, p. 54). However, the 
Spanish government sought to avoid negative consequences for vulnerable sectors, 
particularly those within politically sensitive regions, and EC officials were 
frequently critical of the Spanish objective of gaining something concrete in each 
negotiation to present as a triumph in the domestic arena (G6mez Fuentes, 1986, p. 
35). 
Leading up to the Dublin Summit in 1984, sectoral representatives criticised the 
government for permitting the politics of entry to outweigh other considerations, 
interpreted as a betrayal by Spain's domestic constituents. Harsh criticism was also 
voiced of the more conciliatory approach adopted by Spain in the final negotiations 
between March and June 1985. Despite enthusiastic responses from industrial lobbies 
such as Confemetal representing the metal industries when the negotiations were 
concluded (Le Monde, 13 June 1985), the mood at the time of the agreement, 
particularly in the agricultural sector, was described as an 'anti-climax' (Daily 
Telegraph, 31 December 1985). A sizeable farm lobby against EC entry terms had 
developed at a relatively late stage in the negotiations, as illustrated by the protests 
when the Spanish government was asked in 1983 to cut off aid to olive growers, and 
to begin phasing out subsidies over a ten-year transition period in order to pacify 
French and Italian farmers. Even sectors which had largely supported EC membership 
throughout the negotiations were critical of the entry terms. The Comite de Gesti6n 
de la Exportaci6n de Frutos Cftricos (Management Committee for the Export of 
Citrus Fruits) claimed that the sector would not enjoy the same conditions as 
exporters in Morocco for a further six years (El Pais, 30 March 1985). Farming 
organisations recognised the importance of EC entry, but the Confederaci6n N acional 
de Agricultores y Ganaderos (National Farming and Livestock Confederation, 
CNAG), including many of the bigger, more prosperous farmers, and the 
Coordinadora de Organizaciones de Agricultores y Ganaderos (Co-ordinated Farming 
and Livestock Organisations, COAG), representing smaller farmers, were both highly 
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critical and urged the government to help out the worst hit sectors28. Wine producers, 
while acknowledging the need to curtail volume production, considered that the 
application in Spain of the criteria for Greece represented a disaster for the industry 
(FT, 11 June 1985). While the prospects for Spanish Mediterranean agriculture, 
essentially citrus fruits and vegetables, were relatively positive, sectors in Northern 
Spain, such as dairy farming, cattle rearing and cereals, were severely hit by entry 
terms (The Times, 10 June 1985)29. 
The two main trade unions, particularly the CCOO, were also critical of entry terms. 
The resolution adopted by the CCOO Executive Committee in 1985, although in 
favour of EC entry, criticised the electoral and party-led interests of the government, 
the lack of debate in Spanish society, and the actual content of the Treaty which it 
considered did not reflect national interests (CCOO, 1985b). The union considered 
that more pressure could have been placed by the Spanish government to gain 
concessions in the worst hit sectors (El Pals, 29 March 1985). The CCOO Secretary 
General highlighted the harmful effects of the immediate application of V AT, the lack 
of priority given to employment issues and Spanish workers' rights, and the negative 
effects on sensitive sectors. In June 1985, both the main unions protested against the 
lack of social measures accompanying the modernisation of Spanish society. 
Regional opposition to EC entry developed in the final stages, although the majority 
of regional authorities had generally been in favour during negotiations. In June 1985, 
the President of the Canaries resigned after parliamentary opposition groups rejected 
the terms of Spain's EC entry by 30 votes to 27. In a struggle between economic 
lobbies on the islands, the importers won over the producers of cash crops, the 
preference thus being the opting out of the customs union (The Times, 16 July 1985). 
Farmers protested against the treatment of their produce as if it were from a non-EC 
country. Although free-port status and other fiscal privileges were maintained (JHT, 
24 June 1985), conditions enjoyed by Third countries in the fruit and vegetable sector 
would not be attained until two years after accession (Congress, no. 195, 27 March 
1985, p. 8917). Basque terrorists resorted to killings on the day of the signing of the 
treaty in Madrid as a protest against entry. One region which maintained its full 
28 Although opposition was not homogeneous, as some lobby groups considered that agriculture would 
benefit from EC entry, the majority of agricultural unions were highly critical of the government. The 
Young Farmers' union (Jovenes Agricultores) announced that the agreement would be disastrous for 
the dairy and pork sectors, and the Union representing farmers in Asturias (Union de Campesinos 
Asturianos) declared that the transition period should have been for ten years instead of five. 
Agricultural protests in !run against the terms of the treaty clearly illustrated the sense of discontent 
with the agreed terms (El Pars, 29 March 1985). 
29This countered the notion in many EC member states that Spanish agriculture would obtain the 
benefits, and industry the disadvantages ofEC membership (Le Monde, !2 June 1985). 
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support for EC entry was Catalonia; its leader, Jordi Pujol, claimed that this was a 
sign of its strong European credentials compared with more hesitant, isolationist 
tendencies in other parts of Spain. 
Although parliamentary ratification of the Accession Treaty was largely a foregone 
conclusion, opposition parties in Spain already referred to a phase of re-negotiation 
within the Community (FT, 29 October 1985). The opposition particularly criticised 
the negotiation of the agriculture and fisheries chapters, accusing the PSOE 
government of not explaining the potential losses to affected sectors. Some opposition 
MPs also criticised Gonzalez for using Europe to enhance his own image 
domestically and internationally30, Key sectors, such as agriculture in Galicia, viewed 
the rushed nature of the final negotiations as a result of the imminence of general 
elections and the linkage with NATO membership31, and many sectors referred to 
their lack of preparation for EC entry. However, the PSOE argued that the shock 
would not have been significantly lessened by delayed accession. Although a 
spokesman for the main opposition Popular Coalition group, Miguel Herrero de 
Mifi6n (1986, p. 63), supported EC entry, he was critical of the idealistic terms in 
which the government viewed Europe, the strictly political base of the accession 
process, and the PSOE negotiating formula which had not maximised Spanish 
interests. The low respect for parliamentary debate during the negotiations was a 
further key criticism. PSOE government officials such as Moran predictably justified 
their negotiation, arguing that Spanish negotiators had often rejected the terms 
dictated by the EC, for example the Spanish refusal of the EC' s proposals on 
agriculture on 21 February 1984 (Congress, no. 98, 29 February 1984, p. 4615). In 
areas such as fisheries, which were particularly prone to domestic criticism, 
government officials acknowledged the fear of the Spanish fleet prevalent in other 
member states, and the reluctance at BC level to admit Spain into the CFP (Congress, 
no. 221, 25 June 1985, p. 10192), but considered that the optimal deal had been 
obtained for the sector. 
This analysis provides evidence of widespread opposition to EC entry terms, even if 
the overall political rationale in favour of accession was not seriously doubted. 
Criticism was only fully articulated when the negotiations drew to their conclusion in 
1985, which led to a more intense interaction between the EC and domestic arenas. 
30rnterview with Spanish MEP (PP), Brussels, 22 February 1996. 
31 Interview with Head of Galicia regional office, Brussels, 21 February 1996. 
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Conclusions 
At EC level, Spain set forward tough bargaining terms, demanding equality of respect 
and recognition of its status as a middle ranking power in view of its belief in 'a self 
evident right to be treated as an equal by the Community' (Preston, 1997, p. 85). At 
domestic level, the Spanish government had to maintain the balance in favour of 
membership throughout the negotiations (El Pa(s, 22 March 1985). This set the scene 
for a long and complicated accession process in which the Spanish state played a key 
role at domestic and EC levels. 
During the talks on accession, tough economic decisions solidified the PSOE's status 
as a party of state, and the only political force able to deal with EC issues, thus 
contributing to its 'electoral hegemony' (Marks, M., 1997, p. 76). Otto Holman 
(1996, p. 92) highlights the key importance of the incorporation into the Community 
for the Spanish government when he describes the progressive subordination of its 
domestic policies to the PSOE's European project. The need to build and sustain an 
internal coalition in favour of EC accession was minimised by the overwhelming 
consensus existing in Spanish society, although discrepancies between domestic 
expectations and EC obligations had to be explained in sectors set to lose heavily 
from EC entry. Constituent support was important in view of the national elections in 
1986, but the large majority of the PSOE government from 1982 generally enhanced 
its level of autonomy in the formulation of European policy. Despite interparty 
criticism, even the main opposition parties could not oppose the fundamental 
objective of attaining EC entry. Gonzalez had an unquestioned control over 
government, the party and electorate, which meant he was able, unlike the UCD who 
had resorted to financial palliatives, to carry through electorally unpopular economic 
policies. Even former UCD government officials acknowledged the use of EC entry 
as a strategy to carry out essential domestic restructuring: 
Es diffcil tomar la decisi6n de cambio de legislaciones en una democracia 
nueva, por miedo a !as repercusiones electorales que ello pudiera tener. La 
adhesi6n nos marca el camino del progreso, sin coste polftico alguno en la 
lucha electoral interna, ya que la transformaci6n legislativa y la 
modemizaci6n se nos imponen desde fuera ... '. 
(It is difficult to take the decision to change laws in a new democracy, for 
fear of the electoral repercussions that that could have. Accession sets out 
the path towards progress, without any political cost in the internal 
electoral struggle, given that legislative changes and modernisation are 
imposed on us from outside .. .' (Bassols, 1995, p. 170). 
EC accession thus acted as a strong force against established vested interests opposed 
to liberalisation in Spanish society. Evans (1993, p. 400) considers that 'interests that 
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create intractable obstacles to international agreements in the short run ... are likely to 
be the object of restructuring efforts in the long run'. For example, the Agriculture 
Minister, Carlos Romero, stressed that one-third of the agriculture sector would be 
lost without EC entry (El Pa(s, 20 April 1985), arguing that the benefits would 
become evident in the medium term even if the transition period was difficult. Moran 
(1984, p. 59) openly admitted the difficulties and the vulnerability of certain sectors 
but emphasised the 'volonte de transformation et de rationalisation economique' (the 
willingness to adapt and carry through economic rationalisation) in Spanish society. 
The government highlighted the fact that EC entry would put the country on an equal 
footing with other EC member states, for example through providing funding for 
underdeveloped regions. This was an important consideration given that Madrid, the 
most developed province, represented 85% of the average EC gross domestic product' 
(GDP) prior to accession, whereas the less advanced provinces represented only 36% 
(Payno, 1983, p. 14). Spain therefore believed from an early stage in the accession 
process that the EC would 'arm them with the weapon of re-negotiation' (FT, 15 
December 1980). Gonzalez assured his constituents that 'the EC will not impose 
further demands beyond our social and economic means' (Europe 86, no. 253, 
January-February 1986, p. 48). 
The Spanish government had to adjust its policies considerably to reconcile its 
domestic policies to long-term EC aims. Therefore, 'each part of the government's 
domestic, social, and economic policy was presented and legitimized by reference to 
the necessity of adjusting Spanish socio-economic and political structures in the light 
of future membership of the EEC .. .' (Holman, 1996, p. 80). A key example is the case 
of fisheries, where the interests of the sector had to be compromised in return for the 
expected benefits of EC membership. The government expressed its determination to 
protect the sector's existing rights, while gaining additional advantages from 
incorporation into the CFP. Michael Marks (1997, p. 94) concludes that 'in the end, 
the Socialist government changed from protecting the narrow interests of Spain's 
huge fishing fleet to adopting the Community line that it was best to limit the size of 
the Spanish fleet in favor of strengthening the Common Fisheries Policy of the EC'. 
The aim was to prove to its counterparts in the negotiating arena that its policies 
would also largely benefit the EC as a whole. Despite the overall domestic consensus, 
the PSOE's objectives were strongly attacked from outside the party, and underlying 
tensions were even caused within the party by the increasingly neo-liberalist direction 
of policy (Holman, 1996, p. 84). 
Couching membership negotiations in political terms was an effective government 
ploy to overcome opposition in certain sectors, although the EC tried to emphasise the 
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economic realities of entry. Spain was seen by one analyst as a 'sensible and realistic 
polity', which was not expecting too much from the EC economically but regarding it 
as vital politically, although its greater awkwardness once a member was considered 
likely (Holmes, 1983, pp. 177-8). French opposition to Spanish produce was thus 
seen as 'an attempt to keep Spain in backward isolation' rather than sectoral 
opposition to the threat to their markets (Europe 85, no. 5, May 1985, p. 15). A study 
of the UK domestic negotiating arena leading up to EC accession showed how 
interest groups concerned with material benefits had less influence as the negotiations 
became more politicised (Lieber, 1970). In the case of Spain, the balance between 
economic and political rationales was reversed, as negotiations were politicised at the 
outset, and economic concerns only became more pronounced later. Although the 
political imperatives were genuine and existed from the outset, state strategies 
(described in Chapter 2 as 'creative statecraft' by Moravcsik, 1993b, p. 16) were a 
way of dealing with narrower economic interests, since opposition could be 
interpreted as disloyalty to the 'national interest'. Friman (1993, pp. 393--4) refers to 
the shaping of perceptions of domestic actors by stressing the broader issues at stake, 
thereby increasing the costs of opposition, at least morally. It is thus that 'domestic 
factors are manipulated by elites in order to create support for their chosen policy 
initiatives' (Marks, M., 1997, p. 6). The definition of issues to strengthen the position 
of the state vis-a-vis domestic actors would seem relevant to the Spanish case. For 
example, a key objective of NATO membership was to stabilise the democratic 
framework, and enhance a fuller acceptance of Spain in the European context. 
Political goals seemed far more important than national security issues in the debate. 
Gonzalez increased pressure on key member states by emphasising the growing tide 
of disillusion nationally. In 1980, according to PM Calvo Sotelo, 'Ios ambitos 
empresariales y la opinion publica ... se encontraban cada vez mas desengafiados ante 
el hecho de que Ios intereses econ6micos de la Comunidad pesasen ahora mas que el 
interes politico de nuestra entrada' (business circles and public opinion ... found 
themselves increasingly disillusioned with the fact that EC economic interests now 
had more weight than political interest in our entry) (Bassols, 1995, pp. 241-2). 
Although the Spanish government alerted industry at national level to the necessity of 
facing up to the realities of the market economy, it criticised EC negotiators for 
insufficient understanding of Spain's problems which was in danger of strengthening 
internal anti-EC feeling. The Secretary of State for the EC described EC agricultural 
demands in 1984 as going beyond what could reasonably be expected of Spain in 
sensitive sectors such as the olive-growing industry in Andalusia (Ya, 26 February 
1984, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1984, pp. 194-98). The transition ban on 
fishing in EC waters for ten years, proposed for the Spanish fishing sector in 1984, 
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was also regarded as unacceptable by the Spanish government. It anticipated firm 
opposition when it presented such terms for endorsement to its parliament, 
particularly as many fishermen were in politically sensitive regions such as Galicia 
and the Basque Country (Harrison, 1992, p. 207). Despite this caution, many 
opposition politicians considered the state's autonomy was enhanced by the EC 
context, and that the government was freed from even a minimal parliamentary 
control over its running of external affairs (Herrero de Mifi6n, 1986, pp. 146-7). 
Control over resources and agenda-setting gave Spanish negotiators the power to 
build up coalitions of support domestically, and to reconcile sensitive sectors to 
intransigent EC demands. The control of information is particularly important where 
a high degree of uncertainty exists amongst domestic constituencies, even if the 
government itself is relatively inexperienced in EC-level negotiation, and unsure of 
the actual costs and benefits. 
An example of domestic influence on the government's negotiating position at EC 
level was when a ten-year integration period for Spanish fruit and vegetables was 
decided on 20 June 1984, and, in the light of increased opposition from home, the 
Spanish government declared in July that it was seeking a general seven-year 
programme, with the exception of citrus crops (Keesings Contemporary Archives, no. 
3, May 1985, p. 33590). This shows that a study of the accession negotiations as a 
single, unopposed, rational choice by the Spanish state at EC level without any 
reference to the Spanish domestic arena would be incomplete. An examination of the 
input of key domestic groups to the accession process, and their relations with the 
state, provides a fuller analysis of the negotiating process. However, the influence of 
domestic actors on the negotiations depends not only on their power, information 
resources, and visibility, but also on the extent to which the political opportunity 
structure allowed them access to the policy-making process. Chapter 2 set out key 
factors which were expected to close the opportunity structure during the accession 
process and permit a high level of state autonomy. Evidence from the analysis in this 
chapter affirms the predominant role of the state in the process as a result of the 
following sets of conditions: 
1. Political rationale for EC accession which had a capacity to overcome economic 
or sectoral opposition 
The overall political consensus in favour of EC accession was very important in 
dispelling major opposition to entry. It gave the government a broad-based level of 
support, enabling it to remain in control of the negotiations. Disputed entry terms 
were accepted, if reluctantly, because of the overall imperative of EC entry for which 
there were no real alternatives. 
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2. Strong, majoritarian PSOE government 
The task of holding the balance in favour of membership, despite the existence of 
anti-EC lobbies in some key sectors, was far easier for a strong government backed 
by an ample majority in parliament. This was the case for the Socialist government 
which took power in 1982. Gonzalez was able to carry through electorally unpopular 
economic policies, which the former UCD government had been less able to do. In 
February 1985, Secretary of State for the EC Marin denied that a strong government 
needed to make concessions at EC level to satisfy electoral objectives, considering 
that its strength lay in the conviction that 'la opini6n publica se va a colocar detras de 
nosotros por mantener esta actitud' (public opinion will support our adoption of a 
firm position) (Interview in Ya, 17 February 1985, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 
1985, p. 231). This is one illustration of the confidence of the PSOE government in 
the support of its domestic constituency, which considerably enhanced its level of 
autonomy at EC level. 
3. Process of decentralisation still at an early stage 
The moves towards EC integration were occurring in parallel with the process of 
decentralisation in Spain so that, in key EC policy areas, the distribution of 
competencies between central and regional authorities was still being defined. This 
made regional involvement in EC negotiations a key issue; only some of the regions 
had the right to receive information on the drawing up of international treaties and 
agreements in areas of specific interest written down in their recently created statutes. 
Regional competencies had developed considerably since 1978 when 89% of all 
spending was controlled by central government (Gunther, 1996, p. 53), but the level 
of transfer of competencies was still limited when negotiations were concluded in 
1985. 
4. Lobbying process yet to be established in a newly consolidated democracy 
Lobbies were only just beginning to establish themselves in the new democratic 
framework, despite the 'hurried ferment of interest group formation' noted in the 
years of the consolidation of the democracy (Giner and Sevilla, 1984, p. 134). The 
Spanish polity had recently emerged from the era of protected, elite groups under 
Franco, and civil society needed to establish itself to create the conditions necessary 
for the organisation and legitimation of interests. The lobbying process in Spain was 
therefore noticeable for its fragmented nature during the accession negotiations, when 
even the strongest domestic groups only had a sporadic and restricted influence over 
policy decisions. 
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5. Low level of demand for information on the EC 
A general lack of information about the implications of EC entry existed in Spanish 
society, which, in some cases, meant that criticism only emerged late in the process 
when domestic actors became more aware of the length of transition periods and the 
detail of safeguard clauses. Only a minority of better informed regions sought to 
obtain an input to the negotiating process, and trade unions had a limited know ledge 
of negotiations at EC level. 
The state was not significantly constrained by opposition to entry terms in the 
domestic arena, which ultimately gave it full control over the negotiations. 
Furthermore, the majoritarian PSOE government was able to justify domestically 
tough measures agreed at EC level. This was even the case when demands clashed 
with those of the electorate, with the danger that 'the long-term benefits that 
economic restructuring was expected to have might not materialize in time to 
vindicate the governments' actions in the eyes of voters and economic interest groups 
alike' (Marks, M., 1997, p. 12). The state was able to manipulate domestic demands 
to increase its bargaining power at EC level, for example in the case of the demands 
of steel producers, which the government used to obtain the optimal deal for the 
sector. Although the Spanish delegation argued that it was at the mercy of key 
sectoral interests, the extent to which the EC took this negotiating ploy seriously is 
doubtful in view of the consensus in favour of membership commonly known to 
exist. Putnarn's (1993) strategy of 'tying hands' to increase the bargaining advantage 
was thus of limited utility in Spain's accession negotiations. As argued in Chapter 2, 
domestic constraints can only be exploited when bargaining involves relative gains 
for each state, whereas they are more likely to obstruct an agreement where all states 
aim to obtain mutual benefits (Mayer, 1992). 
The state-centric perspective thus seems appropriate for an analysis of the accession 
negotiations. Only minimal evidence exists for the development of a domestic 
ratification process, as in the two-level game approach described in Chapter 2. 
However, the incorporation of domestic political considerations within the state-
centric approach helps to explain how national preferences were aggregated, and 
clarifies the strategies adopted by the state to achieve its international goals. The 
development of a multi-level process was inhibited during the 1979-86 period by sets 
of conditions which allowed central government to monopolise the interface between 
the separated EC and domestic arenas. The evidence examined in this chapter 
supports the predominant assumption in the literature that the government's strategies 
to retain a consensus in favour of EC entry in the domestic arena were facilitated by 
its high level of autonomy. The costs of non-agreement were high in view of Spain's 
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political necessity for EC accession, and it was ultimately the state which remained 
the exclusive channel for the representation of domestic interests throughout the 
negotiating process. 
Chapter4 
CHANGING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SPANISH STATE AND 
DOMESTIC ACTORS DURING EC/EU MEMBERSHIP 
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The central role played by the Spanish state during the negotiations for Spain's BC 
accession, and the limited participation of actors other than the state in the process, 
were presented in the previous chapter. The nature of the political opportunity 
structure during EC/EU membership, as a result of the changing sets of conditions 
outlined in Chapter 2, may be expected to lead to a higher level of domestic 
involvement in the policy-making process after accession. This chapter seeks to 
reconsider many of the existing, relatively static interpretations of Spain's EC/EU 
membership, thus adopting a perspective which takes greater account of the 
participation of key domestic actors in the policy process. 
Firstly, the institutional arrangements and key actors involved in the national policy-
making process are examined. An initial focus on the nature of the pre-existing 
national framework is important as it can be considered to mediate the process of 
adjustment to EC/EU membership. Secondly, the mechanisms developed for the 
formulation and co-ordination of EU policy during Spain's membership are analysed, 
including an examination of the involvement of key domestic actors. Conclusions are 
then drawn on the extent to which the political opportunity structure has changed, and 
the potential impact of the new context for policy-making on the level of state 
autonomy. 
Institutional framework 
The framework for policy-making in Spain is a relatively recent development 
following the end of the Franco era in 197 5. The centralis! control of both political 
and economic structures in Spain was a key element of the Francoist dictatorship, 
thus enhancing the role of central government while inhibiting the development of 
independent organisational life (see Chapter 3). This section seeks to highlight 
significant features and key developments in the nature of the policy-making process, 
focusing on central government, parliament, regional government, and key socio-
economic actors. 
Central government 
In Spain, the domination of the policy-making process by the executive is particularly 
marked. Its role is enhanced in the 1978 Constitution, as illustrated by the privileged 
position of government bills, the vast majority of which are initiated by the executive. 
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The primacy of the Spanish central state has led to analogies with the institutional 
structure in France (Lequesne, 1993), in contrast to a more dispersed executive in 
other member states such as Germany (Bulmer, 1986). Political circumstances have 
enhanced the role of central government, for example highly disciplined Spanish 
political parties (see section on parliament), and the single-party majoritarian PSOE 
government from 1982-93. The Constitution accords particular importance to the 
strength of the president of the government, described in this thesis as the Prime 
Minister or PM, who is chosen following the King's consultation with representatives 
of the main political groups, and elected by means of a vote of investiture in the 
parliament. 
The PM enjoys considerable autonomy in shaping the political agenda in the Spanish 
policy-making process. It is his programme that is voted on, a personalisation which 
indicates the importance of the position in Spain (Heywood, 1991, p. 99; 1995, p. 90); 
this emphasis continues during Aznar' s term of office in the late 1990s, described as 
the 'sobredimensionamiento de la figura del jefe del Gobierno en el ordenamiento 
constitucional' (exalted status of the figure of Head of government in the 
constitutional order) (El Pais, 8 March 1998). According to Michael Newton (1997, 
p. 77), the PM 'becomes almost synonymous with the government'. Article 98.2 of 
the Constitution outlines his powers as the direction and co-ordination of the 
government's activities, and supreme control over all ministries including the 
appointment and dismissal of ministers. The Constitution also refers to the existence 
of one or more deputy PMs without indicating their specific duties, which have 
largely depended on each leader's objectives1• The most important political resource 
for the PM is the party, the management of which is one of the central roles of the 
leader (Jones, 1991). He also has an expert team of advisers who keep him regularly 
informed of policy developments2. His control of the policy process depends on many 
contingent factors such as the unity and homogeneity of the party, the extent of the 
party's parliamentary majority, and the level of popular support he commands (Bar, 
1988, p. 112). In addition to these endogeneous factors, exogeneous challenges also 
determine his level of authority (Heywood, 1991, p. 100; 1995, p. 91). For example, 
l While Gonzalez was PM, he concentrated more on foreign policy and general political strategy, while 
his deputy concentrated on internal matters including institutional problems, illustrated by the division 
of powers between Gonzalez and Alfonso Guerra in the 1980s. The PM's power to modify the 
institutional structure is illustrated by Aznar's appointment in 1996 of two deputies or Vice-presidents, 
responsible for the Ministry of the Presidency, and the Ministry of Economy and Finance. 
2rhe Presidency's office began as a small department, but has become equivalent to a ministry, its 
main purpose being to provide an advisory service, particularly in relation to issues to be discussed at 
cabinet meetings. The most important sub-division is the cabinet of the Presidency or PM (Gabinete de 
la Presidencia), which began to function when Gonzalez came to power. This is a separate entity from 
the government's office or the Ministry of the Presidency (Ministerio de la Presidencia), which 
includes the office for relations with the parliament. 
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Suarez faced considerable political challenges during his 1976-81 term of office, 
namely the need to establish the new Constitution, economic recession, and 
increasing demands for regional autonomy, whereas Gonzalez had a far more solid 
basis for political success in 1982, using the prospect of economic recovery and EC 
accession as a foundation for his policies (Heywood, 1991, pp. 105-6; 1995, pp. 95-
6). 
The top political category of the government is the cabinet (Consejo de Ministros), 
described by Newton (1997, p. 81) as 'the highest political and executive body in the 
land'. The cabinet is headed by the PM and includes the Deputy PM(s) and the 
ministers. The agenda is prepared by the General Committee of Secretaries of State 
and Under-secretaries which allocates the budgets to the various ministries and plays 
a key part in the decision-making process, only passing on the most controversial 
issues to the cabinet for discussion. The key roles of the cabinet are to exercise the 
executive function of formulating and approving national policy, to discuss and then 
present draft bills to parliament, and to propose regulations for the implementation of 
law already approved by parliament. Five cabinet committees have been established, 
which act in an advisory capacity and improve policy co-ordination between 
departments; the Committee for Economic Affairs is the most frequently convened. 
Ministers form a key element of the core executive, but also manage departments of 
public administration, indicating the overlap between administrative and political 
positions. They enjoy considerable autonomy in the running of their ministry, 
although they are ultimately responsible to the cabinet, to whom they present outline 
draft laws, and to the parliament, where they can be called upon to explain their 
policy decisions at any time. Figure 4.1 shows the structure of a typical ministry in 
Spain in 1995. 
The positions of Secretary of State and General Secretary were introduced by the 
1983 Law on Central Government Structure and are filled by political appointees, 
whereas the majority of positions below this level are, in theory, restricted to career 
civil servants. The PSOE sought to clarify political and administrative roles in 1984 
when an effort was made to establish specific guidelines for all positions (Keating, 
1993, p. 336). No other radical reforms of the administration occurred until 1997 
when two new laws updated that of 1983. Changing political circumstances have led 
to alterations in the structure and role of ministries. For example, in May 1996, the 
new PP government merged the ministries of Culture, and Social Affairs with existing 
ministries, and established a Ministry of Promotion (Fomento). However, 
restructuring is more an indication of the priorities of the new PM and the 
government, and their power to shape the institutional structure, than of substantial 
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Figure 4.1 Structure of a typical ministry in Spain 
Minister 
Secretary of State 
General 
Under-secretary Secretary 
Director General Technical General Director General Secretary 
Assistant Director Technical Assistant Director 
Generals Advisers Generals 
(Source: Newton, 1997, p. 94) 
Notes: 
The Secretary of State, despite considerable power within the ministry, is not involved in legislative 
functions, but can stand in for the Minister, for example in parliamentary hearings. Not all ministries 
have this position, although they are increasing in number. The Secretary of State may attend the 
Council of Ministers if invited, but is not a formal member of the Cabinet. 
The Under-secretary is responsible for the administration of the ministry, for communication between 
its various divisions, and for the drawing up of legislative drafts and other legal documents. The 
position has an important role in the weekly General Committee of Secretaries of State and Under-
secretaries meetings where key decisions on government policy are taken. 
The General Secretary, which does not exist in all ministries, officially has the same rank as the Under-
secretary, but does not enjoy the same prestige (Newton, 1997, p. 96). 
The Technical General Secretary often enjoys direct contact with the Minister, despite ranking below 
the Under-secretary, and heads an important team of technical advisers, experts and researchers who 
provide essential expertise to the ministry. Some commentators consider that this position has declined 
in status, given the importance of the minister's own team of advisers (Ross, 1997, p. 38). 
The Director Generals and their Assistants are responsible for the day to day running of specific 
departments and provide an annual report to the Minister on progress made. 
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changes in policy-making. The monopoly of the PSOE government over the policy-
making process was criticised by one analyst who concluded that 'the government, 
and the premier in particular, have not always resisted the temptation (offered by an 
initially unassailable parliamentary majority) to act in ways that have been allegedly 
authoritarian' (Newton, 1997, p. 89). However, Holman (1996) highlights the less 
assured power base of the PSOE in the 1990s, namely the end of its parliamentary 
majority in 1993, the growing internal divisions within its organisation, and the 
increasing conflict with domestic groups over tough economic decisions. These 
factors could be expected to have a considerable impact on the government's relations 
with parliament, although the strong role of the executive in Spain, and pacts with 
regionalist parties, have enabled Spanish governments in the 1990s to retain their key 
position in the policy process. 
Parliament 
The Spanish parliament or Cortes Generales is divided into two houses, the Congreso 
de Ios Diputados (Congress or Lower House) which has precedence in most matters, 
and the Senado (Senate or Upper House). According to Article 66 of the Constitution, 
the role of the Cortes is to 'exercise the legislative power of the state, to approve the 
state budgets, to control the actions of the government and to exercise the other 
powers vested in them by the Constitution'. However, the emphasis on consensus and 
negotiation during the transition resulted in a weak parliament whose main role was 
to facilitate pacts between the different political parties. The defeat of the government 
using a formal vote of censure is extremely unlikely, and the cabinet only needs the 
support (ordinary majority) of the Congress. The Senate is described as the chamber 
of territorial representation, although the vast majority of representatives are elected 
from the provinces as for the Congress. The effectiveness of the Senate is 
questionable when it is given only two months, or in urgent cases twenty days, to 
review bills passed to it by the Congress (Heywood, 1995, p. I 00), and it has no 
significant role in the relationship between government and parliament. A reform to 
enhance its role as a territorial chamber representative of the views of the 
Autonomous Communities remains on the political agenda. 
Although a more active role was possible for the parliament in the post-Franco 1979-
82 period, after 1982, the majoritarian PSOE government gave little importance to 
parliamentary debate. The strength of Gonzalez's position as PSOE leader was 
reinforced by the low levels of party membership, and the fact that few cabinet 
members were simultaneously members of the party's executive committee. The role 
of the parliamentary Socialist group was weakened by the highly centralised nature of 
the party. This resulted in the parliament having a 'subordinate position in which its 
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role amounts to little more than that of a privileged observer of the direct and intense 
relationships that exist between the government and the opposition. Accordingly, it 
tends to limit itself to supporting dutifully whatever the government does or proposes 
to do' (Capo Giol et al., 1990, pp. 116-17). All members of the Spanish parliament 
are generally bound by a strict party discipline, especially on matters requiring voting, 
and full support is expected for the party leader. Little space is left for divergent 
views or independent initiatives when the party spokespersons tightly control both 
procedure and outcomes. The decline in parliamentary influence is exacerbated by the 
rare occasions for spontaneous debate, the few opportunities to question the PM, and 
the focus of the electoral system on parties rather than individuals (Newton, 1997, pp. 
71-2). 
Legislation can be initiated by parliamentary groups and, if the government presents 
no objections to the bill within thirty days, it is submitted to the Congress followed by 
the appropriate committee for debate. However, government bills are clearly 
prioritised over parliamentary proposals. From 1982, 90% of all legislation debated 
was proposed by the government, the majority of which was speedily approved in 
parliament with minimal debate and minor amendments (Alda Ferniindez and L6pez 
Nieto, 1993, p. 257). Few limits to the power of the executive exist when a passive 
parliament generally follows the government's line, rarely setting up investigative 
commissions and not even serving as a forum for public debate. Domestic groups 
prioritise dialogue with the government for access to the policy process; 
parliamentary debate is generally regarded as being of minor importance for their 
interests. The lack of an effective opposition party reinforced the centrality of the 
government, and even the clear loss of majority for the PSOE in 1993, and the rise in 
importance of opposition parties, did not significantly change the executive-
legislative balance. 
Regional government 
The Constitution establishes that regions may have a degree of limited self-rule; 
Article 148 defines areas where powers would be assumed by the Autonomous 
Community, and Article 149lists those powers reserved for central government. The 
speed of devolution depended on the route to autonomy used, the so-called 'rapid 
route' used by Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia permitting higher levels of 
regional competency sooner than the slower route3, although it was intended that all 
regions would eventually be able to attain the same level of autonomy. The 
3WhiJe it did not qualify for the fast route option as an historic nationality, widespread support for full 
autonomy existed in Andalusia and, following a referendum on the issue, the region joined the other 
three historic nationalities in their accelerated procedure towards full autonomy. 
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devolution process began in Catalonia and the Basque Country, whose Statutes of 
Autonomy were ratified in parliament in 1979, and power was transferred to all 
regions by 1983. The rapid development in Spain of a semi-federal structure ensured 
expanding regional competencies in an increasing number of areas formerly 
controlled by central government. 
Each region has a legislative assembly elected by universal suffrage, a government 
headed by a president, and a high court of justice. The Statutes of Autonomy 
determine the regional government's capacity to draw up, approve and administer 
laws, and its relations with central government, while it is left to each regional 
executive to decide on the structure of public administration. From the outset, 
regional governments have been given considerable freedom in drawing up their own 
budgets, although the state generally retains responsibility for taxation4 (See Chapter 
5 for the system of regional financing in Spain). The Autonomy agreements of 28 
February 1992 advanced the open-ended process of devolution, seeking to harmonise 
the level of decentralisation between the regions, and establish intergovernmental co-
operation between central and regional authorities. The dependence of the 
government on regionalist parties for a majority in parliament from 1993 resulted in 
an enhanced bargaining power for key regions such as Catalonia and the Basque 
Country (see section on the framework for EC/EU policy-making). 
Socio-economic actors 
Despite the considerable development of key domestic groups in Spain, trade unions 
and employers continue to criticise the lack of consultation with the state. Relations 
between trade unions, employers and central government are considered here with a 
view to highlighting the attempts of socio-economic actors to obtain a greater input to 
the policy process. 
TRADE UNIONS 
The declining influence of the union movement can be noted in most EU member 
states, including Spain, in the 1980s and 1990s, partly as a result of structural changes 
in European economies which have inhibited union activity. The level of affiliation 
was still only around 10-15% of the Spanish working population in 1994 according to 
most estimates. However, between 1989 and 1993, the UGT recorded an increase of 
over 50% in their membership, partly explained by its growing distance from the 
increasingly unpopular PSOE government, and its more militant policies in favour of 
4The exception is the statute for the Basque Country and Navarre which includes certain tax-raising 
privileges. 
83 
workers (Newton, 1997, p. 234). The CCOO also reported rising membership, 
although the number of members declined in regions with high unemployment 
(Newton, 1997, p. 239). 
A more fragmented movement has emerged in the 1990s due to the rise in importance 
of smaller unions representing particular sectors, and the greater autonomy of regional 
federations in the decentralised structure of the two main unions. A further cause of 
weakness has been the disunity between the UGT and CCOO. The CCOO has often 
advocated militant methods to win concessions from the government, while the UGT 
has mostly adopted a more moderate line, focusing on negotiation with both 
individual employers and the government to highlight its demands. In general, the 
UGT's strategy has been more successful than the CCOO's militancy, but both unions 
combined forces in the late 1980s, reflected in the united action agreement of 
February 1988, which was facilitated by the election of a new, more flexible CCOO 
leader, Antonio Gutierrez. Faced with the PSOE government's increasing cuts in 
social spending in the late 1980s, three major strikes were called between 1988 and 
1994 by the two unions, the UGT having formally severed its links with the PSOE in 
1988. Even though the unions sought to maximise their influence on the government, 
particularly on issues such as wage bargaining and labour market reforms, their 
protest had little effect on policy decisions, as illustrated by the fact that widespread 
union opposition to economic policies in the 1990s seemed to have little impact on 
the government (Heywood, 1995, p. 253). This is clearly illustrated by the statement 
of the former Economy Minister Miguel Boyer to the UGT leader Nicohis Redondo 
that 'the norm in democracies is that the government takes decisions and afterwards 
informs the social agents' (Petras, 1993, p. 120). Tripartite negotiation with 
employers and the government became increasingly problematic in the 1990s, and it 
is significant that neither the Competitiveness Pact (1990) nor the Social Contract for 
Progress (1991) were ultimately signed. Despite moves towards co-operation with 
social partners by the new PP governmentS, relations were reported to have worsened 
in 1998 (El Pais, 8 March 1998); union influence thus remains limited. Increased 
dialogue with government officials is still a key objective in view of the lack of 
success of public protest, and the UGT and CCOO have published joint documents 
and adopted united strategies with a view to enhancing their influence on the 
government's economic and social policy decisions. 
Another channel used to gain access to the policy process has been the Economic and 
Social Council (Consejo Econ6mico y Social), belatedly established by the Law 
5Pacts between key socio-economic actors and the PP government were signed in 1997. 
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21/1991 of 17 June, as originally set out in the 1978 Spanish Constitution (see 
Chapter 3). The Council is a consultative organ on economic and social issues, 
providing trade unions, business and various sectoral and other representatives with a 
forum in which expert advice and recommendations can be given to the government 
on draft Jaws submitted to them by ministries. However, the forum has little impact 
on the policy process given that the cabinet is not obliged to implement 
recommendations, which are made in the absence of government representatives. 
Furthermore, because of the large number of members, it is difficult to reach 
consensus on the range of issues which fall within its remit (Solans Latre, 1995, pp. 
93-4). Evidence from interviews would suggest that trade unions will have little 
confidence in the Council until its structure and status are reformed6. 
EMPLOYERS 
The CEOE is a loose alliance of organisations which, in the 1990s, incorporates 
around 184 employers' federations representing nearly one million employers 
(Newton, 1997, p. 258). The majority of business organisations have affiliated to the 
Confederation, accounting for 75% of all employment (Keating, 1993, p. 340)7• 
Conflict of interest between sectoral and territorial groups is common, especially in 
important sectors such as metals and construction, although regionally based groups, 
for example in Madrid and Catalonia, have also become more established (Keating, 
1993, p. 340)8, The size and broad-based membership of the CEOE should make it a 
privileged discussion partner of the government in economic questions, but it lacks 
negotiating authority (Heywood, 1995, p. 255). Few policy areas exist where the 
CEOE has a substantial input, although it has sought to expand its areas of 
intervention. Ironically, its attempt to reduce labour involvement in policy-making 
ultimately restricted further its own input to policy formulation (Martfnez Lucio, 
1991, p. 47). Despite its monopoly of business interests, it has still not developed the 
capacity to represent the demands of diverse sectoral and business groups. As well as 
the loose nature of its organisational structure, the high level of foreign ownership 
works against organised employers' interests. Spanish industry Jacks 'leader' 
companies to play a key role and strengthen the CEOE's influence on the 
government, and competition between employers has further inhibited the 
development of an influential organisation. Other bodies such as the Chambers of 
Commerce constitute an important form of representation for smaller employers at 
6Jnterview with official of CCOO, Madrid, 21 May 1996. 
7 Other commentators (such as Colomer, 1995, p. 228) have reported that more than 90% of businesses 
are affiliated to the CEOE. 
8The 184 federations of the CEOE consist of seventeen confederations representing Spanish regions, 
thirty seven provincial associations, and 130 sectoral organisations at national or regional level 
(Newton, 1997, p. 258). 
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local level, while larger, multinational firms negotiate directly with the government 
without needing a representative association, or use alternative channels to pressure 
policy-makers within groups such as the Cfrculo de Empresarios. Newton (1997, p. 
259) considers that 'the supremacy of the CEOE-CEPYME was clearly signalled 
when it secured the totality of employer representation on the Economic and Social 
Council'. However, the Council's lobbying power was limited, not least because of 
the obligation to reach a common position with the unions whose interests often 
conflicted with those of business. 
Despite the limitations of the CEOE, its attempts to improve links with both central 
and regional government as well as the trade unions in the 1990s may lead to greater 
access to the policy process. The Confederation's relations with the party in power 
have been important in determining its influence. In the latter half of the 1980s, under 
the leadership of Jose Marfa Cuevas, it placed greater emphasis on deregulation, wage 
restraint and liberalism than previously, and was less committed to achieving pacts 
with the government and unions. Access to the policy process under the Socialist 
government was more difficult, and relations with the unions also became 
increasingly strained9. In the early 1990s, attempts at political dialogue with the 
unions and government were renewed, but the CEOE was often marginalised from 
debates. Although its support for the PP varied according to its policy line, close links 
with the party were expected to increase the CEOE' s potential for influencing 
government policy from 1996. However, during the election campaign in 1995-96, 
Aznar highlighted the distinction between the Confederation's demands and his 
party's policy (Ross, 1997, p. 117). 
Other than the lobbying mechanisms established by the CEOE, Spanish employers 
lack an effective system of interest mediation, thus making their participation in the 
formulation of Spanish government policy problematic. Interest groups tend to be 
small and weak, and have limited capacity to negotiate on behalf of their members. 
This is partly the result of the relatively new democratic framework established in 
Spain, and also of public reliance on the state to deal with domestic problems, as is 
consistently shown in opinion polls (Ross, 1997, p. 131). Consequently, pressure is 
largely channelled through state-controlled organisations. Some economic sectors 
exert a greater influence, a key example being the banking sector whose control of 
9 At the outset, the CEOE, under the leadership of Ferrer, enjoyed close relations with the UGT and 
reached a series of accords with the unions from 1979, thus contributing to the strengthening of the 
position of the UGT over the CCOO (Martfnez Lucio, 1991, p. 52). However, the subsequent leader, 
Cuevas, developed closer relations with the PP, and was less sympathetic to the union cause 
(Heywood, 1995, p. 255). Although the unions' influence was considered limited, the CEOE was wary 
of any increase in their standing vis-a-vis the government (Heywood, 1995, p. 254). 
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considerable commercial interests has ensured its impact on government policy. 
However, a succession of mergers has significantly reduced the number of leading 
banks, which may have increased their commercial power, but has not enhanced their 
collective political influence. This has happened to a large extent because the main 
banks often work independently rather than presenting a unified policy position 
(Ross, 1997, p. 115). Furthermore, increasing presence of foreign banks in Spain has 
limited their autonomy, although they still remain one of the most powerful Spanish 
lobbies. By contrast, the lobbying strategy of other economic sectors is considerably 
underdeveloped, as illustrated by the limited influence of the agricultural sector, with 
the exception of certain well organised sectors dependent on exports such as fruit and 
vegetables, and wine. In view of the generally weak representation of business 
interests, the CEOE has acted as the most important point of reference for employers 
despite its limited access to the policy process, thereby contributing to the forging of 
an employers' identity at national level (Martinez-Lucio, 1991, pp. 53-4). 
In conclusion, the policy-making process in Spain is characterised by a strong 
executive and a relatively weak legislative. A pluralist framework is only gradually 
developing in comparison with the more established lobbies found in other European 
countries. Little evidence exists for the development of access points to the policy 
process for key domestic actors such as trade unions and employers, although 
regional authorities have been able to increase their competencies and influence to a 
greater extent as the decentralisation process has advanced. 
Framework for EC/EU policy-making 
Spain's incorporation into the European framework led to new demands being placed 
on the Spanish administration, which are explored in this section. Key domestic 
actors sought to maximise their access to the bargaining process by adapting to the 
potentially new opportunity structures at national and EU levels. 
Central government 
From an analysis of the impact on national administrations of the need to accept 
organisational modernisation, reform, and innovation on accession to the Community, 
Vincent Wright (1996) concludes that a change in the balance of power is likely, 
depending on the prevailing domestic political climate. The process of 
Europeanisation can be considered as 'an incremental process reorienting the 
direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics 
become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making' 
(Ladrech, 1994, p. 69). The Spanish government adapted rapidly to the new demands, 
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its first EU Presidency in 1989 being widely regarded as proof that Spain, as a 
relatively new member, had developed the necessary administrative framework for 
European policy-making. The impact of some EU policy areas on the Spanish 
administration has been notable, for example cohesion policy (see Chapters 5 and 6), 
and environmental policy, which was largely a new area prior to accession. Pressure 
from the Commission may have contributed to the government's allocation of 
responsibility for the environment to the Secretary of State for Water and 
Environmental Policies in 1991 and, following the initial impetus, the policy area 
gained ministerial status in 1993, and a separate Ministry for the policy area was 
created by Aznar's government in 1996. The EU's impact on the development of the 
Spanish institutional framework is thus an important area for further analysis in view 
of its potential influence on policy formation. 
The Secretariat of State for Relations with the EC within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, responsible for co-ordinating the Spanish position during the accession period 
(see Chapter 3), continued to be responsible for co-ordinating EU policy during 
EC/EU membership (Law 1458/1985 of 28 August, replaced by Law 75811996 of 5 
May) (Secretariat of State for the EC, now the Secretariat of State for Foreign Policy 
and the EU, hereafter SSEU). In 1986, the SSEU consisted of a total of 158 
employees, 105 of whom were career civil servants (Secretaria de Estado para !as 
Comunidades Europeas, 1987, p. 11). SSEU officials have been recruited from the 
different ministries, which facilitates co-ordination because of their direct experience 
of departments and personal contacts. The SSEU has a number of working groups, 
not formally institutionalised, which discuss issues raised in the Council of Ministers 
at EU level. Ad hoc, informal meetings are held with ministerial representatives in the 
Secretariat, although the formal convocation of co-ordination meetings is within the 
framework of the Interministerial Committee for EU Affairs chaired by the SSEU 
(Law 156711985 of 2 September, replaced by Law 2367/1996 of 18 November). The 
Interministerial Committee seeks to achieve a consensus on issues which have caused 
conflict between ministries in the working groups, and to reach a united policy line. 
However, it has less power than the government's cabinet committees, and can only 
make recommendations. Representatives from the various ministries implicated in EU 
policy serve on the Committee; they are usually officials of lower rank than Director 
General, which does not enhance the Committee's standing (Dastis, 1995, p. 333). 
When agreement is not achieved on this level, or when the issue is considered highly 
important politically, the debate is transferred to the government's cabinet Committee 
for Economic Affairs (Law 156811985 of 2 September), or ultimately to the cabinet, 
which always has the last word on controversial issues. The final decision becomes an 
instruction communicated to the Permanent Representation in Brussels via the SSEU. 
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The structure of the Secretariat did not substantially change between 1986 and May 
1996 when the government widened its remit to include foreign policy as well as the 
co-ordination of EU affairs, largely as a result of the need to streamline public 
administration rather than a logical restructuring of the EU policy-making process to. 
The broader remit of the Secretariat is illustrated in Figure 4.2. It is too early to 
evaluate the impact of the reform, although the increase in workload signified by the 
drawing of a wide range of foreign policy under the umbrella of the Secretariat would 
seem to be in danger of giving less priority to EU issues. Furthermore, initial 
impressions from government officials indicate that co-ordination between the 
Secretariat and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will not be enhanced by the 
restructuring which is seen as representing 'un diffcil equilibrio entre una necesidad 
de austeridad y ahorro y un funcionamiento fluido' (a difficult balance between a 
necessity for austerity and saving and a smoothly functioning system), although the 
basic mechanisms established by the Secretariat were not changed by the 1996 
restructuring H. 
The Spanish Permanent Representation (SPR) was set up in 1986 (Law 260/1986 of 
17 January), and is the only body to have the right to represent Spain in Brussels and 
ensure its interests are defended in all areas of European policy. It is also responsible 
for keeping the domestic arena informed of developments at EU level. In 1987, the 
SPR was staffed by forty eight officials, its relatively large size reflecting the Spanish 
objective of familiarising as many officials as possible with EC procedures (Hayes-
Renshaw et al., 1989, p. 124)12. The number increased during Spain's EC Presidency 
in 1989, making it second only to the Greek Representation. The SPR officially sends 
the initial draft position to Madrid for approval, but often votes in Council meetings 
without formal written instructions from central government. This has sometimes 
been due to a lack of instructions from Madrid, although central administration 
ultimately has full responsibility (Dastis, 1995, p. 326). In general, central 
government representatives have a detailed knowledge of the technical issues, which 
is relied on by officials in Brussels, but less awareness of more horizontal, strategic 
lOnw Secretariat was formerly divided into two DGs, responsible for the Technical Co-ordination of 
EC issues, and for the Co-ordination of Legal and Institutional affairs. The DG responsible for 
Technical Co-ordination was restructured in 1996, while the DG responsible for Legal and Institutional 
Affairs was disbanded, and its functions transferred to other sections of the Ministry. 
11Interviews with official of the SSEU (Technical Co-ordination), Madrid, 29 May 1996, 13 June 
1997. 
12Jn an interview, an official in the Spanish Permanent Representation highlighted the small size of the 
SSEU in Madrid compared with the larger Permanent Representation in Brussels. Although an 
expansion of the SSEU has been considered, the number of officials in Madrid has not changed 
significantly (Interview, Brussels, 22 February 1996). This may be an indication of the greater 
importance given to the SPR for the monitoring of developments at EU level, and for the formulation 
of the national bargaining position. 
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matters. The presence of Spanish administrators in Brussels allows close monitoring 
of EU policy development, and the establishment of contacts with a wide range of 
actors. The SPR enjoys a fairly high degree of autonomy in its formulation of the 
Spanish position, particularly in the case of officials with long experience of EU 
policy-making who often take the initiative in negotiations. The Spanish Permanent 
Representative and the Deputy Permanent Representative play an important role 
because they have a horizontal vision of all policy areas. Their contact with officials 
in the International department of the Presidency of the government is essential for 
the formulation of a strong Spanish position in the most controversial areas. The PM 
is informed of all politically sensitive EU issues, and plays a key co-ordinating role in 
the preparation of the European Councils. High-level policy decisions would thus 
seem to be the domain of a very small team of experienced officials which has 
remained fairly constant from Spain's EC accession negotiations13. Figure 4.3 sets 
out the official structure for EU policy-making, although the influence of the 
Presidency, the government cabinet committee and key ministries on policy 
formulation is expected to vary according to the specific policy area. 
Ministries in Madrid are keen to maximise their involvement in negotiations at EU 
level which sometimes leads to duplication of effort and even a fragmentation of 
interests (Gonzalez Sanchez, 1987, pp. 704-5). Problems of policy co-ordination, 
such as contradictions between instructions from SSEU, and influential ministries 
such as Agriculture, were commonplace even during the early years of membership 
(Hayes-Renshaw et al., 1989, p. 131). Direct contact between the SPR and the 
particular ministry in question was often considered essential for a rapid formulation 
of the Spanish position, although the SSEU was mostly kept informed of the issues 
discussed. Co-ordination of EU policy depends on the effectiveness and capacity of 
the Spanish government to aggregate its internal interests and formulate a common 
position, rendered increasingly problematic when each ministry tends to establish 
direct contact with its interlocutor in Brussels. The Interministerial Committee has 
13rn an interview with an official of the Spanish Pennanent Representation (Brussels, 22 February 
1996), it was emphasised !hat the role played by key individuals in EU policy could not be overstated; 
for example Javier Elorza (Spanish Pennanent Representative), who had a considerable influence in 
key ministries in Madrid and often a 'free hand' in Brussels, and Westendorp (fonnerly Secretary of 
State for the EC), who is highly regarded for his wide experience of Spanish involvement in EU 
affairs. The importance of such individuals is illustrated by the interviewee's allusion to a shift in !he 
decision-making process in the early 1990s when Elorza and Westendorp moved from Brussels to 
Madrid. Pedro Solbes, who was fonnerly Secretary of State for the EC, was also noted by EU officials 
for his capacity to sell ideas fonnulated in Brussels domestically (Interview with official of Forward 
Studies Unit, European Commission, Brussels, 23 February 1996). The key influence of Gonzalez was 
repeatedly emphasised in interviews; one interviewee described his briefings to parliament on Spain's 
achievements at the European Council meetings as largely accepted without debate (Interview with 
fanner official of Basque regional office, Brussels, 23 February 1996), an indication of the high level 
of autonomy enjoyed by the PM in the domestic arena. 
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frequently struggled to define Spain's position on issues on the COREPER and EU 
Council of Ministers agendas (Molins andMorata, 1994, p. 118). This is an indication 
of the development of a 'compartmentalisation' of government, where ministries act 
independently of the EU and develop their own relations with sectoral actors, as has 
been illustrated in the case of Germany (Bulmer, 1986, pp. 38-9). According to 
Article 2.1 of the law establishing the SSEU, its co-ordinating role should not 
negatively affect the competencies given to other departments (Dastis, 1995, pp. 330-
31). Zapico Goiii (1995, p. 55) considers that the SSEU's Interministerial Committee 
is more a forum for information exchange, restricted to debate about specific episodes 
in the short term rather than long -term strategic issues. He describes it as merely 'una 
instituci6n para la legitimaci6n de !as instrucciones que eran enviadas a la 
Representaci6n Permanente' (an institution for the legitimation of the instructions 
sent to the Permanent Representation) (Zapico Goiii, 1995, p. 63), and argues that a 
permanent co-ordination unit within the SSEU would lead to a more horizontal, 
strategic defence of Spanish interests. It has been suggested that the SSEU would 
enjoy a greater degree of authority if directly attached to the Presidency of the 
government (Moderne, 1987, p. 154; Zapico Goiii, 1995, p. 55). This view was also 
put forward by a former official of the Secretariat, although he considered that one 
advantage of its position within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was that it caused less 
conflict with the Autonomous Communities over the division of competencies 
between central and regional levels (Dastis, 1995, p. 331). 
The SSEU seeks to centralise the EU policy-making process as far as possible, 
although the high level of co-ordination achieved during the accession process was far 
less easy to maintain during membership. Zapico Goiii (1995, p. 62) comments that 
many of the civil servants responsible for negotiating accession left the SSEU on 
Spain's entry, and new officials, although highly qualified, lacked the knowledge of 
Community procedures. Furthermore, the SSEU could not have in-depth expertise in 
a rapidly increasing number of policy areas, particularly when Spanish interests had 
to be defended multilaterally in the EU arena rather than bilaterally as during 
accession. However, co-ordination has been enhanced in the 1990s by more 
developed relations between the SSEU and the various ministries, improved intra-
ministerial co-ordination and more stable representation in the Interministerial 
Committee (Zapico Gofii, 1995, p. 63). However, this positive view of the learning 
process undergone by Spain is not held by other commentators such as former SSEU 
official, Alfonso Dastis ( 1995), who concludes that co-ordinating mechanisms have 
deteriorated during EU membership, as illustrated by the diminished status of the 
Interministerial Committee. He relates the problems to increasing maturity of 
ministries who are assuming greater control of their particular policy area, but also to 
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the functioning of SSEU itself, highlighting the ad hoc, informal meetings which only 
occur in specific cases, and the 'cierta relajaci6n en la labor de Ios propios 
responsables de la coordinaci6n' (a certain relaxation in the work of those responsible 
for co-ordination) (Dastis, 1995, p. 349)14. Although the Technical General Secretary 
in each ministry is generally responsible for the dissemination of information and for 
making contact with EU institutions, the level of co-ordination varies considerably 
between ministries, and even those most active in European affairs have not always 
developed effective strategies to replace the SSEU's co-ordinating role. 
Although the SSEU has minimal contact with key domestic actors, ministries active 
in EU policy generally maintain close relations with sectoral and regional interest 
groups prior to and during the drafting of directives, and during the formulation of the 
ministry's position. The increasing autonomy of key ministries could signal greater 
access to the policy process for domestic actors, particularly during the 
implementation phase when officials increasingly rely on their involvement. 
Although communication between Brussels, Madrid and regional authorities has been 
facilitated by technological advances such as the establishment of electronic mail 
links, implementation of a rapidly expanding EU policy agenda at regional level is 
problematic for central government, which relies on the participation of subnational 
authorities at ground level. Morata ( 1996, pp. 139-40) notes that a public survey 
among 650 senior public officials in 1991 by the Ministry of Public Administration 
concluded that an improvement in the mechanisms for implementation of European 
legislation was needed, as well as an enhanced level of co-ordination with regional 
administrations. 
Access to the policy-making process is far more problematic during the policy 
initiation and decision-making phases, and national positions formulated by officials 
in Brussels and Madrid have not necessarily been approved domestically by the 
private sector (Molins and Morata, 1994, p. 129). Where relations between 
government officials and domestic actors have developed, they remain ad hoc and 
informal rather than institutionalised. EU membership could be considered to have 
given central government the opportunity to strengthen its decision-making functions 
and increase its monopoly over the policy process. As one ofLynn Maurer's (1995, p. 
147) interviewees acknowledged in her doctoral research on executive-legislative 
relations, 'actually, the Government, and no-one else, is the one who has contact with 
14one current SSEU official considered that the fact that Dastis had been based in the SSEU at an 
early stage, and had then returned to the Secretariat at a later date, meant that he was comparing two 
completely different situations, many changes being logical developments for any member state during 
EC/EU membership in view of the increase in number of actors and policy areas (Interview with 
official of the SSEU, Institutional Relations, Madrid, 29 May 1996). 
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the other members. In other words, the language, the gestures, and the codes are 
known only by the Government and the Ministers'. The role of the PM in formulating 
the Spanish bargaining position is particularly important. Gonzalez played a key part 
at the highest level, generally enjoying greater autonomy in Brussels than in the 
domestic arena. This indicates the continued centralisation of the policy process, 
involving a higher number of ministries and a less developed role for institutions such 
as the SSEU, but more rarely including the involvement of key domestic actors in the 
formulation of the government's position. Parliamentary debate of the Spanish 
bargaining position prior to negotiations in Brussels could potentially act to lessen the 
high level of autonomy of the government, but limitations to the role of the 
parliament remain during EU membership. 
Parliament 
The PM reports on each European Council Summit in parliamentary plenaries and 
responds to questions from party leaders. Resolutions and recommendations resulting 
from the debate should, theoretically, be taken into account in the formulation of the 
Spanish position. In reality, ceniral government retains a large margin of manoeuvre, 
with the danger that the briefing to parliament can become a mere formality. The lack 
of parliamentary participation in EU policy is not unique to Spain; in all EU member 
states, governments remain responsible for transferring information to parliaments, 
and hence largely control the extent of their involvement. However, in the case of 
Spain, the existence of a majoritarian government for most of the 1980s, the generally 
high degree of consensus on EU policy, and the weak nature of opposition parties, at 
least until 1993, meant that the parliament was particularly unlikely to exert a high 
degree of influence on government policy. 
Although the parliament does not have a direct role in defining Spain's position on 
EU policy, a Joint Committee for the EU (Comisi6n Mixta Congreso-Senado para la 
Union Europea) (Law 47/1985 of 27 December) was created in 1986 to monitor 
European policy, as has occurred in varying forms in all EU member states. The 
Committee initially focused on examining the enactment of regulations and directives 
into Spanish law. Twice a month, the Secretary of State for the EU answers questions 
in the Joint Committee for the EU as well as the Congress Budget Committee, 
although little interest is taken by the parliament or public in this opportunity to 
monitor the implementation of Community policy (Molins and Morata, 1994, p. 118). 
The objective of the Committee is to formalise the systematic and permanent transfer 
of information from the government to parliament, merely aiming, according to one 
Spanish parliamentary official (Delgado-Iribarren, 1997, p. 15), to avoid the 
duplication of information in the Congress, Senate and the various committees. 
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The acknowledgement of the inadequacy of the guidelines established for the 
monitoring of EU policy led to the reform of July 1988 (Law 1811988 of 1 July), 
which allowed the Committee to expand its competencies. In the reform, it was 
recommended that it should be informed by the government of all agreements and 
decisions in the Council of Ministers affecting Spanish membership, and of the 
objectives of central government at EU level. The reform also allowed it to write 
reports on issues of interest, and provided for the development of relations with 
Spanish MEPs and other national parliaments. This reform led to a higher level of 
activity, especially following the creation in 1990 of three sub-committees, on the 
effects of EC accession, EMU, and political union, which encouraged greater 
parliamentary debate. Furthermore, the competencies of the Committee have 
increased during the third legislature, leading to some increase in its standingts. In 
1993, the opposition PP proposed involving it more closely in the preparation of the 
IGC. The creation of a Subcommittee for the Monitoring of the IGC in the 29 October 
1996 session of the Joint Committee led to a unanimously approved report on the IGC 
in its session of 29 May 1997 following thirteen Committee sessions16. In 1994, it 
was established that the Committee should be informed by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs about proposals made by the Commission relevant to Spanish interests, along 
with an evaluation of their likely effects (Law 811994 of 19 May). More generally, 
information would also be transferred on the activities of the EU institutions to allow 
the Committee to intervene at an earlier stage in the process. However, the fact of not 
being able to question EU policy until 'after the event' led to harsh criticism of the 
government and a growing demand for greater accountability. The May 1994 reform 
included the Committee's capacity to request discussion on the floor of the House of 
a specific legislative proposal; this led to the passing of a resolution on 14 November 
1994 setting out the terms of reference for the government's negotiation of the reform 
of the market for wine production, which gave rise to a full debate with the 
Agriculture and Fisheries Minister on 27 April 199517 . Increasing requests for 
ministers to explain their policies before the negotiation of important legislative 
proposals are a key illustration of the Committee's attempts to adopt a more active 
role in European policy. 
15Jnterviews with member of the Joint Committee since 1993, Madrid, 28 May 1996, 3 June 1996. 
16The list of sessions is an indication of the increased activity of the committee: 18 November 1996, 
and 19, 25 February, 4, 18 March, I, 11, 15,25 April, and 6, 22, 28,29 May 1997, with guest speakers 
including the Secretary of State for Foreign Policy and the EU, Ram6n de Miguel (18 June 1996), the 
Spanish Ambassador in the EU, Elorza (11 April 1997), and Commissioner Oreja (25 April 1997) 
(Report of the Special Monitoring Subcommittee, responsible for studying and debating the IGC 
process, Congress, 29 May 1997, pp. 16-17). 
17Jnformation supplied by the Clerk to the Joint Committee in a communication to the author in 
August 1995. 
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However, despite some positive developments, the actual impact of the Committee on 
European policy remains minimal. It is not a legislative committee. Its initial task was 
to examine the fifteen legislative decrees issued by the government to adapt Spanish 
legislation after accession, but their opinions, according to Closa (1996, p. 141), 'did 
not have any political relevance nor were they discussed in plenary session'. No 
significant bilateral relations have developed with either EU or national institutions as 
a result of the 1988 reform, and the ad hoc sub-committees set up on EMU and 
political union have had little effect; the document on political union, after only two 
hearings with ministers, was issued after the Maastricht Summit (Closa, 1996, p. 
143). An official in the Spanish Parliament questioned the function of the Committee 
after the 1988 reform: 
Cual era entonces la funci6n de esa Comisi6n? Limitarse a ser un buz6n de 
recepci6n de documentaci6n gubernamental y, todo lo mas, celebrar 
comparecencias sin que todo ello se tradujese en acuerdos o tomas de 
posici6n sobre Ios asuntos tratados? 
(What then was the function of this Committee? Limited to being a 
postbox for the receipt of government documentation and, what is more, 
holding hearings without translating all this into agreements or positions 
on the issues debated?) (Delgado-Iribarren, 1997, p. 15) 
Despite some increase in the Committee's standing, subsequent reforms have also 
seemingly failed to give it any importance in the policy process. Although the 
committee on the IGC in 1996-97 had considerably more hearings, its conclusions 
largely reflected the government's position. In parallel to other EU member states, the 
links between national parliaments and the EU have thus been described as having a 
'caracter indirecto y bastante debil' (indirect and fairly weak character) (Sanchez de 
Dios, 1995, p. 105). The Committee has generally sought to reach an overwhelming 
consensus on state policy vis-a-vis the EU and avoid interparty conflict (Martfn 
Martfnez, 1995, p. 466). The minimal level of discussion of its conclusions on EU 
policy is an indication of its limited role, although some members justify the greater 
degree of consensus in comparison with other committees as being required to 
strengthen the government's position at EU level and, therefore, as a key objective of 
the proceedings IS. 
The level of efficiency of the Committee seems to be far less than in other committees 
such as Foreign Affairs and Agriculture, which have a higher political standing and a 
greater capacity to hold informed debate on specific issues. Analysts have illustrated 
this with statistical data which show that, in 1996, taking into account the reduced 
activity due to national elections, only eight sessions of the Committee were held with 
18Jnterview with former member of the Joint Committee (1986-93), Madrid, 18 June 1996. 
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a total duration of eighteen hours, compared to the Economy, Trade and Finance 
Committee, which met twelve times for a total of forty five hours (Delgado-Iribarren, 
1997, p. 17). In practice, the huge increase in paper work received by members on all 
subject areas as a result of the 1994 reform has not necessarily enhanced the level of 
political debate19, and, for so long as the information received from government still 
arrives after the Spanish position is determined, its role will remain largely symbolic. 
Central government argues that the rapidity with which decisions must be taken 
makes parliamentary backing for positions on EU legislation impossible (Sanchez de 
Dios, 1995, p. 108). Therefore, although an increase in the exchange of information 
between government and parliament has occurred, the number of questions and 
hearings having doubled between 1989 and 1993 (Closa, 1995, p. 141), the 
Committee continues to have little input to the EU policy process. 
Spain's incorporation into the Community would thus seem to have distanced the 
parliament from the decision-making process. Despite the greater powers for 
acquiring information in the 1994 reform, the evaluation of the information in reports 
produced by the committees lacked any significant input. A Committee member 
denied that its non-legislative nature reduced its importance, and highlighted the 
limited remit of all parliamentary committees which can only approve or reject EU 
treaties20. However, in practice, the lesser political standing of the Committee tends 
to mean that it is less prioritised by the bureau of each House responsible for passing 
on legislative proposals from the government to committees. Even if the Committee's 
debates occasionally have a greater input, for example on the question of regional 
participation (see section on regional government), it does not form an essential part 
of the EU policy-making process; the key problem according to commentator 
Magdalena Marfa Martin Martfnez (1995, p. 461) is the 'escaso o nulo valor 
concedido por el Gobierno a la actividad que la Comisi6n desarrollaba' (little or no 
value given to the activity carried out by the Committee by the government). Without 
legal modifications, which are unlikely, the Committee will continue to receive a 
posteriori information on EU issues. According to the Speaker of the Congress in a 
speech in 1997, 
en el caso especffico de !as Cortes Generales, parece aconsejable dotar a 
nuestra Comisi6n Mixta de mayor agilidad y entidad. Posiblemente haya 
19The information sent to committee members, according to one interviewee who has been a member 
of the Joint Committee since 1993 (Interview, Madrid, 28 May 1996), was excessive, covering a wide 
range of legislation in specific areas. He considered that the focus should be on broad EU policy lines 
rather than technical detail which could be dealt with in other committees. He also commented on the 
facility with which information was obtained by PSOE members during the Socialist term of office up 
to 1996, especially when good relations had been established between ministers and parliamentarians. 
20rnterview with member of the Joint Committee since 1993, Madrid, 28 May 1996. 
llegado tambien el momento de plantearse la posibilidad de desdoblar la 
actual Comisi6n Mixta en dos comisiones nuevas, una en el Congreso y 
otra en el Senado. 
(in the specific case of the Spanish parliament, it seems advisable to give 
our Joint Committee greater energy and capacity. Possibly the moment has 
also come to consider the possibility of dividing the current Joint 
Committee into two new committees, one in the Congress and the other in 
the Senate) (Trillo-Figueroa, 1997, p. 9). 
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The fact that the President and Speaker of the Lower House acknowledges that a 
fundamental reform of the Joint Committee is necessary illustrates its lack of input. 
Although the majority of national parliaments have a limited role in EU policy, the 
level of parliamentary control in Spain seems to be less developed than in other 
member states, which further enhances the autonomy of central government. One 
parliamentary representative claimed that key domestic groups 'were not specifically 
interested in their national parliament's position, but only in what is being actually 
negotiated behind closed doors in Brussels'21. The lack of interest of key sectoral 
actors and the Autonomous Communities in parliamentary debate of EU issues 
indicates its lack of implication in the process. 
Regional government 
In the debate on Spain's EC accession in June 1985 (Congress, no. 221, 25 June 1985, 
pp. 10177-217), Foreign Minister Monin acknowledged the necessity for increased 
co-operation between the government and the regions. Despite progress at EU level in 
attaining greater regional participation, most notably in the Maastricht Treaty22, 
obstacles remain at national level. According to the Spanish Constitution, although 
the government is able to delegate power to the Autonomous Communities via Article 
150.2, international relations are the exclusive competency of the central state (Article 
149.1.3). However, higher levels of regional competency in key policy areas have led 
to demands for greater subnational input to European policy during membership. 
Regional participation in EU policy can be divided into three main stages according 
to the progress made: 1985-87; 1988-92; 1992 to the present (Ministerio para !as 
Administraciones Piiblicas, 1995, p. 137). During the first stage, the aim was to sign 
21 Information supplied by the Clerk to the Joint Committee in a communication to the author in 
August 1995. 
22The regions were not mentioned in the Treaty of Rome (1957), which focused solely on the member 
state. The SEA (1986) did not fundamentally change the situation, and it was not until the EU Treaty 
(1992) that the regions were given a place in the institutional system. In brief, the Maastricht Treaty 
made three fundamental changes: regional authorities were allowed to vote in the Council for the first 
time, although still representing member states; the Committee of the Regions was created to represent 
regional interests in Brussels, and the principle of subsidiarity was included which would in theory 
encourage greater regional participation. 
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an agreement which would set out the key principles to be followed. This was very 
much a preliminary stage, and the series of draft accords drawn up (four including the 
Catalan alternative proposal) only ever amounted to an identification of the main 
problems to be fully debated in the second phase. In December 1988, a meeting was 
held to inform the Autonomous Communities of the priorities for the Spanish 
Presidency in the first half of 1989. At this meeting, which marks the start of the 
second phase, the need for a formal institutional mechanism to manage the relations 
between central and regional governments was recognised. On 15 February 1989, the 
Spanish parliament approved a motion which recommended establishing a more 
formal dialogue, and, in a meeting on 16 March 1989, a series of issues were 
prioritised for the following months. It was not until the 5 April 1989 session of the 
Joint Committee for the EC, after two years during which no official statement was 
made on the issue, that the Minister of Public Administration acknow !edged that 
attempts to reach an overall accord were being abandoned due to the lack of a 
common regional agreement. A more progressive approach was then adopted based 
on gradual and often partial agreements according to the policy area rather than a 
more rigid, global vision (Burgorgue-Larsen, 1995, p. 132). Although regular 
meetings between regional and central government representatives on specific policy 
areas had existed since 1983, the existence of sectoral meetings (conferencias 
sectoriales) was now formalised, and a forum was established for the discussion of 
horizontal issues related to the EC, the Conferencia para asuntos relacionados con !as 
Comunidades Europeas (hereafter Conferencia). The plenary meeting of this 
committee is attended by the Minister of Public Administration, the Secretaries of 
State for the EC and for Territorial Administration, and representatives from each of 
the Autonomous Communities. The global outlook of the forum gives it an added 
importance as compared to the technical focus of sectoral meetings, its main functions 
being to provide information on European Council meetings and EU policy 
developments, to work towards an agreement on the method of regional participation 
in EU affairs, and to monitor the activity of the sectoral meetings. 
Two agreements were signed by central and regional authorities on 29 November 
1990, firstly, on the position of the regions in cases of violation of EC rules involving 
regional competencies brought to the Court of Justice by the Commission (according 
to Article 169 of the EC Treaty), and secondly, an agreement on the procedure to 
follow regarding Commission rulings on state aids23. Although these were small 
advances, as a result of the first agreement, a dialogue has developed between the 
Secretary of State for the BC and the Autonomous Communities, and meetings held 
23Boletfn Oficial del Estado (Official State Gazette, BOE), no. 216, 8 September 1992, pp. 30853-4. 
100 
by the Commission to discuss violation of EC rules have included regional 
representatives. The forum also set up a permanent working group responsible for the 
preparation of plenary meetings, the Co-ordinating Committee for EC affairs, and 
agreed to establish the position of co-ordinator in each region (Ministerio para !as 
Administraciones Publicas, 1995, pp. 150-1). 
On 28 February 1992, agreements on the Autonomies were signed by the two main 
political parties which proposed that the Conferencia should be institutionalised. This 
occurred on 29th October 199224. The only significant change was the decision to 
hold regular, formal meetings, for example prior to each European Council. A further 
small step forward was taken on 14 June 1994, when an agreement was signed 
establishing that areas other than purely Community issues would now also be 
discussed, for example relevant issues debated in the Council of Europe. It also set 
out an internal code of conduct which was approved unanimousJy25. 
The first important agreement to be signed, after almost two years of negotiation, was 
that of 30 November 1994. It set out the framework for the internal participation of 
the Autonomous Communities in EU affairs26. Significantly, the accord obliged 
central government to take into account the common viewpoint of the regions in 
policy areas within exclusive regional competencies when formulating its initial 
negotiating strategy. In the case of shared competencies, the views of central and 
regional government would be co-ordinated. Central administration would be obliged 
to keep regional authorities informed of the negotiations in areas within the exclusive 
competency of the state. Cesareo Gutierrez Espada (1994, pp. 225-7) has identified 
two major elements which threaten the coherence of the 30 November 1994 
agreement. The first is the fact that the agreement is not legally binding and is 
therefore dependent on the political will of the participants. The second is the 
difficulty of achieving a common agreement amongst the regions, which is 
particularly problematic considering the independent position adopted by the Basque 
Country. 
The biggest threat to attempts at enhanced regional collaboration is the tendency of 
more active regions to develop individual mechanisms for representing their specific 
interests. Central government in Spain only has to be informed of the various 
arguments put forward by the regions if no common position is possible and, although 
multilateral co-operation should theoretically be the norm, bilateral agreements 
24soE, no. 241, 8 October 1993, p. 28669. 
25soE, no. 257, 27 October 1994, p. 33815. 
26soE, no. 69, 22 March 1995, p. 9037. 
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between central and regional governments are still prevalent. This was a key issue for 
the Liinder in the German framework set up in 1979 (Bustos Gisbert, 1995, p. 160), 
and is especially the case for the Basque Country; it did not sign the 29 October 1992 
and 14 June 1994 agreements until 30 November 1995 in response to the 
establishment of the Bilateral Committee for co-operation between the central and 
Basque administrations on EU issues27. The Basque position has generally been the 
most extreme, whereas Catalonia, although articulating individual demands, has been 
keener to adopt multilateral solutions. An intermediate group has included regions, 
such as Andalusia and Galicia, which are generally active, but less vocal in their 
demands. Finally, some regions have shown little interest in EC/EU issues and have 
not articulated specific demands for greater participation (Ministerio para !as 
Administraciones Publicas, 1995, pp. 130-1). The formulation of a regional position, 
including the opinions of the 'historic Autonomies'28, would be facilitated by higher 
levels of co-ordination, for example in the form of a permanent meeting or standing 
committee (Burgorgue-Larsen, 1995, pp. 138-9). Meetings of regional 
representatives have been held, for example in January 1995 in Valencia, but no plans 
have been made to institutionalise consultation between the Autonomies. The opinion 
of liiigo Bullain L6pez (1990, p. 203), that achieving a common regional agreement 
would weaken the Basque political position, illustrates the key obstacle to attaining a 
consensus. Agreement by simple majority may well be both more realistic and 
effective (Perez Tremps, 1995, p. 613). Amendment of the 1978 Constitution to 
transform the Senate into a genuinely territorial chamber has also been proposed as a 
way of establishing a firmer basis for regional demands (for example, Calonge 
Veh1zquez, 1995, p. 13). 
A number of criticisms have been made of the implications of the 30 November 1994 
agreement in practice, such as the lack of transparency of the institutional 
mechanisms developed, as well as the need for greater co-ordination of the meetings. 
Sectoral meetings had been largely ineffective in the past both because of the wide 
range of topics covered, and the large number of participants (L6pez Castillo, 1993, p. 
147). This problem remains. Relevant information is often received by regional 
authorities at too late a stage for their interests to be defended adequately, especially 
if the Spanish position is adjusted during the negotiations themselves. In practice, 
taking into account regional interests is difficult in view of the time constraints and 
the lack of subnational representation in EU institutions. Furthermore, the political 
27soE, no. 305,22 December 1995, p. 36759. 
28The historic Autonomies are Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, so-named because they 
were the only regions to gain the right to autonomous government by 1936 during the Second 
Republic. 
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rather than economic bias29 of regional representatives may tend to encourage less 
pragmatic solutions to the problem of regional participation (Ministerio para !as 
Administraciones Publicas, 1995, pp. 172-3). 
The Co-ordinating Committee of the Conferencia set up a working group to carry out 
an evaluation of the functioning of the 30 November agreement, but the report had 
not materialised in 1997. Similarly, plans to set up mechanisms for regular 
monitoring of sectoral meetings, focusing on five at the outset, had not been carried 
out. Their functioning has been problematic in practice as the general norms 
established have not been adapted to the needs of each policy area. A few of the 
meetings, for example in the area of the environment and agriculture, have been more 
effective and have given greater priority to EU issues, although they are still largely 
reduced to a posteriori evaluation of issues which have been negotiated in the EU 
arena30. Furthermore, any agreement adopted requires the approval of central 
administration, limiting the degree of regional influence. Since 1994, the Conferencia 
has lost some of the dynamism of its first years, perhaps due to political factors 
brought to the fore by the March 1996 elections31, for example the lack of informed 
debate on the IGC in the 24 September 1996 plenary meeting32. Limited progress on 
the activation of the 1994 agreement had thus been made in 1997. However, signs of 
renewed activity can be noted following the 1995-96 election period, one illustration 
being the elaboration of a common position on regional participation in EU policy for 
the IGC, which was passed in the plenary of the Conferencia of 21 April 1997. 
However, it is significant that the regional position was substantially modified by the 
Spanish government before it was presented at EU leveJ33. 
In a meeting of central government with regional representatives on 22 July 1996, the 
plan set out in the pact between the new government and the Catalan party 
Convergencia i Uni6 (Convergence and Union/Catalan Nationalist Party, CiU) to 
have a representative for the Autonomies in the Spanish Permanent Representation in 
Brussels was approved. This development is, to some extent, an indirect result of the 
increased influence of regional parties on the Spanish government since 1993, which 
has strengthened their bargaining power. The representative has been actively 
29For example, ten representatives in a meeting on 14 September 1995 were officials from regional 
ministries of the Presidency, and two were public administration officials, while four were from an 
Economy or Finance Ministry (Ministerio para !as Administraciones Publicas, 1995, p. 170). 
30rnterview with official of Ministry of Public Administration, Madrid, 9 October 1996. 
31 Interviews with official of the Ministry of the Presidency, Junta de Andalucfa, Seville, 4 October 
1996, 19 June 1997. 
32rnterview with official of Ministry of Public Administration, Madrid, 9 October 1996. 
33rnterview with official of Ministry of Public Administration, Madrid, 12 June 1997. 
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establishing relations with regional offices in Brussels and distributing information to 
the Autonomies, forming part of the Spanish delegation in all meetings debating 
issues within regional competencies. At the same 22 July 1996 meeting, a motion was 
passed to create a legal basis for the regulation of the Conferencia, which was 
approved in the Spanish parliament in March 1997. However, an Andalusia 
government official considered that only a law which regulated regional participation 
as a whole could make a significant difference. Such a law was proposed by 
Andalusia at the 22 July 1996 meeting, but did not receive the backing of other 
regional representatives34. 
Although the SSEU is responsible for relations with the Autonomous Communities, 
formal mechanisms for relations with central government are often bypassed, and 
subnational authorities seek to make direct contact with officials in Brussels wherever 
possible. Regions such as Andalusia have backed the demands of Catalonia and the 
Basque Country for direct participation in Council of Minister meetings. In December 
1993, Gonzalez stressed that the responsibility for foreign policy remained with 
central government, and that regional representation, potentially resulting in a 
doubling of the number of participants at Council of Ministers meetings, was not 
feasible (El Pafs, 19 December 1993). Opposition to regional representation at this 
level was echoed by the PP Foreign Minister Abel Matutes in the Spanish parliament 
on 28 February 1998, when he highlighted the state's need to represent the overall 
national interest and arbitrate between conflicting regional demands (El Pafs, 5 March 
1998). However, the Joint Committee for the EU voted unanimously in favour of 
Spanish regional representation in the Council of Ministers in their session of 4 
March 1998, a move welcomed by regional authorities, although this is only a first 
step towards implementation. 
Central government has been increasingly obliged to take regional interests into 
account in the formulation of European policy during membership. The level of 
political autonomy of the region would seem to be a significant factor in encouraging 
the assertiveness of subnational actors. An example is the Spanish Constitutional 
Court's ruling 165/1994 of 26 May35 on the appeal presented by the Basque regional 
government. The ruling that relations between EU and Basque public institutions 
would not be regarded as within the area of international relations exclusively 
controlled by the state, as outlined in Article 149.1.3, was viewed as an important 
advance. Moves towards a greater regional input to the EU policy-making process are 
34rnterview with official of Ministry of Public Administration, Madrid, 12 June 1997. 
35soE, no. 151,25 June 1994, pp 68-75. 
104 
significant compared with the lower levels of participation of the parliament and 
socio-economic actors in policy-making, although the limited advances are the 
outcome of a long and laborious operation. The most important step forward was the 
30 November 1994 agreement; previously, little progress had been made. However, 
the 1994 agreement still needs to be activated to build on the groundwork laid for 
greater regional participation. 
Socio-economic actors 
The input of socio-economic actors, at least in the early years of Spain's EU 
membership, was limited by the low level of demand for increased participation; 
according to an official in the Spanish Permanent Representation, 'society does not 
demand if36. However, during EC/EU membership, the demand for information and 
greater consultation on EU issues increased, and trade unions and employers 
gradually began to adapt their administrative structure and lobbying mechanisms to 
the new European context. 
TRADE UNIONS 
The two main unions both have departments responsible for EU affairs, the EU 
department in the CCOO having been set up at a relatively late stage in 1990, while 
the UGT's EU section, within the International Relations department, was established 
at the outset in 1976, with only one official focusing exclusively on the EU in 199637. 
Both unions have become increasingly aware of the implications of the EU level for 
national policy. This is illustrated by a key focus in the 1996 CCOO Congress on the 
1997 IGC (El Pais, 16 March 1996). Increasing reference to European issues in their 
publications is also evident, as illustrated by the UGT/ CCOO document 'Union 
Initiative for Progress' of November 1991 written in the context of Spain's relatively 
weak position in the EU (Newton, 1997, p. 247), and their joint statement on Spain's 
European Presidency in 1995 (UGT/ CCOO, 1995). Although generally adopting a 
pro-European position, the unions also expressed their criticism of moves to fulfil EU 
economic obligations through neo-liberal policies with high social costs. 
The trade unions have also increasingly realised the importance of representation at 
EU level, and have sought to develop their intemationallinks. The UGT has its own 
office in Brussels, and both the UGT and CCOO are members of ETUC. The UGT 
has also become a member of the European Syndicals Committee whose objective is 
to provide a forum for sectoral interests at EU level (Newton, 1997, p. 234). In 
36Interview with official of Spanish Permanent Representation, Brussels, 22 February 1996. 
37Interview with official ofCCOO, Madrid, 6 May 1996, and official ofUGT, Madrid, 7 May 1996. 
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conjunction with ETUC, both unions have actively campaigned for greater priority to 
be given to social issues, and for a more democratic European executive. One 
illustration is the joint UGT/ CCOO statement published in El Pais in March 1996 on 
the ETUC's proposals on employment and social affairs for the IGC (El Pais, 28 
March 1996). The unions have also aimed to enhance their influence via the 
Economic and Social Committee at EU level, although its impact on policy as a 
purely consultative body is limited38, 
The unions' involvement in policy formulation is often reduced to sending their 
evaluation and recommendations to the relevant ministry at national level, as well as 
to officials at EU level, in the absence of formal consultative measures. The 
government was criticised by the unions in the 1990s for only going through the 
motions of consensus, while using the EU to justify the ratification of unpopular 
measures domestically. Mechanisms to increase union influence include the 
development of informal channels through establishing firmer contacts with 
government officials and ministers. For example, relations with the SSEU were 
enhanced while Westendorp was Secretary of State for the EU; information was more 
readily made available to the unions than previously, thus facilitating their awareness 
of, and participation in, the policy process39. The Economic and Social Council at 
national level is seen as a useful forum for obtaining information on EU policy, but 
union officials generally consider that dialogue with government officials has not 
been facilitated by its establishment40. Although a moderate increase in information 
and greater transparency of EU policy formation has developed during EU 
membership, union influence remains limited by the government's reluctance to 
encourage their input to the Spanish bargaining position. The dialogue with 
government officials is thus still described by union representatives as a 'dialogo 
forzado' (a forced dialogue)41. 
EMPLOYERS 
The CEOE has widely supported EU membership and further European integration. It 
has not always fully endorsed the government's bargaining position, but has largely 
shared its priorities, particularly with regard to its promotion of free-market 
deregulating policies. Business organisations have been hesitant about their actual 
involvement in the EU arena, giving the CEOE a key role in influencing EU policy 
38The influence of the CCOO in the Committee was particularly limited as it was only represented by 
3 out of the 222 members in 1996. 
39rnterview with official ofCCOO, Madrid, 6 May 1996. 
40rnterview with official ofCCOO, Madrid, 6 May 1996. 
41 Interview with official ofUGT, Madrid, 7 May 1996. 
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development. The Confederation has aimed to establish itself as a significant 
lobbying force, belonging to the major international economic and employers' 
institutions, including the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of 
Europe (UNICE). However, its bargaining strategies at EU level remain 
underdeveloped, and it cannot regard itself as the sole representative of employers. 
According to one former government official, few regional and sectoral actors rely on 
the Confederation for representation in Brussels, thus minimising its influence in EU 
affairs42. The Chambers of Commerce tend to represent smaller employers and local 
firms which the nationally based CEOE neglects. Furthermore, the Jack of Spanish 
multi-nationals weakens the Confederation's lobbying power, and larger companies 
and the more important industrial sectors tend to lobby independently in Brussels 
rather than rely on intermediary channels. 
No tradition exists in Spain of close relations between public administration and 
private interests, nor have they developed in the area of European policy. Morata 
(1996, p. !50) notes that 'participation of the private sector in the decision-making 
process is seen as an obstacle in the achievement of the so-called 'public interest''. 
However, the increasing establishment of direct contacts between the EU level, 
national ministries and interest groups may transform this situation, for example the 
reliance of key ministries on technical expertise provided by sectoral representatives 
in the formulation of the Spanish position. This is also reflected at subnational level 
where administrations increasingly encourage the involvement of regionally based 
interest groups. New access points to the EU policy-making process have been 
established in both the EU and domestic arenas, as illustrated in Figure 4.4. Key 
actors can bypass central government by contacting EU officials directly, thus 
indicating a new political opportunity structure. However, the lobbying procedure is 
still much less developed than in many other European countries. Spanish domestic 
groups generally have a far more reactive than active strategy, linked to structural 
weaknesses inhibiting the development of stronger lobbies. For example, the large 
number of small Spanish companies (over 90% in 1995 had less than nine employees) 
are generally less well informed about European policy, although greater know ledge 
of Community procedures, for example as a result of increased representation in 
Brussels, is gradually improving their capacity to participate compared to the early 
years of EC/EU membership. However, despite the establishment of a CEOE 
representation in Brussels as early as 1980, some sectors have been slower to realise 
42rnterview with former official of the Secretariat of State for Foreign Trade, Madrid, 4 June 1996. 
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the advantages of a base at EU level, for example agricultural lobby groups43. The 
fragmentation of the national agricultural lobby has led to its informal approach to 
European policy, with relatively few contacts at national and EU level44. 
The incorporation into the European framework has transformed the economic and 
political circumstances in Spain, demanding considerable adaptation by existing 
lobbies. However, adjustment to the new context by trade unions and employers has 
only been very gradual, and, in most cases, in contrast to the progress made by 
regional authorities, their access points to the policy process in both the EU and 
domestic arenas have resulted in little substantive input to government policy. 
Conclusions 
A preliminary evaluation of the changing policy process during Spain's EC/EU 
membership seems to indicate the continued strength and autonomy of central 
government which has been able to control access to the policy process for key 
domestic actors. According to Heywood, 
in contrast to the high degree of institutional co-ordination characteristic 
of policy communities, in which a professional public administration acts 
to marshal and regulate competitive interests within a bureaucratic market 
place, the policy process in Spain appears to favour dominant elites, 
notably the party of government, which is able to utilise the resources of 
the state to control access to the policy arena (Heywood, 1995, p. 241). 
In view of the fact that no clear evidence exists for a decline in its capacity to control 
Spain's EU policy, central government has thus retained its legitimate monopoly over 
the formulation of Spain's bargaining position at EU level. One Spanish official in 
Brussels concluded that European policy is ultimately determined by a small, 
relatively constant, and highly talented elite ofEU experts or 'veterans', the outcome 
being that 'European policy is not negotiated domestically'45. 
While acknowledging the key role retained by central government, this analysis also 
takes into account the changing nature of the policy process in the domestic arena. A 
43The agricultural union COAG does not have a permanent delegation, while the Union de Pequeiios 
Agricultores (Union of Small Farmers, UPA), is represented by the UGT, an indication of the diversity 
of forms of representation in the agricultural sector (Molins and Morata, 1994, p. 122). 
44one illustration of the lack of co-ordination is the disagreement between Spanish officials and 
agriculture organisations caused by the nomination of a Spanish candidate for a vice-presidency of the 
Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations (COPA). Relations between the government and 
sectoral actors improved when the former Secretary of State for the EC became Minister of Agriculture 
in 1991 (Molins and Morata, 1994, pp. 127-8). 
45rnterview with official of Spanish Permanent Representation, Brussels, 22 February 1996. 
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study of the Europeanisation of the French policy-making process refers to 
exogeneous factors originating from EU sources and processes, and endogeneous 
factors which have their own impetus, such as the process of decentralisation 
(Ladrech, 1994, p. 71). Both sets of factors could be expected to have transformed the 
nature of the political opportunity structure in Spain during EC/EU membership. 
Chapter 2 outlined the expected changes in the sets of conditions which could reduce 
the level of autonomy of central government and provide greater access to the EU 
bargaining process for domestic actors during membership. Evidence from the 
analysis in this chapter affirms the prevalence of these conditions: 
1. Balance in favour of economic over political rationale for membership 
The overwhelming political consensus in favour of incorporation into a European 
democratic framework during the accession negotiations allowed central government 
to determine the national bargaining position with minimal consultation of domestic 
groups. In view of the more economically oriented critique of EU policies which has 
developed during membership, the bargaining position of central government is no 
longer passively accepted by its domestic constituency. This was particularly the case 
where tough economic policies had to be implemented in line with long-term EU 
objectives, described by Holman (1996, p. 211) as "top-down' internationalization of 
austerity'. One illustration is the rising tensions between the government and unions 
caused by the high social costs of policies aimed at meeting EU macro-economic 
targets. 
2. Loss of PSOE government majority 
During the first years of membership, the majoritarian PSOE government enjoyed a 
large margin of manoeuvre, which enhanced the predominance of the executive in the 
EU policy-making process. The loss of the government's majority in the 1993 
elections meant that its high degree of autonomy could no longer be assumed. 
Although it has retained its central position in the policy process, imposing EU 
policies in the domestic arena may require building up favourable coalitions, 
particularly within sensitive sectors in key regions. The strong role of the state in 
actively shaping domestic demands thus became less assured during membership 
when the PSOE' s 'electoral hegemony' (Marks, M., 1997, p. 76) ceased to exist. 
3. Process of decentralisation at a more advanced stage 
A more developed institutional structure has increased the regions' capacity to 
participate in European policy. Considerable progress towards developing 
mechanisms for subnational participation in EU policy created a new framework for 
consultation in the domestic arena as the decentralisation process advanced. This has 
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strengthened the argument that central government cannot represent Spain if a 
particular aspect of the policy area is within regional competencies, as illustrated by a 
statement from a Basque spokeswoman, who claimed that it was logical for a regional 
representative to accompany the Industry Minister at EU level when discussing the 
issue of the steel industry in the Basque Country (El Pafs, 11 April 1994). The 
approval of Spanish regional representation in the Council of Ministers in the 4 
March 1998 session of the Joint Committee for the EU thus represents an important 
initial step towards a greater regional presence in the EU arena. 
4. Development of a more established lobbying process 
Key domestic actors were increasingly organising their interests more effectively and 
developing lobbying strategies at national and EU levels. The growing number of 
Spanish associations and interest groups with representations in Brussels illustrates a 
greater awareness of the importance of seeking to influence the EU agenda. Although 
institutionalised dialogue between unions, employers and the government was still 
peripheral to the bargaining process, a more regular consultative role was developing 
for key domestic actors compared with the infrequent debate of EC issues during the 
accession negotiations, indicating an opening of the opportunity structure. 
5. Increase in level of knowledge about the EC!EU 
The level of awareness in the domestic arena of the implications of EU policy, and of 
potential access points to the bargaining process at national and EU levels, has 
increased during membership. For example, the government transfers increasing 
amounts of information on EU legislation at an earlier stage to the parliament and to 
subnational authorities, and the presence of ministers is requested more regularly to 
answer parliamentary questions on key policy decisions. The actual impact of 
domestic groups on the bargaining process may still be questioned, but evidence of a 
greater awareness of the EU arena during membership is clear. 
Domestic lobbying activity is rarely aimed at the central co-ordinating institutions, 
namely the SSEU in Madrid and the SPR in Brussels, but at specific DGs within 
national ministries, which then have the task of channelling demands directly to the 
EU level. Particularly influential ministries reluctantly cede any power to the SSEU, 
and the task of making sectoral priorities compatible with a national bargaining 
position is thus often beyond the remit of the Interministerial Committee. Although 
some analysts have highlighted the gradual development of more effective co-
ordination of EU policy (for example, Zapico Goiii, 1995), evidence suggests that a 
less centralised policy process with less dependence on the SSEU is a logical 
evolution, even if co-ordination mechanisms in key ministries have not always been 
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established. This is illustrated by the varied competencies enjoyed by officials in the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance in relation to the EU (Salas Herm1ndez and 
Betancor Rodrfguez, 1991, pp. 510-11). The growing autonomy of ministries may 
facilitate access to the policy process for key domestic actors in specific policy areas. 
Furthermore, domestic groups can increasingly obtain direct contact with EU 
officials, thus bypassing established mechanisms for consultation in the domestic 
arena. Taking into account both Spain's adaptation to the EU framework, and 
important internal changes in the policy-making process, the government's monopoly 
of the interface between the separated EU and domestic arenas can no longer be 
assumed. 
However, interest group representation remained less developed in Spain than in 
many other EU member states. Potentially important channels of influence provided 
by the changing opportunity structure were still underexploited by Spanish domestic 
actors, for example via the Spanish Permanent Representation, the Chambers of 
Commerce, or regional offices in Brussels (Besc6s, 1995, p. 28). The level of access 
to the policy process in the domestic arena continued to be controlled by central 
government structures, which tended to marginalise domestic influence, particularly 
of the parliament and key socio-economic actors. The lack of consultation and 
dialogue with the government on EU issues has been highlighted by many domestic 
groups. For example, in a series of interviews carried out in 1987, Spanish domestic 
groups concluded that the government 'furnished information parsimoniously', and 
that they were better informed by EU officials of decisions taken in the Community 
(Sidjanski, 1991, p. 207). Evidence from interviews carried out in 1996 and 1997 for 
this thesis does not seem to suggest that the level of consultation in the domestic 
arena has developed substantially. 
Despite evidence of the opening of the domestic opportunity structure, the actual 
impact on the policy-making process and on the level of autonomy of central 
government remains marginal, one illustration being the lack of influence of the 
Economic and Social Council. The far stronger institutional mechanisms established 
for regional participation were only effective in a few cases, the majority of sectoral 
meetings being reduced to a posteriori discussion of issues previously negotiated in 
the EU arena. In fact, many of the regions considered that their institutional position 
had been weakened by the transfer of competencies to the EU level, leading Morata 
(1996, p. 153) to conclude that 'the integration process has had a negative impact on 
both the horizontal and the vertical division of powers'. The government is only 
obliged to consider the regional position if a common agreement is reached between 
the Autonomies which, given the heterogeneity of interests, is itself a formidable 
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challenge. However, Kitschelt (1986, pp. 66-7) considers that the opening of the 
opportunity structure to domestic actors may not necessarily lead to a substantive 
impact on policy formulation, but may have the potential to transform the opportunity 
structure by legitimising new channels of influence. The progress towards 
establishing a new institutional framework to enhance Spanish regional influence 
could thus be more significant in the long term, even if sectoral meetings currently 
remain 'an internal co-ordination instrument that does not diminish the exclusiveness 
of state representation vis-a-vis the Community' (Garcfa, 1995, p. 128). 
A Spanish interviewee46 in Brussels referred to an increase in domestic participation 
in European policy as an indication of a growing maturity or 'acculturation' of 
Spanish society, considering that 'domestic groups are not constraining policy; they 
are even strengthening it, making Spain more of an established force' in the EU arena. 
The changing domestic context does not necessarily reduce the government's 
autonomy at EU level. In fact, the two-level game approach considers that a more 
developed domestic ratification process could be an asset rather than a liability if 
domestic demands result in a smaller win-set which can gain a better deal at EU leveL 
The position of central government as the locus of political power in EU policy-
making is not therefore necessarily displaced. As argued by Dehousse (1996), it is 
less a question of a loss of state autonomy, which can be enhanced by integration into 
the EU at key stages of the process, than of the government's adaptation to a new 
context. 
The multi-level game approach draws attention to the opening of the political 
opportunity structure to a range of actors other than central government. It highlights 
the fact that domestic constraints do not always remain nested within the national 
framework with central government as the sole channel to EU level. However, 
although the changing domestic context may mean that a multi-level perspective is 
more valid than during the accession negotiations, the history-making decisions 
described by Peterson (1995) continue to be co-ordinated by a relatively small elite of 
high-ranking central government officials, which allows little access for other 
domestic actors. An analysis of the institutional framework established in Spain for 
EU policy-making clearly indicates the resilience of central state structures and tbe 
government's role as a strong national gatekeeper. According to one analyst of the 
policy-making process in both Spain and Portugal, 'la mayor parte de !as relaciones 
de cada uno de Ios dos Estados con la CE es vehiculada a traves de sus gobiemos' 
(the majority of relationships between each of the two states and the EC is channelled 
46Jnterview with MEP (PSOE), Brussels, 21 February 1996. 
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through its governments) (Colomer, 1995, p. 236). However, the analysis of specific 
issue areas, where domestic actors would be expected to have greater expertise, 
resources and access to the process, in Chapters 5-8 might be expected to modify the 
conclusions drawn on the institutional framework. 
114 
ChapterS 
THE ROLE OF THE SPANISH STATE IN THE NEGOTIATION OF 
COHESION POLICY 
The development of EU cohesion policy has been a priority for Spain throughout its 
membership of the Community. Chapter 5 analyses the key role the Spanish state 
played in setting the agenda, and negotiating the optimal level of funding. A 
substantial body of literature on cohesion policy focuses on the increasing role played 
by regional governments, arguing that the state is less in control of the policy-making 
process in view of enhanced subnational input. The multi-level governance approach 
has frequently been used for the analysis of regional policy, where theorists seek to 
illustrate the potential threat to the monopoly of central government over European 
policy-making represented by increased regional mobilisation, as illustrated in 
Chapter 2 (for example Hooghe and Keating, 1994). Chapter 5 tests this assumption 
by focusing on the resilience of state political and bureaucratic elites, particularly 
during the policy initiation and decision-making phases, which has led to the 
'retention of almost exclusive powers of negotiation by the states in the phase of 
policy formulation with the Commission' (Nanetti, 1996, p. 87). This chapter 
considers the development of cohesion policy, the role played by the Spanish 
government in negotiations, and the interaction between the EC and domestic arenas, 
with a view to gaining a better understanding of the role played by the state at key 
stages in the policy process. Chapter 6 will then consider the role of actors other than 
the Spanish state in the area of cohesion policy. 
Development of cohesion policy at EC level 
The SEA, which came into effect in 1987, made promotion of economic and social 
cohesion in the Community a key requirement for the first time. Article 2 of the 
Treaty of Rome merely referred to the objective of 'a harmonious development of 
economic activities' via the establishment of a common market and the 
approximation of the economic policies of member states. The key aim of Article 
130a of the SEA was to promote the development of the Community by 'reducing 
disparities between the various regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured 
regions'. Article 130b specifies the means of achieving these objectives, namely the 
implementation of common policies and of the internal market, supported by the three 
structural funds, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Guidance 
Section (EAGGF), the European Social Fund (ESF), and the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF). 
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The SEA coincided with the enlargement of the EC to Spain and Portugal on 1 
January 1986. The accession of the two Iberian countries led to a widening of 
regional disparities in the Community, namely a doubling of the population of the 
least-favoured regions (those with a per capita GDP of less than 50% of the EC 
average) (European Commission, 1989c, p. 9). The funds co-ordinate multi-annual 
programmes for the promotion of economic development in the less developed areas 
of the EU. The objective of achieving the internal market by 1993 required the 
convergence of member states' economic policies, and a reduction in major regional 
disparities. By signing the SEA in 1986, the member states thus laid the foundation 
for a major advance in the development of the Community's structural policies. At 
the London European Summit on 5 and 6 December 1986, the President of the 
Commission, Jacques Delors, gave a detailed report on the state of the EC's finances, 
and concluded that a thorough revision would be necessary. In February 1987, he 
presented the Delors 'package' to the European Parliament, calling for a settling of 
the budget, and a doubling of the structural funds over the following five years. 
Cohesion policy thus became one of the key priorities in the Community, strongly 
promoted by the Spanish government from the time of its EC accession, and linked to 
the development of its domestic regional policy. 
Development of regional policy at domestic level 
The process of decentralisation of powers to the Autonomous Communities (see 
Chapter 4) remained problematic during EU membership due to the varying level of 
competencies between regions, and the shared responsibilities between national and 
subnationallevels. The issue of regional financing was also controversial given the 
high level of disparity between the regional economies. Article 2 of the 1978 Spanish 
Constitution refers to the aim of achieving solidarity between Autonomous 
Communities. The Fondo de Compensaci6n Interterritorial (Interterritorial 
Compensation Fund, FCI)l was created to fulfil the objective of reducing regional 
disparities by providing grants for capital investment according to relative levels of 
income, migration and unemployment rates. Since 1986, its budget has been limited 
to 30% of the state's total public investment (Heywood, 1995, p. 152). The FCI was 
reformed in 1990 in an attempt to prevent the financing being channelled to services 
in the more developed regions (Newton, 1997, p. 128). The state also provides aid to 
the regions via the Regional Incentives Programme, administered by the Ministry of 
1The FCI was put into effect in 1982, its regulations being formally set out in Law 711984 of 31 
March, substituted by Law 29/1990 of26 December. 
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Economy and Finance, as well as via specific projects in areas such as public 
transport. 
Article 156 of the Constitution recognised the right of the regions to financial 
autonomy, and the 1985 Organic Law on Financing of Autonomous Regions 
established the key variables determining the intrastate transfer of resources, This laid 
the basis for the first instruments of a full regional policy. The Consejo de Polftica 
Fiscal y Financiera (Council for Fiscal and Financial Policy), consisting of Economy 
Ministers at central and regional levels, and the Minister of Public Administration, 
was a consultative forum created for the co-ordination of key economic policies such 
as state funding and public investment. The Council reached an agreement in 
November 1986 on public sector spending for the 1986-91 period, followed by 
another set of accords for 1992-96 agreed on 7 October 1993. One of the most 
important elements of the 1993 agreement was the access of all Autonomous 
Communities, apart from the Basque Country and Navarre which have a special 
statute (see Chapter 4), to 15% of personal income tax generated at regional level. 
Many regions were opposed to the concession, and considered the agreement largely 
a result of strong Catalan pressure, which was particularly influential given the 
PSOE's dependence on Catalan support in parliament from 19932. Despite this 
concession, and the right of the regions to count their own resources as part of their 
total revenue (Article 157.1 of the Constitution), central government transfers 
continue to provide the majority of the funding. For example, in Andalusia, regional 
resources only amounted to 8.2% of their total funding in 1995 (Newton, 1997, p. 
127). However, regional governments have been granted a high level of freedom to 
draw up their own budgets and, in 1995, the budget for Andalusia alone was 
1,905,488.2 million pesetas (Newton, 1997, p. 124). The increase in regional power 
over the budget is illustrated by the fact that, while central government was in control 
of 84.5% of public expenditure in 1979, this had fallen to 65.5% by 1990 (Heywood, 
1995, p. 154). In 1996, the regions were responsible for 25% of total public 
expenditure, and for approximately one-third of public investment (Morata, 1996, p. 
136). 
According to Article 8 of the Law 7/1984 establishing the FCI, all Autonomous 
Communities had to elaborate their own programme of regional development, thus 
laying the groundwork for their involvement in EC regional policy. EC accession 
2catalan pressure has continued during the PP's term of office. Following the March 1996 elections, it 
was agreed that the quota of income tax retained by the region would be increased from 15 to 30%. 
The accord was viewed by most regional authorities as a concession to the Catalan nationalist party 
whose support remains essential for the government's parliamentary majority. 
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prompted a new phase in Spain's regional policy by re-introducing the concept of 
regional planning to Spain, which might not have developed very far without the 
external stimulus of the Community (Lazaro, 1988, p. 6). The Spanish government 
endeavoured to co-ordinate the actions of the FCI, ERDF and other financing 
mechanisms in an effort to create an efficient, global system of regional funding. 
Initial regional plans were, to a great extent, inspired by EC norms, and formed the 
basis for those presented to the Commission during the first year of membership. The 
working methods of the FCI have increasingly been brought into line with those of 
the ERDF. For example, areas funded by the FCI in 1990 and 1991 coincided exactly 
with Objective one areas funded by the ERDF (Lazaro, 1991b, p. 305). The structural 
funds have thus had a considerable influence on the system of regional funding in 
Spain, although it was already adapting to the increased level of competencies at 
subnationallevel. 
Role of the Spanish government in interstate negotiations 
Following its EC accession, Spain considered that its position as a net contributor 
during the first year should be amended. One of its key objectives was the inclusion 
of a firm commitment to economic and social cohesion policy within the SEA which 
required the Commission to implement major budgetary reform. The proportion of 
EC redistributive funds had been increased, for example the new 1986 budget, agreed 
on 10 July, took the financing of enlargement into account, and included 175 million 
ecu of ERDF funding for Spain. However, the funding arrangements did not satisfy 
the Spanish government which, during discussions of the 1987 draft budget on 22 
July, insisted that non-obligatory spending be increased (Brewin and McAllister, 
1987, p. 364 ). Spain vigorously argued its case in the negotiations over the 
Community's resources, demanding financial compensation for the economic 
adjustments caused by the Single Market. 
The first 'victory': the 1988 Brussels Summit 
Towards the end of 1987, strong pressures were put on Spain by other member states 
to accept the 1988 budget, but Spain would not remove its veto unless its demands on 
funding were accepted. The Copenhagen Summit of December 1987 sought to reach 
agreement on the package, but ended in major disagreements between member states 
which were only resolved at the emergency summit called by the German Presidency 
in Brussels in February 1988. At Copenhagen, Gonzalez was critical of the lack of 
political will of the richer member states, particularly as they approved an increase in 
agricultural spending, while refusing a similar rise in the structural funds. Spain's 
main demand during the negotiations was the doubling of funding, and it threatened 
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to obstruct the package deal if there was any reduction in the amount of money 
originally proposed by the Commission. Its position was not energetically supported 
by the other poorer countries, who were satisfied with an increase in funding only for 
their most underdeveloped regions which, unlike Spain, covered the majority of their 
national territory. Germany, the largest member state contributor, eventually agreed to 
Spanish demands over a six-year period when it was decided that the EC budget 
would gain a new source of finance in the form of a contribution based on member 
states' GDP. Likewise, despite strong objections initially, the UK was eventually 
convinced by the compensations received in the form of agricultural payments. The 
structural funds increased from approximately seven billion ecu in 1987 to fourteen 
billion in 1993. Spain had established itself as a tough negotiator during its first years 
of membership, and the successful outcome at Brussels owed much to its 
uncompromising, often isolated position. 
Spanish strategies at the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference 
The Commission supported the Spanish arguments for budgetary increases in the 
structural funds, as illustrated by the communication on cohesion by Delors at the 
Luxembourg Summit in June 1991, which skilfully justified regional redistribution. 
However, he warned the Spanish delegation that excessive demands would jeopardise 
the IGC negotiations. His cabinet was critical of Spain's subordination of all other 
aspects of the negotiations to gaining higher levels of financing (Ross, 1995, p. 105), 
and Commission officials were also irritated by Spanish criticism of the functioning 
of the structural funds, which they feared would re-open a complicated dossier (Ross, 
1995, p. 153). The Commission would have preferred to delay greater financial 
commitments until after Maastricht, seeking to pacify Spain by promising that the 
structural funds would be doubled in the Delors li package. However, the Spanish 
minister responded that 'Spain would not let Maastricht get by without treaty 
insurance on cohesion' (Ross, 1995, p. 182), thus showing its determination to hold 
up the IGC rather than wait for future concessions which were less likely given the 
demands of Central and Eastern Europe. The government's emphasis on cohesion 
policy was strengthened in 1991, as not only was Spain a more experienced player at 
the EU negotiating table, but it was also concerned about a decline in net receipts 
from the Community in 1990. Two-thirds of Community funds came from VAT, thus 
penalising the high-spending, low-saving Spanish economy, which was also 
dependent on its tourist industry. The Spanish delegation considered that it had been 
discriminated against in both regional and agricultural funding since its EC entry (El 
Pais, 17 March 1991), and that only the receipt of larger amounts of funding would 
prevent it becoming a net contributor. For example, Gonzalez stressed in the 
Maastricht negotiations that, although Spain's per capita income was 22% below the 
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EC average, it obtained proportionately less overall income from EC funds than the 
other three less advanced countries (The Guardian, 3 December 1991). However, 
proposals for ambitious resource transfers were particularly resisted by net 
contributors to the Community, who were themselves facing recession. Furthermore, 
even Ireland, who backed the demand for an equalising budgetary fund, was willing 
to delay debating the issue until later negotiations. According to one EC diplomat, 
'there was no applause from the other beneficiaries' (FT, 18 June 1991), which often 
left Spain arguing for the inclusion of cohesion on the EC agenda from an isolated 
position. 
The issue of social and economic cohesion remained an obstacle throughout the 
Luxembourg Presidency. Spain strongly criticised the contrast between repeated EC 
commitments to redistribution, and the lack of reference to cohesion in the IGC 
negotiations. A Spanish working group, including officials from the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance, the Bank of Spain and the Secretariat of State for the EC, 
sought to maximise Spanish input to negotiations at EC level. Documents outlining 
the Spanish position were presented to the Commission in March and May 1991. The 
March 1991 document, clearly negative about existing Community efforts, stressed 
the need to reinforce the concept of cohesion in general, while, two months later in 
May, more specific recommendations were put forward (Spanish delegation, 1991a, 
1991b). The three major proposals were: an increase in the share of Community 
funding to structural programmes; the setting up of a fairer system of resources where 
member state contributions are measured by their relative prosperity; and the 
establishment of a fund for interstate compensation, or an equalising budgetary fund, 
based on the FCI at national level. The proposals generally faced firm opposition in 
the Community, the Northern member states accusing Spain of jeopardising the 
Treaty talks to obtain solutions to financial problems which were outside the IGC's 
brief (FT, 18 June 1991). The interstate compensation fund was regarded as 
unrealistic by the Commission, and, despite the backing of Portugal, Ireland and 
Greece, the proposal was rejected during the Luxembourg Presidency. However, 
Spain continued to argue for fiscal transfers to make EMU viable for poorer states. 
The Spanish Secretary of State for Economy, Pedro Perez, declared that such transfers 
would not be open-ended, but 'only until the playing field is more or less level' (FT, 
18 June 1991). 
When the Netherlands took over the Presidency in 1991, their draft treaty on political 
union largely ignored Spanish demands on cohesion which they described as 
intransigent, isolated, and unacceptable to the majority of member states (El Pafs, 15 
November 1991). It was not until the penultimate ministerial meeting in November 
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that, in response to Spanish pressure, the issue was debated, using the Luxembourg 
draft treaty as a basis. Spain's position remained unchanged, but the Commission 
sought to influence the Irish and Portuguese who were considered 'softer' negotiators 
(Ross, 1995, p. 188). The Spanish delegation did not directly threaten to veto the 
Maastricht agreement, but the Economy Minister, Carlos Solchaga, made clear that 
the national parliament would not necessarily ratify the EU Treaty if it was 
dissatisfied with the negotiations (El Pats, 15 November 1991). 
Little advance was made on the cohesion issue on the first day of the Maastricht 
Summit. The Commission's support for Spanish proposals was crucial, as it not only 
broke Spain's isolation, but also encouraged the other poorer countries to be more 
vigorous in their demands (El Pats, 26 November 1991). A meeting was held to 
discuss cohesion in which Spanish and German diplomats, and the Head of Delors' 
cabinet, Pascal Lamy, participated3. The Spanish delegation demanded legal 
guarantees on the issue within the Treaty and, by the morning of the second day of the 
Summit, the Dutch Presidency had proposed the inclusion of a 'cohesion fund' in a 
protocol as well as an agreement on relative prosperity. Although the majority of 
member states considered a non-binding declaration sufficient, the Dutch Presidency 
proposed a legally binding protocol as a compromise between the two positions. 
Initially, German officials would only consider an environmental fund and dismissed 
a compromise proposal, put forward by Belgium and Italy, which proposed 
addressing Spanish concerns in a protocol. However, the importance of interstate 
bargaining is illustrated by talks between Kohl and Gonzalez on the eve of the 
summit which enabled a compromise to be reached. This commitment, along with the 
agreement to base budgetary contributions on the relative prosperity of member 
states, led one Spanish spokesman to declare that Spain had 'won everything we set 
out to achieve at Maastricht' (The Independent, 11 December 1991). Gonzalez, 
although recognising that Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) remained a 
formidable challenge, said that it was 'now almost inconceivable that by 1996 Spain 
was not in the group of countries that begins the process towards a sole currency' 
(FT, 12 December 1991). The review of the EU's finances in 1992 was closely 
monitored by Spain, to ensure that a firm legal commitment to cohesion was retained. 
The second 'victory': the 1992 Edinburgh Summit 
Just as the Brussels European Council was the 'essential financial counterpart' of the 
SEA, the Edinburgh Summit performed this role for the Maastricht Treaty (Duff et 
3The Spanish representatives included the Director of International Relations of the cabinet of the 
Presidency (Jose Pons), the Director General of the Treasury (Manuel Conthe), and the Secretary 
General for the EC (Elorza), who was described as the Spanish spokesman on cohesion. 
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al., 1994, p. 135). Delors presented the Commission's proposals (the so-called Delors 
II package) to the European Parliament on 12 February 1992, and an agreement was 
reached in Edinburgh in December 1992. Michael Shackleton (1993, p. 11) describes 
the fact that the budgetary negotiations were concluded in a marginally shorter time 
than in February 1988 as surprising in view of the lack of an urgent need to raise the 
amount of Community resources. However, Spain's threat of a veto of the EFTA 
enlargement unless it obtained the full Delors II package, designed to double the 
receipts of the poorer countries by 1997, ensured that priority was given to budgetary 
issues. The Spanish government thus had a key role in setting the agenda for the 
negotiation of cohesion at the Edinburgh Summit. 
The Portuguese Presidency in the first half of 1992 sought agreement on general 
guidelines rather than specific figures, in an atmosphere which was generally negative 
following the Danish 'no' in their EU referendum (FT, 26 June 1992). This left the 
main decisions for the UK Presidency which Spain feared would be far less receptive 
to Southern member state demands. Although Spain was the strongest advocate of the 
doubling of structural funds, Portugal also backed tough Spanish statements in pre-
Summit meetings (El Pafs, 20 June 1992). The UK and Dutch delegations firmly 
opposed any raising of the ceiling before 1997, and other member states were 
unsympathetic towards the amount of funding demanded by Spain, even suggesting 
that the Cohesion Fund could be delayed until 1999. Delors tried to bridge the 
North/South divide by conceding that his plan to raise EC spending by one-third 
could be spread over another two years, which he hoped would gain the approval of 
Southern European states if the increase affected policies such as research and 
development rather than cohesion (FT, 26 June 1992). However, the Commission was 
more critical of specific Spanish proposals, such as its demand in January 1992 for 
487,500 million pesetas, of which 300,000 would be received by Spain (El Pais, 24 
January 1992). Kohl was described as the most vocal in his refusal to pledge more 
aid, arguing, with support from the UK and France, that a substantial increase in 
funding could undermine the support for Maastricht in the richer countries (IHT, 29 
June, 1992). The final Lisbon communique declared that the budget from 1993 was 
set for either five or seven years, and that it would lead to an 'appropriate' increase in 
support. Gonzalez accused the UK and Germany of reneging on prior commitments. 
However, a private Commission note, sent to offices after the Summit, considered a 
doubling of the financial effort by 1997 in the poorer member states likely, thus 
indicating a move in Spain's direction despite the lack of progress made at Lisbon 
(The Times, 29 June 1992). 
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Spain's bargaining power was strengthened at Edinburgh by the need for its support 
for the acceptance of both the Danish exemptions from Maastricht and enlargement. 
The UK plan was presented to a meeting of EC Foreign and Finance ministers in 
Brussels in November. It was immediately criticised by the less developed countries, 
particularly Spain, as the plan was to freeze EC spending for the following three 
years, and to limit growth to 1.2% Gross National Product (GNP) unti11996-97, and 
1.25% in 1998-99 (FT, 30 November 1992). France was more sympathetic to Spanish 
demands, as it needed Spain's support for its re-negotiation of farm subsidies with the 
US, but the UK sought to prevent Spain from strengthening the previously isolated 
French position and warned of the market risks of a Summit failure during its tour of 
capitals prior to the Edinburgh Summit. The UK highlighted reductions on V AT from 
55 to 50%, which Spain had obtained immediately rather than over five years, as a 
significant victory in an attempt to pacify the Spanish delegation. Furthermore, it 
stressed that the difference between the amounts of funding it proposed, and those put 
forward by the Commission, was only 2.5 billion ecu a year. Diplomatic sources 
claimed Gonzalez was 'bordering on outright anger' because of the UK and Danish 
delays on Maastricht ratification, even before the UK had tabled the compromise EC 
financing plan (The Independent, 1 December 1992). Gonzalez described the proposal 
on the budget as 'insufficient', and the spending package as 'minimal' (FT, 2 
December 1992). However, the Spanish delegation agreed to compromise on certain 
of its demands, including the approval of a less generous budgetary deal than that 
originally demanded, which enabled informal talks to begin on enlargement before a 
financial agreement was reached (El Pais, 10 December 1992). 
The establishment of a multi-annual financial framework was eventually agreed at 
Edinburgh, involving an increase from 18.6 to 30 billion ecu in the budget by 1999. 
The main increase was in the structural funds, with the newly created Cohesion Fund 
(see Chapter 6) making up the 2.6 billion ecu balance4. The budget froze the ceiling 
on resources at 1.2% of GDP for two years, with a phased increase to 1.27% by 1999. 
The Spanish delegation was generally satisfied, although the agreement fell short of 
the original Spanish proposal of 1.37%. The importance of interstate relations in 
reaching a final agreement is underlined by Kohl's claim that he had made a 
'substantial verbal contribution' to convince Gonzalez that a compromise on financial 
arrangements was possible (FT, 14 December 1992). The Spanish delegation had 
been a key player throughout the negotiations; according to the Foreign Minister 
4It was agreed that the Cohesion Fund would be extended beyond the Delors I! levels to include 3.15 
billion ecu for 1998 and 1999. This fell short of the 5.6 billion pesetas originally demanded by Spain, 
and the Cohesion Fund finally approved amounted to 41% of the amount requested by the Spanish 
negotiators. 
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Francisco Fermindez Ord6iiez in his briefing to the Joint Committee for the EC on 13 
October 1988, 'lo que se haya hecho en cohesion se ha hecho con el impulso de 
Espaiia' (what has been achieved in cohesion has been the result of Spanish initiative) 
(Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1988, p. 386). Although cohesion policy was on 
the EC agenda prior to Spain's accession, 'it took Spain to pitch it at the level it 
deserved' according to a former adviser to Gonz:llez5. The fact that it was fully taken 
into account in the areas of research and development, the Single Market, the EFT A 
enlargement, and environmental policy was viewed by key Spanish government 
officials as largely the outcome of Spain's initiative. Its tough position was retained in 
1994 during enlargement negotiations, when it insisted on an increase in cohesion 
funding using the contributions of the new members, Austria, Sweden and Finland, of 
between 2000 and 4000 million ecu (El Pais, 15 February 1994). The Spanish 
government was not prepared to facilitate the entry of other countries into the 
Community by changing the rules in key areas such as cohesion policy, arguing that 
their position was entirely logical in view of the tough EC accession terms which had 
been imposed on Spain6. 
An analysis of negotiations at EC/EU level clearly depicts an interstate bargaining 
framework to which domestic actors had minimal access. Considerable evidence 
exists for the key role of the Spanish government in the negotiation of cohesion 
policy, its skilful bargaining tactics being widely recognised by both the Commission 
and other EU member states. This evaluation thus suggests that the Spanish 
delegation enjoyed a high level of autonomy vis-a-vis domestic actors throughout the 
negotiations. 
Interaction between the domestic and EU arenas 
Marks (1992, p. 194) argues that the clearest way of explaining the growth in 
structural funds is to consider the funding as a side payment to the poorer countries in 
return for the assent to the Single Market, thus amounting to 'a combined optimal 
solution'. His analysis highlights the fact that countries such as Spain lack a cushion 
of affluence against any downturn in the economy, and could suffer from a 'negative 
political fallout' if the Spanish population's high expectations of the EC are not 
fulfilled (Marks, 1992, p. 203). The tough position on funding adopted by the Spanish 
government at EC/EU level was, to a certain extent, a response to the need to present 
a successful outcome to parliament and public opinion in the domestic arena. In the 
5rnterview with former diplomatic adviser to Gonzalez on foreign policy, Madrid, 30 May 1996. 
6rnterview with former diplomatic adviser to Gonzalez on foreign policy, Madrid, 30 May 1996. 
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press conference following the Brussels summit on 12 February 1988 (Ministerio de 
Asuntos Exteriores, 1988, p. 127), Gonza1ez highlighted the politically sensitive 
process of explaining the outcome of the summit to the public in each member state 
by the Head of government, thus underlining the importance of the domestic 
ratification process. The high visibility of the structural funds, representing the direct 
gains from Spain's incorporation into the European framework, made their 
presentation in the domestic arena particularly important for retaining an internal 
consensus in favour of membership. In the 1988 press conference, Gonzalez stressed 
that Spain's gains at EC/EU level were not for senior government officials, but for 
Spanish citizens (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1988, p. 129). This section seeks 
to analyse the interaction between interstate negotiations and the ratification of the 
state's position in the domestic arena. 
Definitions of cohesion 
Cohesion was defined by the Spanish delegation in its March 1991 document to the 
IGC as a 'necessary political balance between efficiency, stability and equity', and 
not merely as compensation for EMU (Nicoll and Salmon, 1994, p. 274). This took 
into account the varying effort required by economies at different stages of 
development to implement EU policies. The Spanish Presidency's statement to the 
European Parliament in January 1989 declared that the SEA not only set out specific 
measures to strengthen cohesion, but included 'an effective and parallel presence of 
that objective in developing the various policies and the internal market' (European 
Commission, 1989a, p. 88). Cohesion policy is thus viewed as part of the progress 
towards European integration, rather than a quantitative concept detached from key 
developments. The EC's obligation to the Spanish domestic arena in return for the 
tough conditions imposed for accession was highlighted, for example by 
incorporating the concept of cohesion in the reform of the CAP7. In a speech in 1988 
in Brussels, Gonzalez declared that: 
si unos hacen un ejercicio duro, pero necesario, de convergencia de polfticas 
econ6micas ... otros deberan, 16gicamente, corresponder con una aproximaci6n 
semejante por la vfa de la solidaridad, mediante la aceptaci6n de decisiones que 
impliquen un grado mayor de cohesion econ6mica y social. 
(if some countries go through a tough, but necessary, exercise in order to 
converge their economic policies ... others should, logically, respond with a 
similar effort of solidarity by accepting decisions which imply a higher level of 
social and economic cohesion)8 
7This was suggested by Ugalde Ruiz de Assin of the Popular Coalition party in a question to Foreign 
Minister Fernandez Ord6fiez, following his briefing to the Joint Committee for the EC on 13 October 
1988 (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1988, p. 396). 
8speech given by Gonzalez in Brussels, 12 December 1988 (Ministerio del Portavoz del Gobierno, 
1988, p. 79). 
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Gonzalez was aware of the likely resistance of key EU member states to the 
development of cohesion policy, but sought to maximise support for his demands at 
EU level by presenting Spain's objectives as part of a political, pro-integrationist 
discourse, rather than highlighting the gains at domestic level (Closa, 1993, p. 304). 
Gonzalez thus included the request for an increase in structural funding as part of a 
Europeanist vision. For example, in September 1987 in Bonn, Gonzalez rejected the 
notion of a mere free trade zone9 and, in October 1987 in Florence, he described the 
close relationship between the internal market and cohesion in an integrated Europe!O. 
The protocol obtained at Maastricht was considered by Gonzalez as the minimal 
solution to avoid a damaging political climbdown domestically and, in the domestic 
arena, Gonzalez stressed that Spain's fulfilment of EC obligations would be 
compensated for by the Community's 'indispensable solidaridad polftica y 
econ6mica' (indispensable political and economic solidarity)ll. 
Domestic responses to the government's negotiation at EU level 
The government's tough negotiating position on cohesion policy was generally 
supported by all political parties, including influential regional parties such as the CiU 
and the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party, PNV). Likewise, the 
government received the full backing of the CEOE in its negotiation of cohesion 
funding, whose only major fear was regarding its distribution to less developed 
regions and to SMEs (Youngs, 1996, p. 201). Key domestic actors were concerned to 
maximise Spain's net benefits from Community membership; criticism that Spain had 
become a net contributor during the first year of EC membership was voiced by the 
CEOE and opposition parties (El Pafs, 9 January 1987). Gonzalez sought to gain the 
approval of key actors, such as the main trade unions, by highlighting the economic 
benefits obtained in negotiations in Brussels to counter their increasing criticism of 
governmental reforms (see Chapter 6 for a fuller discussion of the input of domestic 
actors). However, relations between the government and unions had generally 
deteriorated in the 1990s, and were exacerbated by Spain's attempts to meet the EMU 
convergence criteria during a time of growing economic crisis. 
9
speech given by Gonzalez at the German Society for Foreign Policy, Bono, 17 September 1987 
(Ministerio del Portavoz del Gobierno, 1988, p. 39). 
10speech given by Gonzalez in the European University Institute, Florence, 19 October 1987 
(Ministerio del Portavoz del Gobierno, 1988, p. 62); other speeches underlining his definition of 
cohesion include the plenary in the Congress on 9 December 1987 to report on the European Summit 
of 4--5 December 1987 (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1987, pp. 177-85). 
11speech given by Gonzalez in the ceremony for the beginning of the academic year at the College of 
Europe, Bruges, 28 October 1985 (Ministerio del Portavoz del Gobierno, 1988, p. 19). 
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As illustrated in Chapter 4, the sets of conditions which enhanced government 
autonomy during the negotiations for EC accession (see Chapter 3) were changing 
during membership. The increased lobbying capacity of domestic actors, and the 
greater vulnerability of political leaders to their demands, meant that a new context 
for policy-making was developing. Richard Youngs (1996) draws a clear distinction 
between the 1986-90 and the post-1990 periods in his analysis of the domestic 
political context in Spain; key changes included a hardening of public opinion vis-a-
vis the EU, and a greater consideration of the extent to which Spain's EU membership 
benefited national interests. This is illustrated by the harsh criticism of the Izquierda 
Unida (United Left, IU)I2 of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty without prior EC 
commitments to economic and social cohesion, and the opposition parties' initial 
rejection of the draft text on Maastricht in the Joint Committee for the EC (El Pais, 19 
November 1991)13• Key actors in the domestic arena increasingly demanded more 
information on EC/EU policy decisions, as illustrated by the criticism of the 'total 
desinformaci6n gubernamental' (total lack of information from the government) in 
the Joint Committee for the EC of 13 October 1988 (Ministerio de Asuntos 
Exteriores, 1988, p. 395); according to opposition parties, this had encouraged a break 
in the Spanish consensus on Europe (El Pais, 20 November 1991). In its defence, the 
government referred to the lack of amendments made by the opposition to the text on 
political union in the Joint Committee for the EC over a four-month period, also 
arguing that it could not be bound to a parliamentary resolution when it had to retain a 
high degree of flexibility and autonomy during negotiations in the EC/EU arena (El 
Pais, 21 November 1991). Obtaining increasing levels of funding from the EU to 
present to the domestic arena had thus become more urgent for a government faced 
with a less assured consensus on European policy. Business and trade union 
representatives, and opposition parties, urged the blocking of advances in other policy 
areas if Spain did not obtain its demands, and parliamentary debate, particularly 
during pre-election periods, frequently criticised the government's negotiating 
position in Brussels. In November 1991, Gonzalez declared in the Spanish parliament 
that he would exercise his veto if no satisfactory agreement on cohesion policy was 
obtained, and the chief Spanish negotiator at Maastricht in 1991 acknowledged that 
uppermost in his mind was the probability that a weak agreement on cohesion would 
not get through the national parliament (El M undo, 7 December 1991 ). 
12The United Left was fonnally established in 1986, the Spanish Communist Party being the largest of 
the member parties. 
13However, the Maastricht Treaty was eventually ratified almost unanimously in the Spanish 
Parliament with only three Herri Batasuna (radical Basque Nationalist) votes against and eight IU 
abstentions. 
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Despite the growing criticism, the government ultimately relied on full parliamentary 
backing for its bargaining positions. For example, Spanish Commissioner Abel 
Matutes referred in December 1992 to the similar understanding of the Cohesion 
Fund of the PSOE and PP (El Pats, !I December 1992). Nonetheless, the 
increasingly critical stance put pressure on the Spanish delegation at EU level, and 
increased the public awareness of the issues at stake. In the July 1992 plenary 
following the Lisbon Summit, the main parliamentary groups highlighted the lack of 
achievement following the commitment to cohesion policy made at Maastricht. The 
government's triumphalist propaganda was strongly criticised by the opposition, 
while government officials drew attention to the difficult circumstances in which the 
negotiation had occurred (Congress, no. 204, I July 1992, pp. 10014-50). Opposition 
parties emphasised the disillusionment in the domestic arena, and the lack of 
consensus on European policy amongst the main political parties and trade unions. 
They were particularly critical of the lack of dialogue between the government and 
domestic groups (Congress, no. 204, I July 1992, pp. 10014-50). 
While Gonzalez highlighted the firm defence of Spanish interests at Edinburgh 
(Congress, no. 238, 15 December 1992, p. 12040), the leader of the PP pointed to the 
Spanish government's 'begging stance' within the EU (as pedigueiios) while they 
were prone to high spending in the domestic arena (El Pais, 13 December 1992). 
Other key points of criticism were the minimal nature of the funding (the fact that the 
Cohesion Fund actually represented less than 0.5% of the overall national budget), 
and the neglect of Spanish sectoral interests while concentrating on EU funding; this 
was described as 'un punto debil para influir en la evoluci6n de la Comunidad y en la 
protecci6n de nuestros mas inmediatos intereses' (a weak way in which to influence 
the development of the Community and protect our most immediate interests) 
(Congreso, no. 238, 15 December 1992, p. 12025). The PP highlighted the 
insufficient EC commitment to the Cohesion Fund which it considered to be a 
declaration of intentions rather than a firm guarantee (El Pafs, 15 December 1991), 
and the IU stressed the need to address the problem of growing inequalities instead of 
relating cohesion funding purely to the EMU convergence criteria (Congress, no. 238, 
15 December 1992, p. 12030). Outside the parliamentary arena, both the CCOO and 
the UGT criticised the considerable reduction in funding from the level agreed at 
Maastricht. Although much of this criticism could be viewed as part of a politically 
motivated, premature election campaign, the uncompromising position of Gonzalez 
on Spain's financial demands was influenced by the need to present a good deal to his 
domestic constituency to consolidate their support prior to national elections. 
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Mon1n claimed that an overall consensus on European policy still existed in Spain in 
1992, arguing that 'el caso espaiiol se caracteriza todavfa por una menor maduraci6n 
crftica respecto al proceso europeo .. .' (the Spanish case is still characterised by a less 
mature critical outlook with respect to the European process) (Diario 16, 24 May 
1992). However, the demand for more participation in European policy was coupled 
with greater awareness of EU obligations at a time of economic recession. A united 
position was even difficult to achieve within central administration once the concerted 
effort to attain a co-ordinated policy on EC accession was over. For example, the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance argued for an increase in ERDF funding, while the 
Social Affairs Ministry was concerned that this increase was not to the detriment of 
the ESP, thus leading to internal wrangling over Spanish priorities (El Pafs, 24 
January 1992). 
Conclusions 
Despite the presentation in the domestic arena of the negotiation at Brussels in 1988 
and Edinburgh in 1992 as major victories for Spain, the Spanish government wanted 
to avoid being labelled as a demandeur of increasing amounts of funding at EU level. 
Gonzalez affirmed that the defence of Spain's interests in the area of cohesion policy 
had been demanded by all political groups, but that it was not 'un elemento decisorio 
de la soluci6n de nuestros problemas respecto de nuestra aproximaci6n a Ios Indices 
de prosperidad de la Comunidad Europea' (a decisive element for the solution of our 
problems in meeting the European Community's economic indicators) (Congress, no. 
204, I July 1992, p. 1 0049). By reconciling its key role as a pro-integrationist player 
at EU level with its strong defence of national interests, the Spanish government 
sought to deflect potential criticism from other member states. The Secretary of State 
for the EU declared on 26 November 1992, in the Joint Committee for the EU, that 
the government would ultimately opt for further European integration rather than 
concrete benefits for Spain (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1992, p. 771 ), 
indicating that European unity should not be endangered by Spain's tough negotiating 
tactics. The Spanish government also wanted to avoid raising overly high 
expectations in the domestic arena regarding transfers of funding from the EU, 
particularly as it had been accused in the plenary following the Lisbon Summit of 
using Europe and Maastricht as scapegoats for the failure of its national economic 
policies (Congress, no. 204, I July 1992, p. 10042). A delicate balance between 
domestic and EU objectives thus had to be achieved whereby the government could 
succeed in consolidating its bargaining power and standing in both arenas. 
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Evidence from the analysis in Chapter 5 points to a clear interstate bargaining 
framework where the state enjoys a high level of autonomy even when domestic 
pressures for an optimal deal on EU funding have increased. The negotiation of 
funding and distribution of resources were purely state-run operations. The input of 
the domestic arena was reduced to criticism of the government's position following 
the bargaining process at EU level. One official referred to the key role of Gonztllez 
and the importance of his personal convictions regardless of pressure from the 
recipients of funding at regional level, at least in the early negotiationsl4. The state's 
control of the process was fully retained, even where interstate bargains potentially 
conflicted with the 'segments' of society which it was representing (see Taylor, 1991, 
1996 in Chapter 2). Negotiations at intergovernmental level among national 
executives seemed to enhance the state's autonomy vis-a-vis domestic actors. The 
closed nature of the EU opportunity structure during the decision-making phase 
meant that even strong, unambiguous demands, increasingly articulated as a result of 
the opening of the opportunity structure in the domestic arena, had little impact on the 
state's bargaining position at EU level. 
Pollack (1995, p. 363) concludes that member states have 'proven adept at retaining 
their "gatekeeper" status'. However, although the state enjoyed a wide margin of 
manoeuvre, the growing awareness of European issues increasingly obliged it to act 
as aggregator of domestic interests to consolidate its power and construct coalitions in 
favour of EU membership. This was even the case in an area where backing for the 
government's negotiating position was unproblematic. At national level, cohesion 
policy was used by the state to illustrate the visible benefits of EU membership, and 
to detract attention from domestic economic problems. At EU level, domestic 
constraints helped to justify Spain's intransigent negotiating position to its 
counterparts. Successive rounds of domestic ratification, and the role of the active 
state in maximising its room for manoeuvre in the EU and domestic arenas, thus 
become increasingly important elements of the policy process, indicating the validity 
of the two-level game approach for the study of relations between the state and 
domestic actors. 
An examination of the negotiation of cohesion policy at EU level indicates that 
regional mobilisation has little impact on the policy initiation and decision-making 
stages of the process. However, the impact of increasing regional involvement is 
likely to vary according to the type of decision and the stage of the policy-making 
process. Before concluding that the state has retained its full control in the issue area, 
14rnterview with former diplomatic adviser to Gonzalez on foreign policy, Madrid, 30 May 1996. 
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a closer examination of relations between the state and domestic actors at all policy-
making stages is necessary. Studies of subsequent stages have provided multi-level 
theorists with considerable evidence for an increase in subnational involvement (as 
shown in Chapter 2). The potential impact of this is the focus of Chapter 6 which 
completes the cohesion case study. 
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Chapter6 
THE INPUT OF KEY DOMESTIC ACTORS TO COHESION POLICY 
The role of the Spanish state in the area of cohesion policy is evident from the 
analysis of negotiations at EC/EU level in Chapter 5. This chapter seeks to broaden 
the study of the policy area to consider the role of domestic actors other than central 
government. In view of the potential for an increase in regional mobilisation in the 
EU context, and the importance of the subnational level in the area of cohesion 
policy, the Spanish regions are a valid focus of enquiry in this chapter. However, the 
input of other domestic groups, such as key socio-economic actors, is also outlined, 
and compared with the advances made by regional authorities. Despite key 
limitations, institutional mechanisms established by the regions to enhance their 
involvement in the EU policy-making process were shown to represent a significant 
advance in Chapter 4. This provides a framework for an evaluation of their access to 
policy-making in a specific issue area in this chapter. 
A survey by the Commission (European Commission, 1996e, p. 61) in EU member 
states concluded that the highest level of enthusiasm for greater regional input to EU 
policy-making existed in Southern Europe, for example some 83% of those surveyed 
in Spain. However, the nature of the opportunity structures at EU and domestic levels 
did not enhance subnational involvement at all stages of the policy process. Many 
analysts have highlighted the essentially centralised nature of the cohesion policy 
process, resulting in the state's retention of its control at key points of the negotiation. 
For example, Morata and Xavier Mufioz (1996, p. 196) adopt a sceptical attitude 
regarding an increase in regional participation in the case of Spain, on account of 'the 
dominant role played by national authorities in fixing priorities and managing Euro-
funds'. However, as established in Chapter 2, other analysts consider that the multi-
level governance framework is far more appropriate for an examination of areas such 
as cohesion policy. For example, Hooghe (1995) emphasises the development of 
partnership between the EU, central and regional administrative levels, which has 
resulted in an acceleration of subnational mobilisation since the mid-1980s, 
particularly during the implementation phase of structural funding. The focus of this 
chapter is the operationalisation of the structural funds, given that the central role of 
the state during the decision-making phase was firmly established in Chapter 5. The 
divergent conclusions of key analysts on the role of the state and domestic actors in 
cohesion policy are evaluated, with a view to drawing conclusions about the extent to 
which the policy-making process has changed in the specific case of Spain. 
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The chapter pays particular attention to the case of Andalusia as the beneficiary of the 
highest level of Objective one funding, and to the ERDF as the largest source of 
funding in the region. The ERDF was created in 1975 and aimed to 'redress the 
principal regional imbalances in the Community through participating in the 
development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging 
behind and in the conversion of declining industrial regions' (Article 130c). 
Reform of the structural funds 
As well as a substantial increase in the amount of funding (see Chapter 5), the 
operational rules of the structural funds underwent a fundamental reform in 1988. In 
Article 130d of the SEA, the Commission was asked to present a proposal for a 
reform of the structural funds to the Council and, in February 1987, it outlined the 
major developments it advocated in the document 'The Single Act: A new frontier for 
Europe' (the so-called 'Delors I' package) (European Commission, 1987a). In June 
1988, the Council of Ministers approved the legal base for the reform, and 
implementing legislation for the ERDF was passed on 19 December 1988, coming 
into force on 1 January 1989'. The 1988 reform could be regarded as the first attempt 
to impose uniform procedures for regional policy on all member states. 
Structural fund assistance now concentrated on five priority objectives2. The aim of 
the reform was to make structural actions more consistent with member states' 
economic policies, and to improve the administration of the funds through multi-
annual budgetary planning, greater simplification and flexibility, and more efficient 
monitoring of operations. The reform also referred to the additionality of EC 
resources which should not replace national funding. The key innovation in 1988, 
relevant to the focus of this chapter, was the introduction of the concept of 
partnership, which can be viewed as the basis of the reform as it determines the 
implementation of the other principles (European Commission, 1989c, p. 14). 
According to the framework regulation, the principle is 'established through close 
consultations between the Commission, the Member State concerned and the 
!Regulation 2052/88, Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ) L!85/9, 1988 (Framework 
regulation), Regulation 4253/88, OJ L37411 (Co-ordination regulation), Regulation 4254/88, OJ 
L374115 (ERDF), Regulation 4255/88, OJ L374/22 (ESF), and Regulation 4256/88, OJ L374/25 
(EAGGF). 
2objective one focuses on the development of lagging regions, defined as those where per capita GDP 
is less than 75% of the EC/EU average; Objective two covers regions seriously affected by industrial 
decline; Objective three aims to combat long-term unemployment; Objective four aims to facilitate the 
occupational integration of young people; Objective five, subdivided into agricultural and forestry 
assistance, and development of rural territories, aims at promoting the activity of rural areas; Objective 
six (newly created) focuses on the sparsely populated regions of. the Nordic countries. 
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competent authorities designated by the latter at national, regional, local or other 
level, with each party acting as a partner in pursuit of a common goal'. The reform 
was intended to shift the balance of power between actors at different levels of 
administration in relation to the planning, implementation and monitoring of the 
structural funds, indicating the changing nature of the policy area at EC level. A 
speech made by Delors to a meeting of Objective two regions in July 1991 expressed 
the view that 'Nous voulons favoriser ce partenariat pour une raison simple: nous 
crayons qu'aujourd'hui, penser le developpement c'est plus une affaire des agents 
locaux qu'une affaire de !'echelon central ... ' (y{e want to promote this partnership for 
one simple reason: we believe that development strategies today are more an area for 
local agents than for actors at central leveJ)3. According to the principle of 
partnership, regional authorities are given a key collaborative role in the 
implementation of programmes. The principle reflects the concept of subsidiarity, 
according to which initiatives should only be taken at EU level where the objectives 
of the proposed action cannot be adequately achieved nationally. Firstly, the 
Commission intended that regional authorities should be fully involved in the drawing 
up of Regional Development Plans (RDPs), where maximum consultation with the 
competent authorities designated by the member state was recommended for their 
preparation, although the final plan would be presented by central administration. 
Secondly, the adoption of programmes through negotiation of the Community 
Support Framework (CSF) with the Commission should include representatives of all 
the regions in its meetings. Thirdly, the objective was to encourage subnational actors 
to participate fully in the implementation stage, involving the drawing up of 
operational programmes (OPs) and the monitoring and assessment of projects. 
Separate regional multi-annual plans were intended to encourage a greater role for 
regional monitoring committees. 
The six revised regulations for the structural funds for the period 1994-99, adopted 
by the Council of Ministers on 20 July 1993, maintained or strengthened the major 
principles adopted in the 1988 reform. Article 4 of the amended framework 
regulation4 advocates the participation of socio-economic actors as well as regional 
and local authorities, although 'in full compliance with the respective institutional, 
legal and financial powers of each of the partners' (European Commission, 1996a, p. 
17). The seventh annual report on the structural funds in 1995 (European 
Commission, !996b, p. 229) recognises that participation depended on member 
3speech published in European Commission, 1991, La reconversion des regions industrielles: 
rencontre des 60 regions eligibles a l'objectif2 desfonds structurels, Brussels, 8 July 1991 (Hooghe, 
1996b, p. 122). 
4Regulation 2081/93 (Framework regulation), OJLI93, 1993. 
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states' institutional structure, highlighting the fact that 'the effective operation of the 
regional partnership in the context of the Structural Funds is influenced of course by 
this institutional and political diversity'. A further factor which led to inadequate 
implementation of the partnership concept was its lack of clear definition. Smith 
(1995, p. 133) considers that 'la notion de partenariat est done particulierement molle. 
Elle permet les interpretations a la fois des rapports inter-acteur "verticaux" et 
"horizontaux" qui sont nettement differenciees selon les cas'. (the notion of 
partnership is therefore particularly fluid. It permits interpretations of both "vertical" 
and "horizontal" relations between actors which vary considerably from case to case). 
In practice, the state can use its interpretation of the definition of partnership to limit 
the extent of domestic participation in the process. 
Analysts considered that national policy-makers became increasingly concerned about 
the influence of the Commission during the 1989-93 period, and thus attempted to 
reinforce their position in the 1993 reforms (for example Wishlade, 1996, p. 55). In 
1993, member state priorities and national statistical data were emphasised in the 
designation of areas eligible for funding, thus shifting the focus towards the national 
level. However, Marks (1996, pp. 395-6) argues that the 1993 reform enhanced the 
role of the Commission as arbiter at the centre of the policy process in view of the 
increased competition between member state governments, and that greater 
competition between regional authorities also encouraged regional actors to seek to 
maximise their influence on decision-making. The regions were also far more widely 
consulted prior to the 1993 reform in contrast to the elitist drawing up of the 1988 
regulations (Hooghe, 1996b, p. 118). 
Institutional framework 
The level of access to policy-making for key actors is determined by the nature of the 
institutional framework at domestic and EU levels, and the degree of willingness of 
EU and central government actors to accept greater domestic participation. This 
framework is examined here prior to a detailed analysis of the policy process. 
European Union 
The EU's regional policies and cohesion are the responsibility of Directorate-General 
(DG) XVI of the Commission. In contrast to other DGs involved in regional policy, it 
deals exclusively with regional issues and has full responsibility for relations between 
the Commission and the General Affairs Council (Smith, 1995, p. 454). Furthermore, 
it is responsible for managing the largest amounts of funding, namely for Objective 
one and two areas. The DG has thus been described as 'the informal leader of 
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cohesion policy' (Hooghe, 1996b, p. 90). The political importance of DGXVI was 
enhanced by the firm support of Delors throughout his Presidency, the high priority 
given to the DG by Commissioner Bruce Millan, and the appointment of a close 
colleague of Delors, the Spanish socialist Eneko Landaburu, as Director General in 
1986 (Smith, 1995, p. 456). During the re-organisation of its structure in 1994, 
DGXVI acquired responsibility for the Cohesion Fund, and for relations with the 
Committee of the Regions from the Secretariat General, which further boosted its 
budget and range of competencies. 
DGXVI is extensively involved in the negotiation of the allocation of funding, the 
priorities of the programmes, and the implementation of policy. In 1997, the DG, 
consisting of approximately 200 A-grade civil servants, was divided into seven 
directorates, which are shown in Figure 6.1. A large number of experts seconded from 
their member states are based in the DG (30% of the A-level Commission staff in 
early 1993) which, as well as potentially enhancing member state influence on policy, 
also leads to a high level of in-house expertise (Hooghe, 1996b, p. 108). The 
implementation unit responsible for Spain has around the same number of 
administrators as other countries such as Ireland, despite the higher level of funding 
received. The low number of EU officials responsible for Spain increases the 
likelihood of greater responsibility being given to Spanish central and regional 
governments for the administration of projects. This development is more probable 
than an expansion of the division at EU level according to one DGXVI official5. 
Enhanced national and regional input is also likely in view of the increasing priority 
given by the Commission to strengthening its policy conceptualisation, at the expense 
of project administration carried out by traditional desk officers (Hooghe, 1996b, p. 
104). 
Hooghe (1996b, p. 98) considers the Commission a significant autonomous actor in 
the promotion of greater regional participation6. The Commission's powerful agenda 
underlying the 1988 reform was hardly altered in the Council of Ministers 7. She 
describes how 'the insular drafting, the backing of Jacques Delors, the timing, and the 
5 Interview with official ofDGXVI/Cl, European Commission, Brussels, l7 Aprill997. 
6one of the Commission's early attempts to promote subnational representation was on 24 June 1988 
when it set up the Consultative Council for Regions and Localities. The powers of the Consultative 
Council remained limited during its existence (the Committee of the Regions took its place in 1991), 
and the institution was thus a political gesture rather than a genuine attempt to enhance regional input. 
7The power of the Commission was enhanced by the 1988 reform, which reduced the control of 
member states over the structural policy instruments, and established the Community aspects of the 
policy area. For example, it allowed the Commission to use 15% of ERDF resources for its own 
initiatives, which would not require Council of Ministers approval (Uzaro, 1991a, pp. 80-1). 
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careful selection of the negotiation team suggest that the Commission had not been 
acting on behalf of the states', thus highlighting its 'monopoly of initiative on the 
institutional design' (Hooghe, 1996b, pp. 99-100). However, the gap between the 
theory and practice of the concept of partnership highlights the problems of 
implementation of policy (Hooghe, 1996b, 1997). Furthermore, competing interests 
within the Commission did not always allow a clear-cut policy on subnational 
participation 8• The changing opportunity structure at EU level thus depended on the 
balance of power within the Commission's administration. 
Other EU institutions have sought to enhance regional input to the policy process, 
although their influence has been limited in comparison with that of the Commission. 
The Committee of the Regions9 is regularly consulted on economic and social 
8The small unit responsible for masterminding the 1988 reform was upgraded in 1986 to become the 
DG responsible for co-ordination between the structural funds, namely DGXXII, which was keen to 
maximise subnational input. However, DGXVI advocated a more flexible approach to partnership, 
only encouraging regional participation where it increased the overall effectiveness of policy 
implementation (Hooghe, 1997, pp. 93-5). The more functional approach of DGXVI seemed to win 
through, as DGXXII was disbanded in 1992, although DGXVI administrators remained keen to 
maximise the input of local and regional actors. 
9The Committee consists of 229 representatives of regional and local bodies, its organisation, size and 
the national composition of its membership resembling the Economic and Social Committee. It is 
interesting that the Spanish government showed little enthusiasm for setting up the Committee in the 
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cohesion, including the aims and rules of the structural funds. The Committee 
demanded greater regional participation in the Cohesion Fund in its plenary session of 
5 April 1994 (El Pats, 6 April 1994), and its own-initiative opinion of 20 July 1995 
(Committee of the Regions, 1995) argued the case for greater regional and local 
participation in the structural funds. In 1997, the Committee (Committee of the 
Regions, 1997) advocated the Commission's reinforcement of the partnership 
principle at the programming stage. However, despite a Commission communication 
in April 1995 establishing a potentially stronger consultative role for the Committee 
of the Regions, its influence is restricted to a limited advisory role (European 
Commission, 1996a, p. 35). 
The final declaration of a joint conference organised by the European Parliament and 
the Committee of the Regions in 1996 on regional participation in EU policy-making 
called for the partnership principle to be strengthened by incorporating it into the EC 
Treaty, and extending it to other policieslO. The European Parliament has frequently 
criticised the lack of regional access to Community institutions, and has made bold 
proposals to increase subnational input, for example its demand for more transparent 
information for local and regional authorities, and greater regional competencies in 
the management and control of EU funding. Although the influence of its proposals 
on the policy process remains limitedll, it frequently acts as an effective mediator 
between the EU institutions and regional authorities, thus creating the possibility of 
bypassing central government structures, even if the central state still retains its key 
role in the funding process. 
Central government 
The Ministry of Economy and Finance has the most involvement in European policy 
after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, largely because it is the general co-ordinating 
agency for all EU structural funds and initiatives. Within the ministry, the structural 
funds are co-ordinated by the DG for Analysis and Budgetary Programming, as 
shown in Figure 6.2. The sub-DG for Administration of the ERDF is responsible for 
1991 !GC, as it feared a rise in subnational influence, particularly in the more economically developed 
regions. 
I Dconference on 'The European Parliament and the Regional and Local Authorities of the European 
Union for a Europe based on Democracy and Solidarity', Brussels, 1-3 October 1996. 
liThe 1988 reform of the structural funds merely provided for the Commission to present a report on 
the implementation of the structural funds to the Parliament, Council of Ministers, and the Economic 
and Social Committee. In its resolution on the Commission's sixth annual report on the structural funds 
(European Parliament, 1996, pp. 30-31), the European Parliament's lack of involvement in the setting 
of the 1994-99 financial perspective is highlighted, which it describes as being negotiated 'behind 
closed doors' at the Edinburgh Summit. The 1993 reform permitted greater parliamentary involvement; 
development plans submitted by the member states are now forwarded to the European Parliament, and 
MEPs are provided with regular and detailed information on the implementation of the funds. 
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Figure 6.2 Organisation of structural funding at central level 
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the implementation of funding and constitutes a permanent Secretariat for the 
preparation of documentation in conjunction with regional authorities, including the 
organisation of monitoring committees (lnstituto de Desarrollo Regional, 1997a, pp. 
614-5). It is significant that the Secretariat of State for Foreign Policy and the EU 
only has a secondary role in the funding process, and that the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance frequently has direct contact with the Permanent Representation in 
Brussels on cohesion policy issues12. 
The centralised funding process initially established by Madrid, where central 
government is responsible for the proposal of programmes and requests for payment 
to the Commission, the authorisation of any modification of projects, the 
12rnterviews with officials of Ministry of Economy and Finance, Madrid, September 1996. 
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administration of ERDF receipts, and the transfer of funding to the appropriate 
authority, has not changed substantially during EC/EU membership. The number of 
officials responsible for EU funding at central level is still very small, and 
interviewees in Brussels highlighted the lack of resources for more global thinking on 
regional policy, given the huge administrative and technical workload, and the non-
involvement of the Ministry of Public Administration in the EU funding process13. 
The participation of regional authorities, especially for the implementation of 
projects, was therefore needed in view of the limited resources at central level. 
Ministry of Economy and Finance officials consider that the transfer of all 
information and resources should be via central government, and that the 
development of multilateral relations between the Commission and regional actors 
would not enhance the functioning of the system14. On 24 March 1988 in the 
. Committee for the Monitoring of the FCI of the Senate, the Secretary of State for the 
EC highlighted the need for the state to be informed of any direct contact between the 
regions and the EU, while accepting subnational input to the formulation of the 
government's position in areas which affected them (Ministerio de Asuntos 
Exteriores, 1988, pp. 411-24). According to a Ministry official, 'the state is finally 
responsible and central control and co-ordination are essential' 15. Central government 
officials consider that the regions have generally seemed satisfied with the negotiation 
of funding by the Spanish government at EU level (see Chapter 5), suggesting that 
this acceptance has increased rather than diminished as regional authorities have 
acknowledged the importance of a co-ordinated, national approacb16. However, 
continued tensions over the distribution of resources and responsibilities are 
inevitable, even if resistance to greater regional input in central administration has 
declined during EC/EU membership. 
Regional government 
Raffaella Nanetti (1996) describes the new industrial model where the region 
becomes an active participant in the development process, gains a pro-active role in 
policy formulation, and is increasingly recognised as the appropriate level for 
development planning. The process of learning the complex funding procedures has 
been important in increasing regional capacity to participate in the process. Growing 
demands for information, and a greater subnational input, can no longer be resisted by 
13Jnterview with official ofDGXVI/Cl, European Commission, Brussels, 17 Aprill997. 
14Jnterviews with officials of Ministry of Economy and Finance, Madrid, September 1996. 
15Jnterview with official of Ministry of Economy and Finance (Adviser, DG for Analysis and 
Budgetary Programming), Madrid, 23 September 1996. 
16rnterview with official of Ministry of Economy and Finance (formerly responsible for Andalusia, 
sub-DG for Administration of the ERDF), Madrid, 18 September 1996. 
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member states in policy areas within regional competencies. The learning process at 
regional level could thus be ultimately more important for enhancing subnational 
involvement than reform at EU level (Ordovas Blasco, 1989, p. 94). Regional 
governments are also increasingly taking the opportunity to lobby the EU institutions 
directly, for example the President of the Andalusia government, Manuel Chaves, 
held talks with Delors in November 1990 in order to lobby for EC financial support 
for the National Park of Dofiana (El Pais, 22 November 1990). 
In the case of Andalusia, only one person in the regional administration was 
responsible for ERDF funding when Spain joined the Communityl7. In 1987, a 
Comite Tecnico de Coordinaci6n para asuntos relacionados con !as Comunidades 
Europeas (Technical Committee for Co-ordination of European Community Affairs) 
was created to co-ordinate European policy, including the structural funds. The 
regional government attempted to enhance the standing of the Committee in 1988 by 
attaching its Secretariat to the regional Presidency, but the capacity of the institutional 
structure established for the EU funding process remained limited. The new structure 
of the Committee was partly in response to the greater opportunities for regional 
participation in the 1988 reform of the structural funds. Further significant 
institutional changes were not made until 1996, when the new PP government created 
· the DG for European Funding within the Ministry of Economy and Finance, as shown 
in Figure 6.3. The DG groups together the three structural funds for the first time, and 
is responsible for the evaluation of all structural funding and the management of the 
ERDF. The management of ESF and EAGGF funding is carried out in the Ministries 
for Employment and Social Affairs, and Agriculture respectively IS. 
Regional participation from 1986-88 
Regional authorities were described as the absentees in EC regional policy by one 
analyst in 1984, in view of the fact that central government was responsible both for 
sending the regional plans to the Commission, and for monitoring their 
implementation (Granell, 1984, pp. 38-39). The Commission was concerned about 
the marginalisation of regional authorities and had already proposed their greater 
involvement in 1981, for example the elaboration of regional plans, and the direct 
receipt of funding for projects which were within their area of responsibility (Granell, 
1984, p. 39). Although a more effective relationship between the Commission and 
17rnterview with official ofinstituto de Fomento de Andalucfa (!FA), Seville, 2 October 1996. 
18rnterview with official of regional Ministry of Economy and Finance, Seville, 2 October 1996. 
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regional authorities had been recommended in the 1984 ERDF reform, advisory 
bodies such as the Committee for Regional Policy still only consisted of national and 
Commission representatives. State executives enjoyed a high degree of autonomy 
until 1988; as Hooghe ( 1996a, p. 2) describes, 'essentially the European Commission 
wrote a cheque and the individual state executives cashed it'. The result was that 
funding became the instrument of national rather than European policy-making, 
whereby 'governments tended to regard ERDF commitments as a welcome but 
unexpected windfall which could most usefully be employed to mitigate the national 
budgetary implications of regional policy incentives'. The fixed national quotas 
enabled governments to filter project applications and thus enhance their predominant 
role in the funding process (Scott, 1995, pp. 17-18). 
Spain presented its first regional plan to the BC in July 1985, under the co-ordination 
of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, in order to be able to take full advantage of 
EC resources from the beginning of its membership. The capacity of new member 
states to obtain and manage BC funding in their first year had been limited during 
previous enlargements, and Spain thus applied for funding for national projects which 
already existed, and where EC transfers could merely substitute national funding. 
According to BC guidelines on the formulation of regional plans, the law establishing 
the 1985 budget set 31 January 1985 as the deadline for the approval of a common 
methodology. The list of eligible regions and development plans were presented by 
'. ,,
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central government to the Commission for its approval, although the Autonomous 
Communities had contributed to the formulation of the sections dedicated to their 
region (Lazaro, 1986, p. 150). However, all EC funding went to the national budget 
during the first year, which was regarded as important for the reduction of the state 
deficit of 4.5% of GNP in 1986. This led to tensions between central government and 
regional authorities, illustrated by the criticism of the government openly expressed in 
Valencia and Catalonia (Hildenbrand, 1987, p. 138). The system was considered 
provisional until the revision of the financial system of the Autonomous Communities 
was completed, and it was agreed that a definitive plan would be presented during 
1986 which would aim to cover the 1986-90 period. 
The agreement on financing of the Autonomous Communities on 7 November 1986 
created an automatic mechanism which allowed the participation of regions with 
territories eligible for EC funding. The level of financing was up to a maximum of 
30% of the resources received from the FCI. While all the projects were the 
responsibility of central administration in 1986, the management of ERDF funding 
was already changing from 1987, when projects within regional competencies were 
presented and approved at subnationallevel (Lazaro, 1988, pp. 13-14). However, the 
absence of guidelines for the distribution of funding during the early years gave 
central government a significant weight in the policy process (Conejos i Sancho, 
1993, p. 327). Central administration continued to initiate and co-ordinate the funding 
of projects, largely because of its wider experience and more established contacts 
with the Commission. Furthermore, only a minority of the more active regions, such 
as Catalonia and the Basque Country, demanded greater involvement and direct 
contact with the Commission. Regions such as Andalusia focused on maximising the 
amount of resources received, and were little concerned, at least initially, about 
gaining an input to the policy processl9. Some analysts highlight the general lack of 
sensitivity of the Spanish central government to the question of regional participation, 
illustrated by the rare references made to subnational input during the first years of 
membership ( Ordovas Blasco, 1989, p. 99). 
Development of regional participation since 1988 
From 1988, a new phase can be distinguished, when greater knowledge and 
experience of the funding process, coupled with reform of the structural funds, 
enhanced the prospects for regional participation throughout the EU. The Spanish 
regions sought to develop their status as interlocutors of the Commission in the 
19rnterview with fonner official of Ministry of Economy and Finance, Madrid, 8 October 1996. 
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implementation of regional policy, particularly in the operationalisation of 
programmes. The collaborative effort between central and regional authorities was 
intensified, especially in the formulation of RDPs, as illustrated by the increased 
number of bilateral and multilateral meetings. However, authorities complained about 
the lack of time for consultation, given the speed with which they had to present the 
plans. Many regions also highlighted the long delays for the Commission's approval 
of RDPs, during which time it was difficult to get information from EC officials on 
progress made20. Although the three multi-regional sub-CSFs were directly managed 
by central government, nine regional sub-CSFs for Objective one were the 
responsibility of the appropriate regional authority. According to a government 
official in Madrid, subnational authorities enjoyed complete autonomy in the 
operationalisation of projects within their competencies once the budget had been 
decided, and were thus free to decide on projects in conjunction with the Commission 
without the interference of central government21. 
Despite increased regional involvement, the central state continued to retain control 
during key stages of the funding process, as illustrated by its responsibility for 
sending an indicative budget to each regional government. Although authorities then 
responded with their preliminary programmes and the proposed level of funding, 
central government had the final say on the use of funding. The formulation of the 
RDP was still ultimately the responsibility of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, 
where changes could be made to the regional programmes before their presentation to 
the Commission (Morata and Mufioz, 1996, p. 206). Furthermore, although the 
individual negotiation of the CSF with each region facilitated greater involvement, 
regional participation in the negotiation of the CSF with the Commission remained 
limited. The Commission and central administration organised separate meetings to 
discuss overall distribution or major modifications, and the regions were generally 
excluded from final decisions22. The distribution of funding between the Spanish 
regions, the most politicised stage of the policy process, was determined by the 
Commission in consultation with the member state government which retained its 
central moderating role. The criteria used were very similar to those used for 
distribution between member states to maximise objectivity, and the decision was 
then presented a posteriori to the regions for their approval. However, the level of 
regional awareness of the process had increased, and co-ordination mechanisms were 
20rnterview with official oflnstituto de Fomento de Andalucfa (!FA), Seville, 2 October 1996. 
21 Interview with official of Ministry of Economy and Finance (Adviser, DG for Analysis and 
Budgetary Programming), Madrid, 13 June 1997. 
22rnterview with official of Ministry of Economy and Finance (Adviser, DG for Analysis and 
Budgetary Programming), Madrid, 23 September 1996. 
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set up which sought to ensure that the system established for EU funding took 
account of powers enjoyed by subnational authorities. 
Maximising their access points to the policy process was a key objective for regional 
authorities. Officially, the Committee for Public Investment, created by the 
Secretariat of State for Economic Programming within the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance, is the forum for co-ordination between central and regional administrative 
levels. It provides the regions with the opportunity to be fully involved, although the 
final decision rests with central government. The Committee meets officially only on 
exceptional occasions, for example when the RDP is presented to the Commission. 
However, this is only the formal name, which appears in the Official State Gazette, 
for far more regular meetings co-ordinated by the Ministry, which essentially involve 
the same group of representatives although an official meeting is not called under this 
name23. Regional sectoral meetings (see Chapter 4) are the instruments of co-
ordination most often used for determining the level of regional responsibility for OPs 
within different sectors, although regional policy forms only one of many other issues 
discussed. Plans can be established in the absence of the Autonomies in policy areas 
where the state has exclusive competency, but regional authorities are mostly 
informed of decisions taken. Meetings between central and regional administrations 
on economic issues, known as Foros de Economia y Poiitica Regional (Economy and 
Regional Policy meetings), also occur every three to four months, where regional and 
central governments can exchange information, and discuss developments on a range 
of economic issues including regional policy24. Meetings between subnational and 
central governments existed prior to EC accession, for example a working group of 
regional and central representatives was created on 21 December 1984 for the 
formulation of regional plans, but the level of information exchange and discussion 
has developed considerably during membership. 
The evaluation phase of the process provided Spanish regional authorities with the 
opportunity to develop a greater input in view of the need for their technical expertise. 
The monitoring committees are the principal mechanism for ensuring the functioning 
of the partnership principle in evaluation at both national and regional levels. 
Committees meet at least twice a year for each form of assistance, allowing 
involvement of regional and local partners. The annual report on the structural funds 
for 1995 (European Commission, 1996b, p. 229) considered that monitoring 
23Jnterview with official of Ministry of Economy and Finance (Adviser, DG for Analysis and 
Budgetary Programming), Madrid, 23 September 1996. 
24Interview with official of Ministry of Economy and Finance (Adviser, DG for Analysis and 
Budgetary Programming), Madrid, 23 September 1996. 
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committees were functioning well, and that their operating procedures permitted 
regional and local partners to become more involved than previously. Regional 
authorities could also participate in the committees at subnationallevel for the multi-
regional plans for Objectives one and two. However, despite the increase in regional 
participation, strict time limits for the monitoring of projects tended to discourage the 
full participation of all partners. Furthermore, the complexity of procedures, 
depending on the particular sector and level of co-operation, inhibited full subnational 
involvement, a view put forward by the Committee of the Regions (1995). Key 
problems were the lack of strict legal requirements for the membership of 
committees, which allowed each member state to determine their composition, and a 
shortage of technical resources, which limited the effectiveness of evaluation at 
regional level. Furthermore, the concept of evaluation was a far less established 
aspect of the policy process in Spain than in other member states (Smith, 1995, p. 
333). According to the Commission's first report on economic and social cohesion 
(European Commission, 1996c, p. 121), the operation of partnership in the monitoring 
committees across the EU was only just beginning to contribute creatively to problem 
analysis, and to the local implementation of Community priorities; it advocated more 
dialogue between national and regional authorities, greater efforts to explain EU 
policies, apd pilot actions involving EU, national and regional partners as a means of 
enhancing regional input. 
Single Programming Documents (SPDs), incorporating both the development plan 
and the relevant financing request, have been increasingly used in EU cohesion policy 
in an attempt by the Commission to simplify the policy process. The plans may be 
expected to reduce subnational input in view of the lesser access for the Commission 
and regional authorities to the member state's formulation of the single proposal. 
However, the view of Spanish central government officials is that its capacity to 
obtain information on projects from the regions, and thus retain full control of the 
process, has been diminished by the use of SPDs. The Spanish government thus 
decided to retain CSFs for Objectives one and two, which has not been strongly 
opposed by regional authorities25. SPDs are viewed by central administration as a 
threat to the government's autonomy, and a further attempt by the Commission to 
strengthen the role of both supranational and subnational actors. According to a 
former official of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the real interest of the 
Commission was to decrease the monopoly over the policy instruments held by 
central administration, and give the regions a decision-making capacity not permitted 
in the EC Treaties as autonomous actors at EU level (Lazaro, 199la, p. 87). The 
25rnterview with official ofDGXVUCI, European Commission, Brussels, 21 April1997. 
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resistance of the Spanish government to the Commission's interference in its 
domestic arena is reflected in the speech in the Joint Committee for the EU in 1992 
by the Secretary of State for the EU, Westendorp, when he questions the 
Commission's right to decide on the institutional arrangements within each member 
state (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1992, p. 771 ). During the negotiation of the 
CSF for the 1994-99 period, central government officials criticised the Commission 
for insisting on more contact with the regions than during the previous period, the aim 
being to push forward its own agenda26. 
Despite the gradual inroads made by the Spanish regions into the policy process, the 
Autonomous Communities, particularly Catalonia and the Basque Country, were still 
highly critical of the overly centralised funding system. For example, in April 1993, 
the PNV spokesperson in the Congress, liiaki Anasagasti, put forward a proposal in 
the parliament for greater subnational input to EU regional policy, criticising the 
financial centralisation of the state (Congress, Series D, no. 400, 2 April 1993, pp. 
11-12). PNV representatives proposed regional CSFs, as well as direct financial 
relations between the Commission and regional administrations, claiming that 
subnational authorities had a far better knowledge of specific projects than central 
government. Demands for more regional participation were also frequently articulated 
by the CiU, which, in the Joint Committee for the EU in February 1995, called for 
greater account to be taken of regional competencies in the management of funding, 
and criticised decisions taken in advance by the state on quotas for each level 
(Congress, no. 63, 13 February 1995, pp. 1276-7). 
Comparison of the 1989-93 and 1994-99 funding cycles 
Taking into account both the criticism of the lack of access to key points of the policy 
process highlighted by regional authorities, and the advances made towards fuller 
articulation of the partnership principle, the two cycles of structural funding, 1989-93 
and 1994-99, can usefully be compared with a view to drawing conclusions on the 
extent to which the nature of the policy process has changed in the case of Spain. The 
Regional Plan for Spanish Objective one regions for the period 1989-93 was 
presented to the Commission on 30 March 1989, and the Commission approved the 
CSF on 31 October 1989 following a tense period of negotiation from 26 May to 5 
September. Although the plans for each of the Objectives were finally presented by 
central government, the regions were able to have an input to the priorities drawn up. 
26rnterview with official of Ministry of Economy and Finance (official responsible for Andalusia, Sub-
DO for Administration of the ERDF), Madrid, 12 June 1997. 
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However, many regions still considered that the plan presented in March 1989 lacked 
adequate regional participation because of the speed with which the I 988 reform had 
to be implemented, although the Director General of Planning in the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance denied that the decision on the destiny of the structural funds 
was carried out in Spain in a centralised way (El Pafs, 4 August 1989). Despite the 
Commission's pressure on the Spanish government to involve the regions more (it 
delayed signing Spanish CSFs in I 989 as Spain had not permitted sufficient regional 
involvement), the regions have obtained little input at the CSF negotiation stage 
(Marks, 1996, pp. 402-3). Analysts of partnership arrangements considered that the 
concept had far more chance of being put into effect where EU regions had the 
competencies and capability to play a full role; despite calls for greater subnational 
participation, 
some local authorities, notably in Objective one member states, admitted 
privately that the implementation of structural fund policies required skills 
and competencies that exceeded their resources. Furthermore, the financial 
situation of such regions was often such that they could not compete with 
the private sector to attract staff with the requisite skills and technical 
expertise (Wishlade, 1996, p. 45). 
The plan for Objective one regions for the 1994-99 funding cycle was approved by 
the Spanish government and presented to the Commission on 20 October 1993. The 
Autonomous Communities were fully involved in the elaboration of the RDP and the 
setting of priorities, culminating in the meeting on 23 July 1993 of the Committee for 
Public Investment in which all regional representatives were present. Considerably 
more bilateral and multilateral meetings with regional authorities took place during 
the formulation of the RDPs for the 1994-99 funding cycle, partly because more time 
was allowed for the elaboration of plans. The preparatory negotiations for the CSF 
began at the start of 1994, and the framework for Objective one for 1994-99 was 
approved by the Commission on 1 June 1994, and was definitively adopted on 1 July 
1994. The Economy Minister affirmed in the Senate Committee of Economy and 
Finance in June 1994 that the amount of funding received directly by the Autonomous 
Communities represented a significant proportion of the regional budget (Senate, no. 
119,27 June 1994, p. 6). Furthermore, the Ministry of Economy and Finance made a 
greater effort in the 1994-99 period to indicate, a priori, the distribution of the multi-
regional financing initially received by central government, a significant development 
considering the conflict with regional authorities caused by its reluctance to 
regionalise the funding in the previous cycle. The operationalisation of the 
programmes involved greater direct regional contact with the EU level; regular 
transfers of information between regional authorities and the Commission were not 
always sent via Madrid, and meetings between regional and EU officials became 
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more common, although a representative from central government would generally 
also be present27. 
Access to the policy process was still limited for subnational authorities, one 
illustration being the reluctance of Spanish central government to allow regional 
participation in monitoring committees for the Interreg programme, despite the active 
subnational role in its implementation, and the fact that national funding only 
amounted to around 35% of the total28. Nonetheless, an evaluation by the 
Commission (European Commission, 1996b, p. 229) concluded that, on the basis of 
information available on the management and monitoring of assistance in 1995, 
regional authorities in the EU now enjoyed a broad level of participation which 
represented an improvement on the previous programming period. This was echoed 
by the Committee of the Regions (1995) which noted that, although the programmes 
were in most cases constructed by central government, 'with a few exceptions local 
and regional authorities are more involved at present than in the last programme 
period'. However, the eighth annual report on the structural funds, while noting some 
consolidation of the partnership principle, acknowledges the difficulties involved in 
its application. Increasing the number of initiatives at Community level in 
conjunction with local and regional authorities, for example territorial employment 
pacts, was considered an important mechanism for consolidating collaboration, as 
well as enhancing the partners' capacity to participate through supporting training and 
technical assistance measures (European Commission, 1997). A comparison of the 
two funding cycles does not reveal a transformation of the process, or a considerably 
reduced role for the state, but indicates the advances made by Spanish regions 
towards a greater input to the policy process and an enhanced capacity to shape state 
policies. The transfer of structural funds is still essentially a centralised operation, but 
the state's full control of all stages of the process is no longer guaranteed. 
As well as these general findings, the level of distribution of resources between 
central and regional authorities could be expected to act as a more concrete indicator 
of the potential increase in regional participation during the 1994-99 funding cycle. 
This can be illustrated by comparing the distribution of ERDF funding between the 
levels of Spanish administration during the two funding periods. The CSF for 
Objective one for the period 1989-93 amounted to 1.27 billion pesetas (9393 million 
ecu at 1989 value) of which around 806,000 million is ERDF funding. As shown in 
Figure 6.4, regional administrations manage 33.8% of the funding. If the overall 
27rnterview with official ofDGXVIIC1, European Commission, Brussels, 17 April1997. 
28rnterview with official ofDGXVIIC1, European Commission, Brussels, 17 April 1997. 
Figure 6.4 Distribution of ERDF funding between levels of administration 
1989-93 
Institution Millions of pesetas % 
Central administration 412,630 51.2 
Regional administrations 272,350 33.8 
Public firms 64,470 8.0 
Local authorities 56,420 7.0 
Total 805,870 100.00 
Source: Lazaro, 1991a, p. 111 
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level of funding, including ESP and EAGGF, is considered, similarly, 66% of the 
funds finance programmes or projects under the responsibility of central 
administration and local authorities, and approximately 33% of the funding is 
earmarked for programmes under the competency of the Autonomous Communities 
(Conejos i Sancho, 1993, p. 336). The CSF for 1994-99 grants around 33.75% of the 
total of structural fund resources given to Spain for Objective one areas to the 
Autonomous Communities to finance projects within their competency (Ministerio de 
Economfa y Hacienda, 1995, p. 89), which indicates that the distribution of funding 
between regional and central authorities has not changed significantly between the 
1989-93 and 1994-99 periods. This is supported by a study by Marks et al. (1996b), 
which finds no evidence for a resource pull hypothesis whereby the active lobbying of 
subnational governments at EU level can influence the distribution of funding. 
The level of funding received by Andalusia can also be considered to explore whether 
any significant increase in the level of resources managed at regional level can be 
noted. In the 1989-93 funding cycle, Andalusia obtained approximately 10.5% of the 
total of Objective one funding, and, in the 1994-99 cycle, it received around 10.6%. It 
would be necessary to examine the exact level of eo-financing with national 
authorities during the 1994-99 cycle to confirm fully the level of participation in 
Andalusia29, but the data suggest that the amount of resources under its responsibility 
has remained broadly the same. 
29until the end of the 1994-99 cycle, not all the multi-regional finances under the control of central 
administration will have been allocated, so that any evaluation of the level of distribution of finances 
between central and regional authorities will remain incomplete. 
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The case of Andalusia 
The formulation of the regional plan at domestic level for Andalusia for 1987-90 was 
carried out in very different circumstances from that drawn up in 1984-86, according 
to an evaluation of Andalusia's regional policy for the Commission by the Instituto de 
Desarrollo Regional (Institute for Regional Development) (1997a, p. 56) in Seville. 
Not only were the economic circumstances more favourable, but considerable 
adaptation to EC norms was compulsory following accession to the Community. 
Furthermore, in 1986, most competencies in the Statutes of Autonomy had been 
transferred to the regions. The Economic Development Plan for Andalusia for 1991-
94 was again formulated in a different context, given the added knowledge of the 
funding process, the learning experience within the EC, and the expansive economic 
cycle. International economic changes and the creation of the Single Market were 
realities to which Andalusia was forced to adapt, the key objective being greater 
economic growth in order to catch up with other regions. A report in 1997 by the 
Instituto de Desarrollo Regional concluded that: 
El Plan nace de una Administraci6n que dispone de la pr:ktica totalidad de 
!as competencias, que cuenta con un soporte organizativo ya no solo de 
caracter embrionario, y que ejerci6 a lo largo de varios afios la tarea de 
gobierno. 
(The Plan comes from an administration which enjoys practically the full 
range of competencies, which can count on organisational support no 
longer of an embryonic nature, and one which has carried out the role of 
government for several years) (Instituto de Desarrollo Regional, 1997a, p. 
59). 
In the case of Andalusia, regional reform was particularly urgent because of the extent 
of its economic crisis, which had been exacerbated by the lack of action to combat 
key problems by central government (Instituto de Desarrollo Regional, 1997a, p. 53). 
The Andalusia government considered the development of an administration with the 
capacity to deal with the region's underdevelopment to be a key priority, including 
the management of European funding. Only a relatively small number of officials 
were responsible for EU funding at subnational level, although the regional 
administration relied on the expertise of a large number of external analysts to 
monitor and evaluate projects effectiveJy30. The new DG for European Funding (see 
Figure 6.3), created in 1996, did not expand the division significantly, but its creation 
reflected the increased priority given to the management of the structural funds. 
Despite greater organisation, contradictions between the finalised regional plan, and 
the economic priorities demarcated at regional level, were used by Andalusia 
30rnterview with official ofDGXVIICI, European Commission, Brussels, 21 Apri11997. 
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government officials to demonstrate the lack of collaboration between the two levels 
of administration (Rodrfguez de la Borbolla, 1989, p. 570). The Ministry of Economy 
and Finance in Andalusia is responsible for formulating its RDP and the regional sub-
CSF, fixes the financial priorities, and is responsible for the co-ordination of 
programmes in conjunction with central administration. The development of the 
division of labour between central and regional governments is a consequence of both 
the process of decentralisation, and the impact of the EU on policy formation. 
However, officials in Madrid stressed the key role they played in the co-ordination of 
EU funding for Andalusia, given that mechanisms at regional level remained 
inadequate31, Furthermore, despite evidence of greater regional input, interviews at 
subnationallevel suggested that the partnership principle had a limited impact on the 
nature of the policy process. An administrator in the DG for European Funding in 
Andalusia was sceptical of 'concepts such as partnership used in Brussels which are 
very distant from the reality of the process in the regions', considering that central 
government's continued control of the process was accepted by the Andalusia 
administration32. 
The establishment of Andalusia's regional office in Brussels as an official delegation 
in 1995 (Law 164/1995 of 27 June), managed since its creation in February 1991 by 
the development agency IPA, was symbolically important. Although it retained its 
roles of information-gathering and lobbying at EU level, it was the first region to 
apply the outcome of the May 1994 Constitutional court decision on the external 
representation of the Autonomies (see Chapter 4). However, in general, an economic, 
more functionally oriented rationale seemed to dominate Andalusia's concept of 
European policy. The conclusion drawn by Morata and Mufioz (1996, p. 210) that 
'administrative 'partnership' was mainly financial instead of effective or operational' 
thus seems relevant for the case of Andalusia. The issue of participation in EU policy-
making was more politicised in other Spanish regions, whose level of regional 
identity and political activity led them to exploit further the opportunities at EU 
leveJ33. The greater lobbying capacity of regions such as Catalonia and the Basque 
Country even resulted in moves towards regionalisation of the Cohesion Fund, which 
was initially intended to be controlled purely by the state. The achievement of 
subnational involvement in EU funding earmarked for central government provides 
an important illustration of the impact on the policy process of regional demands for 
greater participation. 
31 Interview with official of Ministry of Economy and Finance (official responsible for Andalusia, Sub-
DG for Administration of the ERDF), Madrid, 18 September 1996. 
32rnterview with official of regional Ministry of Economy and Finance, Seville, 19 June 1997. 
33rnterview with former official of Ministry of Economy and Finance, Madrid, 8 October 1996. 
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Regional participation in the Cohesion Fund 
The Commission regulation establishing the Cohesion Fund took effect on 26 May 
1994, replacing the cohesion financial instrument established on I April 1993, which 
had been a provisional measure in view of the delay in the ratification of Maastricht34. 
Nowhere in the interim instrument or in the Cohesion Fund regulation was reference 
made to the concept of partnership, and regional participation was similarly absent 
from guidelines established for the assessment and monitoring of projects. The 
Spanish government lobbied hard for the establishment of the fund at 
intergovernmental level, its link to the EMU criteria lending it a clearly state-centred 
perspective in contrast to structural funding. Any evidence of a regionalisation of the 
Fund would thus represent a significant evolution. 
The fund is based on three major principles. It provides a financial contribution to 
member states with a per capita GNP of less than 90% of the EC average; assistance 
is restricted to the part-financing of projects in the fields of the environment and 
trans-European transport networks (although Spain had initially also requested the 
financing of health and education projects); and it assists member states which have 
drawn up a programme complying with the conditions on excessive public deficits 
linked to the implementation of EMU (Article 104c). Funding is conditional on the 
macro-economic situation, aiming to act as a restraint on lack of budgetary discipline, 
and to promote continued economic growth in the country as a whole. It was argued 
that the focus on interstate instead of regional cohesion was necessary in the context 
of EMU, whereby member states lost a large degree of freedom in determining their 
economic policies35 (Elorza, 1994, p. 320). The Secretary of State for the EU 
explained in the Joint Committee for the EU on 12 March 1992 that the Cohesion 
Fund was an interstate fund which, in keeping with Spanish constitutional 
arrangements, took regional opinions into account (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 
1992, p. 731 ). The Economy Minister, Solbes, refused to present the regional 
distribution of the Cohesion Fund in the Joint Committee for the EU as requested by 
parliamentary groups in 1994, considering that the 'territorialisation' of the fund 
should be avoided (Congress, no. 52, 11 October 1994, pp. 1076-7). While the sub-
DG for Compensation and Cohesion Funding within the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance (see Figure 6.2) has responsibility for the co-ordination and evaluation of the 
Cohesion Fund, the Autonomous Communities would be expected to have limited 
34Jt was intended to set up the Cohesion Fund by 31 December 1993 as the second paragraph of EC 
Article 130d stipulated. 
35The national focus was also important as it meant that the poorest regions of the other eight member 
states would not be eligible for funding. 
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participation both in setting priorities, and in the direct management and financing of 
projects. However, despite the fact that little potential existed for interadministrative 
collaboration, the contradiction between a nationally oriented fund without a 
territorial basis, and the level of decentralisation of the Spanish state remained. This 
was particularly the case in policy areas where the regions enjoyed full competencies, 
for example in the field of the environment. 
The Annual Report on the Cohesion Fund (European Commission, 1995a, pp 92-93) 
referred to concerns within the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions regarding low levels of consultation of local and regional authorities, 
and key socio-economic actors. The lack of objective criteria for the distribution of 
funding was repeatedly criticised by regional authorities. Although the regions were 
initially relatively uninformed about the Cohesion Fund, the considerable amount of 
funding available led increasingly to written requests for information from the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance, particularly from the more active regions36. A 
document sent to the regional government in Catalonia by the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance in 1994 established that projects selected by Autonomous Communities 
could now be financed by the Fund in agreement with central government (El Pats, 5 
July 1994), although it warned against a process of 'territorialisation'. However, 
according to a government official responsible for the Cohesion Fund, it was intended 
from the outset that regional authorities would become more involved in the process 
in an increasingly decentralised state, although the central administration had full 
control during the first year37. 
In 1994, the government was obliged to accept a greater recognition of regional 
competencies in priority areas of the Commission, although the financial allocation 
was still transferred initially to the national budget. Regional demands for greater 
participation came to a head in a meeting of the Council for Fiscal and Financial 
Policy on 21 September 1994, when a decision was taken on subnational participation 
in the Cohesion Fund. The most active regions in the September meeting were the 
Basque Country, Navarre and Catalonia, who managed to obtain a common regional 
agreement on the issue to the effect that the Autonomous Communities would 
manage 40,000 million pesetas of the funding received from the Cohesion Fund in 
1995; 11,000 million pesetas would be set aside for infrastructure projects, and 
29,000 million for the environmental field, namely 10% and 40% respectively. The 
36rnterview with official of Ministry of Economy and Finance (Assistant Director General, Cohesion 
Fund), Madrid, 23 September 1996. 
37rnterview with official of Ministry of Economy and Finance (Assistant Director General, Cohesion 
Fund), Madrid, 23 September 1996. 
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agreement was approved in October 1995, and was generally regarded as a first 
positive step towards greater regional involvement, although Solbes stressed that 
subnational participation could not continue to increase so that it became detrimental 
to the state budget (Congress, no. 52, 11 October 1994, p. 1077). 
The impact of the domestic political situation on EU policy is clearly illustrated by 
the Cohesion Fund. The 21 September 1994 decision could be interpreted as the result 
of the increased leverage of key regions following the 1993 elections (see Chapter 4). 
The regions most active in their demands for greater participation were also those in 
receipt of relatively small amounts of Objective one structural funding, namely 
Catalonia and the Basque Country, which both obtained financing from the Cohesion 
Fund for a significant number of projects in 1995-96. Other regions have criticised 
the fact that the most economically advanced regions receive a disproportionately 
large share of the Cohesion Fund, viewed as a political payment from the government 
for the support of Catalonia and the Basque Country. One DGXVI official claimed 
that the Spanish government even attempted to conceal Commission funding of 
projects, for example the modernisation of Mallorca airport, with the aim of taking 
full credit for successful projects at national IeveJ38. The state's capacity to 
manipulate its use of the Fund is facilitated by the fact that its guidelines do not 
highlight the concept of additionality, thus allowing member states to disregard the 
principle without risk of penalisation. 
Regional authorities are involved in the Cohesion Fund at a relatively late stage in the 
process, namely the implementation and evaluation stages, but demand for greater 
regional involvement in the earlier planning stages is inevitable according to a 
DGXVI administrator39. However, other officials consider that little potential for 
further involvement exists40. According to a national expert in DGXVI, 'at the end of 
the day, there is a single interlocutor in the Cohesion Fund for the Commission: the 
member state•41, The largest Cohesion Fund projects are still managed by central 
government, although the regions try to prioritise environmental projects to maximise 
their input in areas where they enjoy a higher level of competency42. Regional and 
local participation does not occur in a systematic way, and the Commission is mainly 
38rnterview with official ofDGXVIIE2, European Commission, Brussels, 16April1997. 
39rnterview with official ofDGXVIIEI, European Commission, Brussels, 17 April1997. 
40rnterview with detached national expert of DGXVI/E2, European Commission, Brussels, 16 April 
1997. 
41rnterview with official ofDGXVI/E2, European Commission, Brussels, 17 Apri11997. 
42An the projects presented by the regions during the first year were in the area of the environment 
according to an interview with an official of Ministry of Economy and Finance (Assistant Director 
General, Cohesion Fund), Madrid, 13 June 1997. 
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in contact with central administration, as stipulated in the Cohesion Fund regulation. 
However, regional authorities increasingly make direct contact with EU officials, 
although generally discouraged from doing so by central government. Commission 
officials acknowledge that greater regional involvement is more time-consuming and 
complicated in view of the frequent lack of knowledge of EU funding procedures at 
subnationallevel. This particularly caused problems in the first year of participation 
in 1995, as subnational authorities expected the Cohesion Fund projects to work in a 
similar way to the ERDF programmes43. 
Socio-economic actors in Spain have not obtained access to policy-making in the area 
of the Cohesion Fund. They have made little contact with government officials 
regarding the Fund, while the Economic and Social Council has not requested 
information on projects44. A central government official responsible for the Fund 
denied his opposition to their participation, but did not see it as useful in view of the 
areas financed by the Fund, which are in the public sector and have little relevance for 
socio-economic actors. Their full involvement in public sector funding would mean 
their participation, and even eo-decision, in the state budget45; their consultative role 
via the Economic and Social Council at state level was thus considered adequate. The 
input of socio-economic actors to EU funding other than the Cohesion Fund may be 
expected to be greater, given that the priorities of structural funding are more relevant 
to their interests. However, many institutional obstacles continue to exist at domestic 
level. This analysis of the level of access to policy-making of trade unions and 
employers provides a useful contrast with the case of regional authorities. 
Access of socio-economic actors to the policy process 
Socio-economic actors consider that they have been sidelined from the EU policy-
making process during membership (see Chapter 4). The shift towards greater 
regional participation has not been accompanied by a similar shift in the participation 
of actors such as trade unions, despite the fact that Article 7 of the Spanish 
Constitution refers to the role of socio-economic actors in defending and promoting 
social and economic interests (Garcfa Dfaz, 1995, p. 79). Although the 1993 reform of 
the structural funds was generally seen as a fine-tuning of the 1988 reform, one of its 
innovations was the recommendation of enhanced partnership with socio-economic 
43Jnterview with detached national expert of DGXVI/E2, European Commission, Brussels, 17 April 
1997. 
44Jnterview with official of Ministry of Economy and Finance (Assistant Director General, Cohesion 
Fund), Madrid, 23 September 1996. 
45Jnterview with official of Ministry of Economy and Finance (Adviser, DG for Analysis and 
Budgetary Programming), Madrid, 23 September 1996. 
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actors. The 1988 reform had left open the possibility for their inclusion in the 
principle of co-operation, but their presence was not usual in practice, particularly as 
the relatively short time within which the CSFs had to be approved meant that 
consultation, even with regional and local actors, was limited. 
The absence of detailed rules defining the nature of participation meant that their 
involvement was contingent upon the political will of member states (Scott, 1995, pp. 
33-4). In one of the final Commission drafts of the reform, the clause on 'institutional 
norms', which encouraged governments to interpret the co-operation principle 
restrictively, was omitted, but was then re-introduced following pressure from 
member states at European Council leveJ46. Furthermore, the fact that the type of 
funding was not clearly specified made it likely that their participation would still be 
reduced to membership of ESF monitoring committees (CCOO, 1993a, p. 1). The 
Economic and Social Committee (1994a, 1994b) at EU level criticised the lack of 
measures established for socio-economic participation, and stressed the need for the 
support of relevant public authorities at local, regional, and national levels. However, 
the influence of the Committee on the policy process is limited; proposals such as the 
creation of a single consultative committee for all the funds were largely ignored by 
the Council and Commission (Economic and Social Committee, 1988, p. 1). Although 
the Commission expressed willingness to support the participation of key trade unions 
and employers, their input was largely reduced to its annual obligation to consult 
them on the EU's structural policy, which clearly indicates the closed nature of the 
EU opportunity structure for socio-economic actors. However, some advances have 
been made. A working group, established in 1995, made it possible to bypass the 
strictly annual nature of the consultation procedure, and turn it into an 'on-going 
cooperative process' (European Commission, 1996b, p. 238) and, in 1996, the 
Commission (European Commission, 1996b) recognised that recent trends indicated a 
greater willingness to involve socio-economic partners. This was illustrated by the 
representation of social partners on Objective three and four committees in most 
member states, although participation varied considerably between Objectives and 
countries. 
In Spain, socio-economic actors are not members of the monitoring committees for 
Objectives one and two CSFs and OPs. Any formal representation is generally limited 
to the ESF evaluation committees47. In 1995, the Commission persuaded the Spanish 
authorities to inform socio-economic partners of the conclusions of the committee 
46rnterview with official of CCOO, Madrid, 20 June 1997. 
47 An amendment to the reform in 1995 means that they can now attend all ESF monitoring 
committees (Interview with official of CCOO, Madrid, 20 June 1997). 
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evaluating the Objective one CSF, although generally regarded as a minor advance if 
they are excluded from the negotiations48. Socio-economic actors were concerned that 
regional plans, which strongly conditioned the content of the CSFs, were determined 
by the priorities of the government, over which they had little, if any, influence 
(Garcfa Dfaz, 1995, p. 77). The plans were presented to the Economic and Social 
Council at national level, where they were discussed by union and business 
representatives. However, delay in the presentation of plans, and the complexity of 
operational procedures, meant that little time was allowed for any in-depth analysis or 
genuine input to the debate. Socio-economic actors complained of the lack of 
discussion of the social implications of projects, claiming that their participation was 
mostly reduced to an informative role when decisions had already been taken. This 
has also been the criticism of regional evaluation committees, such as the one set up 
in Andalusia by the pact signed by the regional government, the UGT and CCOO, 
and the Confederaci6n de Empresarios de Andalucfa (Confederation of Andalusia 
Business Organisations, CEA) in February 1995 (Junta de Andalucfa, 1995). 
However, consultation is considerably more advanced than in other regions, and the 
Economic and Social Committee (1994b, p. 13) refers to the good will shown by the 
Andalusia regional authority which 'does not seem to have rubbed off on the national 
authorities as regards the central funds allocated to Andalusia'. The participation of 
socio-economic actors is dependent on the existence of a tradition of consensus and 
social dialogue and, even in Andalusia, the influence of socio-economic actors 
remains limited when major political decisions are taken (Porras Nadales, 1994, pp. 
89-90). 
The presence of socio-economic actors in Objective one evaluation committees was 
considered largely unnecessary, and even impractical, by the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance in view of their lack of technical expertise in such projects49. Another 
government official confirmed the view that their participation was not logical, given 
their minimal involvement in the formulation of regional plans50. Evidence would 
thus seem to suggest a general resistance in the Ministry of Economy and Finance to 
socio-economic participation. A similar reticence can be found within many regional 
authorities; for example, in Catalonia, little evidence exists of participation of socio-
economic actors in the ERDF Objective two monitoring committee (Morata and 
Mufioz, 1996, pp. 211-2). The Commission's 1996 report on economic and social 
48rnterview with official of CCOO, Madrid, 20 June 1997. 
49rnterview with official of Ministry of Economy and Finance (Adviser, DG for Analysis and 
Budgetary Programming), Madrid, 23 September 1996. 
50rnterview with official of Ministry of Economy and Finance (Assistant Director General, Cohesion 
Fund), Madrid, 18 September 1996. 
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cohesion (European Commission, 1996c, p. 121) proposes distinguishing between 
decision-making and consultative partners, the former being authorities responsible 
for eo-financing, and the latter being mainly the social partners and interest groups, 
which 'might allow the political authorities responsible to take a more objective and 
constructive view of the latter and embrace their involvement more whole-heartedly'. 
The Commission recognises that socio-economic participation can only be effective 
where actors have the necessary technical capacity. The Economic and Social 
Committee organised fifteen seminars in 1995, funded by the ERDF, to prepare 
regional and national representatives of its member confederations for attendance at 
the Objective one monitoring committees. It has also promoted the idea of a network 
of regional experts to assist union officials who have little experience of EU funding 
(European Commission, 1996b, p. 238). A proposal for a tripartite Co-ordination 
Committee for the discussion of structural funding, consisting of representatives of 
central government, unions, and the employers' confederation, remained under 
discussion in 1995 (Economic and Social Council, 1995, p. 77-8). The Economic and 
Social Committee (1994b, p. 13) praised regional initiatives, such as that taken in 
Valencia, where a forum was organised by the regional authority, in conjunction with 
trade unions, to discuss decentralised development. The forum discovered a serious 
lack of information about EU regional policy mechanisms, including Article 4 of the 
framework Regulation. 
Although some progress has been made since the 1993 reform of the structural funds, 
the outcome is uneven, and socio-economic actors remain largely peripheral to the 
process. Socio-economic participation depends, to a great extent, on the level of 
commitment to their input at regional and national levels, determined by the 
institutional norms and practices of each region and member state. A study of the role 
of trade unions in a regional context, carried out by DGXVI between September 1991 
and November 1994, concluded that the subnational level should be seen as an 
important field of action for trade unions (European Commission, 1996d). The 
Economic and Social Committee (1994b, p. 17) confirmed this view when it referred 
to the 'regional authorities' greater amenability to the implementation of Article 4, in 
contrast with the wariness displayed by the national governments'. However, key 
socio-economic actors, such as the CCOO (1993a, p. 2), continue to emphasise the 
importance of direct contact with central government, given that it defines the main 
lines of economic policy, and has the final say on the formulation of RDPs. 
Other key interest groups also sought to gain greater access to the implementation and 
evaluation stages of the policy process. For example, the 1993 reform made 
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participation by environmental authorities compulsory in the preparation and 
implementation of relevant programmes (European Commission, 1996b, p. 229). 
They were made members of monitoring committees, and rules on their level of 
involvement were included in the programming documents. However, the rhetoric of 
partnership was not always translated into practice, and environmental actors faced 
similar resistance to their greater participation in the policy process. A Court of 
Auditors evaluation considered their involvement in the formulation of RDPs, CSFs 
and OPs minimal, concluding that even environmental departments in regional 
authorities were not formally consulted about the preparation of relevant 
programmes51• They are excluded from national and regional monitoring committees, 
unless there is an absolutely explicit environmental remit, and the lack of information 
on national development plans inhibits their influence. A study by Joanne Scott 
( 1995) of the functioning of the ERDF examines the participation of more than 
seventy non-governmental environmental organisations in a 'European Campaign for 
the Reform of the Structural Funds'. She highlights the minimal influence on regional 
development planning of environmental organisations, particularly as drafts of 
national development plans, CSFs and OPs are excluded from the public domain, 
which has been repeatedly criticised by environmental groups (Scott, 1995, pp. 83-4). 
The lack of political will to implement the partnership principle in member states 
remained a major obstacle to the full participation of interest groups and key socio-
economic actors. In Spain, it could be considered that 'the national authorities have 
hitherto taken an extremely centralizing approach to regional development policies' 
(Economic and Social Committee, 1994b, p. 12). 
Conclusions 
During the first years of EC membership, regional participation in the structural funds 
was limited in Spain, and central administration retained full control of the funding 
process. However, information exchange, collaboration, and co-ordinating 
mechanisms between central and regional authorities have developed during 
membership. This is a result of the Commission's initiative to encourage subnational 
participation, greater awareness and capacity at regional level, and less resistance 
within central administration to a more regionalised policy process. According to 
Keating (1997, p. 35), 'regional institutions are important in defining the issues, in 
mobilizing resources, in providing differential access, in mediating interests and in 
implementing policy'. Smith (1995, p. 355) concludes that EU funding programmes 
have had a considerable influence on the structure of territorial relations in Spain, 
51specia1 Report, 1992, no. 3/92 Concerning the environment, OJ C24511, 1992, p. 13. 
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describing the funds as 'catalyseurs de la federalisation du systeme politique' 
(catalysts of the federalisation of the political system). Despite the lack of change in 
distribution of resources between central and regional authorities, the difference 
between the 1989-93 and 1994-99 funding cycles is essentially one of much 
enhanced experience, increased resources, and greater opportunities for regional 
participation. The increase in regional involvement was partly the result of the 
extended time scale for negotiations, and the larger amount of available resources, but 
the decision rules established at EC/EU level also significantly enhanced the role of 
regional authorities. This indicates the opening of the opportunity structures at both 
EU and domestic levels, encouraged by the partnership principle in the 1988 reform. 
Keating (1997, p. 26) concludes that states are no longer the privileged arena for all 
policy areas as they 'may not be able to control the processes they have set in train. 
New actors and networks may emerge to create a new political game'. The changed 
context may mean that the state could be considered less capable in the long term of 
controlling access to the policy process of domestic actors during the implementation 
and evaluation stages. 
A state-centric perspective no longer seems to provide an adequate analysis of a 
policy process where a range of actors other than central government can gain 
opportunities to participate in the process, and the extensive consultation process 
between actors at regional, national and EU levels indicates a development beyond a 
two-level game process confined to the national arena. Given the high level of 
regional mobilisation, the potential exists for the development of a multi-level 
governance process. Key illustrations of the changing relations between groups of 
actors at different administrative levels are: 
1. Relations between regional and central government 
Information exchange and more developed co-ordination mechanisms in the 
implementation of structural funding enhanced collaboration between regional and 
central government during EC/EU membership. However, a high level of subnational 
variation tended to result in a minority of regions maximising their involvement in the 
process. 
2. Relations between regional government and the EU level 
Regional authorities were increasingly able to obtain direct contact with officials at 
EU level, although, at key stages of the process, central government still retained its 
strong national gatekeeper role. However, increased EU resource dependence on the 
regional level for implementation and evaluation of projects resulted in a more 
established collaboration between the two levels. 
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3. Relations between socio-economic actors and regional government 
Although the Economic and Social Committee highlighted the regional governments' 
greater acceptance of socio-economic participation in structural funding, key socio-
economic actors rarely exploited the opportunities for greater access to policy-making 
at regional level. Evidence suggests that consultation between unions, employers and 
the regional government is more advanced in Andalusia than in other regions, as 
illustrated by the Pact signed in 1995. 
4. Relations between socio-economic actors and central government 
The absence of rules clearly defining the nature of socio-economic participation in 
structural funding led to restrictive interpretations of the partnership principle by 
member states. The involvement of socio-economic actors often remained restricted 
to membership of ESF monitoring committees. 
5. Relations between socio-economic actors and the EU level 
The proposals of the Economic and Social Committee to enhance socio-economic 
participation at all levels have largely been ignored by the Council and Commission. 
Although the Commission expressed its determination to increase socio-economic 
participation, this was largely restricted to annual consultation on structural funding at 
EU level. 
The partnership principle stands the best chance of realisation at the implementation 
and monitoring stages, given the greater demands on regional knowledge and 
resources to implement detailed projects on the ground. Hooghe (1996a, p. 15) 
considers that 'who is dominant varies with the phase of policy-making, the policy . 
instrument, and the particular territorial niche'. Chapter 2 considered that it was not 
only the particular policy area and episode which determined the extent of domestic 
participation, but also the stage of the policy process. Marks (1996) outlines the 
stages of structural programming, highlighting the lesser dependence on regional 
input during the formulation of RDPs and the negotiation of the CSF, which contrasts 
with greater subnational participation in the implementation of the OPs and the 
evaluation of projects. He concludes that 'this ordinal sequence of decreasing 
functional reliance on subnational government is reflected without exception in the 
relative strength of subnational actors ... across the stages of structural programming 
within individual countries' (Marks, 1996, p. 408). His conclusions would seem to be 
borne out in the analysis of the input of Spanish regions at different stages of the 
process. Although some analysts have dismissed the implementation stage, Smith 
(1997) underlines its significance as an intensely political process. He acknowledges 
the importance of high level bargaining at intergovernmental level in the Council of 
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Ministers where 'the input of the central state is thus at its purest' (Smith, 1997, p. 
122). However, he also highlights the fact that an exclusive focus on the negotiation 
of budgetary issues at interstate level, which only occurs every four or five years, 
ignores the intense consultation and political bargaining with a range of actors other 
than the state outside the big negotiating 'occasions'. 
Evidence from Chapter 6 has illustrated the varying level of domestic involvement in 
the EU structural funds between different groups of actors. The marginalisation of 
socio-economic actors reflects their less developed access points to the policy process 
at national and EU levels. Although the involvement of regional authorities is far 
greater, an analysis of subnational mobilisation is forced to acknowledge the high 
level of variation between and within member states. Udo Bullmann (1997, p. 17) 
refers to the asymmetric course of regionalisation processes, arguing that participation 
depends on the strength of the regional government, and key factors such as their 
economic functions, their methods of democratic participation and their regional 
identity (though he considers that identity has often been overestimated as a pre-
condition for enhanced input). The high level of regional variation in Spain carried 
the risk that only a 'select subset' would be empowered to obtain maximum 
involvement in the policy-making process (Marks et al., 1996b, p. 63). This is 
illustrated by the case of Andalusia, where the level of partnership with central and 
EU levels was less effective than in more politically active regions, thus underlining 
the danger that an increase in access to the process will exacerbate tensions over 
resources and competencies. The Castilla and Leon government criticised Catalonia's 
bid to play a bigger part in the management of the Cohesion Fund, considering that 
EU financing was being used to achieve domestic political goals rather than the 
objectives outlined at EU level (El Pafs, 3 September 1994). Similar concerns were 
voiced regarding the distribution of structural funding. Some regions advocated the 
selection of projects by central government to maintain greater objectivity, for 
example as expressed by the mayor of Malaga, Pedro Aparicio, in 1994 (El Pafs, 28 
August 1994). This can be compared with the tensions resulting from the efforts to 
attain a common regional position in sectoral meetings, as described in Chapter 4. 
The moderating influence of central government is thus important in reconciling 
frequently conflicting regional interests (Bachtler, 1997, p. 89), giving it a key role as 
the only organ able to mediate between different levels of actors, and represent the 
regions as a whole in an area of 'overlapping competencies, tensions and conflicts' 
(Marks et al., 1996b, p. 63). 
Jeffery Anderson (1990) refers to the strong position retained by state actors at key 
stages of the process, the state thus remaining an essential gatekeeper and mediator 
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between EU and domestic actors as the only recognised interlocutor at EU level. The 
institutional structure established in each member state ultimately seems to determine 
the level of domestic participation. Regions such as Catalonia, Navarre and the 
Basque Country still complained about their absence from the negotiation of the 
allocation of the funding because of remaining obstacles at national level. 
Distribution of resources between regions within member states remained the 
initiative of the Spanish government in conjunction with the Commission, and the 
domestic ratification process tended to be an explanation and justification of decisions 
already taken. Morata and Muiioz (1996, p. 217) illustrate central government's 
continued hold on the policy process when they describe how the Spanish 
government opted for the presentation of global plans for each of the Objectives 
instead of specific regional CSFs, and prioritised infrastructural projects to minimise 
subnational input. They conclude that a national approach has largely persisted in 
Spain. Despite his view of the regions as the new interlocutors of the Commission in 
a multi-level pattern of governance, even Marks (1996, p. 402) acknowledges that the 
Spanish regions are 'still struggling to institutionalize their influence in the EU'. It is 
difficult for multi-level analysts to deny the firm evidence for: 
the importance in all countries of central administration in the 
implementation of Structural Funds. This is because of the Commission's 
lack of administrative capacity and that of the regions, when these 
exist.. .. Central governments and administrations can thus not be 
considered as marginalized by Community regional policy and indeed they 
sometimes gain in influence over the regions ... 
(Balme, 1997, p. 73). 
Despite moves towards a greater number of access points for subnational actors, and 
evidence of increased regional mobilisation, the state agrees to share authority to a 
limited degree and only at certain stages. Subnational authorities may seek to 
maximise the level of EU funding obtained by their particular region, and exploit the 
political opportunity structure to enhance their regional autonomy, but the state 
ultimately enjoys full capacity to formulate a unified national bargaining position at 
the negotiating table in order to maximise its overall returns from the EU. Despite the 
opening of opportunity structures at domestic and EU levels, the state still retained 
considerable control over the extent of regional participation in the policy process, 
and, at times, a closing of the opportunity structure seemed to be encouraged by 
regional governments which feared losing out to stronger regions with more effective 
lobbying strategies. 
The state's role has thus not been significantly reduced by increasing regional input, 
although the changing nature of the policy-making process, as illustrated by a 
164 
comparison of the 1989-93 and 1994-99 funding periods, means that its role in the 
process has had to adapt to a new context. Although a more pluralist tradition has 
developed in Spain, and the lobbying capacity of key actors has been strengthened 
during EC/EU membership (see Chapter 4), obstacles still exist which inhibit regional 
access to the policy process. However, the progress made towards a more 
decentralised state, and the enhanced knowledge of EU policy-making at subnational 
level, are conditions which encourage a greater impact on the autonomy of central 
government in the area of cohesion policy. 
Taking into account an increased number of agendas from a wider range of actors 
requires the insights of the multi-level game perspective to analyse the 
implementation of structural funding. Although central government continues to 
control the articulation between the EU and domestic agendas, it may agree to play a 
weaker role in the implementation and evaluation stages. This is particularly the case 
where it is more dependent on expertise at regional level to implement projects, even 
if it refuses to give up its monopoly at other stages of the process. Marks (1997) 
considers that political actors may agree to disperse authority to subnational or 
supranational actors for a variety of reasons, such as the need to attain the support of 
powerful interest groups in the domestic arena. In the case of Spain, the new domestic 
context, represented by the dependence of central government on regional parties for 
the survival of its coalition from 1993, may have allowed the more active regions to 
increase their input. This is illustrated by the government's approval of regional 
involvement in the Cohesion Fund in 1994. A state-centric approach is clearly 
inadequate for clarifying the wide range of interactive processes which have 
developed in the area of cohesion policy. The multi-level perspective allows a fuller 
analysis of the developing context, although it is obliged to acknowledge the capacity 
of the state to structure the conditions under which domestic actors participate 
throughout the policy process. As the role of the state is expected to vary in different 
policy settings, the conclusions drawn on cohesion policy may not apply in other 
areas, an hypothesis which is tested by the case of fisheries in Chapters 7 and 8. 
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Chapter7 
THE ROLE OF THE SPANISH STATE IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THE EU-
MOROCCO FISHERIES AGREEMENT 
The Spanish government was a key protagonist at EU level in the policy area of 
fisheries. It played an important role in the re-negotiation of the fisheries agreement 
between the EU and Morocco in 1995, seeking to maximise the defence of its national 
interests in view of the potentially negative impact of the accord on its fishing sector. 
Former Agriculture and Fisheries Minister Luis Atienza ( 1996, p. 12) recognises the 
considerable importance of fisheries agreements with non-EU or Third countries for 
the Spanish fishing sector, but also acknowledges that the negotiating process 'no esta 
exento de tensiones de caracter peri6dico' (is not free from tensions of a periodic 
nature). Chapter 7 focuses on the series of talks in 1995 to re-negotiate the 1992 EU-
fisheries agreement, which caused a high level of tension in the Spanish domestic 
arena. At national level, the Spanish state sought to obtain the optimal deal for its 
fishing sector, while being obliged to accept the EU's overall control of the 
negotiating process. At EU level, Spain had to justify its tough bargaining position 
vis-a-vis Morocco to fellow member states and to the Commission, whilst seeking to 
preserve its role as a leading player in the area of Mediterranean policy. The aim is, 
therefore, to examine the extent to which, in view of the prominent role played by the 
Spanish government, a state-centric model is the most appropriate approach for the 
analysis. Chapter 8 will then consider the input of key regional and sectoral actors in 
the domestic arena to the EU bargaining position, and their relations with central 
government. The conclusions of the fisheries case study assess the capacity of the 
Spanish government to retain its autonomy during the negotiating process, whilst 
meeting demands at both domestic and EU levels. 
Development of fisheries at EC/EU level 
Prior to an evaluation of the negotiations at interstate level, an examination of EU 
fisheries policy, the impact of Spain's EC accession, and relations between Spain, 
Morocco and the EC/EU sets the context for the analysis. 
Spain's EC accession 
The doubling in size of the Community fishing sector, and an increase of 75% in 
fishing capacity and 45% in fish consumption, was one result of the accession of 
Spain and Portugal in 19861. Prior to accession, Spain had an agreement with the EC 
I Europa web site, DGXIV home page: http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/DG 14/DG 14.html 
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which accounted for approximately 10% of its total fish catch. The Accession Treaty 
set out transitional arrangements, valid until the end of 2002, which guaranteed 
mutual access to selected fishing areas for EC countries including Spain and Portugal. 
The Spanish government considered that the quotas established for each member state 
in the 1983 agreement, negotiated in the absence of Spain, had an extremely negative 
effect on its fishing sector. The measures imposed by the entry terms have been 
viewed by one Spanish analyst as 'extraordinariamente duro, largo e irracional' 
(extraordinarily tough, long and irrational) (Diez-Hochleitner, 1995, p. 15). 
It was not until eight years after entry that it was agreed that the arrangements for 
incorporation of the two new members into the CFP should be adjusted by the 
Council of Ministers2. The decision was formally taken on 22 December 1994, 
bringing forward the end of the transitional period to 31 December 1995. Although 
this agreement allowed some commentators to adopt an optimistic vision of the future 
of the Spanish fishing sector, for example Gonzalo Vazquez et al. (1996), who 
conclude that Spain is likely to be a leading player in the future CFP, other observers 
highlight the minimal knowledge of the serious, long-term problems at national level. 
Miguel Peiia (1997, pp. 56-8) criticises the lack of priority given to Spain's own 
fishing waters, the government's postponement of unpopular decisions, and its 
inadequate support for the long-term planning of fishing following EC accession. 
Another key problem caused by Spain's entry into the Community was that access to 
European markets for many Moroccan imports became more problematic, thus 
causing tensions between the two countries. 
Relations between the ECIEU, Spain and Morocco . 
Although the Moroccan government feared a deterioration in its relationship with 
Spain when the Socialists gained power in 1982 (de Larramendi, 1997, p. 405), the 
PSOE made a major effort to normalise relations which had been ambivalent for 
centuries. Gillespie (1995, p. 167) argues that the links between Spain and Morocco 
were diversified and intensified during the Socialist term of office, the beginning of 
top-level summits from 1990 being one illustration. The issue of Morocco's claims on 
Spain's populated enclaves in its territories, the coastal towns of Ceuta and Melilla, 
caused less tension in the early 1990s, although proposals to grant them Autonomy 
Statutes in 1994 aroused strong reactions in Morocco, illustrated by the decision to 
suspend summits of Heads of government and ministerial visits. Mustafa Sehimi 
(1996, pp. 110-11) refers to the lack of communication and understanding between 
2council Regulation EC 1275/94 of 30 May 1994 on adjustments to the arrangements in the fisheries 
chapters of the Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal, OJ L 140, 3 June 1994. 
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the two neighbours, with two issues, the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, and fisheries, 
being most likely to cause tensions. 
Spain lobbied in the early 1990s for a restricted free trade agreement between 
Morocco and the Community. However, Spanish sectors set to lose most from 
increased competition from Morocco, such as citrus fruit, vegetables and textiles, 
opposed any further liberalisation of entry conditions, and direct competition between 
Moroccan and Spanish products led to a deterioration in their relations (de 
Larramendi, 1997, p. 416). The lobbying power of key Spanish sectors can be 
illustrated by the final declaration of the EuroMediterranean (EuroMed) conference in 
Barcelona in November 19953, which was cautious regarding preferential access for 
fruit and vegetables from non-EU Mediterranean countries, particularly as the overall 
level of imports from these countries into Spain had tripled over the previous fifteen 
years (Bataller Martin and Jordan Galduf, 1997, pp. 143-8). Morocco feared losing 
its markets as a result of Spain's EC entry, and therefore reinforced its efforts to 
establish closer relations with the Community. This was illustrated by its second 
application for EC membership in July 1987, which was rejected by the Council of 
Ministers on 15 September (de Larramendi, 1997, pp. 275-6). A protocol was signed 
by the EC and Morocco referring to Spain and Portugal's accession on 26 May 1988, 
which ensured the same terms for the entry of Moroccan agricultural products into the 
EC as for Spanish and Portuguese imports4. 
Following EC entry, an increased rate of growth in Spain promoted a higher level of 
investment in Morocco, which rose by a factor of thirty seven in five years (de 
Larramendi, 1997, p. 431). In June 1988, a framework agreement for economic and 
financial co-operation between Spain and Morocco was signed, whereby export credit 
of 125,000 million pesetas, subsequently increased to 150,000, provided for 
purchases of Spanish goods and services (Gillespie, 1995, p. 168). Spanish exports to 
Morocco increased by a factor of four, partly as a result of the 1988 agreement (de 
Larramendi, 1997, p. 430). Although France was still well ahead of Spain in terms of 
its trade with Morocco, Spain was reducing the gap. In February 1996, at a bilateral 
summit held in Rabat, the Spanish government agreed on a new economic and 
financial co-operation agreement amounting to 150,000 million pesetas for Morocco 
3The EuroMed conference was the first ever summit between the EU and non-EU Mediterranean 
countries, held under the Spanish EU Presidency on 27-28 November 1995. It resulted in the 
Barcelona Declaration, including agreements on the gradual introduction of a free trade area known as 
the EuroMediterranean Economic Area. 
4 Adding new protocols of co-operation was an EC/EU strategy for responding to Moroccan demands. 
For example, in 1988, a new financial protocol was signed (the third since the signing of the co-
operation agreement in 1976), which allocated 62.8% more funding to Morocco than in 1981 (de 
Larramendi, 1997, p. 277). 
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for the period 1996-2000 (de Larramendi, 1997, p. 429). A friendship and co-
operation treaty was also signed between the two countries on 4 July 1991, coming 
into effect on 28 January 1993, after a long ratification process during which the 
Spanish parliament questioned the appropriateness of the agreement in view of 
Morocco's human rights record. The accord, which institutionalised bilateral 
summits, and established measures to increase co-operation in a number of sectoral, 
financial and cultural fields, marked a considerable advance in relations between 
Spain and Morocco. 
At EU level, Spain was the member state most committed to promoting 
Mediterranean policy according to many analysts5 (for example, Baixeras, 1996, p. 
150), even though it has also been a priority for other countries such as France. 
Although Spain blocked talks on Moroccan agriculture during the first nine months of 
membership (de Larramendi, 1997, pp. 416-7), it also played an active role in 
Mediterranean policy, as illustrated by the Hispano-Italian initiative for the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean in 1990, the Co-
operation Council during the first Spanish Presidency in July 1989, aimed at 
establishing closer relations with Morocco, and the organisation of the 1995 EuroMed 
conference during its second EU Presidency. Factors such as the firm position on 
Mediterranean policy taken by Spanish officials in the Council of Ministers, and the 
position of Spaniards in key posts dealing with the Mediterranean (including the two 
last Commissioners responsible for this area), have continued to enhance its role as 
protagonist of the non-EU Mediterranean countries. However, Gillespie (1997a, pp. 
11-12) considers that Morocco has been less prioritised from March 1996 by the new 
PP government, although the first official trips as PM of both Aznar and Gonzalez 
were to Morocco. 
Spanish diplomatic efforts successfully promoted the creation of a Euro-Maghreb 
'partenariat' at the Lisbon Summit in June 1992, when Morocco was considered by 
the EU to be a candidate for a special free trade agreement6. Talks in 1992 focused on 
political dialogue, co-operation in key sectors, financial co-operation involving EU 
economic aid of around 56,000 million pesetas over three years, and the aim of 
creating a free trade area in exchange for limited concessions in agriculture. The 
5 Spain's key role in laying the basis for the EU' s Mediterranean policy is illustrated by the 
commissioning of two reports in February 1992, one directly from Spain on the political situation in 
the Maghreb, and the other a response by Commissioner Matutes to the economic problems of the 
region (Gillespie, 1997a, p. 5). 
6The EC and Morocco signed the first co-operation agreement on 27 April 1976, which came into 
effect in February 1978. It was expanded in 1988, and expired on 20 April 1995, ten days before the 
expiry of the fishing agreement. The inclusion of economic, technical, scientific and social co-
operation opened a new phase in BC-Morocco relations. 
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Commission's mandate for negotiating the Association agreement was originally 
approved by the Council of Ministers on 7 December 1993, and Mediterranean policy 
was given a considerable impulse at the 1994 Corfu Summit when the Commission 
was asked to write a report on a EuroMediterranean free trade area. The proposal was 
approved at the Essen Summit in December 1994, and negotiations finally began in 
1995. Spanish Commission officials were very eager to organise the EuroMed 
conference under the Spanish EU Presidency, and direct communication during 1994 
and 1995 between Commissioner Marfn in Brussels, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Madrid, enhanced the key role Spain played in the initiative (Baixeras, 
1996, p. 159). The Spanish commentator Miguel Hernando de Larramendi (1997, p. 
288) considers that Morocco sought to globalise its relations with the EU, 'vinculando 
la cuesti6n de la pesca con el futuro de sus exportaciones agrfcolas asf como con el 
contenido del Acuerdo de Asociaci6n ... ' (linking the question of fisheries to the future 
of its agricultural exports as well as to the content of the Association agreement. .. ). 
Morocco's key interest was thus in a substantial increase in the level of economic 
compensation, and an improvement in the terms for the export of its agricultural 
products, while Spanish interests in the Association agreement were firmly linked to 
obtaining fishing rights in Moroccan waters. The development of EU fisheries was a 
key source of tension in Spain's relations with Morocco during EC/EU membership. 
Common Fisheries Policy 
The CFP covers all activities involved in the fishing and farming of living aquatic 
resources, as well as the processing and marketing sectors. Provisions for a CFP were 
already made in 1957 in the EEC Treaty of Rome?, and it was established in a 
transitory form in 1983 before Spain joined the EC (Regulation EEC 170/83 and 
171183), with a view to consolidating it in 1986 on the accession of Spain and 
Portugal (Regulation EEC 3094/86). A review in 1992 (Regulation EEC 3760/92) on 
the basis of a Commission report (European Commission, 1991) assessed the 
situation of the industry and its outlook. The CFP focuses on four major areas, 
namely conservation of stocks, organisation of markets, structural measures, and 
international agreements. The restructuring of the fleet forms a constant underlying 
theme of fisheries policy, the aim being to reduce the fleet to a size commensurate 
with the stocks available. Multi-annual guidance programmes, enforcing reductions of 
up to 20% in fishing effort on member states, were established for the periods 1983-
86, 1987-91, 1993-96, and 1997-2002, and measures to assist fisheries were 
incorporated into the structural fund arrangements in the 1993 reform of the funds 
7 Article 39 (1) sets out the aims of the CAP; under Article 38, these are also the aims of the CFP. The 
Treaty on European Union inserted Article 3 (e) stating that a fisheries policy is one of the activities of 
the EU. 
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(Regulation EEC 2080/93). The various fishery finances available were grouped into 
one fund, the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG), which aims to 
achieve the objectives of the CFP, while contributing to strengthening economic and 
social cohesion under Article 130a of the Treaty on European Union (see Chapter 6 
on cohesion policy, and Chapter 8 on regional involvement in FIFG funding). The 
Community Initiative, PESCA, was established in 1994 to supplement the structural 
aid available under the FIFG8. Despite increased measures to assist fisheries, the EU 
fleet is dependent on agreements with other coastal nations to provide vital access to 
fishing grounds in the sector's search for new stocks, which thus form a central 
element of the CFP. 
Third-country fisheries agreements 
Without third-country agreements, the general extension of fishing zones to 200 
miles9, and the resulting substantial reduction in fishing opportunities, would have 
had serious repercussions for Community fishermen. According to a former 
government official, during Spain's early accession negotiations, the extension to the 
200-mile limit was 'un trauma sin precedente para Ios intereses pesqueros espafioles' 
(a trauma without precedent for Spanish fishing interests) (Bassols, 1995, p. 170). 
Over one-quarter of all fish caught by Community boats for human consumption is 
taken from international waters, or from those under the jurisdiction of non-EU 
countries, accounting for 40% of total CFP expenditure (European Commission, 
1994, p. 29). The Community makes various forms of concessions to the non-member 
countries with which it negotiates agreements. From 1990, in the so-called second-
generation agreements, it sought to promote the mutual development of both parties' 
fishing industries, and to highlight the opportunities for co-operation (European 
Commission, 1994, p. 32). 
Prior to the negotiations with Morocco, the illegal capture of the Spanish ship 'Estai' 
by Canadian coastguards led to a fisheries dispute. Canada's struggle for the control 
of international waters threatened the Spanish fishing presence in the area, and Spain 
requested the defence of legitimate fishing rights in its protest against the Canadian 
action. The fisheries agreement between the EU and Canada was heavily criticised in 
Spain for the granting of excessive concessions to Canada by the EU, and for not 
adequately representing Spanish interests. As a result, the Spanish fleet in the area 
8Notice from the Commission 94/C 180/01 (PESCA), OJ C 180, 1 July 1994. 
9 A conference which opened in New York in 1973 proposed the idea of extending the fishing zone 
towards the 200-mile limit, and discussions continued until 1982 when the United Nations General 
Assembly adopted the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. The creation of such an area around coastal 
states such as Morocco, within which they would have the right to determine the conditions of access 
to any economic resources, represented a considerable change for the EU fleet. 
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was reduced from thirty six to twelve boats, and the number of jobs fell from 
approximately 1000 to 150 (La Gaceta de Ios Negocios, 18 April 1995). The issue of 
access to Moroccan waters was particularly important in view of the outcome of the 
conflict with Canada, and the Spanish fishing sector feared that the EU, having set a 
precedent with the Canadian dispute, would give in to excessive Moroccan demands. 
However, the President of the Andalusia government highlighted the fact that 
Moroccan dependence on the EU distinguished the case from that of Canada (Diario 
16, 27 April 1995). Nonetheless, Moroccan moves to establish its own fishing 
industry led to the questioning of the traditional rights of Spanish fishermen to fish in 
its waters and, thus, to the protracted re-negotiation of the terms of the agreement in 
1995. 
The Commission has sole power to negotiate EU third-country fishing agreements. 
The DG for fisheries, DGXIV, under the Commissioner Emma Bonino, was 
responsible for the negotiations, the chief EU negotiator being the Head of the Latin 
America, Antarctic and Mediterranean Unit in 1995, John Spencer. The Unit was 
within Directorate B, which was responsible for international fisheries agreements, as 
shown in Figure 7.1. Agreements with non-member countries have to be approved by 
the Council, following consultation of the European Parliament. According to Article 
43, the fishing agreement also had to be ratified by the European Parliament, although 
MEPs were critical of the limitation of their role to the approval of an agreement 
which had already been negotiated 10. 
Previous fisheries agreements with Morocco 
The lack of a well-established legal framework for negotiations in the area of 
fisheries, the signing of transitory accords in an atmosphere of tension, and the 
relatively high public awareness of the issue, make fishing agreements with Morocco 
particularly problematic for EU negotiators. Morocco can use its pressure on the 
Spanish government via sensitive or economically weak regions where the fishing 
sector is dependent on Moroccan resources (Nufiez Villaverde and de Larramendi, 
1996). The question of fishing rights thus has a high impact on the state of political 
relations between Spain and Morocco, frequently determining the extent of Spanish 
concessions to Moroccan demands on political and territorial issues. An analyst of 
Spain's relations with the Maghreb, de Larramendi (1997, p. 35), gives an illustration 
of an attempt by Morocco to strengthen its bargaining power vis-a-vis the 
10rnterview with MEP, President of the Fisheries Committee from January 1997, Brussels, 23 April 
1997. 
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Figure 7.1 Structure of Directorate-General XIV (Fisheries), European 
Commission, during the 1995 negotiations 
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Community when, following the annexation of the Sahara 11, it refused to ratify the 
1977 fisheries agreement. Bilateral fishing agreements with Morocco were negotiated 
by the Spanish administration until 198812. In December 1982, a six-month fishing 
agreement was signed between Spain and Morocco, but it was not until 1983 that a 
longer term four-year accord was agreed, which marked a new period of co-operation. 
The agreement committed Spain to a 40% reduction in fishing rights, and to the 
11spain's renunciation of direct responsibility for the territory of the Western Sahara was recognised 
in an agreement between Spain and Morocco in November 1975. 
12From 1975-79, tripartite accords on the administration of the Western Sahara existed between 
Spain, Morocco and Mauritania. 
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protection of fishing stocks, while also seeking to establish a Moroccan fishing 
industry. The accord was significant as its aim was to end Morocco's use of the non-
ratification of agreements as an instrument of political pressure. The Accession Treaty 
(Article 167) transferred responsibility for managing third-country fisheries 
agreements formerly negotiated by Spain and Portugal to the EC, and a new EC 
accord was signed on 25 February 1988 after the former one expired in July 1987. 
From the beginning of 1988, all EC boats were forced to leave Moroccan waters, and, 
when a new agreement was reached, the Spanish sector, constituting more than 90% 
of the fishing boats affected, opposed the reduction in fishing quotas imposed. It 
could be considered that, 
in terms of the fishing negotiation itself, the transfer of responsibility from 
Madrid to Brussels was an inconvenience, while in broader terms it was 
advantageous to Spain, bringing an uncoupling of the fisheries issue from 
political questions (including pressure on Ceuta and Melilla) and various forms 
of bilateral cooperation, economic, cultural and military (Gillespie, 1995, pp. 
167-68). 
Spain was able to free itself of Moroccan pressures and take advantage of the 
EC/EU' s stronger bargaining position in the negotiations, thus exploiting the 
opportunities presented by the new EC framework to justify policy decisions in the 
domestic arena. Some Spanish shipowners were more critical of the Community's 
defence of their interests, highlighting the greater degree of autonomy in the 
negotiation of bilateral agreements prior to EC accession 13. It is significant that 
Gillespie (1997b, p. 101) also notes that the Spanish government discovered the 
disadvantages of not directly controlling the negotiations during key points of the 
1992 fisheries talks; one illustration is the panic in Spanish central government when, 
on 15 January 1992, the European Parliament rejected the fourth protocol on financial 
co-operation for political reasons, which then jeopardised negotiations on fisheries. 
This was considered particularly damaging for relations with Morocco by the Spanish 
administration. However, the importance of fisheries for Spain was recognised in the 
EU arena where negotiations were frequently regarded as an essentially Spanish 
affair, although the Spanish government was often pressurised into making bilateral 
concessions to attain a new agreement. For example, Spain approved the signing of an 
accord on 31 March 1988 on the transport of Moroccan citrus fruits through Spanish 
territory to unblock stalled negotiations on fisheries (de Larramendi, 1997, p. 421). 
13Jnterview with President of the Professional Association of Shipowners' Firms of Cadiz (Asociaci6n 
Profesional de Empresas Arrnadores de Buques de Pesca de Cadiz, ASEMAR), Cadiz, 3 October 1996. 
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On 1 May 1992, a new fisheries agreement between the EU and Morocco came into 
effect, which retained largely the same conditions for EU boats as in the previous 
accord, while increasing the financial flows to Morocco by 50%. The Commission's 
offer to begin setting the framework for an Association agreement with Morocco 
eventually permitted an accord to be reached on fishing rights. The agreement 
provided for approximately 700 EU fishing boats, more than 90% Spanish, to fish in 
Moroccan territorial waters for a four-year period in return for a payment of 102 
million ecu a year (L6pez Garcia-Asenjo, 1994, p. 338). It was the most important 
fishing arrangement with a Third country that the EU has signed in terms of the 
potential catch, the number of boats and workers, and the socio-economic impact on 
regions such as Andalusia, the Canaries and the South of Portugal. The accord 
involved a mix of finance and easier access for fishery products to the EU market, in 
exchange for fishing rights and preferential trade terms for selected fish exports. A 
Commission document (European Commission, 1994, p. 32) claimed that the 
agreement between the EU and Morocco was 'in some ways, a forerunner of the new-
style fishing agreements, based more on partnership than price', illustrating the 
Commission's determination to encourage closer economic links and co-operation 
between the EU and Moroccan fishing industries. 
Article 15 of the agreement established that a meeting would be held halfway through 
the period to examine its functioning. In May 1994, Morocco used Article 15 to 
request a revision of terms, demanding a substantial reduction in EU fishing rights in 
its waters, and greater control and inspection of EU fleets, a large proportion of which 
were Spanish. Morocco withdrew fishing licences from 200 EU boats in 1994 in view 
of the increasing scarcity of catches and, despite the difficulty in monitoring Spanish 
fishing activity, accused Spain of sending out three times more than the 700 boats 
allowed by the 1992 agreement, of catching mainly small fish which the Moroccans 
were prohibited from fishing, and of extending their activities beyond the allowable 
zones. Morocco also insisted on the EU's adoption of measures for the restructuring 
and relocation of the Spanish fleet during the period of the agreement. The Spanish 
delegation, in a communication to the Fisheries Commissioner in 1994, considered 
that the large reductions in fish quotas proposed by Morocco were totally 
unacceptable (Unpublished letter, 7 September 1994). After five months of tense 
negotiation, a compromise was reached on 13 October 1994, whereby the 1992 
agreement would remain unchanged until 30 April 1995, but its length would then be 
reduced by one year. Spain was in agreement with Morocco on a full re-negotiation of 
terms for the fishing agreement (Unpublished document, 7 September 1994 ). In 
November 1994, the Council of Ministers agreed on a negotiating mandate for the 
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Commission, and, following a delay, which was partly a result of the formation of a 
new government after the Moroccan elections, negotiations began in March 1995. 
Although some commentators consider that relations between Spain and Morocco 
have become increasingly normalised, key illustrations being the new period of 
collaboration marked by the Hispano-Moroccan Summit in Rabat on 5-6 February 
1996 (NUfiez Villaverde and de Larramendi, 1996, p. 33)14, and the meeting in 
Casablanca on 26 and 27 May 1997 on partnership arrangements in their fishing 
industries, other analysts have highlighted the deterioration in their relationship in the 
mid-1990s (Gillespie, 1997b, p. 143). This is illustrated by the tensions caused by the 
re-negotiation of the fishing agreement in 1995. 
Role of the Spanish government in interstate negotiations 
The sub-DG for International Fisheries Agreements, in the DG for Fishing Resources 
within the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (see Figure 7 .2) was directly 
responsible for the negotiations with Third countries, its officials acting as key 
members of the Spanish delegation 15. The delegation was regarded by the 
Commission as well prepared and competent, enabling Spanish officials to exert a 
significant influence on Commission negotiators, who relied on their high level of 
expertise, their past experience of Moroccan negotiating tactics, and their close 
relations with the sector16. The re-negotiation of the fisheries agreement was expected 
to be difficult in view of previous negotiations, and the tension caused was intensified 
by the severe economic crisis in the fisheries sectors of both Morocco and Spain. The 
fishing problem had become a national issue in Morocco, and caused great agitation 
in political and media spheres, which were particularly critical of Spain's tough 
negotiating position. 
Opening positions 
Morocco was developing a national fleet, and wanted to assert its sovereignty over its 
200-mile area, considering that only the surplus stock should be fished by EU 
fishermen. According to Abdelmajid Smires, President of the Moroccan shipowners' 
association, Morocco had shown its determination 'to regain the respect it is owed by 
14An interviewee responsible for fisheries in the Spanish Permanent Representation (Brussels, 22 
April 1997) also affirmed their good relations in 1996, illustrated by rising Spanish investment in 
Morocco. 
15Luis de Andres and Rafael Conde of the DG for Fishing Resources were key members of the 
Spanish delegation; Conde presided over the negotiations during Spain's EU Presidency. 
16rnterview with official responsible for fisheries in the Spanish Permanent Representation, Brussels, 
22 April 1997. 
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Figure 7.2 Organisation of fisheries at central level 
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exercising its sovereignty over its resources' (FT, I May 1995). In the presentation of 
his programme on Friday 2 March, PM Abdellatif Filali expressed considerable 
discontent with the EU' s policy towards Morocco for not complying 'with the 
geopolitical position of the kingdom, its political options and its economic and social 
achievements' (Europe, no. 6435, 8 March 1995, p. 6). An indication of the priority 
given to reformulating fisheries policy and rationalising its industry, was the number 
of policy statements issued by the Moroccan government on fisheries in the 1990s, 
including frequent references to the problem of the EU fleet I?. The extension of the 
fishing agreement had been a formality in the past but, according to the President of 
the Moroccan shipowners' association, it had now become a real negotiation (FT, I 
May 1995). 
The Moroccan delegation, headed by the Director General for Fisheries Mohamed 
Rami, presented a series of tough demands for the new fisheries agreement. They 
considered that the fishing quotas currently established for EU fishermen should be 
17rnterview with chief EU negotiator of fisheries agreement, European Commission, Brussels, 21 
April1997. 
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substantially reduced, the biggest reductions in fishing possibilities being 65% for 
cephalopods (squid, octopus and cuttlefish) over a three-year period. Furthermore, the 
delegation demanded that the percentage of Moroccan fishermen on EU fishing boats 
be raised to 35% (over a certain tonnage, they currently represented about 25% of the 
crew), and that a partnership between Moroccan and European shipowners be 
established rather than continue with conventional co-operation measures. A three-
year duration was demanded for the fishing agreement, as well as a substantial 
increase in the payment to Moroccan shipowners. A further controversial demand was 
for the unloading of catches by Spanish boats partly, or even totally, in Moroccan 
ports. 
The Commission considered the reduction in fishing quotas excessive, and proposed a 
gradual reduction of 25% in cephalopods over three years, and cuts of 5-10% in 
quotas for other fish types (El Pais, 29 August 1995). The reductions demanded by 
Morocco were regarded as unacceptable, unless it could present technical data which 
showed a substantial reduction in fish stocks over the previous two years. However, 
EU negotiators largely approved other Moroccan demands on the duration of the 
agreement, the need to ensure conservation of current stocks, and the unloading of 
catches in Moroccan ports, although not for all EU fishing boats. 
The Spanish delegation lobbied hard for a tough EU position vis-a-vis Moroccan 
demands throughout the talks. For example, the shortening of the fishing agreement 
by one year was a Spanish proposal in September 1994 in response to Moroccan 
demands, which eventually obtained the agreement of other member states. In an 
interview in June 1995, Bonino considered the strong pressure from the Spanish 
government on the Commission to be natural in view of the greater implications for 
its sector (El M undo, 9 June 1995). According to one Spanish analyst: 
Parece 16gico que en la Comisi6n de la UE se tenga especialmente en 
cuenta la opinion del sector y de la administraci6n pesquera espafiola para 
diseiiar una polftica pesquera audaz y agresiva en beneficio de todos Ios 
intereses espaiioles y comunitarios'. 
(It seems logical that in the Commission of the EU the opinion of the 
Spanish fishing sector and administration is especially taken into account 
in formulating a bold and aggressive fishing policy for the benefit of all 
Spanish and Community interests) (de Aldasoro, 1995, p. 43). 
However, despite acknowledgement at EU level of the implications for the Spanish 
fishing sector of substantial cuts in quotas, the Spanish government was frequently 
under pressure from the Commission to compromise its bargaining positions. 
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Deadlock in negotiations: March-August 1995 
Negotiations between the EU and Morocco began in Brussels on 28-30 March 1995, 
but mainly consisted of setting out the opening positions of the two delegations. The 
first round of talks was considered to be reasonably favourable as a starting point for 
reaching an agreement, allowing time for a full examination of the details before the 
second round (Europe, no. 6454, 3-4 April1995, p. 9). The talks took the form of co-
ordination meetings between the Commission and member states to establish a 
common position prior to and during the round, followed by plenary meetings with 
the Moroccan delegation. Bilateral meetings with the Commission took place when 
specific problems arose in relation to one member state. The political importance of 
the agreement in Spain and Portugal was illustrated by the presence of a senior 
official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Permanent Representation in the 
delegation, as well as officials responsible for fisheries18. 
In the second round on 11-12 April in Rabat, following consultation with key 
member states, the Commission submitted counterproposals which included less 
radical reductions in fishing quotas in certain categories, limits to the compulsory 
biological rest period for some species without discrimination between Moroccan and 
EU fleets, and optional off-loading in Moroccan ports (Europe, no. 6466, 22 April 
1995, p. 6). However, Morocco did not modify its negotiating position, arguing that 
the conditions demanded for EU fishermen would be detrimental for its own fishing 
sector. Negotiations were resumed on 26 April in Rabat but, despite the politically 
positive talks between Bonino and Moroccan Fisheries Minister Mustapha Sahel prior 
to the negotiations, the conclusion of an agreement seemed unlikely before the 
interruption of EU fishing in Moroccan waters on 30 April. The Spanish delegation 
had shown considerable concern at Bonino's previous optimism regarding the 
conclusion of negotiations before the end of April, fearful that a rapid agreement 
would be reached involving terms unacceptable to its sector. However, although the 
Fisheries Commissioner noted agreement on key principles such as the need to 
preserve fish stocks, she acknowledged that 'the positions concerning actually putting 
these principles into the text of an agreement are still far apart' (Europe, no. 6469, 27 
April 1995, p. 12). 
During the third round of negotiations, the Commission emphasised the importance of 
partnership arrangements in the fishing industry, involving the promotion of joint 
ventures between Moroccan and EU fishermen, training schemes, and Moroccan 
18Jnterview with chief EU negotiator of fisheries agreement, European Commission, Brussels, 21 
Apri\1997. 
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research initiatives. The Spanish delegation was more reticent regarding Commission 
proposals, stressing the high rate of failure of joint ventures set up since the 1992 
agreement. Wide differences remained on the reduction of quotas, resulting in the 
breakdown of negotiations on 27 April, and the decision to resume talks in May in 
Brussels. Morocco's intransigent position remained unchanged despite financial 
incentives offered by the EU, namely over 100 million ecu in annual financing from 
the Community budget (Europe, no. 6471, 29 April 1995, p. 8). The emphasis on 
partnership continued in the fourth round of negotiations, which began in Brussels on 
15 May, where the emphasis was on a long-term framework to facilitate an agreement 
on the issues of quotas and the financial counterpart (Europe, no. 6480, 13 May 1995, 
pp. 7-8; no. 6482, 17 May 1995, p. 8). The Commission forwarded a 'non-paper' to 
the Moroccan delegation, including a potential framework for partnership, with a 
view to eliciting a response before the following round. However, Moroccan fishing 
associations criticised arrangements which amounted to sharing the 'pillaging of 
resources with the Spanish' (Europe, no. 6495, 6-7 June 1995, p. 11), and the 
Moroccan delegation was deeply suspicious of proposals which, according to the 
chief EU negotiator19, were viewed as an attempt to avoid debate on quota reductions. 
The Commission stressed that proposals were not aimed at circumventing key 
Moroccan demands (Europe, no. 6484, 19 May 1995, p. 8), while acknowledging that 
negotiations had not gone beyond the least controversial issues, and that 'the tough 
talks still lie ahead' (FT, 18 May 1995). 
The Spanish delegation largely determined the extent of reductions in quotas during 
each negotiating round. For example, EU negotiators indicated that they would be 
willing to approve a cut in quotas of up to 30% during the fifth round, while Spain 
was opposed to what it viewed as a major EU concession, and would only accept a 
maximum of a 15% global reduction. This made the formulation of a common EU 
position almost impossible. Nonetheless, Bonino hoped that the fifth round of talks 
opening in Rabat on 1 June would enable the Commission to take a substantial step 
towards concluding negotiations (Europe, no. 6492, I June 1995, p. 10). Talks were 
expected to clarify the nature of partnership arrangements in exploitation, processing, 
and marketing, thus facilitating a resumption of bargaining on quotas on a case-by-
case basis according to the type of fishing. Although, according to Moroccan sources, 
'it immediately seemed that the European delegation had no response to the 
Moroccan offer presented' (Europe, no. 6495, 6-7 June 1995, p. 11), the EU 
delegation highlighted its presentation of counter proposals following extensive eo-
19rnterview with chief EU negotiator of fisheries agreement, European Commission, Brussels, 21 
Aprill997. 
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ordination meetings between the Commission and Spanish delegation to try to find a 
common position on quotas (El Pafs, 3 June 1995). 
In June, the Spanish proposal of a cut of only 2% for the cephalopod fleet was 
immediately rejected by Morocco, and the Commission sought to persuade the 
Spanish delegation to accept reductions in quotas of 10-30% to convince Morocco to 
enter the negotiating process. However, the Spanish delegation was aware that the 
30% cut in quotas proposed by the Commission would involve a decrease of around 
200 Spanish fishing boats, and a loss of 6000 jobs, which would have to be justified 
in the domestic arena (Ya, 3 June 1995). Spain thus refused to compromise its 
bargaining position any further. The divergences between the EU and Spanish 
positions were evident and, despite Commission support for the Spanish fishing 
sector, Spain's demand for a far tougher, less compromising bargaining position was 
criticised by the Commission and EU member states, particularly when it put short-
term gains above more strategic thinking about the future of its sector. For example, 
Bonino was particularly critical of the Spanish government's postponement of the 
restructuring of the sector, although acknowledging the difficulty of the task (El 
M undo, 9 June 1995). Most member states were generally supportive of the Spanish 
fishing sector, but countries such as France, whose economic interests in Morocco led 
it to favour Rabat over Madrid at certain stages of the negotiation, were more reticent 
regarding Spanish interests. The Director General of DGXIV, Almeida Serra, 
declared that all fifteen member states had to be taken into account (lndustrias 
Pesqueras, no. 1636, 15 June 1995, p. 5), indicating his criticism of the predominance 
of Spanish interests in the negotiations. 
Following the failure of the fifth negotiating round, Bonino highlighted the necessity 
for further Spanish concessions before a date was set for the resumption of talks 
during a visit to Madrid. The suspension of negotiations was a 'pause for reflection', 
intended to lead to a more flexible stance according to a Commission spokesperson 
(Europe, no. 6495, 6-7 June 1995, p. 11). Bonino, who intervened personally 
whenever political pressure was considered advantageous, held talks in Madrid, Rabat 
and Lisbon in June in an attempt to establish a more accommodating EU negotiating 
position (Europe, no. 6500, 14 June 1995, p. 12). She sought to maximise political 
pressure on the government in meetings with Gonzalez to obtain Spanish approval of 
concessions to Morocco, attempting to separate high-level political discussions from 
economic, sectoral issues discussed with officials responsible for fisheries20. A 
diplomatic source described the Spanish attitude as 'no agreement rather than a bad 
20rnterview with former Agriculture and Fisheries Minister, Madrid, 19 July 1996. 
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agreement', and the Commission feared that Spanish proposals, in addition to the 
uncompromising position defended by Moroccan shipowners, would block the 
negotiations indefinitely (Europe, no. 6500, 14 June 1995, p. 12). The Spanish 
government resented the Commission's criticism of its bargaining terms, and 
monitored the EU' s strategies carefully for fear of becoming the victim of an overly 
flexible EU negotiating position. Spain was critical of what it viewed as the 
Commission's attempt to play the role of intermediary between Spain and Morocco, 
rather than defender of global EU interests including those of the Spanish fishing 
sector21, No progress was made in reaching a compromise between Spain and 
Morocco in June (Europe, no. 6504, 19-20 June 1995, p. 10), although Morocco was 
encouraged to return to the negotiating table by the outcome of the Cannes Summit in 
June 1995, when total funds of 4685 million ecu for the 1995-99 period were 
approved for the non-EU Mediterranean countries (Khader and Nufiez Villaverde, 
1996, p. 63). This was partly the result of a deal between Kohl and Gonzalez, which 
represented a considerable victory for Spain, even if it meant a 10% reduction in the 
budget originally proposed by Commissioner Marfn (Gillespie, 1997a, p. 10). 
The Spanish Agriculture and Fisheries Minister pointed out in a plenary in the 
Spanish parliament on 29 June 1995 that, although the EU had exclusive competency 
as negotiator of the new fisheries agreement, relations between Spain and Morocco 
were of immense importance for improving the climate for the negotiating process (El 
Correo de Andalucfa, 30 June 1995). Actions were taken to improve bilateral 
relations, for example the visit of Foreign Minister Javier Solana to Rabat in June to 
hold talks with PM Filali and King Hassan 11, the aim being to improve the general 
political atmosphere. However, the Commission continued to play a key role in 
finding a solid base for compromise between the Spanish and Moroccan delegations, 
for example by discussing the financial counterpart to be conceded to Morocco. 
Towards an agreement: August-November 1995 
Fisheries negotiations resumed in Brussels on 11 August, following a meeting 
between Bonino and Fisheries Minister Sahel which concluded that the foundation for 
reaching an agreement now existed (Europe, no. 6532, 29 July 1995, p. 6). Bonino 
was hopeful that fishing activity could recommence by 1 September in view of the 
progress made in high-level political talks. After a brief pause, the EU proposal of a 
global reduction of around 30% in fish quotas was presented on 17 August, but was 
immediately rejected by Morocco (El Pais, 13 August 1995). The Moroccan 
delegation demanded as a basis the actual use of fishing possibilities, which were in 
21 Interview with former Agriculture and Fisheries Minister, Madrid, 19 July 1996. 
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fact not fully exhausted (until the end of April, the EU had used about 64,000 tonnes 
out of a possible 82,000), while the EU delegation, under pressure from Spain, 
insisted on former fishing possibilities as the point of departure. The demand for 
compulsory offloading in Morocco of EU catches met with the Commission's 
counterproposal that a system of voluntary offloading be established, with financial 
incentives to encourage EU shipowners. Financial compensation was another 
outstanding issue, and talks were suspended from 19 to 25 August when no 
compromise could be found. The plenary session on 25 August ended after forty five 
minutes following Morocco's refusal to reduce its demands for quotas of 65% for 
cephalopods, and 50% for fish caught by trawlers, while the EU was only prepared to 
accept cuts of 21% and 10% respectively. Fishing of cephalopods represented 30% of 
Spanish employment directly linked to fishing in Moroccan waters, whereas the lesser 
reductions in fish caught by trawlers represented 23% of employment, fish caught by 
multiple hooks, another 23%, and the remainder, around 24%22, The Commission 
showed signs of compromise when it submitted a unilateral proposal on 27 August for 
a 25% reduction in catches of cephalopods during the three years of the agreement 
(Mar, no. 331, September 1995, p. 9); it had been preparing to negotiate on the basis 
of between 30 and 35% according to EU sources (Europe, no. 6556, 6 September 
1995, p. 8). The Commission's objective was to stimulate an actual negotiating 
process for the first time, but the sixth round of negotiations was suspended when the 
Moroccan delegation refused the Commission's working papers, including substantial 
EU concessions, and demanded a re-opening of all issues. 
Morocco was reported by a Spanish commentator to have tried to gain support for its 
position from member states with economic interests in the country when the sixth 
round failed, but 'la respuesta de la Union Europea fue en alguna medida 
contundente, a! cerrar filas con !as posiciones espaiiolas frente a Marruecos' (the 
EU' s response was to some extent conclusive, closing ranks with the Spanish 
positions towards Morocco) (Mar, no. 332, October 1995, p. 8). Key Spanish 
government officials were more confident of obtaining an accord in September and 
October, when Morocco began to export its agricultural products via Spain, informing 
Morocco that it could not expect better conditions for its exports to the EU while its 
fishing sector had to accept major adjustments to its fleet23. The Spanish delegation 
considered Bonino's contribution to be positive, although remained concerned ·about 
her eagerness to reach a hasty agreement which did not fully consider Spanish 
22According to sources in the fishing sector, the fish type 'arrastre' refers to fish caught by trawling, 
and 'palangre' to fish caught with a multiple-hooked line. 
23Jnterview with former Agriculture and Fisheries Minister, Madrid, 19 July 1996. 
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interests24. Atienza highlighted the contradictory Moroccan negotiating position as a 
key obstacle to reaching a successful compromise with the Spanish delegation (El 
Pais, 1 September 1995). This is illustrated by the acceptance of the Moroccan 
Fisheries Minister of global reductions in quotas of 30% in a private meeting with 
Bonino on 27 July, and PM Filali's later rejection of this agreement, attributed to his 
own private fishing interests by diplomatic sources (El Pais, 7 September 1995). The 
Moroccan delegation's refusal to draft a written agreement also caused tension, 
although some EU officials regarded this as ultimately working to their advantage as 
it allowed the EU text to become the basis for negotiation25, 
A comprehensive and general re-evaluation of relations between the EU and Morocco 
was proposed at a meeting of the College of Commissioners on 6 September to 
discuss the crisis situation. The meeting reaffirmed the EU' s determination to 
conclude negotiations as soon as possible, but highlighted the need for a greater will 
to negotiate from the Moroccan delegation (Europe, no. 6557, 7 September 1995, p. 
8). Strengthening relations with Morocco was considered a priority for the EU, but 
Bonino declared that the Commission was also fully aware of the serious socio-
economic problems in Spanish regions most affected by the suspension of fishing 
activity, the Commission's support for the sector being illustrated by actions such as 
the EU' s suspension of imports of tinned sardines from Morocco. Bonino' s awareness 
of the high political importance of the issue was indicated by her statement to the 
European Parliament that she would appear herself at any plenary session in 
September where oral questions on the fisheries agreement were raised (Unpublished 
document, European Parliament, 1 September 1995). 
A successful meeting was held between Bonino and Sahel on 15 September 1995 to 
create the most fruitful atmosphere possible for the resumption of negotiations and, 
on 29 September, Gonzalez and Bonino met in Madrid to discuss potential 
compromises, particularly on reductions in fish quotas (El Pais, 30 September 1995). 
According to negotiators, significant headway had been made by the end of 
September to reduce differences on the total size of the EU catch, and on financial 
compensation, to 'a reasonable negotiating zone' (FT, 4 October 1995). However, a 
major obstacle to the successful conclusion of negotiations was EU opposition to the 
demand that a significant share of the fish caught by foreign boats should pass 
through Moroccan ports. Morocco proposed a phased change-over as an economic 
imperative, but Spain was reluctant to enforce the condition on more than a 
24rnterview with former Agriculture and Fisheries Minister, Madrid, 19 July 1996. 
25rnterview with chief EU negotiator of fisheries agreement, European Commission, Brussels, 21 
Aprill997. 
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'symbolic' number of vessels (FT, 4 October 1995). The Spanish delegation favoured 
a voluntary regime, and argued that fishermen could not be expected to unload their 
catches in Morocco until an adequate infrastructure was in place. Although 
Morocco's agreement to lower the amount demanded in financial compensation, 
which was initially three times that obtained in the 1992 agreement, removed an 
obstacle to the successful conclusion of negotiations in the seventh round beginning 
on 17 October, major differences remained regarding reductions in quotas and 
unloading in Moroccan ports. Morocco would only accept cuts of 45% in 
cephalopods compared to the 35% maximum accepted by Spain. The Spanish 
delegation was prepared to consider a substantial increase in payments to Morocco, in 
exchange for reductions in fishing quotas, but was aware that other member states 
would be more reticent about an excessive rise in the EU' s financial contribution 
(Diario 16, 14 October 1995)26, Intensive negotiations at a high ministerial level, 
where the Spanish delegation played a key diplomatic role, contributed to concessions 
from the Moroccan and Spanish delegations. Following a meeting on 17 October 
between the Spanish delegation and members of Bonino's cabinet, Atienza declared 
that he was optimistic for a conclusion to the negotiations which would not be 
excessively traumatic for the Spanish fishing sector (El Pats, 19 October 1995), and a 
Commission fisheries spokesperson considered that the terms constituted adequate 
compromise for a successful outcome (FT, 19 October 1995). 
The re-negotiation of a fisheries agreement was concluded during the eighth round of 
negotiations from 10-12 November, when the agreement eventually gained the 
approval of all delegations. The EU' s payment was fixed at 350 million ecu over four 
years for the right to fish in Moroccan waters, and a gradual 20% decrease overall in 
the number of EU fishing vessels. The major compromises in the negotiating 
positions which brought an end to the stalemate were a reduction in fishing 
possibilities of 40% for cephalopods over the four years, an increase in financial 
compensation of up to 30 or 35%, compulsory off-loading in Moroccan ports only for 
frozen cephalopods, and a suspension period of two to three months a year to enable 
stocks to reconstitute themselves27. As for the controversial issue of unloading in 
Moroccan ports, most of the fleet were able to continue landing fish in Spain, but 
some of the larger boats, twenty five in the last year of the agreement, were obliged to 
26This was also commented on in an interview with an MEP, President of the Fisheries Committee 
from January 1997, Brussels, 23 April1997. 
27The agreement reduced the number of licensed EU boats from over 600 to 477 at the end of four 
years, with a gradual increase in fees from the second year. Spanish boats would also have to take on 
some 950 Moroccan crew, representing about one in six (FT, 19 December 1995). The average 
reduction in fish quotas was 23% over the four-year period, although this was unequally divided 
between fish types. 
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unload their catches in Morocco. Rabat managed to obtain funding for training and 
research, and a substantial increase in economic compensation from 16,400 to 20,000 
million pesetas, to which would be added the payments from the EU shipowners 
themselves. 
According to one Spanish commentator, a compromise had been made between the 
EU and Moroccan delegations with the 'especial peso de la Administraci6n espaiiola' 
(particular weight of the Spanish administration) (Mar, no. 332, October 1995, p. 8). 
Although the Moroccan Fisheries Minister described the four-year accord without 
mid-way revision as the last agreement of its type (FT, 19 December 1995)28, the 
Spanish government still hoped that their needs would be accommodated by Morocco 
after 1999. Spain and Portugal only reluctantly accepted that the agreement would not 
be renewed automatically after four years (Europe, no. 6585, 16-17 October 1995, p. 
9). The Moroccan Fisheries Minister declared that Morocco wanted its sector to 
become capable of exploiting its own fishing grounds, and that the EU financial 
contribution would be used to develop facilities to this end (FT, 19 December 1995). 
An accord was also reached with Mauritania regarding fishing possibilities for 
eighteen additional vessels, essentially Spanish, and for a maximum tonnage of 5250 
gross registered tonnes in its waters (Europe, no. 6606, 16 November 1995, p. 10). 
The economic compensation provided by the EU was the major factor behind 
Mauritania's approval of the agreement. This offset the reductions imposed on the EU 
fleet under the new agreement with Morocco, and was described by the Secretary 
General for Fisheries, Jose Loira, as crucial for obtaining the agreement of the 
Spanish fishing sector, especially in the Canaries, to the reduction in quotas of 
cephalopods29, 
The EU and Morocco officially signed the fishing and Association agreements on 26 
February 1996, which then had to be ratified by parliaments in all EU member states, 
Morocco, and the European Parliament. Solana, as Spanish President of the EU 
Council of Ministers, considered that the two accords guaranteed stable political and 
economic relations between the EU and Morocco (El Pa{s, 12 November 1995), and 
PM Filali declared that Morocco was 'turning a page in ... relations with the world's 
major trading bloc and entering a new era' (FT, 27 February 1996). The Spanish state 
played a key role in linking the two agreements, and was satisfied with the 
acknowledgement by EU member states that it was impossible to 'agree a good 
28However, a four-year agreement not subject to mid-term review was preferable to a three-year 
accord, as it allowed more time for Spain to reduce the size of the fleet dependent on Moroccan waters. 
29Jnterview with former Secretary General for Fisheries, Madrid, 9 June 1997. 
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association agreement with Morocco if Madrid is suffering from concessions on fish' 
(FT, 30 August 1995). 
Linkage between fisheries and Association agreements 
Faced with Spanish pressures to reach a fisheries agreement, the Commission 
increasingly recognised that additional concessions for sensitive agricultural products 
of importance to Morocco would reinforce the bargaining power of the fisheries 
sector, and would thus 'play a determining role in the outcome of negotiations' 
(Europe, no. 6478, 11 May 1995, p. 10). In Commission talks with the Moroccan PM 
on 6 July, the parallel between the agreements was acknowledged, although Bonino 
had initially attempted in April 1995 to separate the two negotiations (Diario 16, 27 
April 1995). PM Filali had also opposed greater linkage until strong domestic 
pressures to obtain increased EU financial aid made talks on the Association 
agreement more urgent. No progress was made in the negotiation of the agreement 
until the political impetus from talks on 6 July between the Moroccan PM and 
Foreign Minister, the President of the European Commission Jacques Santer, and 
Commissioners Marfn and Bonino led to the relaunching of talks on 26 July (Europe, 
no. 6515, 5 July 1995, p. 5). 
In response to the Moroccan delegation's refusal to discuss fish until trade 
concessions were offered, the Commission did not demand a definite timetable for 
negotiations on fisheries. Morocco eventually agreed to temporary arrangements for 
its exports of tinned sardines, and a re-examination of the situation of certain 
agricultural products, but its negotiating position was divided between those who 
would permit some concessions, and those, including the Moroccan PM, who adopted 
a much tougher, non-conciliatory position (Mar, no. 331, September 1995, p. 8). 
Commission officials discussed the possibility of granting Morocco financial support 
worth one billion ecu over a period of five years in order to restart the fisheries 
negotiations (Europe, no. 6518, 8 July 1995, p. 9), as well as trade concessions 
including reduced or zero duty tariff quotas for the import of tinned sardines and 
citrus fruit (Europe, no. 6524, 17-18 July 1995, p. 10)30, Although the proposals met 
with strong sectoral opposition in the Portuguese domestic arena, Marfn considered 
that the trade concessions were not excessively detrimental to key EU sectors, and 
would restore a climate of confidence, 'making it possible to conclude a good 
fisheries agreement' (Europe, no. 6524, 17-18 July 1995, p. 10). Proposals submitted 
30concessions amounted to an annual import of 8750 tonnes at zero duty, and of 3750 tonnes at the 
10% rate, for 1995. Morocco had benefited under the 1992 agreement from a reduced duty of 6% but, 
following its expiry, the rate returned to 22.5%. The Moroccan delegation considered that the re-
establishment of the reduced rate would be 'a political gesture facilitating the pursuit of negotiations' 
(Europe, no. 6503, 17 June 1995, p. 14). 
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by the Commission at the end of July remained on the table in Council until 
September due to the stalemate in the fisheries negotiations. 
The fishing row threatened to conflict with the EU' s broader strategy of strengthening 
ties between the EU and the Maghreb, for example through the conclusion of 
Association agreements with Morocco and other Third countries which was a key 
priority for the Spanish Presidency (Europe, no. 6498, 10 June 1995, p. 4). Atienza 
considered that Spain's EU Presidency was not decisive for negotiations with 
Morocco, but that it gave the Spanish government a privileged position at the centre 
of the bargaining process, necessitating a full knowledge of the positions of all 
member states31. As the Spanish Presidency had a key role in formulating the EU 
bargaining position, it could thus use broader interests to increase awareness of the 
crisis situation in its fishing sector, although obliged to maintain an objective 
position. 
Many Northern EU member states were more concerned about Moroccan agricultural 
imports than fisheries but, although critical of Spain's overly tough bargaining 
position and frequently aggressive fleet, largely lent their support to Spanish fishing 
interests in view of the crisis in its sector. Any support for the Moroccan position 
from EU member states was skilfully countered by the Spanish delegation. As one 
commentator claimed, 'en este caso, parece que Espafia ha logrado que se pongan Ios 
intereses del sector de la pesca por encima de !as presiones de esos grupos' (in this 
case, it seems that Spain succeeded in placing the interests of the fishing sector above 
the pressures of those groups) (Mar, no. 331, September 1995, p. 8). However, 
opposition of some member states to agricultural concessions to Morocco still held up 
the agreement and, although many member states thought the move was premature, 
the Spanish Presidency submitted the issue to the General Affairs Council for 
discussion. It was not until October, when both agreements were placed under a 
single banner at the highest level, that any progress was made (Europe, no. 6580, 9-
10 October 1995, p. 7). In the 30 October General Affairs Council meeting, the 
Spanish Presidency's attempts to break the deadlock failed, as Germany, Belgium and 
the Netherlands refused to agree to agricultural concessions on cut flowers, tomatoes 
and new potatoes proposed by the Commission. Westendorp, as Secretary of State for 
the EU, declared Spain's approval of the limited increases in agricultural imports, and 
criticised the attitude of member states who were normally advocates of free trade. 
This is illustrated by Germany's refusal to accept the entry of 5000 tonnes of cut 
flowers into the EU from Morocco, only 300 of which would reach the German 
31 Interview with former Agriculture and Fisheries Minister, Madrid, 19 July 1996. 
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market (lndustrias Pesqueras, 1 November 1995, no. 1645, p. 5). However, the 
Spanish tomato sector also opposed annual increases in Moroccan imports of 15,000 
tonnes, thus illustrating the sectoral opposition also existing within Spain. Although 
such opposition was criticised by the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food, which compared the increase with the thirteen million tonne s produced 
annually by the EU, senior government officials suggested that the concern of 
Northern member states about the threat to their agricultural sectors was shared by the 
Spanish delegation. The obstructionist tactics of other member states thus enabled 
Spain to grant concessions to its own agricultural sector which would have been 
impossible otherwise32. In a debate on the issue in the Spanish parliament on 10 
November 1995, parliamentary groups were particularly critical of the agreement on 
fruit and vegetables, which they considered had been sacrificed to obtain a better deal 
on fisheries. The weak influence of the parliament on the government's position (see 
Chapter 4) is illustrated by the fact that the Spanish government largely maintained its 
negotiating position at EU level despite strong parliamentary support for a PP motion 
rejecting the agreement (El Pais, 9 November 1995). 
The General Affairs Council session was suspended until 10 November to allow 
delegations more time to assess the agreement (Europe, no. 6596, 1 November 1995, 
p. 5). Following the deal reached on fishing on 13 November, the Spanish Presidency 
worked hard during the month of November to obtain approval of the accord despite 
continued German, Dutch and Belgian opposition to limited agricultural concessions. 
Spanish EU ambassador Elorza highlighted the fact that the Spanish delegation would 
do all they could to obtain a final agreement (El Pafs, 30 November 1995). The 
Commission's approval of compensation to Portugal enabled the complete 
liberalisation of access to Moroccan sardines by 1998, an important bargaining point 
in the final negotiations. The Commission exercised caution in its role as chief 
negotiator, in view of the possible repercussions on the EuroMed conference in 
November. Morocco had expressed its reluctance to attend the first preparatory 
meeting, thus causing considerable tension between Morocco and EU member states, 
particularly Spain. In Morocco, the press hinted at the direct relation between the 
conclusion of negotiations, and its attendance at the EuroMed conference (Algeciras 
Marftimas, 18 October 1995), the Moroccan presence being problematic if the 
Spanish fleet was still inactive in its waters. The Association agreement was finally 
approved in November 1995, a few days before the EuroMed conference began, 
following twenty days of intensive meetings (El Pais, 11 November 1995). A high 
degree of co-ordination between the cabinets of the Commissioners Bonino and 
32rnterview with former government official, Madrid, July 1996. 
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Marfn, along with the strong leadership skills of the Spanish EU Presidency, had been 
crucial to the successful conclusion of negotiations, involving last minute adjustments 
to the terms under which agricultural products could enter the EU33. 
Interaction between the domestic and EU arenas 
The key role of the Spanish state in negotiations at EU level is clear from an analysis 
of the negotiations. However; it was not the best moment politically for the Spanish 
government to take advantage of a position of leadership as EU President after poor 
results in the municipal and regional elections in May 1995, particularly in fishing 
villages affected by the negotiations. The main opposition party used every 
opportunity to criticise the government's strategies during the electoral campaign; the 
political sensitivities surrounding the local elections were thus an important influence 
on the government's response to regional demands in economically weak areas 
dependent on Moroccan fishing grounds. Although the vulnerable position of the 
minority government vis-a-vis domestic actors was denied by officials involved in the 
negotiations at the time34, press reports considered that the Spanish delegation 
seemed happy to skirt around the toughest problems to avoid concluding an 
agreement prior to the elections 'para no pagar el precio electoral de sus inevitables 
concesiones en la negociaci6n pesquera' (in order not to pay the price for inevitable 
concessions in the fishing negotiation in the elections) (El Pafs, 26 April 1995). This 
illustrates the close interaction between the EU and domestic arenas, and the 
influence of sectoral and regional actors on the government, to which Chapter 8 pays 
greater attention. 
The delicate balance between the EU and domestic arenas was clear at the 1995 
EuroMed conference, where official Spanish statements on the opportunities 
presented by closer links with the Mediterranean contrasted with sectoral protest 
against Moroccan imports. The statement by Pujol, as President of the Catalonia 
government, at the opening of the EuroMed Ci vi! Forum at the conference on 29 
November 1995, illustrates the conflicting rationales at play in Spain's Mediterranean 
policy: 
Hay un sector de la opinion publica espafiola, y de la europea, que tiene la 
siguiente postura respecto al Magreb: no quieren ni naranjas ni claveles del 
33under the new deal, Morocco would be allowed to export 5000 tonnes of cut flowers between mid-
October and mid-May, phased in over several years. The compromise on tomatoes cancelled a 10,000 
tonne allowance for April, but increased the total Moroccan export allowance to 150,000 tonnes, 
permitted to enter the EU between the end of October and the end of March (FT, 10 November 1995). 
34Jnterviews with former Secretary General for Fisheries, Madrid, 10 July 1996, 9 June 1997. 
Magreb ... quieren poder pescar sin trabas en !as aguas del Magreb y no 
quieren inmigraci6n del Magreb. Hay que hacer entender que esto es en 
primer lugar insolidario, pero que, ademas, es imposible, peligroso, y que a 
medio plazo resulta contrario a Ios intereses espafioles y europeos. 
(A sector of Spanish, and European, public opinion has the following 
position with regard to the Maghreb: they do not want oranges or carnations 
from the Maghreb ... they want to be able to fish without limits in the waters 
of the Maghreb and they do not want immigration from the Maghreb. It 
must be demonstrated that this, firstly, shows no solidarity, but that, in 
addition to this, it is impossible, dangerous, and in the medium term will be 
harmful to Spanish and European interests) (Bataller Martin and Jordan 
Galduf, 1997, p. 151). 
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The Spanish government thus had to strike a difficult balance between the demands of 
its fishing and agricultural sectors in the domestic arena, and its need to defend 
Maghreb interests as a leader in the area of Mediterranean policy at EU level. 
Domestic responses to the government's negotiation at EU level 
A briefing, written by a MEP representing the PP in 1995, enumerated the major 
criticisms of the PSOE government's negotiation of fisheries agreements with 
Morocco; key aspects criticised were its non-insistence on the suspension of activity 
for the Moroccan fleet in parallel to that of the EU fleet, the lack of enforcement of 
stricter controls on fish imports from Third countries leading to the boycott in 
Andalusia, and the setting of a precedent by re-negotiating the 1992 fisheries 
agreement a year before its expiry without demanding concessions in return 
(Unpublished document, European Parliament, June 1995). The report considered that 
the Spanish government, as the only member state with such a strong interest in 
fisheries, did not have the influence in the EU to enforce a more global treatment of 
fisheries issues. This briefing, which sought to supply ammunition for the opposition 
in the domestic arena during the 1995-6 election campaign, highlights some of the 
key criticisms of the Spanish government during the negotiations. 
The high level of debate of the fisheries agreement in Spain, which contrasted with 
the minimal discussion of other EU policy areas, raised the profile of Spanish fishing 
interests in the EU arena. Despite the key influence on the EU bargaining position 
exerted by the Spanish delegation, the government faced harsh criticism in the 
domestic arena for its insufficient defence of national interests, for example the 
claims of the PP that the Spanish government gave in to Moroccan demands without 
gaining concessions. The MEP Antonio Gutierrez Dfaz (IU) considered that a key 
problem for the Spanish fishing sector was the fact that 'la credibilidad y la autoridad 
de nuestro Gobierno en Europa se encuentra muy degradada' (the credibility and 
authority of our government in Europe is very low) (Sur, 7 May 1995), echoed by the 
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criticism of Matutes MEP (PP) of the lack of firmness of the government's 
negotiating strategy (El Peri6dico, 12 May 1995). The PP accused Gonzalez of being 
more concerned about his own personal, pro-European image in Brussels than the 
defence of Spanish sectoral interests (for example ABC, 23, 24, 29 May 1995). The 
opposition also highlighted the fact that the government's weakness was exacerbated 
by its image as a demandeur of funding at EU level (see Chapter 5), which reduced its 
influence in the decision-making process in other key policy areas such as fisheries 
(Gaceta de Ios Negocios, 19 April 1995). However, in its defence, government 
ministers highlight the PP's approval of the fishing agreement when it won the 
elections in 1996, the only changes in its terms being negative, namely the longer 
duration of the suspension period for certain fish types (See Chapter 8)35. The PSOE 
considered the majority of the criticism to be politically inspired, as further analysed 
by the study of the input of key domestic actors in Chapter 8. 
Conclusions 
Analysis of the role of the Spanish state illustrates the importance of the 
government's strategies at the EU negotiating table for obtaining the optimal deal for 
its fishing sector. The Spanish government was frequently criticised by both the 
Commission and other key EU member states for the predominance of its interests in 
the negotiations, particularly when short-term sectoral interests were put before more 
strategic considerations about the future of the fishing sector, and the EU' s relations 
with the Mediterranean. Despite overall support for the Spanish fishing sector, key 
member states, such as France, were critical of the uncompromising Spanish 
bargaining position, and were unwilling to accept considerable increases in EU 
payments to Morocco to attain its demands. Considerable evidence exists for Spain's 
strong influence on the fisheries agenda. It is significant that the former Secretary of 
State for Fisheries considered in 1996 that 'el esquema actual de la Polftica Comun de 
Estructuras Pesqueras responde hoy, en 1o esencial, a !as aspiraciones de Espaiia 
cuando se incorpor6 a la Comunidad' (the present framework for the policy of 
Common Fisheries Structures is, currently, largely a response to Spain's aspirations 
when it joined the Community) (Loira, 1996, p. 11). 
The negotiation of fisheries agreements with Third countries, and particularly 
Morocco, was a priority for the Spanish government in view of the dependence of its 
fishing sector on Moroccan waters. Although the chief negotiator of the accord was 
the Commission, the Spanish government placed considerable pressure on EU 
35Jnterview with former Agriculture and Fisheries Minister, Madrid, 19 July 1996. 
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negotiators to support its demands, and Spain's EU presidency from July 1995 gave it 
a central position in the negotiating process. The Moroccan press frequently referred 
to the uncompromising EU position on fisheries being largely determined 'bajo 
presi6n del gobierno espafiol' (under the pressure of the Spanish government) 
(Industrias Pesqueras, no. 1641, 1 September 1995, p. 5), and the Spanish delegation 
also successfully ensured close linkage between the Association and fisheries 
agreements to increase the pressure on the Moroccan delegation to meet its demands 
on fishing rights. 
Although the evidence would seem to point to the relevance of a state-centric 
approach to the analysis, the increasing interaction between the domestic and EU 
arenas means that the autonomy of the Spanish state vis-a-vis domestic actors cannot 
be assumed, and a two-level perspective may thus provide a fuller account of the 
negotiating process. The Spanish government was able to exploit the high visibility 
and awareness of the fisheries issue in Spain to explain its intransigent position at EU 
level to other member states, and to obtain the best deal for the fishing sector, thus 
'tying its hands' domestically (Putnam, 1993). Likewise, decisions taken in the EU 
arena were used to justify to the affected regions the substantial reductions in fishing 
quotas demanded by Morocco, and the urgent restructuring which was particularly 
necessary in Andalusia. The state thus acted as a gatekeeper between the EU and 
domestic arenas, and used the interaction between them to obtain a balance between 
sectoral demands at domestic level, and its obligations as an EU member state, and 
EU President from July 1995, to take a leading role in the formulation of a strong EU 
Mediterranean policy. Spain's role as an 'active state' (lkenberry, 1986) is thus 
illustrated by its manipulation of EU and domestic demands to enhance its autonomy. 
However, before assuming that the state retained its full control of the interface 
between the domestic and EU arenas throughout the negotiations, Chapter 8 considers 
the input of key sectoral and regional actors, some of whom had considerably 
developed their capacity to gain access to the policy process at both domestic and EU 
levels. 
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ChapterS 
THE INPUT OF KEY DOMESTIC ACTORS TO THE FISHERIES 
AGREEMENT 
The focus of the chapter is on the input of sectoral and regional actors to the 
negotiation of the 1995 EU-Morocco fisheries agreement. Chapter 7 highlighted the 
state's framework-setting role at EU level, but was largely limited to central 
government's role in the negotiations. An analysis of the mobilisation of sectoral and 
regional actors throughout the negotiating rounds provides a more complete analysis 
of the policy process. The Spanish government was expected to act cautiously by 
Commission officials over an issue which was far more explosive domestically than 
the EU fishing dispute with Canada, considering that few of the boats fishing in 
Moroccan waters were suitable for operating further afield. The study centres on the 
case of Andalusia, which is the region most economically dependent on the 
agreement in view of its lack of alternative fishing grounds, even if other regions such 
as the Canary Islands have larger fishing quotas in Moroccan waters. 
The substantial reductions in fishing quotas, proposed by Morocco in 1995, 
distinguished the negotiations from those of previous accords, and the sector thus 
sought to maximise the defence of its fishing interests, aware of the serious crisis in 
affected regions if Morocco's demands were met. In view of the lack of analytical 
studies of the negotiation of EU fishing agreements, the starting point for the analysis 
is less clear than in the study of cohesion policy. The evaluation of the domestic arena 
could be expected to conclude that domestic actors were able to exert a strong 
influence on the government in view of the highly visible protest reported in the press 
throughout the negotiations. The relevance of a purely state-centric approach to the 
analysis cannot be assumed, even if access for domestic actors to the decision-making 
phase of the policy process at EU level is far more problematic than their input to the 
implementation of the agreement at ground level. 
The chapter firstly examines the institutional framework at central and EU levels, and 
then analyses the changing structure and organisation of regional government and the 
fishing sector. This evaluation lays the foundation for a detailed study of domestic 
input to the policy process, both through widespread protest, and an enhanced level of 
dialogue, which enables conclusions to be drawn on the relations between central 
government and key domestic actors in the fisheries negotiations. 
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Institutional framework 
The institutional framework at central and EU levels shapes the nature of the political 
opportunity structures for key domestic actors. However, exploitation of the available 
access points also depends on the extent to which key actors had developed a greater 
capacity to participate in the negotiations during Spain's EC/EU membership, which 
is examined in the analyses of regional government and the fishing sector. 
European Union 
In addition to the negotiation of EU agreements with non-member countries, the role 
of DGXIV of the Commission (see Figure 7.1 in Chapter 7) is to initiate legislative 
and policy proposals in the area of fisheries, to manage and administer the CFP, and 
to monitor compliance with Community law. On the basis of proposals from the 
Commission, the Council of Ministers passes legislation relating to the CFP, for 
example the Total Allowable Catches (T ACs) and fishing quotas, and the 
establishment of measures laying down the conditions of access to waters and 
resources. In the European Parliament, fisheries issues were discussed in a 
Subcommittee of the Agriculture Committee until a separate Committee for Fisheries 
was created in 1994, indicating the increasing importance of the policy area. The first 
two Presidents, both Spanish, have been able to influence the agenda to maximise 
discussion of contentious issues for Spain such as the agreement with Morocco!. 
Bonino declared in 1998 that direct consultation of the EU fisheries sector would be a 
priority for the Commission prior to revising the CFP after 2002 (Pesca Info, DGXIV 
Newsletter no. 13, 1998, p. 3), indicating how sectoral and regional actors are 
encouraged to maximise their contact with Commission officials to raise awareness of 
their demands. The European Parliament has also acted as an effective mediator 
between key regional and sectoral actors, and institutions at EU level. However, in 
view of its inability to participate directly in the negotiations, it was not a priority for 
key sectoral actors but, rather, an important additional channel for influencing policy. 
Central government 
Central government was responsible for the basic regulation of the fishing sector, 
international relations, and the monitoring of international waters (see Chapter 4 for 
the basic structure of ministries). Despite the importance given to fisheries, a 
relatively small number of people deal with the policy area. One official has 
responsibility for fisheries in the Spanish Permanent Representation in Brussels, who 
I Interview with MEP, former President of the Fisheries Committee, Brussels, 23 April 1997. 
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has a single interlocutor in the SSEU in Madrid, although contact is frequently made 
directly with the Ministry during EU negotiations. Around twenty two civil servants 
were based in the sub-DG for International Fisheries Agreements (see Figure 7.2 in 
Chapter 7) in 1997, approximately five of whom were responsible for Morocco, while 
a total of around 170 officials in central administration work in the area of fisheries2. 
This is a relatively small number when one considers the Spanish fleet of at least 
18,000 fishing boats (see Annex 1 on the Spanish fishing sector). Despite the 
relatively low number of officials, the political importance of fisheries in Spain is 
evident3, especially given the high level of public interest. 
Central government sought to maintain a dialogue with key regional and sectoral 
actors throughout the negotiations, one illustration being the Agriculture and Fisheries 
Minister's visits to the worst affected regions to speak directly to local representatives 
at key points of the negotiation. However, it was the Secretary General for Fisheries, 
as well as key officials in the International Agreements division, who were 
responsible for maintaining regular contact with the sector, for example through 
attending regional seminars, and organising meetings with key representatives. 
Regional government 
At regional level in Andalusia, the DG for Fisheries in the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries in Seville, shown in Figure 8.1, enjoyed close relations with central 
government during the negotiations. An increase in regional influence on the 
bargaining position of central government was attributed to a different mentality in 
the DG following the appointment of a new Agriculture and Fisheries Minister, 
Paulino Plata, in August 1994, rather than to institutional changes at subnational 
level4. Plata was considered to have exploited more fully the regional capacity to have 
an input to the talks; less evidence exists for collaboration during the 1992 fisheries 
negotiations when, according to a key sectoral representative, agricultural interests 
predominated in Andalusia5. The increased input was partly the result of Plata' s 
initiative to set up a working group consisting of representatives of both the regional 
government and fishing sector, the aim of which was to establish a strong, 
2rnterview with official responsible for fisheries in the Spanish Permanent Representation, Brussels, 22 
April1997. 
3 According to an official responsible for fisheries in the Spanish Permanent Representation (Interview, 
Brussels, 22 Aprill997), a strong linkage seems to exist between high-level diplomatic and ministerial 
positions, and past experience in fisheries, one illustration being the former position of the current 
Secretary of State for the EU, Ram6n de Miguel, in the area of fisheries. He considered that many 
senior officials have previously been involved in the negotiation of fishing agreements, negotiations 
with Morocco being particularly highly regarded in view of their problematic and protracted nature. 
4rnterview with official of regional DG for Fisheries, Seville, 30 September 1996. 
5rnterview with President of the Association of Shipowners of Barbate (Asociaci6n de Armadores de 
Buques de Pesca de Barbate, ARPEBAR), Barbate, 3 October 1996. 
Figure 8.1 Organisation of fisheries at regional level 
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consensual position to present to Madrid. Sectoral meetings also provided regional 
government with increased opportunities for collaboration with central government 
(see Chapter 4). One official in the sub-DG for International Fisheries Agreements in 
Madrid expressed doubts about a possible increase in the influence of regional 
government as a result of sectora1 meetings, but considered their organisation a 
considerable advance, given that they encouraged greater transparency at central level 
prior to the ratification of agreements in the EU arena6. 
As well as working group meetings to decide on a unified bargaining position in the 
negotiations with Morocco, regional meetings were held to formulate the 
Modernisation Plan for the Andalusia fishing industry in close collaboration with the 
sector, which thus had a major input to the plan finally approved7. According to the 
plan, proposed on 12 September 1994, and approved by the regional parliament on 13 
and 14 December 1994, both the EU's CFP and Andalusia's Statute of Autonomy 
point to an adequate legal framework at regional level for the planning of its own 
fishing policy on the basis of a general consensus with key interest groups (Junta de 
6Jnterview with official of sub·DG for International Fisheries Agreements, Madrid, 11 June 1997. 
?For example, during the first phase of the formulation of the plan, seventeen fishermens' associations, 
four producers' organisations, sixteen shipowners' associations, two trade unions and five other 
organisations participated, and twenty meetings were held in the ports, and five in the provinces (Junta 
de Andalucfa, 1997). 
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Andalucfa, 1997). The Modernisation Plan is indicative of the progress made towards 
greater co-ordination of fishing policy with the Autonomous Communities, 
acknowledged by the Agriculture and Fisheries Minister in central government 
(Atienza, 1996, p. 13). 
The greater exploitation of the capacity of regional government to manage FIFG 
funding is an illustration of the growing collaboration between central and regional 
levels in the area of fisheries (see Chapter 6 on regional participation in structural 
funding). The Agriculture and Fisheries Minister from 1996, Loyola de Palacio, 
proposed institutionalising a more stable framework for co-operation, as many 
procedural problems had resulted from the difficulty of maintaining close relations 
between central and regional government during the first years of funding. The new 
Secretary General for Fisheries in the PP government from 1996, Samuel Juarez, 
considered that 'el IFOP se estaba utilizando como un sistema para tener sujetas a !as 
CCAA, y eso es un tremendo error' (the FIFG was being used as a system to control 
the Autonomous Communities, which is a major error) (lndustrias Pesqueras, 
no.1667, 1 October 1996, p.4). In the sectoral meeting on fisheries in Vigo in July 
1996, de Palacio highlighted the reliance of the funding system on the co-operation of 
the Autonomous Communities, claiming that 90% of the competencies in the area of 
fisheries had already been transferred to regional governments (lndustrias Pesqueras, 
no. 1663, I August 1996, p. 14). Central administration hoped that an enhanced role 
for the regional administration would enable more efficient use of the funding. For 
example, only 8% of the money allocated by the EU had been spent by May 1996 
(Mar, no. 346, January 1997, p. 21). Regional governments considered that 
developments such as the revision of OPs, to adapt them to the demands of 
subnational authorities and to ensure improved distribution and use of funding, would 
lead to their greater input to EU fisheries policy more generally. 
Fishing sector 
The fishing sector in Andalusia represents a significant proportion of the Spanish 
fleet, namely 14.9% (see Annex 1 for further detail on the Spanish fishing sector). 
The objectives of the Andalusia modernisation plan included support for the 
establishment of organisational structures and the consolidation of existing 
organisations within the fishing sector to enable the more effective defence of fishing 
interests, and the participation of socio-economic actors (Junta de Andalucfa, 1997). 
The successful implementation of the plan sought to establish a more organised 
fishing sector in Andalusia, particularly in view of its incorporation into the wider EU 
framework. 
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Faced with substantial reductions in quotas imposed by Morocco and Mauritania, the 
fishing sector has been increasingly obliged to organise its interests more coherently 
(Nufiez Villaverde and de Larramendi, 1996, p. 54), as illustrated by the more 
professional and business-oriented policy developed by key shipowners' associations. 
In addition to the shipowners' and producers' organisations, fishermen and 
shipowners have also organised themselves jointly into associations (cofradias) in 
Andalusia, although this is less developed than in other regions. Its lack of unity was 
particularly problematic during negotiations at EU level. According to an article in 
1995 in a specialist fisheries journal, 'la desuni6n del sector pesquero andaluz, la 
debilidad del Gobiemo Espafiol y Ios intereses contrapuestos de Ios paises 
comunitarios son factores que favorecen a Marruecos y que van a utilizarse en nuestra 
contra' (the disunity of the fishing sector in Andalusia, the weakness of the Spanish 
government and the conflicting interests of EU countries are factors which favour 
Morocco, and which will be used against us) (Productos del Mar, nos. 89-90, May-
June 1995, p. 14). The President of the European Parliament Fisheries Committee in 
1997, Carmen Fraga Estevez MEP (PP), highlighted the lack of a common position in 
the sector in Andalusia as largely a result of the fact that its associations of fishermen 
and shipowners represented very different fish type sS. Furthermore, many 
organisations and trade unions were more politically radical in Andalusia, illustrated 
by the extreme positions of some CCOO representatives, which led to tension with 
unions in other regions9. Andalusia sought to co-ordinate its interests with other 
fishing areas opposed to substantial quota reductions imposed by Morocco, but a 
united position was difficult in view of the existing tensions between groups within 
the region. In the 1994 re-negotiation of the fishing agreement, conflict between 
groups from Andalusia observing the negotiations was reported, and lobbying actions, 
such as strikes and port closures, were rarely well co-ordinated (Productos del Mar, 
nos. 89-90, May-June 1995, p. 5). Despite attempts to present a united regional 
position in 1995, representatives of Almeria and Malaga organised joint actions 
without taking into account the position of other ports. A further illustration of the 
conflict of interests is the disagreement between the fishermens' association in 
Algeciras and the President of the Almeria Association, Francisco Mayor, whose 
radical views were more politicised (El Pais, 15 October 1995). 
Despite clear differences in sectoral interests which made a united position highly 
problematic, co-ordination of the sector was improving even in Andalusia, as 
illustrated by the common position reached in the working group created by regional 
8Jnterview with MEP, President of the Fisheries Committee from January 1997, Brussels, 23 April 
1997. 
9Jnterview with former government official, Madrid, July 1996. 
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government. Another illustration of the attempt to co-ordinate regional interests was 
the creation of the Federation of Shipowners' Associations in Andalusia. It had a clear 
symbolic importance despite the little direct input to the 1995 negotiations and 
minimal contact with fishermens' associations, and the profile of the Federation was 
raised by the efforts of its President Pedro Maza to defend acceptable fishing quotas 
for the sector. In the majority of associations, the management had become more 
professional, although this was more the case in the larger industrial sector with a 
higher level of resources, such as cephalopod fishing associations in the Canaries, 
rather than in the smaller, often family-owned businesses and diverse fishermens' 
associations common in Andalusia 10. However, even associations in Andalusia were 
renovating their organisational structure, a key objective being to create a 
representative regional federation to reduce tensions between the subnational 
administration and the various associations. One of the central objectives, according 
to both Rafael Montoya, President of the Andalusia Federation of Fishermens' 
Associations, and the Director of the DG for Fisheries in Andalusia, Francisco G6mez 
Aracil, was to present fishermens' demands more effectively to the administration and 
to shipowners (lndustrias Pesqueras, no. 1673, I January 1997, p. 24). In an 
interview, G6mez Aracil drew attention to the fact that: 
el sector ha tenido Iogros sustanciales en su reestructuraci6n. Las cofradias 
se han articulado en federaciones provinciales y regionales, lo cual es un 
exito para la vertebraci6n que necesita el sector, representado parcialmente 
por !as cofradfas. En otros ambitos de la estructuraci6n, como Ios 
organizaciones profesionales pesqueras, se ha acrecentado la 
consolidaci6n econ6mica y empresarial de Ios armadores. Prueba de ello 
es que el vigor estructural y la interlocuci6n con la administraci6n 
pesquera andaluza es eficaz y eficiente. 
(Major progress has been made in the restructuring of the sector. The 
fishermens' associations have joined together in provincial and regional 
federations, signifying a success for the restructuring needed in the sector, 
partially represented by the fishermens' associations. In other areas of the 
structure, such as the professional fishing organisations, the consolidation 
of the shipowners has increased in the economic and business spheres. 
Proof of this is that the solid structure and the communication with the 
fishing administration in Andalusia is effective and efficient) (lndustrias 
Pesqueras, no. 1676, 15 February 1997, p. 7). 
The former Secretary General for Fisheries, Jose Loira, also referred to a more 
organised fishing sector in the 1990s, although the major task of establishing a single 
representative association continued to be debated (lndustrias Pesqueras, no 1655-6, 
April 1996, p. 8). The increasing organisation of the sector facilitated a greater input 
to EU-Ievel negotiations, the long duration of the 1995 negotiation and the substantial 
10Andalusia currently has twenty three fisherrnens' associations to which around 8000 fishermen are 
affiliated (lndustrias Pesqueras, no. 1676, 15 February 1997, p. 28). 
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cuts in quotas demanded by Morocco having particularly encouraged a more coherent 
articulation of interests. 
Trade unions complained about their lack of representation vis-a-vis central 
government (see Chapter 4), although divisions between socio-economic actors often 
inhibited a common position to present to the government on key issues. The input of 
socio-economic actors to the regional modernisation plan was assured through the 
sectoral meeting on fisheries (Mesa Sectorial de Pesca), which had been set up by the 
Andalusia Pact on Employment and Productivity of 13 February 1995, for example 
their presence in monitoring committees (Junta de Andalucfa, 1995) (see Chapter 6). 
Furthermore, a Interministerial Committee (Comisi6n Interministerial) was jointly 
created by the Ministries responsible for Employment and Social Affairs, and 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, to increase discussion of issues affecting workers 
with union representatives. The CCOO had lobbied hard for the constitution of such a 
forum, as they considered that the government ignored socio-economic actors in its 
negotiation of fisheries issues. However, according to trade union representatives, the 
committee has been of limited effectivenessll. The Secretary General of the CCOO 
Fisheries Division, FETCOMAR, Jon Azkue, criticised the fact that '!as medidas de 
la UE eran exclusivamente para Ios armadores' (EU measures were exclusively for 
the shipowners) (Gaceta Sindical, no. 140, October 1995, p. 22) 
Opportunities for participation of domestic actors 
Considerable domestic pressure on the Spanish government was inevitable during the 
negotiations, given the crisis in the fishing sector and the high level of dependence on 
Moroccan fishing grounds. In previous fishing negotiations with Morocco, the 
government's bargaining position had also been obliged to take into account key 
sectoral interests. This is clearly illustrated by a letter in June 1982 from the Spanish 
Agriculture and Fisheries Minister, Jose Luis Alvarez, to the Moroccan Economy 
Minister, to inform Morocco that 'un accord imposant de plus grandes limitations a 
notre flotte et comportant un accroissement de la cooperation espagnole ne pourrait 
pas politiquement etre presente ni au secteur de la peche, ni a I' opinion publique et 
encore moins au Parlement espagnol' (it would not be politically possible to present 
an agreement imposing greater limitations on our fleet, and including an increase in 
Spanish co-operation, to the fishing sector, or to the public, or, even less so, to the 
Spanish parliament) (Unpublished letter, Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries 
11 Interviews with representative of CCOO fisheries sector, Federation of Transport, Communications 
and Fisheries (Federaci6n Estatal de Transportes, Comunicaciones y Mar, FETCOMAR), Madrid, 10 
May 1996, 9 July 1996. 
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and Food, Madrid, 14 June 1982). However, in 1995, the negotiation was potentially 
more politically sensitive in the domestic arena in view of the greater threat to 
Spanish fishing rights. Regional authorities lobbied for a greater input to the talks 
throughout the negotiating rounds, and criticised the lack of transparency of the 
process. 
The PP government in Galicia requested integration into the Spanish delegation on 
the basis of the argument put forward by Jmirez, who was a regional government 
official in 1995, that 'tiene que entender que !as comunidades aut6nomas son 
estado ... De la misma forma que se cuenta con delegados cientfficos y representantes 
de la administraci6n central, debe haber un lugar para !as CCAA mas afectadas' (they 
should understand that Autonomous Communities are the state .... ln the same way that 
they count on scientific delegates and representatives of central government, there 
should be a place for the worst affected Autonomous Communities) (Industrias 
Pesqueras, no. 1641, 1 September 1995, p. 10). However, in the Andalusia parliament 
on 29 March 1995, the regional Agriculture and Fisheries Minister emphasised the 
limits to the pressure which could be exerted in the negotiations from the regional 
level (Ideal, 30 March 1995). Plata's appearance in parliament had been requested by 
both the PP and the Andalusia regionalist party which had criticised the weakness of 
the regional government in the negotiating process. Debates in the regional 
parliament, although regarded as relatively unimportant by central government, 
included regular warnings from opposition parties of the disastrous outcome of a 
weak EU negotiating position. While aware of their limited competencies in 
negotiations at EU level, regional representatives in affected regions such as 
Andalusia were extremely critical of the minimal subnational input to talks (Diario 
16, 19 April 1995), especially when the future of their economy depended on the 
outcome of the bargaining. Sectoral associations in the Canaries similarly criticised 
their lack of representation. The President of the main fishing association in the 
Canaries, Jose Ram6n Fontan, expressed concern that the more visible and violent 
protest in Andalusia would lead to their demands being prioritised at the expense of 
regions such as the Canaries (lndustrias Pesqueras, no. 1641, I September 1995, p. 9) 
(in parallel to the fears that more active regions would gain higher levels of EU 
funding, as illustrated in Chapter 6). The Spanish government generally considered 
that established rules did not permit greater representation for subnational 
governments, as they were not recognised interlocutors at EU level. However, 
government representatives from Andalusia observed negotiating rounds to maximise 
opportunities to lobby negotiators, and, according to central government officials, 
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regional governments were always consulted on political issues, while more technical 
issues were discussed with sectoral representatives12. 
The fishing sectors from affected regions were also consulted by central government 
at all negotiating rounds, although one commentator on the 1994 re-negotiation of the 
agreement considered that the sectoral presence amounted to waiting for minimal 
information from the Spanish delegation after each session had closed (Productos del 
Mar, nos. 79-80, July-August 1994, pp. 17-19). However, the sector regarded the 
opportunity to obtain information firsthand, and defend its specific regional interests, 
as highly important. Representatives were consulted by the Spanish delegation at key 
points of the negotiation which, according to interviewees, formed an important part 
of the input of the sector to the Spanish bargaining position 13. The comparative study 
of the relations between the government and the fishing sector in the UK and France 
by Shackleton (1986) analyses the UK government's effort to develop a close 
relationship with sectoral representatives and to encourage their presence at 
negotiations, describing how the Fisheries Minister 
proved remarkably successful in developing a close relationship with the 
nine main industry representatives. He revelled in their presence in 
Brussels and got them to accept concessions bit by bit, persuading them to 
move ever closer to the government position and get their own members to 
do likewise. By the end, it was difficult for them to say that they had been 
sold-out, as they had been intimately involved in what had been going on 
(Shackleton, 1986, pp. 228-9). 
The Spanish government similarly welcomed the sector's full involvement in the 
negotiations. It acted as an arbitrator between dispersed regional interests, in parallel 
to the UK government's strategy of gaining a general consensus through the use of 
informal persuasion. 
The sector was particularly concerned about the agreement with Morocco, as it felt 
that the conflict with Canada had been resolved without its involvement. For 
example, the President of the shipowners' association in Cadiz, Arturo Castafio, was 
highly critical of the concessions made to Canada by the EU delegation, which he 
considered had placed the EU in a weak, vulnerable position vis-a-vis Morocco 14. 
The Federaci6n Nacional de Cofradfas de Pescadores (National Federation of Fishing 
Associations) considered direct and permanent contact with officials at central and 
12rnterview with official of sub-DG for International Fisheries Agreements, Madrid, 4 July 1996. 
13rnterviews with President of ARPEBAR shipowners' association, Barbate, 3 October 1996, 16 June 
1997, and with President of ASEMAR shipowners' association, Cadiz, 3 October 1996. 
14Interview with President of ASEMAR shipowners' association, Cadiz, 3 October 1996. 
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EU level the most effective mechanism for raising awareness of its demands and 
lobbying negotiators (Productos del Mar, nos. 95-96, November-December 1995, p. 
13). Contact with regional government was considered an important accompanying 
measure, as officials acted as effective mediators with the EU level, assisting in the 
organisation of meetings15. Commission officials in DGXIV welcomed direct contact 
with the sector, and considered that this caused minimal tension at national level as 
central government representatives were generally also present to enhance the 
articulation of sectoral interests. According to a DGXIV official, 'es normal; no 
hacemos el acuerdo ni para el gobierno central ni para nosotros, sino para satisfacer 
Ios intereses de Ios armadores' (it is normal; we do not negotiate the agreement for 
the central government nor for ourselves, but to meet the demands of the 
shipowners)l6. In addition, the fishing sector lobbied the European Parliament, which 
sought to increase awareness of regional demands at EU level, and put forward 
questions raised by the sector to the Commissionl7. In the 1995 re-negotiation, the 
aim of key fishing representatives was to use all potential channels to maximise their 
influence; the increasing presence of sectoral representatives on EU consultative 
fishing committees was thus also seen as an important additional channel (Productos 
del Mar, nos. 81-82, September-October 1994, p. 18). 
Input of domestic actors to the 1995 negotiations 
The political opportunity structure may have increased access for key regional and 
sectoral actors during EC/EU membership, but a more established dialogue with 
government and EU officials did not necessarily ensure their actual influence on the 
bargaining process. In addition to seeking to formalise dialogue at regional, central 
and EU levels, the sector in Andalusia thus sought to maximise its pressure on the 
Spanish government and the EU in 1995 via direct measures of protest to show their 
discontent, such as the boycott of Moroccan goods, strikes, and public 
demonstrations. This is an illustration of both confrontational and assimilative 
strategies adopted by domestic actors to exploit the domestic opportunity structure, 
described by Kitschelt (1986). 
Level of protest 
Domestic protest raised the visibility of the crisis situation, and increased the pressure 
on the Spanish delegation to meet regional demands. The sense of crisis in the 
Spanish fishing sector was exacerbated by what it regarded as the unacceptable 
15Jnterview with President of Producers' Organisation, Barbate, 17 June 1997. 
16Jnterview with official of DGXIV, European Commission, Brussels, 18 Aprill997. 
11Jnterview with MEP, former President of the Fisheries Committee, Brussels, 23 April1997. 
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demands of Moroccan fishing industry representatives, for example their warning to 
the Moroccan government against accepting increased EU payments in return for 
more fishing rights (FT, I May 1995)18. However, although regional protest was an 
effective pressure on the government, particularly during the pre-election period, the 
lack of co-ordination of actions often reduced their impact. Actions were rarely 
organised in the region as a whole, and never nationally, so that in May and June 
1995, 'por el momento cada puerto afectado parece estar haciendo la guerra por su 
cuenta' (for the moment each affected port seems to be making war unilaterally) 
(Productos del Mar, nos. 89-90, May-June 1995, p. 14). However, central 
government was fully aware of the high visibility and potential impact of sectoral 
protest in the domestic arena, and considered maintaining calm in Andalusia during 
the suspension of fishing activity as a key objectivel9. Even during the EC accession 
talks, one of the key negotiators criticised the fact that the fishing sector was rarely 
satisfied, illustrated by the fact that 'un pequefio fallo del negociador o una posici6n 
men os dura de lo que ell os deseaban Ios llevaba a protestar con vehemencia' (a minor 
mistake made by the negotiator or a less tough position than they wanted led them to 
protest strongly) (Bassols, 1995, p. 171) (see Chapter 3). The Spanish fishing sector 
regarded their acts of protest as enforcing a direct response to their urgent demands, 
and increasing awareness of the extent of the dependence of the Andalusia economy 
on Moroccan fishing waters. 
Spanish government officials, in regular meetings with representatives of fisheries 
and agricultural associations, sought to show the negative effects of an illegal boycott 
and violent acts against Moroccan imports, considering such actions as largely 
politically inspired, and particularly prevalent during a pre-election period. However, 
opposition parties highlighted the complacency of government officials, whose 
response was described as being limited to verbal criticism of the more violent actions 
taken. As a result of the Spanish boycott, Morocco was forced to establish new 
maritime routes to European markets via the Mediterranean ports of France, and the 
Moroccan press exposed the fear of the authorities that a rise in Spanish protest would 
prevent the transit of emigrants (for example Al-Bayane, 9, 21 June 1995). The 
Commission considered Spanish acts of vandalism against Moroccan fishing products 
18Evidence from an interview with an official in the Spanish Permanent Representation (Brussels, 22 
April 1997) would seem to suggest that the re-negotiation of the accord differed from previous 
negotiations, as the fishing sector in Morocco was far more aware of the implications of the EU 
agreement. This was illustrated by its criticism of the Moroccan government for only allocating around 
12% of EU payments for fishing rights to the sector. 
19central government officials were particularly concerned about any Spanish actions during the 
holiday period when thousands of workers returned to Morocco via Algeciras, illustrating the direct 
impact on negotiators of domestic protest (Interview with former Agriculture and Fisheries Minister, 
Madrid, 19 July 1996). 
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harmful to the progress of negotiations (Europe, no. 6489, 26-27 May 1995, p. 13), 
while central government emphasised the importance of the EU' s support for its 
negotiating position to avoid exacerbating domestic tensions. However, at regional 
level, the Director General of Fisheries in Andalusia announced his support of a legal 
boycott following a meeting with representatives of the Federation of Andalusia 
shipowners on 19 April1995, which led to the approval of strict health inspections on 
Moroccan fish imports; the rigorous nature of controls amounted to an effective 
boycott. The measure was passed in an attempt to defuse tension in the ports of 
Algeciras, Malaga and Almeria (FT, 16 May 1995). However, in keeping with the 
demands of negotiators at EU and central levels, violent protest was condemned, and 
even some provinces of Andalusia were critical of the more radical actions against 
Moroccan lorrydrivers in ports such as Algeciras. The Moroccan press drew attention 
to the two-sided nature of the Spanish position, namely the official position adopted 
by the Spanish delegation at EU level, and its complacency towards illegal acts 
against Moroccan goods at domestic level for fear of being accused of not fully 
supporting its fishing sector's demands. This is illustrated by headlines in the 
Moroccan newspaper Al-Bayane on 17 July 1995, which refer both to Madrid's 
support for increased Moroccan exports of sardines and oranges, and to the pressure 
placed on the Spanish government by the fishing sector in Algeciras (Ojeda Garcia, 
1996, p. 33). 
Financial support for the fishing sector, from both the Spanish government and the 
EU, was a key factor in reducing the rising tension during the suspension of fishing 
activity. The government highlighted the financial backing in the pre-election period 
as a clear illustration of its support for the sector, while some press reports cynically 
linked the speed with which the payments arrived to the government's need to win 
votes in the elections (for example Ya, 16 May 1995). Spain placed high pressure on 
the Commission to eo-finance the support given to the Spanish fleet by central 
government, as it had done during the suspension period in 1991. The Spanish 
government argued that the European negotiating position vis-a-vis Morocco would 
be strengthened if the EU provided aid to sustain the fishermen for a longer period, 
but the Commission remained retice,nt regarding Spanish demands. In the European 
Parliament Fisheries Committee on 20 March 1995, Bonino ruled out automatic EU 
payments, and proposed financial backing from the structural funds already allocated 
to member states, although agreeing to investigate legally acceptable ways of 
providing aid from the EU budget (Unpublished communication from Spanish 
Permanent Representation to European Parliament on 14 February 1995). The 
Spanish cabinet approved a two billion peseta aid package for Spanish fishermen on 
28 April 1995 in view of the fact that the EU-Morocco fisheries agreement 
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represented the livelihood for 28,000 workers in Spain and Portugal, and would affect 
up to 40-50,000 of the workforce (Europe, no. 6471,29 Apri11995, p. 8). A specific 
measure for the crews concerned was established by the Commission, using a system 
of monthly individual compensation payments, although delays in the transfer of 
payments caused considerable tension in Andalusia. In addition, FIFG appropriations 
(see Chapter 7), already granted to Spain and Portugal under their operational 
programmes, were partly re-directed to compensate ship owners for the temporary 
inactivity of their vessels (on the basis of article 14 of Regulation EC 3699/93). 
During the period, fifty two million ecu was made available (forty eight million for 
Spain and four million for Portugal), of which thirty nine million ecu came from EU 
resources (European Commission, 1996b, p. 99). 
Level of dialogue 
The Spanish government was fully aware of the sector's reluctance to accept EU 
legislation which brought an end to traditional fishing rights in Moroccan waters, 
claiming from the start of the talks that it would fully support the sector as it had done 
in previous negotiations. The Secretary General for Fisheries assured sectora1 
representatives that the EU would reject conditions which were unacceptable for the 
Spanish fishing sector20, and the Agriculture and Fisheries Minister described 
Moroccan demands as 'clearly out of proportion and unacceptable' (FT, 28 April 
1995). After each stage of the negotiation, the Spanish delegation held extensive 
meetings with sectoral representatives and the Andalusia regional government, 
considering that direct contact was important for a full awareness of the issues 
involved, and for maintaining good relations with the sector. The high political 
importance of the agreement was underlined by the warning of Miguel Arias Caiiete 
MEP (PP) in April 1995, that the agreement could jeopardise 18,000 jobs in 
Andalusia (Ideal Granada, 9 Aprill995). 
The Andalusia working group set forward its overall position, and more specific 
demands for each fishing type, in a document on 27 February 1995 prior to the 
commencement of negotiations. In March 1995, the Andalusia Agriculture and 
Fisheries Minister held meetings in Brussels with key officials in both the 
Commission and the Spanish Permanent Representation to present the position of 
Andalusia before negotiations began (Diario 16, 21 March 1995). Meetings had been 
held prior to the beginning of negotiations in January 1995 to inform the Commission 
directly of specific regional demands, and contact with Fisheries Commissioner 
Bonino was a priority during the negotiations, including key meetings during the 
20Interviews with former Secretary General for Fisheries, Madrid, 10 July 1996, 9 June 1997. 
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third, seventh and eighth negotiating rounds21. Furthermore, regular meetings were 
held throughout Andalusia in an attempt to formulate a strong position to present to 
the central and EU levels. One illustration is the presentation of an Algeciras working 
group document, approved by the General Assembly of the Federaci6n Andaluza 
(Andalusia Federation) to government officials on 18 April 1995, which totally 
rejected Moroccan demands, and other provinces applied similar pressure. For 
example, it was agreed on 19 May, in a meeting of fishing representatives in Barbate, 
that a document listing demands agreed by the regional government in conjunction 
with the sector would be presented to central government for its defence at EU level. 
The fishing village of Barbate is a key example of a locality which is totally 
dependent on the fisheries agreement with Morocco for its livelihood, and the 
government was fully aware of the social and economic implications for the 
community if Moroccan demands were met by the EU. Full government support for 
Barbate was evident in earlier fishing negotiations, as illustrated by a letter in 1981 
from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries to the Moroccan Fisheries Minister, 
where the particular interest of the Spanish government in the Barbate fleet is 
expressed (Unpublished letter, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Madrid, 1 
April1981) (see Annex 2 for a fuller analysis of the case ofBarbate). 
Despite the different interests of the provinces, the Andalusia fishing sector and 
regional government sought to maintain a united position, and set out their latest 
series ofdemands on 19 June, urgently requesting meetings with both Bonino and 
Atienza to argue their case directly. The failure of each negotiating round exacerbated 
domestic tensions at key ports such as Algeciras, and officials from central 
administration discussed the negotiations with representatives in the worst affected 
zones whenever another deadlock was reached. Atienza declared that his arguments 
against violent protest, and for a reasoned defence of fishing interests, were well 
received by the sector, for example by Andalusia representatives in a meeting with the 
Minister on 24 May 1995 (Diario de Jerez, 25 May 1995), although press 
declarations following the meeting described the dissatisfaction of representatives 
with the government's response. Sectoral representatives in Andalusia accused the 
EU of treating Morocco more like an EU member than Spain (lndustrias Pesqueras, 
no. 1636, 15 June 1995, p. 5), and were particularly critical of the notion of 
partnership which, according to the President of the ASEMAR shipowners' 
association in Cadiz, was not viable in practice (Diario de Cadiz, 6 May 1995). 
Criticism of the lack of transparency of the policy process was also voiced, although, 
according to press reports, key actors at regional level, such as the President of the 
21 Interview with official of regional DG for Fisheries, Seville, 30 September 1996. 
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Andalusia shipowners' association, frequently managed to obtain information directly 
from Brussels. In a meeting with Bonino on 29 June 1995, Plata, and sectoral 
representatives from Andalusia, highlighted the tensions within the sector, and 
presented their key demands (El Correo, 30 June 1995). Plata had sought to co-
ordinate the Andalusia bargaining position as far as possible prior to the meeting, 
following extensive talks with the President of the regional government, Chaves, and 
representatives of the sector. A key point highlighted by Plata was Andalusia's 
acceptance of a gradual 15% reduction in quotas, but not for key fish types with 
major social and economic implications for the region. Bonino promised to increase 
awareness of Spanish regional problems at EU level, considering an agreement which 
did not take account of their interests unacceptable to the EU. The close relations 
between the EU and regional levels are illustrated by Plata's praise of Bonino's 
sensitivity, and in-depth knowledge of the situation experienced in Andalusia, after 
the meeting (El Correo, 30 June 1995). 
When negotiations resumed in Brussels on 11 August, tensions were high in the 
fishing sector in view of the continued suspension of activity. Key sectoral 
representatives made pessimistic statements about a successful conclusion of 
') 
negotiations. For example, a key Andalusia representative considered that Spain 
should veto the signing of a negative agreement, fearing the approval of an accord in 
the absence of full consultation with the sector (Algeciras Marftimas, 9 August 1995). 
The most contentious issues in the Andalusia fishing sector still held up the 
negotiations, namely fishing quotas, and the issue of Moroccan fishermen on Spanish 
boats (see Chapter 7). In a document sent to the Spanish delegation, the CCOO 
(1995a) highlighted the fact that the Moroccan presence on Spanish ships meant less 
employment for local fishermen in mainly family-owned businesses, especially in 
towns in Andalusia such as Barbate and Algeciras. On 30 August, Atienza held 
meetings with representatives from affected regional governments and the fishing 
sector to report on all areas of the negotiation. He stressed the importance of a tough 
Spanish position which was dependent on a unity of action in the sector. A 
spokesman for the fishermen in Algeciras, Miguel Alberta Dfaz, considered that 
Andalusia's interests were being prioritised for the first time in the negotiations in 
August (Algeciras Maritfmas, 10 August 1995). 
The lack of agreement on any key issues worked to the Spanish government's 
advantage in one respect, namely in ensuring unanimous opposition to Moroccan 
demands as long as no individual region had attained their specific objectives22. 
22Jnterview with fonner Agriculture and Fisheries Minister, Madrid, 19 July 1996. 
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Despite the criticism of the government, all regional authorities, including those ruled 
by the PP, were reported to have largely supported the government's position at EU 
level (Mar, no. 331, September 1995, p. 9). The linkage with the Association 
agreement (see Chapter 7), and the EU' s commitment to financial aid, was considered 
an effective means of placing pressure on the Moroccan delegation by Andalusia 
shipowners, who were prepared to accept the inactivity of the fleet rather than an 
agreement which ignored Spanish interests. Nonetheless, the lack of any concrete 
results following Bonino's talks in Rabat led to unrest, and demands for greater 
consultation, exacerbated by the criticism of the main opposition party. According to 
a spokesperson in Algeciras, where some of the most serious protests had occurred, 
the breakdown of negotiations at the end of August was an 'autentica declaraci6n de 
guerra para el sector' (real declaration of war for the sector) (El Pais, 29 August 
1995). Pressure on the government from key fishing representatives was maintained 
until the final negotiating round in November when, after eight months of suspended 
activity, tensions were particularly high in the domestic arena. 
Reactions to the agreement and implementation 
Although the final agreement was, in the view of one Spanish fisheries official, 'the 
best we could have hoped for' (FT, 19 December 1995), the EU's concessions to 
Morocco in the final negotiating rounds were criticised in the Spanish fishing sector. 
The Commission's offer of a 25% reduction in fishing quotas in August was regarded 
as an unacceptable concession by representatives from the Canaries in view of 
Morocco's refusal to make any compromises (Industrias Pesqueras, no. 1641, 1 
September 1995, p. 9), and, as President of the Andalusia Fishermens' Federation, 
Montoya declared that Andalusia was not in a position to accept a 21% reduction in 
its fish catch (El Pa{s, 13 August 1995). Although the biggest reductions in fish 
quotas, namely in cephalopods, had the most impact on the fishing sector in the 
Canaries, the sector in Andalusia was more dependent on the outcome of the 
agreement and particularly critical of the accord approved by EU negotiators; this is 
shown by the widespread protest against the agreement. The government was accused 
of not having insisted on a tougher EU negotiating position, but central government 
officials responded by highlighting the fact that Morocco did not manage to obtain a 
number of its initial demands, namely the huge reductions in quotas, the increase in 
number of Moroccans on Spanish ships, and obligatory unloading in Moroccan ports. 
Many fishing representatives complained of a lack of information; the President of 
the Andalusia Federation of Fisherrnens' Associations drew attention to the secretive 
way in which negotiations were conducted, illustrating this with the lack of awareness 
- _, 
210 
of whether an agreement had been reached in the seventh negotiating round. 
However, it was highlighted at EU level that not even member states could be given 
the full information on negotiating positions during the talks, the lack of transparency 
being considered by EU negotiators as a natural part of the bargaining process23. The 
regional government in Andalusia was less critical of the government's negotiating 
tactics, which was to be expected in view of the PSOE also being the ruling party at 
regional level. It declared its general satisfaction with the outcome, regarding the 
input of the regional working group to have been important for the final accord 
reached. Plata stressed the fact that the majority of the Andalusia fleet remained 
active in Moroccan waters made the agreement globally positive, the final reductions 
in fish quotas being less than he had anticipated. 
The implementation of the 1995 agreement is considered to have been far less 
problematic than prior accords. Evidence from interviews seems to suggest that this is 
largely due to an increasing awareness in the Spanish fishing sector of the need to 
reduce fishing quotas in Moroccan waters, and to a greater respect for Moroccan 
sovereignty over its waters. One key problem was the unilateral Moroccan insistence 
on a revision of the agreement to permit a suspension of fishing activity in March and 
April 1997 for cephalopods, in addition to the two months of inactivity in September 
and October agreed on in the 1995 accord. The demand was at first rejected by 
Brussels, but was eventually accepted in January 1997. This caused considerable 
unrest in Andalusia in view of the impact on the fresh fish market, whereas the frozen 
fish market in the Canaries could adapt more easily to the revised terms24. Both the 
fishing sector and the regional government considered that negotiators were at fault 
for not demanding concessions in return for the extension of the suspension period, 
and regarded the acceptance of Moroccan proposals as setting a dangerous precedent. 
However, according to central government officials, the revision of the agreement 
was generally accepted by the sector, particularly in the Canaries where the fact that 
reciprocity had been accepted by Moroccan fishermen for the first time was 
welcomed25. A widespread feeling of apprehension existed in 1997 regarding the 
negotiation of the next fishing agreement, in view of the crisis situation in the fishing 
sectors of both Spain and Morocco. Despite claims from the Moroccan government 
that the agreement will not be re-negotiated, working group meetings organised by 
23Interview with chief EU negotiator of fisheries agreement, European Commission, Brussels, 21 
April1997. 
24Interview with official of sub-DG for International Fisheries Agreements since 1996, Madrid, 11 
June 1997. 
25Interview with official of sub-DG for International Fisheries Agreements from 1996, Madrid, 11 
June 1997. 
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the regional government in Andalusia in conjunction with the fishing sector were 
already formulating a negotiating position in 1997-98. 
Conclusions 
Whereas the fishing agreement with Mauritania only affected Cadiz, the agreement 
with Morocco was of fundamental importance for all the ports of Andalusia; the 
fishing sector was thus determined to make its demands as visible as possible to 
regional and central government in 1995. The sub-DG for Fisheries in Andalusia 
played a key role in keeping central government informed of the sector's demands, 
and of its response to the Spanish delegation's negotiating terms. The Director 
General of Fisheries in Andalusia highlighted the firm position of the regional 
government throughout the negotiations, following extensive and regular consultation 
with the sector (Jndustrias Pesqueras, no. 1636, 15 June 1995, pp. 7-9). The 
Secretary General for Fisheries affirmed that the Autonomous Communities were 
consulted throughout the negotiating process26; senior government officials thus acted 
as an important channel between the sector and central government. In the case of 
Andalusia, good relations between the PSOE Agriculture and Fisheries Ministers at 
central and regional level aided effective collaboration27. 
However, key sectoral representatives still voiced their criticism of insufficient 
support from central government. For example, certain associations felt that the 
government could have defended the sector at EU level to a greater degree, and taken 
advantage of direct contact with EU negotiators to emphasise further the crisis 
situation in the Spanish sector. Some sectoral representatives had similarly 
complained in 1994 of insufficient meetings with the government, and declared a lack 
of confidence in both central administration and the EU regarding the negotiations of 
a fair fishing agreement (lndustrias Pesqueras, nos. 1620-21, 1 November 1994, pp. 
10-11). In 1995, in view of the crisis in the sector, the visibility of the fishing issue 
was greater, and it is significant that an informal agreement allowed the EU to resume 
fishing in Moroccan waters on 25 November to avoid disruption by Spanish 
fishermen at the EuroMed conference in November. Furthermore, central government 
officials highlighted the fact that they had repeatedly declared at EU level that the 
Spanish delegation would not sign an Association agreement while the future of the 
fishing sector was at risk. The Spanish government assured the sector that its 
bargaining position was firmly based on the demands which it had communicated to 
26lnterviews with former Secretary General for Fisheries, Madrid, 10 July 1996,9 June 1997. 
27rnterview with former Agriculture and Fisheries Minister, Madrid, 19 July 1996. 
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it. The PSOE government had no choice but to pay attention to a highly dependent 
sector, faced with huge regional pressures, and the fact that it could not afford to lose 
face in the domestic arena. The high impact of fisheries at regional level, and the 
traditionally strong attachment to the fishing industry, ensured overwhelming public 
support for the fishing sector's demands. 
As illustrated in Chapter 2, certain sets of conditions in the Spanish domestic arena 
have allowed greater participation of regional and sectoral actors in the EU policy 
process during EC/EU membership. Key factors are particularly relevant to the case 
study on fisheries, namely the development of a more advanced lobbying process, 
illustrated by the increasingly organised fishing sector, greater competencies at 
regional level as a result of decentralisation, and the loss of the PSOE majority in 
1993 which decreased the government's margin of manoeuvre, particularly significant 
during a pre-electoral period in 1995. Other factors are more specific to the 
negotiation in question, namely the high tension in the sector caused by the 
suspension of activity over a long period of time, the potential social and economic 
crisis in key affected regions faced with substantial cuts in quotas in Moroccan 
waters, and a lack of alternative fishing grounds. 
An analysis of a one-off negotiation in the area of fisheries allows a study of the 
relations between actors at the level of the EU, Spanish central and regional 
government, and key representatives of the Spanish fishing sector. Even if some of 
the characteristics of the negotiation are unique to the Moroccan case, it provides an 
illustration of the implication of the increased involvement of key domestic actors in 
the EU negotiating arena. The negotiations required a delicate balance between tough 
domestic demands and external EU obligations, which meant a potentially difficult 
role for the Spanish government. The political rationale for EC entry during the 
accession negotiations could no longer be used to maintain a clear consensus on 
European policy, especially as the economic implications of EC/EU membership in 
areas such as fisheries were increasingly criticised. This is illustrated by a 
Eurobarometer poll in May 1995 which showed that only 20% of Spaniards believed 
Spain had benefited from EU membership, and 60%, the highest percentage of all EU 
member states, considered it had not been beneficial (Eurobarometer, no. 43, 1995, p. 
5). This provides a contrast with the highly pro-European attitude revealed by polls in 
Spain during the accession negotiations (see Chapter 3). 
Evidence in this chapter has demonstrated that a range of actors other than central 
government can gain opportunities to participate in the policy process. The extensive 
consultation process between actors at all levels, between and even during the rounds 
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of negotiations, means that, to some extent, a state-centric perspective no longer 
adequately analyses the policy process. The interaction between the different levels of 
actors in the area of fisheries had clearly developed during EC/EU membership, as 
outlined below: 
1. Relations between the fishing sector and regional government 
Evidence from the analysis suggests that regional government and the fishing sector 
enjoyed closer relations during EC/EU membership. Working group meetings were 
held at regional level to formulate a bargaining position in negotiations with 
Morocco, as well as to elaborate the Modernisation Plan for the Andalusia fishing 
sector. Interviewees in the fishing sector considered their participation in the 
Modernisation plan significant as it set a precedent for future consultation, and 
especially for the sector's increased input during negotiations with Morocco28, 
2. Relations between the fishing sector and central government 
Central government's defence of fishing interests was generally acknowledged in the 
sector, although sectoral representatives complained about insufficient information, 
and excessive concessions to the Moroccan delegation. Evidence from interviews 
suggests that a network of direct contacts between key sectoral representatives and 
government officials was firmly established during the negotiating rounds, which 
facilitated the direct input of the sector to the Spanish bargaining position. The 
Agriculture and Fisheries Minister referred to the 'gran coincidencia en el proceso de 
negociaci6n' (the high level of agreement during the negotiating process) between the 
sector and central administration29. Central government officials often relied on data 
supplied by key fishing organisations to argue the Spanish case at EU level, 
indicating the government's dependence on the resources of key sectoral actors. 
3. Relations between the fishing sector and the EU level 
The fishing sector managed to obtain direct contact with EU officials, even at the 
highest level, namely with the Fisheries Commissioner. Meetings were often arranged 
by regional government, and were considered as highly important for raising 
awareness of their interests directly, instead of relying on the state as an intermediary 
channel. Observation of negotiations at EU level was also a key mechanism for direct 
consultation with EU officials, when sectoral representatives could provide their 
expertise on talks in progress and influence the bargaining process. 
28Jnterviews with President of ARPEBAR shipowners' association, Barbate, 3 October 1996, 16 June 
1997. 
29rnterview with former Agriculture and Fisheries Minister, Madrid, 19 July 1996. 
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4. Relations between regional and central government 
The increased collaboration between regional and central government, for example in 
the management of FIFG structural funding, and the acknowledgement by the current 
Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries that regional government enjoys 90% of 
competencies in the area of fisheries, fully illustrate the growing capacity at regional 
level, and the increasing co-operation between the two levels of government. The 
crisis situation in affected regions gave regional government a particularly prominent 
role in representing sectoral interests in the re-negotiation with Morocco. 
5. Relations between regional government and the EU level 
Representatives from regional government also observed the negotiations at EU level, 
and sought to maximise their contact with EU officials, for example Plata' s meetings 
with DGXIV officials prior to, and during, the negotiations. The direct contact was 
encouraged in Brussels by both the Commission and European Parliament, although 
central government representatives were usually also present at meetings. 
An analysis of relations between the various actors illustrates that, although the 
fishing sector had always sought to maximise its input to talks at EU level, the 
increased facility with which representatives had direct contact with national and EU 
officials indicates an opening of the opportunity structure in 1995. This enhanced 
their implication in negotiations. Regular contact between government officials and 
the sector meant that moves towards the development of an active fisheries 'network' 
could be noted, involving key representatives of the fishing sector, regional and 
central government and key informants and negotiators at EU leveJ30. The sector was 
more likely to have confidence in the Spanish delegation's articulation of the national 
position as a result of this increased contact. One government official illustrated the 
complicity between the government and sector by the fact that it was agreed between 
government officials and sectoral representatives that the fisheries agreement with 
Mauritania, in the final stages of the negotiations with Morocco, would be kept secret 
for a period of time, in case it resulted in a weaker EU bargaining position vis-a-vis 
the Moroccan delegation31. If the sector's interests were not adequately defended, the 
government faced domestic protest, increased scepticism about Spain's EU 
membership and the risk of losing the support of the electorate. The political weight 
of fisheries in Spain increased the visibility of the sector, and could not be ignored by 
30The 'fisheries network' was evident during my fieldwork in July-October 1996 and June 1997, when 
sectoral and regional representatives in Andalusia were contacted directly by central government and 
EU officials with whom they were on familiar terms. Some interviewees considered that such a 
network was more developed in fisheries than in other policy areas in Spain. 
31 Interview with former government official, Madrid, July 1996. 
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a government whose continued power was no longer assured. One interviewee 
emphasised the strong dependence of the fishing sector, the large number of 
employees, and the high visibility and public awareness of fisheries, which ensured 
fisheries was prioritised by the government during the 1995 negotiations32. 
Furthermore, meetings between the fishing sector representatives in Andalusia and 
the EU level were important for the direct representation of sectoral interests, 
meaning that the state was no longer relied upon as the sole channel of influence at 
national level. 
The margin of manoeuvre enjoyed by the government was considerably reduced 
during the negotiating period, the timing of the early rounds ensuring that domestic 
political factors had a high impact on EU-level negotiations. Although a greater 
degree of autonomy was possible after the May elections, its minority status, and the 
predicted opposition victory in the 1996 elections, still weakened its position vis-a-vis 
the fishing sector. Other key factors, such as the increasingly assertive role of key 
regional authorities affected by the negotiation, and the more organised fishing sector, 
also increased the pressures on the government. Although this would seem to indicate 
that a multi-level perspective would be more appropriate for analysing the 
negotiations, the opening of the political opportunity structure does not indicate that 
all actors have enhanced their actual influence in the policy process. Despite regular 
dialogue between government and sector, sectoral representatives complained that the 
Commission was making decisions at EU level to which the Spanish central 
government agreed without consulting fishing and agricultural sectors. One 
commentator highlighted the lack of consultation with affected sectors with the result 
that 'a! final...Bruselas ha tornado sus propias decisiones con el consentimiento de la 
Administraci6n espaiiola y cierto males tar en Ios sect ores afectados' 
(ultimately ... Brussels took its own decisions with the consent of the Spanish 
administration and a certain resentment in the affected sectors) (Mar, no. 330, July-
August 1995, p. 12). Relations between actors at regional, central and EU levels may 
have developed, but evidence indicates that the state still retained its strong national 
gatekeeper role as the only recognised negotiator at EU level, and that the two-level 
game approach is thus a useful tool of analysis. However, in view of the delicate 
balance to be attained between tough domestic demands and external EU obligations, 
the state could no longer be viewed as an autonomous actor in the EU negotiating 
arena. 
32Interview with MEP, former President of the Fisheries Committee, Brussels, 23 April1997. 
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Chapter9 
CONCLUSIONS: BEYOND THE SPANISH STATE? 
The key role played by the Spanish state in the policy process emerges from the 
analysis in this thesis of Spain during its EC accession negotiations and EC/EU 
membership. The dynamic approach adopted for the study of the Spanish case has 
made it possible to look beyond the role of the state, and examine new constellations 
of actors and interactive processes which previous academic work on Spain has 
tended to underplay. The conclusions of the chapter of the thesis on the EC accession 
negotiations supports the dominant view in the literature that the state played a major 
role in the process. However, the analysis also highlights key changes in the 
institutional framework for policy-making in Spain during EC/EU membership which 
suggest that a new policy-making context was developing. In view of the 
predominantly statist focus of the available literature, detailed empirical work was 
carried out to explore further the role of the Spanish state and key domestic actors in 
selected policy settings. The case studies of cohesion policy and fisheries illustrate the 
changing opportunity structures at domestic and EU levels which have enabled 
domestic actors to increase their input to the policy process in particular policy areas. 
Ladrech (1994, p. 85) highlights the importance of differences in the capacity of 
domestic actors to exploit the opportunities for greater input, 'some fearing a loss of 
autonomy, others perceiving an opportunity'. This thesis examines variations in the 
level of access to policy-making, and in the resources of key domestic actors such as 
regional authorities and socio-economic groups, as well as the differing degree of 
control which the state is able to exert over their involvement. 
Although the main objective of this thesis was to evaluate the nature of the changing 
relations between the state and domestic actors, it did not set out to prove that the 
state's role had diminished as a result of key developments at domestic and EU levels. 
Rather, the aim was to show that the state would be obliged to adapt to a new policy-
making environment where domestic actors would have greater potential for 
enhancing their input. Although evidence from the analysis suggests that relations 
between the Spanish government and key domestic actors have developed 
significantly during EC/EU membership, the real impact of greater domestic 
mobilisation on the level of state autonomy cannot be assumed. The conclusion could 
not be drawn that increased opportunities for domestic mobilisation lead logically to a 
reduction in the role played by the Spanish state; it appears rather to have maintained 
its position as a key strategic actor in the EU and domestic arenas. The central state 
has conceded power to domestic actors only where domestic involvement 
strengthened its bargaining position at EU level, or where it was dependent on their 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------, 
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skills and resources for effective policy implementation. The degree to which the 
policy-making process has changed is thus found to be dependent on the level of 
access, resources and control which were highlighted at the beginning of this thesis. 
Key research findings are presented in this concluding chapter, and the analytical 
framework established for the study is then applied to them to enable an evaluation to 
be made of their significance for the Spanish case. 
Overview of key empirical findings 
The key conclusions drawn from the analysis of the role of the Spanish state and 
domestic actors during the EC accession negotiations and EC/EU membership are 
summarised in this section, which includes key findings from the study of specific 
policy settings. 
EC accession 
The study of the EC accession negotiations in Chapter 3 demonstrated the key role of 
the Spanish state throughout the negotiations. At domestic level, the state's use of 
EC-level rationales to justify tough policies, such as the modernisation of key sectors, 
illustrated the level of control it exercised over the interaction between the EC and 
domestic arenas. At EC level, although the overall pro-European consensus within the 
country generally strengthened Spain's application for membership, opposition to 
specific entry terms in vulnerable sectors was also used by the state to gain a better 
deal. For example, the Spanish delegation sought to negotiate longer transition 
periods and limits to tariff barriers in the steel sector in the face of strong demands 
from domestic producers, and the CEOE warned the government against sacrificing 
sectoral interests to obtain a political success. However, domestic constraints were of 
limited use at EC level in view of the high political costs which would have been 
incurred for Spain's future integration into the European framework. 
The analysis of the accession period suggests that relations with domestic actors were 
not developed during the negotiations, although a predictable discrepancy emerged 
between the claims of UCD and PSOE government officials, and those of key 
domestic actors regarding the level of information about EC entry that was conveyed 
to Spanish society. For example, the CCOO claimed they only received a posteriori 
information from government officials during sporadic meetings, while central 
government, for its part, highlighted the lack of interest shown in the negotiations by 
the unions. Key lobby groups, such as CNAG representing farmers, were particularly 
critical towards the end of the negotiations of the lack of consultation with the 
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agricultural sector regarding concrete entry terms. The more active regional 
authorities were generally better informed than socio-economic actors about the 
implications of EC entry, although most of the regions were also sidelined from the 
process. The formulation of the Spanish bargaining position has been shown to be a 
centralised process, involving a small group of senior civil servants whose autonomy 
was enhanced by the predominant role played by the executive in the Spanish policy-
making process. The unquestioned control of Gonzalez over the party and electorate 
from 1982 further centralised the formulation of key bargaining positions. 
EC/EU membership 
The increasing number and complexity of policy areas, and the growing awareness of 
EU policy amongst a wider range of actors, inevitably changed the nature of policy-
making in Spain during EC/EU membership. Key changes in the nature of the policy 
process have included the growing autonomy of key ministries such as Economy and 
Finance, the higher level of knowledge of EU policy among key domestic actors, and 
the greater focus of the SSEU on information exchange rather than policy 
formulation. However, the evidence presented in Chapter 4 points to the continued 
centralisation of the process despite these key developments. Until 1993, the 
majoritarian PSOE government enjoyed considerable autonomy and, even after 1993, 
it retained a large margin for manoeuvre in the domestic arena, although dependent on 
the support of regionalist parties. Furthermore, the role of an elite of government 
officials with a high level of expertise in European policy was essential in formulating 
the Spanish bargaining position. 
The complaint of key domestic actors, such as unions and employers, that they were 
peripheral to the policy-making process continued to be voiced during EC/EU 
membership. Despite reforms intended to strengthen the role of the Joint Committee 
for the EU in the Spanish parliament, its actual impact on European policy remained 
minimal. Sectoral meetings established by regional authorities to enhance their 
participation in the policy process succeeded in making some progress towards 
greater regional representation, but only gradually, and in certain policy areas. 
Furthermore, the lack of common agreement between the regions on many key issues 
reduced their influence on the negotiating position of central government. Fora 
developed for consultation with socio-economic actors, such as the Economic and 
Social Council, were found to exert a minimal influence on the government's position 
at EC/EU level. Both trade unions and employers have been shown to have made 
efforts to enhance their influence on European policy, but progress has been limited, 
particularly when they were faced with the reluctance of government officials to 
establish mechanisms for consultation. Union involvement is still largely confined to 
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sending its recommendations to relevant government officials who are under no 
obligation to take them into account. The CEOE' s bargaining strategies in the EU 
arena remain underdeveloped, and only the most important sectors, who tend to have 
independent lobbying strategies in the EU arena, seem to exert any influence on the 
government's EU policy. Little evidence exists for the development of closer 
relations between public administration and private interests in the area of EU policy 
in Spanish society. Despite greater awareness of European issues and growing access 
to the policy process by key domestic groups, the central state is found to have 
retained its key role in the institutional framework. 
Cohesion policy 
The case study on cohesion policy clearly indicates the key role played by the 
Spanish government in interstate negotiation of structural funding. Spanish arguments 
for budgetary increases at the Brussels, Maastricht and Edinburgh Summits, analysed 
in Chapter 5, had a significant influence on the policy agenda. Spain had to overcome 
opposition from net contributors to the Community, who resisted proposals for 
ambitious resource transfers, by arguing that the development of cohesion policy was 
in the Community's general interest. Although the 1991 Dutch Presidency initially 
ignored Spanish demands, Spain ultimately obtained legal guarantees on cohesion 
within the Treaty. Its voice was strengthened at the Edinburgh Summit by the fact that 
its support was needed for the acceptance of both the Danish exemptions from 
Maastricht and enlargement of the Community. The increase in the financial 
framework from 18.6 to 30 billion ecu by 1999 was regarded as a key victory in the 
Spanish domestic arena. The Spanish government's intransigent bargaining position 
was, to a certain extent, a response to the need to present a successful outcome to 
parliament and the public at large as a means of countering increasing criticism of 
government reforms, and a less assured consensus on European policy. Key domestic 
actors increasingly demanded information on policy decisions at EU level, and 
opposition parties became more critical of the government's negotiation of structural 
funding. Despite increasing pressures on the government to negotiate an acceptable 
deal, evidence of the direct input of domestic actors only emerges during the analysis 
of the operationa!isation of structural funding in Chapter 6. 
EC funding for Spain was all fed into the national budget during the first year of 
membership, regarded as an important means of reducing the state deficit of 4.5% of 
GNP. From 1987, projects that fall within subnational competencies were presented 
and approved at regional level, although the central state continued to retain control 
over the process, including the formulation of the RDP. Despite the lack of change in 
the distribution of resources between regional and central governments between the 
220 
1989-93 and 1994-99 funding cycles, the increased direct transfers of information 
between the Commission and regional authorities was one of the key developments 
which indicated that the context for the funding process had changed. However, the 
level of regional participation depended on the particular stage of policy-making. The 
CSF was still largely negotiated by the Commission and member states and, even if 
the partnership principle functioned increasingly effectively in monitoring 
committees, the Ministry of Economy and Finance maintained that the transfer of 
resources was the responsibility of central government. 
The level of participation has been found to vary significantly between different 
domestic actors. Politically active regions, such as Catalonia and the Basque Country, 
succeeded in making considerable advances, for example in the area of the Cohesion 
Fund, where the pressures they exerted on central government in the 21 September 
1994 meeting led to their involvement in an initially purely state-run fund. In contrast, 
in Andalusia, officials were more concerned about maximising the level of funding 
received rather than being directly involved in the policy process. The analysis of 
cohesion policy thus highlighted the high level of variation between regional 
authorities, to the extent that some even welcomed a central, moderating role for the 
state to avoid losing out to the more politically active regions. The minimal access to 
the process for socio-economic actors, despite their inclusion as participants in the 
1993 reform of the structural funds, is an indication of the government's greater 
reluctance to permit the involvement of trade unions and employers. For example, 
socio-economic actors are not members of the monitoring committees for CSFs and 
OPs for Objectives one and two in Spain, their formal representation still being 
largely restricted to the ESF committees. Even where regional plans were given to the 
Economic and Social Council for discussion, delay in their presentation and the 
complex nature of procedures meant that little time was allowed for any input to their 
formulation. The conclusions of the case study indicate that the Spanish government 
has allowed greater domestic involvement for a select group of actors, and only at 
specific stages of the funding process. 
Fisheries 
The analysis of the re-negotiation of the EO-Morocco fisheries agreement in 1995 
illustrates the key role of the Spanish delegation in lobbying for a tough EU position 
vis-a-vis Morocco. The extent of reduction in EU fishing quotas was largely 
determined by the Spanish position, although Spain was sometimes obliged to 
compromise over its demands. For example, the proposal to cut only 2% of the 
cephalopod fleet in June 1995, intended to minimise the loss of jobs in the domestic 
arena, was rejected by the Commission. The evidence examined in Chapter 7 suggests 
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that Spain's EU Presidency enhanced its central role in the negotiations, for example 
by developing greater linkages between the fisheries and Association agreements in 
order to obtain the optimal deal for its fishing sector. The Spanish state played an 
important role in setting the agenda, and in influencing the Commission and other 
member states, throughout the 1995 re-negotiation of the agreement, which was 
generally acknowledged by the fishing sector and the regional authority in Andalusia. 
Sectoral pressures in the domestic arena were used to strengthen the Spanish 
bargaining position at EU level. 
Close interaction between the government and sectoral and regional actors was 
evident during the negotiations, particularly as the demands of the fishing sector 
became a key issue during the municipal and regional elections in May 1995. The 
high level of protest in affected regions, namely the boycott of Moroccan goods, 
strikes and high-profile demonstrations, and the public sympathy for the sector's 
demands, ensured regular consultation between the PSOE government and the fishing 
sector, although the actual impact on the government's position could not be assured. 
Chapter 8 draws attention to regional governments' increasing participation in EU 
fisheries policy, for example in FIFG funding, and to the greater organisation of 
shipowners' and fishermens' groups into more representative associations. Whereas 
the prevalence of smaller, often family-owned businesses in Andalusia was found to 
have reduced their lobbying capacity, pressure on Spanish negotiators was 
strengthened in 1995 by the establishment for the first time of a working group by the 
Andalusia government which sought to reach a common position. Although direct 
access to negotiators was obtained with increasing facility, for example informal 
meetings with senior officials such as Commissioner Bonino during the observation 
of negotiating rounds, the sector still claimed that the EU bargaining position was 
determined by the Spanish government in conjunction with the Commission and 
involved minimal dialogue with the sector. The case study concludes that the 
mobilisation and strong lobbying capacity of key sectoral and regional actors was 
evident during the 1995 negotiations, but that the state ultimately remained the only 
recognised negotiator at EU level. 
The starting point of this thesis was that the context for EC/EU policy-making in 
Spain had changed during membership, affecting the role of the state and key 
domestic actors, in both the overall policy process and institutional framework 
(Chapters 3 and 4), and in specific issue areas (Chapters 5-8). The empirical work 
clearly demonstrates the growing access to the process of key domestic actors, 
particularly regional authorities, but also shows that the state has successfully adapted 
to the new context and has thus retained a strong role at key policy-making stages. 
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Theoretical approaches 
Evidence emerging from the empirical research concerning the role of the Spanish 
state and key domestic actors has been examined in this thesis using the three 
analytical approaches outlined in Chapter 2, namely the state-centric, two-level game 
and multi-level perspectives. Key conclusions on their application to the Spanish case 
are summarised in this section. 
An interstate bargaining framework: the state as autonomous actor 
The core presumption of a state-centric approach is the continued autonomy of the 
state which was expected to be appropriate for the Spanish case where domestic input 
remained minimal. The analysis of the EC accession negotiations showed that, even if 
domestic actors had their own agendas, either the capacity to articulate them was 
absent, or the state was sufficiently strong to take little account of them. The state 
acted as the exclusive channel for representing domestic interests throughout the 
period. The state-centric approach would seem to be the most appropriate perspective 
for an analysis of the accession process, given that it also takes account of the fact 
that decision-making did not occur in a political vacuum. The incorporation of 
domestic politics into the approach by theorists such as Moravscik (1993a) facilitates 
a fuller explanation of the rationale behind Spanish state strategies during the 
negotiating period, for example its reaction to opposition to EC entry from key 
Spanish sectors. 
Although the potential for greater domestic input during EU membership has been 
demonstrated in this thesis, in Chapter 4, little evidence was found to point to the new 
context having an impact on the level of autonomy of central government. Although 
changes in the institutional framework can be discerned, such as far more direct 
contact between domestic actors and the EU level, the input of domestic actors to the 
policy process is minimised by the strong role of the executive. New channels of 
participation, for example those established by regional authorities, may gain in 
importance during membership, but do not, as yet, represent a significant constraint 
on the autonomy ofthe central state. 
The analysis also explored the role of the state and key domestic actors in specific 
policy areas. The study in Chapter 5 of Spain's negotiation of EU funding clearly 
established an interstate bargaining framework where the Spanish government 
retained almost exclusive powers of negotiation in policy formulation and the 
distribution of EU funding. The Brussels and Edinburgh European Councils were 
state-run operations, largely inaccessible to domestic actors. The analysis of the 
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negotiation of the 1995 EU-Morocco fisheries agreement similarly provides clear 
evidence of the key role of the state in the decision-making process. However, the 
fuller incorporation of domestic politics in the two-level game approach was expected 
to enhance the explanation of the state's strategies in the domestic negotiating arena. 
Increasing interaction between EU and domestic arenas: the state as gatekeeper 
The two-level game approach provides a dynamic framework for exploring the 
increasing interaction between the EU and domestic arenas, considered in this thesis 
to be a useful tool for the analysis of the changing context for policy-making in Spain. 
Even though the role of the central state was shown in Chapter 4 to be enhanced by 
the EU decision-making process, the state-centric perspective was not found to take 
full account of new formal and informal channels which domestic actors have 
developed to gain greater input to specific policy areas. In particular, a statist 
approach did not provide a sufficient explanation of the process in cases where 
domestic actors have developed a high level of expertise and resources. The dynamic 
focus of the two-level game framework may thus provide a more accurate description 
of the changing policy process during EU membership than a purely state-centric 
approach. Kitschelt ( 1986) distinguishes between a substantive impact on policy 
formulation of key domestic actors, and an impact which merely legitimises new 
access points to policy-making, which he describes as procedural. Applying this 
distinction, the material examined in Chapter 4 indicated that new channels of 
participation can be established which, even if not initially influential, may have a 
greater effect in the long term, as illustrated by the gradual advances made by 
regional authorities towards greater representation in the EU arena. 
The role of the state as gatekeeper between two interacting arenas thus affords a more 
appropriate framework for the analysis at stages in the policy process where the 
ratification process in the domestic arena has become more established. Although the 
analysis of the institutional framework for policy-making demonstrated the key role 
of the state, the increasing awareness of domestic actors of policy-making at EC/EU 
level meant that the state was more often obliged to act as an aggregator of domestic 
interests. The evidence examined in the thesis strongly suggests that the interstate 
bargaining framework which emerges from the evaluation of the internal dynamics of 
key policy areas cannot be examined separately from the domestic negotiating arena. 
Chapters 5 and 7 illustrate how the state has increasingly been forced to take account 
of domestic interests, even if it ultimately retains a high level of autonomy. 
In the area of cohesion policy, increasingly assertive regional actors and their 
demands for higher levels of financing were used to strengthen Spain's tough position 
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on structural funding at the Edinburgh Summit in 1992. The Spanish government 
avoided raising overly high expectations in the domestic arena regarding cohesion, 
and used the net gains to demonstrate to its domestic constituency the concrete 
benefits from EU membership. Pressures at EU level also allowed the state to 'sell' 
policies domestically which would have been difficult to justify otherwise. For 
example, in the area of fisheries, substantial cuts in fishing quotas in the 1995 EU 
agreement with Morocco were justified in the domestic arena as the optimal deal for 
Spain given the pressures of other EU member states, the Commission and the 
Moroccan delegation. The central state had to strike a delicate balance between the 
EU and domestic arenas, and its role as national gatekeeper was shown to be crucial 
throughout the negotiations. The existence of a more demanding domestic ratification 
process, for example to gain the Andalusia fishing sector's approval of the terms of 
the EU-Morocco fisheries agreement, indicates that domestic interests became part of 
the specification of the bargaining ability of the state. Sectoral demands were thus 
used to justify a tough national bargaining position to counterparts at EU level, while 
the crisis nature of the issue in the domestic arena made the representation of sectoral 
interests crucial to the state's continued hold on power. 
Even if the two-level approach can be criticised for not clearly specifying the factors 
which lead to different bargaining situations, evidence from empirical material 
demonstrates that it usefully explains state strategies in the EU and domestic arenas. 
The state's manipulation of two arenas was illustrated in selected policy settings, 
namely the use of a small domestic win-set to increase its autonomy at EU level (the 
'tying hands' strategy), and the use of EU-Ievel rationales to justify its policy 
decisions in the domestic arena. This clearly distinguishes the second perspective 
from the multi-level game approach which focuses on the direct involvement of 
domestic actors. 
Multi-level participation: the state as arena 
The multi-level governance framework considers that the state is no longer the 
exclusive channel for the representation of domestic interests. The approach is 
potentially relevant to the case of Spain in view of the growing participation of 
domestic groups, which is played down by a more statist perspective. However, as 
long as the Spanish state executive retains a strong role, a number of factors militate 
against the development of multi-level participation in the policy process. The lack of 
a pluralist tradition in Spain has meant that networks of key actors have been slow to 
develop, thus enhancing the role of the state as national gatekeeper and autonomous 
actor. The continued marginalisation of socio-economic actors from the process 
provides an illustration of how central government interpreted the partnership 
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principle restrictively, and acknowledged the legitimacy of only a select set of actors 
in the policy process. The impact of greater access by domestic actors to policy-
making depends on their capacity to exploit opportunities, and only a minority of the 
strongest regional authorities have been able to gain direct access to the EU arena. 
The increasing involvement of regional authorities in the implementation phase of 
structural funding is the only clear illustration in this thesis of a developing multi-
level game. Chapter 6 offered evidence of the development of more elaborate co-
ordination mechanisms and channels for information exchange in the 1994-99 
funding cycle. The Commission's promotion of regional involvement, the greater 
awareness at regiona1level, and the lesser degree of resistance of central government 
to subnational involvement have changed the policy-making environment. 
Considerable evidence exists of increasing regional involvement during the 
operationalisation of structural funding, and can be contrasted with the minimal input 
of regional authorities to history-making or policy-setting decisions. Marks (1996) 
refers to the varying functional reliance on regional authorities within the 
implementation phase, as manifested by the lesser dependence on regional actors 
during the formulation of RDPs and the negotiation of CSFs, and a much greater 
dependence on subnational resources for the implementation of OPs and during the 
monitoring phase. The state was able to minimise domestic input at key stages in the 
process when it wished to retain full autonomy, for example by establishing global 
plans for each of the Objectives, and by ultimately deciding on the destination of 
funding at regional level. This example indicates that the development of a multi-
level game framework only occurs when encouraged by a greater resource 
dependency of the state on subnational actors. 
In the area of fisheries, mechanisms were established for regular consultation between 
EU and central government negotiators and the fishing sector which made a purely 
state-centric approach clearly inadequate for the analysis. However, despite the clear 
evidence presented in Chapter 8 of a more advanced lobbying process and an 
increased facility of dialogue at all levels, the validity of the multi-level perspective is 
limited in a context where the state remains the only recognised interlocutor in the 
decision-making process. The use of the multi-level approach is not unproblematic 
given that increased domestic mobilisation can be shown to have a minimal impact on 
the role of the state in key policy areas. 
The conclusion can thus be drawn that different theoretical insights are needed to 
enhance the understanding of the decision-making process at varying stages and in 
different issue areas. Sandholtz (1993, p. 39) considers that 'our explanatory goals are 
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best served by specifying the analytic strengths, and limitations, of approaches that 
work better in combination than alone'. Chapter 2 clearly demonstrated the different 
approaches of the three analytical insights to the key issues of access, resources and 
control. It was suggested that all three could be combined in this thesis by using the 
concept of the political opportunity structure as an optimal way of evaluating the 
significance of the changed policy-making context in Spain, since it helpfully draws 
together the differing analytical approaches into one single framework. 
Changing opportunity structures 
The limited access to the policy process for domestic actors during the EC accession 
negotiations was clearly demonstrated in Chapter 3. Key sets of conditions in Spanish 
society resulted in a closed opportunity structure: the political rationale for EC 
accession, the majoritarian PSOE government, the early stage in the decentralisation 
process, the weak nature of civil society, and the low level of demand for information 
about the EC. The 'game' has changed during membership, as illustrated by the 
changing sets of conditions outlined in Chapter 4, which have allowed a more open 
political opportunity structure to develop with greater access to policy-making for 
domestic actors. Although the central state has retained a high level of control over 
the policy process, the government's monopoly of the interface between the separated 
EU and domestic arenas can no longer be assumed. The balance in favour of 
economic over political rationales for membership, the loss of the PSOE government 
majority, the more advanced stage of decentralisation, the development of a stronger 
civil society, and an increased awareness about EC/EU membership were the changes 
considered to have encouraged a more open opportunity structure. 
The factors identified in Chapter 2 have been shown to determine the nature of this 
opportunity structure, and the appropriateness of theoretical approaches for the 
analysis of the policy process. Figure 9.1 shows the key variations in the opportunity 
structures illustrated by the research findings of this thesis. 
The closed opportunity structure during the EC accession negotiations meant that the 
impact of domestic actors on the government's level of autonomy at EC level was 
marginal, thus pointing to the relevance of the state-centric approach for the analysis 
of this period, as clearly illustrated in Chapter 3. 
Growing domestic awareness of policy decisions at EC/EU level, and increasing 
access to the policy process for those actors able to exploit the opportunities for input, 
have led to a development of the state's role as aggregator of domestic interests. This 
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Figure 9.1 Variations in the domestic and EU opportunity structures 
OPPORTUNITY Domestic/CLOSED Domestic/OPENING 
STRUCTURES 
EU/OPENING EC accession negotiations: EC!EU membership: 
minimal domestic input even increasing participation of 
where opportunities exist at regional authorities in the 
EU level 1994---99 period during the 
implementation stage 
(Chapter 3) (Chapter 6) 
EU/CLOSED EC accession negotiations: ECIEU membership: 
minimal domestic input to participation of domestic 
history-making decisions at actors inhibited during the 
EU level decision-making phase, 
despite a more developed 
ratification process in the 
domestic arena 
(Chapter3) (Chapters 4, S, 7, 8) 
has made the policy-making process during ECIEU membership far more consistent 
with a two-level game perspective, which views the state as gatekeeper between two 
interacting negotiating arenas. Although direct contact with the EU arena was 
increasingly possible for key domestic actors in particular policy areas, the active role 
of the state in aggregating and manipulating both domestic and EU demands clearly 
emerged from the analysis of both the overall institutional framework for policy-
making in Chapter 4, and from the clear interstate bargaining framework established 
in the areas of cohesion and fisheries at EU level in Chapters 5 and 7. In addition, 
although sectoral interests were shown to be increasingly articulated in Chapter 8, the 
state remained the only recognised negotiator at EU level and acted as a strong 
national gatekeeper throughout the 1995 negotiations. The two-level game was shown 
to be relevant for an analysis of sectoral input to the government's bargaining position 
on the fisheries agreement. 
The evidence assembled in this thesis indicates that the development of multi-level 
governance was only enhanced where permitted, and even encouraged, by the state 
and by the nature of the policy setting at EU level, as illustrated by enhanced regional 
participation in the implementation of the structural funds. The validity of key 
theoretical insights, presented in Figure 9.2, thus depends on the nature of the 
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Figure 9.2 Validity of analytical approaches 
OPPORTUNITY Domestic/CLOSED Domestic/OPENING 
STRUCTURES 
EU/OPENING State-centric perspective is Potential for increasing 
valid in the majority of cases. domestic participation 
may make multi-level 
perspective more 
appropriate. 
(Chapter 3) (Chapter 6) 
EU/CLOSED State-centric perspective is Potential for an 
clearly adequate. enhanced domestic 
ratification process may 
make the two-level 
perspective more 
appropriate. 
(Chapter 3) (Chapters 4, 5, 7, 8) 
opportunity structures in the EU and domestic arenas. Despite clear limitations to 
their role, regional authorities have been able to obtain direct contact with EU 
officials, manage their own budgets, and represent their interests in meetings between 
the Commission and member states, as was clearly illustrated in Chapter 6. 
The focus of the analysis on the changing domestic context has meant that the EU 
opportunity structure has generally been regarded a relatively constant factor. 
However, the extent to which the opening opportunity structure at domestic level can 
be exploited has been shown to depend on tbe particular EU policy area, the stage in 
the process, and the decision type. Detailed evaluation of the internal dynamics of 
cohesion policy and fisheries allowed a comparison of the role of the state and 
domestic actors in different policy areas, thus providing a more rigorous test of 
conclusions on the role of the Spanish state and its relations with domestic actors. 
Policy areas 
The different nature of the two selected policy settings analysed was outlined in 
Chapter 1 where the localised, crisis management nature of the specific fisheries 
episode negotiated at EU level was contrasted with the series of negotiating rounds 
during EU membership in the area of cohesion policy, although they were both shown 
to be part of tbe broader EU negotiating cycle. A further key difference between the 
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policy areas, which was seen to be important in an evaluation of the findings of the 
cases, was the nature of the most directly implicated domestic actors in each policy 
setting. 
While examining the access of socio-economic groups to the policy process, the key 
focus of the study of cohesion policy was on regional authorities. The most directly 
involved actors in fisheries were sectoral representatives, even if supported by their 
regional authority. In the area of structural funding, regional authorities have made 
increasing input to policy formulation, the management of funding, and the 
implementation and evaluation of projects. They have used both established 
mechanisms and their increasing level of skills and resources to gain access to policy-
making, particularly in the case of the most active regions. Chapter 4 clearly 
demonstrated that the access of socio-economic actors to the policy process was more 
difficult than that of regional authorities, making the input of shipowners' 
associations and unions to the formulation of a bargaining position in the area of 
fisheries problematic. However, given the crisis nature of the negotiations and the 
strong domestic protest, the fishing sector maximised its visibility and pressure on the 
government in 1995, and was able to establish new channels for dialogue, even if it 
still complained about the lack of consultation with government and EU officials. 
Despite these key differences, a changed political opportunity structure was evident in 
both policy areas. In the two cases, the degree to which domestic input was enhanced 
was found to be dependent on the level of resources of domestic actors, and the extent 
to which the state could control their involvement. A study of the interstate 
negotiating level also demonstrates the Spanish state's central role as a strategic actor 
working to maximise its gains in the EU and domestic arenas in the two policy areas. 
In the area of cohesion policy, the Spanish government sought to attain a balance 
between the net gains at domestic level, and its pro-integrationist position at EC/EU 
level, which highlighted the importance of cohesion for all EU member states. In the 
area of fisheries, the state maintained a delicate balance between domestic gains for 
its fishing sector, in the form of a satisfactory fishing agreement, and its pro-
Mediterranean position in EU-level negotiations which emphasised the importance of 
strengthening ties with Morocco. In both policy areas, evidence thus points to the role 
of the active state as gatekeeper between the domestic and EU arenas. 
Stages in the policy process 
Despite the similarly strong role of the state in both policy areas, an element which 
distinguishes the case studies is the evidence provided in Chapter 6 of the 
development of a multi-level game in the area of cohesion policy which is absent 
I 
-------
230 
from fisheries. This reflects the varying level of participation according to the stage in 
the policy process, which was hypothesised in Chapter 2 to be a key variable 
determining domestic participation. The study of cohesion policy offers considerable 
evidence of increased regional participation, but this is largely during the 
implementation phase, while the key role of central government is fully retained 
during the decision-making phase, as was hypothesised in Chapter 2. The study of 
fisheries focuses on the attempt of regional and sectoral representatives to maximise 
their influence on the government's bargaining position at interstate level. Logically, 
this means that their access to the process is far more problematic when the state 
remains the only interlocutor at EU level. The implementation of the fishing 
agreement requires direct sectoral involvement, but the sector has sought to maximise 
its pressure on the decision-making phase to avoid the serious economic and social 
implications of substantial quota reductions, hence the focus in Chapter 8. Despite the 
factors militating against greater domestic involvement in the fisheries negotiations, 
its high visibility across the EU, public sympathy for the sector in the domestic arena, 
and the enormous social and economic implications for specific regions meant that 
the articulation of domestic interests was strengthened, and could succeed in exerting 
considerable direct pressure on the government in a pre-election period. 
Decision types 
The conclusions on the role of the state and domestic actors also indicate how they 
varied according to the type of decision, and this is considered to be broadly 
analogous to the variation according to the policy stage, although focusing on a lower 
unit of analysis. Access to the policy process when history-making decisions are 
involved, such as the decision to join the EC made by the Spanish state, is clearly 
problematic. The 1995 re-negotiation of the EU-Morocco fisheries agreement is a 
further example of a history-making decision, as is the decision at Edinburgh in 1992 
to double the level of structural funding. These key decisions were clearly shown to 
be determined through interstate bargaining at EU level where the Spanish state 
enjoyed a high level of autonomy. Awareness of the state's negotiating tactics was 
limited in the domestic arena, although the analysis of a fisheries agreement with 
direct implications for the livelihood of the fishing sector illustrated that firm 
boundaries cannot be drawn between different decision types. In the case of the 
fisheries agreement, key sectoral actors placed considerable pressure on the Spanish 
delegation during the negotiating rounds, and maximised their input to history-
making decisions wherever possible. However, the conclusion can be drawn that it is 
far easier to find evidence of domestic input and access to the process in the case of 
policy-shaping decisions within individual sectors, which frequently required the 
resources of key domestic actors with a growing capacity to participate and expanding 
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competencies, such as regional authorities. The level of domestic participation is thus 
found to depend on the particular policy stage, decision type and the capacity of 
actors to gain access to the process in different policy settings in this thesis. 
Concluding remarks 
The focus on the changing domestic context, while acknowledging the variation 
according to the policy-making stage and decision type in two distinct EU policy 
areas, has made it possible to contribute to the debate about the impact of both EU 
and domestic factors on relations between the state and domestic actors. The analysis 
has thus highlighted key conditions in Spain which have encouraged greater domestic 
input to the policy-making process as a result of the influence of autonomous 
domestic factors and EC/EU membership, although without claiming to draw 
conclusions on the extent of their relative influence, which remains an issue for 
debate. 
The conclusions point to the continued primacy of the Spanish state in different 
policy settings despite key developments, supporting the view of the exalted role of 
the state in Spanish political culture (Keating, 1993, p. 341). However, this study has 
gone beyond this assumption, predominant in existing literature on Spain and the EU, 
and has taken a more dynamic approach which focuses on the state's ability to adapt 
to a new policy-making context. Although the analysis may be criticised for having 
gone beyond the state-centric view prevalent in previous literature only to return to 
the primacy of the state in its conclusions, it has clearly shown the justification for a 
more dynamic view, which encompasses a wider range of actors in EC/EU policy-
making. This is illustrated by the fuller analysis of the decision-making process in the 
areas of cohesion and fisheries in Chapters 6 and 8, which are a significant addition to 
the predominantly statist picture of decision-making at EU level portrayed by 
Chapters 5 and 7. Increasing access to the policy process for domestic actors does not 
necessarily mean a reduced role for the state. The opening opportunity structure does 
not rule out the possibility that the state's role has even been strengthened by its 
adaptation to the changed sets of conditions. The journey beyond the Spanish state is 
merely intended to contribute to a fuller analysis of the relations between state and 
domestic actors. 
Despite the single-country focus, the key findings of the analysis could also have 
wider significance for other EU member states. The case study on cohesion draws 
conclusions which are applicable to regions not only throughout Spain, but also 
across the EU. Although the issues raised by fisheries are more specific to Spain as 
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the member state most affected by the accord, the evaluation of state strategies, and 
access to policy-making of key regional and sectoral actors, could have wider 
applicability. Conclusions on Spain may be particularly relevant to recently 
democratised Mediterranean states such as Greece and Portugal, even if their 
institutional frameworks, for example their level of decentralisation, differ in many 
key respects. Furthermore, the evaluation of changing opportunity structures in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe may be a fruitful way of analysing their 
domestic contexts as they move closer to integration into the EU framework, although 
key differences between the level of economic and political development in Spain at 
the time of its EC accession, and that in the current applicant countries, should not be 
overlooked. On the basis of detailed empirical research, this thesis has thus drawn 
conclusions which most directly pertain to Spain, but which may offer insights into 
the changing nature of the policy process in other EU member states. Although not a 
central objective of the analysis, it may, therefore, help to fill an important gap in the 
conceptua!isation of the EU policy-making process through a better understanding of 
the changing relations between the state and key domestic actors in the wider EU 
framework. 
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Annex 1 
THE FISHING SECTOR IN SPAIN 
The key characteristics of the Spanish fleet are outlined, followed by a brief study of 
the sector in one of the main fishing regions, Andalusia, which is the focus of 
Chapters 7 and 8. 
The Spanish fishing sector 
Spain has 8000 km of coastline, and its fishing fleet is the most powerful of all EU 
member states, consisting of around 18,091 fishing boats and directly providing 
employment for 74,798 fishermen in 1996 (Jm\rez, 1997, p. 9). Around 16,750 ships 
and 50,000 workers fish in Spanish waters, with a further 1000 ships in EU waters, 
and 1140 in waters of Third countries. The average annual catches are over 1.1 
million tons, a large majority of which comes from outside Spanish waters 
(approximately two-thirds, if aquaculture and 300,000 tons of mussels are excluded) 
(El Pals, 19 March 1995). The activity of the Spanish fleet thus depends considerably 
on its access to waters of Third countries, where more than half of the fish caught are 
found. The sector only represents approximately 1-1.2% of Spanish GNP, but its 
importance should rather be judged by its considerable socio-economic impact on 
specific regions. The importance of fisheries is illustrated by the fact that Spain is one 
of the main fish consuming nations in the world, requiring an official figure of around 
840,000 tons annually to meet domestic demand (El Pa(s, 19 March 1995). 
The Andalusia fishing sector 
The fishing sector in Andalusia officially consists of 2843 fishing boats, which 
represent 14.9% of the total Spanish fleet, and around 19.3% of Spain's total fish 
catch (Mar, no. 325, February 1995, p. 68). Approximately 16,059 fishermen work in 
Andalusia, representing 19% of the national total (Junta de Andalucia, 1994). If the 
employees are divided according to province, 37% of workers are based in Cadiz, 
31% in Huelva, 14% in Malaga, 11% in Almeria, and 7% in Granada (Mar, no. 325, 
February 1995, p. 68). Other Spanish regions where the fishing sector is important are 
Galicia, which represents 47% of the ships in the Spanish fleet and 32% of the fish 
catch, the Basque Country (13% of the total catch) and the Canaries (9% of the total 
catch) (European Commission, 1995a, p. 2). According to the Modernisation Plan 
(Junta de Andalucfa, 1997), fishing in Moroccan waters represented approximately 
17% of employment in Andalusia in December 1995, and Andalusia's boats 
represented 48% of the total fishing in Morocco. In a period of ten years, Andalusia's 
fishing in Morocco has been reduced by 50%, and has lost more than 60% of the 
employment formerly based on fishing rights in Moroccan waters. 
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Annex2 
A STUDY OF BARBATE 
One example of the lobbying capacity at regional level is the town of Barbate whose 
economy depends on the fishing agreement reached with Morocco. The port of 
Barbate lies at the Atlantic end of the strait of Gibraltar. Thirty nine boats were based 
in Barbate in 1995 (the fleet consisted of 170 boats in the 1970s, employing 
approximately 3000 sailors), representing 550-600 jobs, which would be endangered 
if Moroccan demands were accepted. The tonnage varies between forty and ninety 
gross registered tonnes. 
The economy is dependent on fishing of the cerea norte in Moroccan waters. The 
EU' s acceptance of the Moroccan proposal to end this fishing right would mean the 
death of the local economy, and the fishing community in Barbate thus fought to 
retain its fishing rights at the level set in the 1992 agreement. Approximately 70% of 
the boats are at least twenty years old, which means they have no alternatives to 
fishing in nearby Moroccan waters. 
Barbate felt it had been discriminated against in the 1979 fishing agreement between 
Spain and Morocco when its historic fishing rights were denied. The agreement 
reduced the fishing area to one-fifth of the original fishing zone, meaning that only 
around two-thirds of Barbate's boats had access to Moroccan waters during any one 
period. A study produced by the ARPEBAR shipowners' association (ARPEBAR, 
1995) in Barbate in March 1995 concluded that the 1979 and 1983 agreements gave 
priority to Ceuta and Melilla (all their boats obtained licences), and discriminated 
against Barbate. Subsequent agreements have further reduced the fishing zones and 
the number of licences, while the payments to Morocco for fishing rights have 
increased considerably. Barbate was determined not to accept further reductions in its 
fishing quotas in 1995. The community felt particularly vulnerable, faced with 
economic and political decisions at EU level which did not take account of local 
factors, namely Barbate's exclusive fishing of one fish type. The crisis situation was 
exacerbated by the scarcity of resources, overfishing by other ports, and a fall in the 
price of fish, partly a result of an increase in low quality imports. 
Key actors and associations 
The fishermens' association in Barbate accused central government of ignoring its 
interests, particularly those of the workers, for political reasons, and sought to 
maximise pressure on central administration. However, its lobbying strategies were 
weakened by its lack of collaboration with other associations, for example its refusal 
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to join the National Federation of Fishermens' Associations, and its criticism of the 
Andalusia Federation of Associations, presided by Montoya, in view of the lack of 
priority given to workers' interests (El Correo de Andalucfa, 3 May 1995). 
ARPEBAR, founded in 1977, represents the majority of shipowners in Barbate, and 
firmly defended the interests of the sector during the negotiations. The President of 
the Association attended all negotiating rounds, the aim being to exert direct pressure 
on negotiators and provide firsthand information to key actors at 1oca1level. Central 
administration relied on the expertise of associations such as ARPEBAR to provide 
detailed information on the sector, on the terms of past agreements, and on the 
prospects for future fishing in Moroccan waters. During negotiations, this information 
was frequently given to the Spanish delegation to strengthen the case for retaining 
Barbate's fishing quota. For example, comparative data demonstrated the high 
number of jobs provided by Barbate's fishing of the cerco norte. The data also 
showed that the cost of maintaining the 740 jobs generated by Barbate's fishing 
activity was minimal in comparison with the high costs for other fishing types such as 
cephalopods, and that it provided 9.24% of national employment, and 22.36% of 
Andalusia's employment. The information provided the Spanish delegation with an 
important bargaining tool in the negotiation of fishing conditions for Barbate in the 
1995 agreement I, and clearly illustrates the collaboration between the local, regional 
and central levels in the negotiation of the optimal deal for the sector. 
The President of ARPEBAR was also a member of the Plataforma de Defensa del 
Sector Pesquero de Barbate (Platform for the Defence of the Fishing Sector in 
Barb ate) consisting of representatives from local government, political parties, trade 
unions and various other associations. The key objective was to defend local interests, 
keep the public constantly informed of the current state of negotiations, and increase 
the level of local and regional representation. They considered that the EU delegation 
was acting weakly, and doubted its satisfactory defence of Andalusia's fishing 
interests. The Technical Committee, consisting of ARPEBAR, the Exporters' 
Association and the CCOO, declared its lobbying strategies in a meeting on 13 April 
1995. The platform aimed to hold meetings with local and regional government in 
order to obtain their full support, inform central administration in Madrid of the 
situation in Barbate, and organise peaceful demonstrations to increase public 
awareness of the implications of the re-negotiation. Another committee was 
established by the IU in Barbate for the monitoring of fisheries negotiations, aiming 
to make contact with all the political and social forces of the locality, and to maximise 
1 Interview with President of ARPEBAR shipowners' association, Barbate, 3 October 1996. 
236 
pressure on the Spanish government to defend its fishing interests. The IU declared 
that the Committee would be responsible for keeping the local population fully 
informed of the negotiations (Diario de Cddiz, 6 April 1995). 
Domestic Protest 
Key actors sought to increase the awareness of the case of Barbate during the 
negotiations through direct contact with officials at regional, central and EU levels, 
and through protest which was widely publicised in the press. For example, in April 
1995, a demonstration was held in Barbate to show the extent of support for the 
fishing sector which was attended by around 7000 people. Demonstrations were 
organised to publicise their demands whenever negotiations reached another 
deadlock, including the demand for financial support from central government during 
the suspension of activity. In May 1995, the fishermens' association refused to listen 
to the recommendations of regional government regarding the negative effects of a 
boycott of Moroccan fish, and continued to block fish imports. The threat of the 
boycott and other acts of protest were used to increase the pressure on regional 
government for a full defence of their fishing rights and for prompt payment of 
compensation to fishermen. The President of the Barbate fishermens' association, 
showed his determination to lobby for the best deal, affirming that 'no nos podemos 
quedar con las manos cruzadas para que no ocurra con el tratado de Marruecos lo 
mismo que sucedi6 con el de Canada' (we cannot keep our arms folded so that the 
agreement with Morocco turns out like the one with Canada) (ABC, 3 May 1995). 
Support of regional and central government 
Central administration frequently expressed its determination to defend Barbate's 
cause. According to the Agriculture and Fisheries Minister, in his visit to the fishing 
villageg in May 1995 to express his solidarity with the sector, Barbate was considered 
a symbol of the Spanish fishing sector, and the Secretary General for Fisheries 
declared that the Spanish delegation was committed to the 'defensa a muerte' 
(defence to the death) of its situation in negotiations (Unpublished document, local 
government of Barbate, April 1995). A former government official also 
acknowledged that Barbate was a key priority for the Spanish negotiators, and, 
although denying that this priority was due to the strong pressures on negotiators 
exerted by local actors, praised the role of the 'interlocutores muy pragmaticos, de 
gran sinceridad, nada politico' (the very pragmatic, extremely sincere actors, who 
were not at all politicised) in highlighting the crisis situation2. Barbate's situation was 
frequently discussed at regional level in meetings in Seville with government 
2]nterview with fonner government official, Madrid, July 1996. 
L------------------------------------------------------------- -- - -- ·-- --------
237 
officials, who declared their full support for its fishing sector. The regional 
Agriculture and Fisheries Minister considered that its existing quotas should be fully 
retained. Meetings at local level were also important for raising awareness of the 
crisis situation, for example discussions between the Mayor of Barbate and the 
Spanish Moroccan Ambassador. 
Strong lobbying at all administrative levels throughout the negotiations, and the 
increasingly tense atmosphere as the negotiations continued, made Barbate's fishing 
quota a key issue during the negotiations. It is significant that its quota was fully 
retained in the 1995 agreement. However, the problem of the non-recognition of the 
historical fishing rights of the fleet remains, and it has been estimated that if an 
agreement is re-negotiated in 1999, the Barbate fleet will be reduced by a further 
three boats, representing a loss of sixty three jobs (Junta de Andalucfa, 1997). Despite 
the considerable pressure placed on the Spanish delegation from Barbate 
representatives, central government could not always fulfil their demands. For 
example, in meetings between regional and central government during the August 
negotiating round, as a key member of the Spanish delegation, Conde explained that, 
while fully aware of its crisis situation, he could not argue for a return to its fishing 
rights of 1979 at that stage of the talks, in view of the negative implications for 
Spanish interests as a whole (Unpublished notes on August negotiating round, 
ARPEBAR). However, the skilful bargaining of the Spanish delegation was generally 
appreciated at local level, although key representatives expressed a lack of confidence 
in the government's dissemination of information on negotiations, fearing that 
agreements with negative implications for the Barbate fleet were hidden for electoral 
reasons (El Correo de Andaluda, 3 May 1995). The government claimed that the 
optimal agreement had been obtained, acknowledging its reliance on the expertise of 
representatives of local associations who were present at every negotiating round. 
This brief study illustrates the high level of contact between local, regional, central 
and EU levels in the negotiation of the optimal deal for a small fishing village entirely 
dependent on the EU agreement with Morocco. 
Annex3 
METHODOLOGICAL NOTE 
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Chapter 2 illustrates how existing interpretations of Spain's EU policy are inadequate 
for a full analysis of the evolving role of the Spanish state. Empirical and 
documentary material were thus used extensively to provide an instrument for gaining 
a greater understanding of relations between the Spanish state and key domestic 
actors in addition to the analysis of a range of primary material, and extensive 
interviews in Madrid, Andalusia and Brussels. 
The limitations of the secondary literature on Spain and the EU led to the wide use of 
material from primary documents (see list of primary sources in Bibliography). Many 
of them, mostly accessed during the period of field work in Spain from March to 
October 1996, were unpublished and had not previously been the subject of academic 
analysis. The primary sources included policy statements and opinions issued by key 
socio-economic actors, parliamentary debates, internal briefings written by 
government officials at both the central and regional levels, and unpublished letters 
and memoranda. Such documents were sometimes accessed in libraries, but were 
more often made available by interviewees, for example a Spanish Member of the 
European Parliament supplied his dossier on the 1995 re-negotiation of the EU-
Morocco agreement including many unpublished communications between high-
ranking EU officials in Brussels, civil servants in Madrid, and the European 
Parliament. Another interviewee!, a representative of one of the main trade unions, 
allowed full access to the archives of the EC accession period which included a series 
of communications between government officials and trade union representatives. 
The trade union archives were ad hoc and incomplete, but yielded interesting 
documents which provided an insight into trade union relations with the government 
during the negotiations. It is significant that interviewees, sometimes the authors of 
the original communications, gave a quite different view of relations between key 
socio-economic actors and the government during the accession period to the 
perspective given in official documentation. The disparity between the evidence 
indicated the importance of primary source material in capturing tensions between 
state and domestic actors which were rarely revealed in interviews. Access to primary 
source material was particularly invaluable as the positions of key domestic actors 
had seldom been subject to academic research previously, as illustrated by the paucity 
of analytical studies on the subject in the case of Spain. 
!Interview with official in CCOO, Madrid, 6 May 1996. 
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Press articles were used to supplement the material found in the primary and 
secondary literature, mainly from Spain and the UK, but also from other countries, 
such as France, which took an active interest in the Spanish case. Articles from the 
UK press were mainly consulted in Chatham House, London, where the files on 
Spain's EC accession and on key aspects of its EC/EU membership were invaluable 
for the study. The FT provided a solid analysis of relevant developments throughout 
the period and was accessed via CD-rom for more recent years. The Spanish 
newspapers were initially consulted in Colindale Newspaper Library, London, for the 
EC accession period, and, subsequently, in the Juan March library in Madrid which 
holds articles of interest from El Pais on microfilm. Articles in El Mundo, for 
example its coverage of the 1995 EO-Morocco fisheries agreement, could be accessed 
via CD-rom at the Juan March library which considerably facilitated the task. Access 
to extensive press files on the 1995 fisheries agreement at the DG for Fisheries of the 
Andalusia government provided the opportunity to consult press articles at local, 
regional and national levels in both Spain and Morocco. 
The relatively small amount of material existing on political aspects of the EC/EU 
policy-making process in Spain was found at libraries at the Centro de Estudios 
Constitucionales, the Instituto Juan March, CERI (Centro Espaiiol de Relaciones 
Internacionales) and the Fundaci6n Ortega y Gas set, Madrid. The use of such libraries 
made it possible to obtain most relevant secondary sources in Spanish which had been 
difficult to access in the UK, including a wide range of Spanish journals. Useful 
material on the accession period was obtained at the documentation centre of the 
Secretariat of State for Foreign Policy and the EU, Madrid, although their archives, to 
which early literature on the institution refers, were not accessible to the public. 
Documentation centres in relevant government ministries also proved invaluable for 
consulting a wide range of primary and secondary literature, namely the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, and the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The 
libraries of both the Congress and Senate allowed access to parliamentary debates 
throughout the period. Policy statements and opinions produced by trade unions were 
obtained at the Fundaci6n Pablo Iglesias as well as other trade union supported 
foundations such as the Fundaci6n Caballero, while policy statements from the main 
business confederation could be obtained directly from their documentation centre, if 
the title and date of the particular document were known. Other sources were found 
via interviews with policy-makers, Spanish academics and fellow researchers, and 
through the Internet. 
Although primary source documents were essential to fill the gap in the literature, 
interviews were also necessary to obtain the reactions of officials to the positions of 
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key domestic actors, and to explore the more concrete effects of the changing policy 
process. Interviews yielded anecdotal evidence as well as fairly precise information 
on the nature of institutional changes, and illustrations of the roles of central 
government and key domestic actors in the policy process. The statements of key 
socio-economic actors on their influence on the government were rarely confirmed in 
interviews with civil servants, and a key element of the research involved piecing 
together the story from the many divergent opinions and comments provided. 
Interviews were carried out in Brussels in February 1996 and April 1997; in Madrid, 
April-October 1996 and June 1997; and Andalusia, October 1996 and June 1997. Key 
interviewees were EU officials from institutions such as the European Commission 
and European Parliament, officials from the Spanish Permanent Representation in 
Brussels, Spanish regional office representatives in Brussels, central and regional 
government officials, and representatives from trade unions, business, and key 
sectoral organisations, for example local shipowners' associations (see list of 
interviewees in Bibliography). 
Interviews provided useful material which, even if anecdotal and not always reliable, 
enlivened the subject of the thesis. They were particularly invaluable for the fisheries 
case study where relations between state and domestic actors during the relatively 
recent negotiations had not previously been examined by an academic researcher. 
Interviews with key representatives of fishing associations in the village of Barbate in 
Andalusia were informative and set a clear context for the fisheries case study. 
Descriptions of meetings with government civil servants and high-ranking EU 
officials, such as Commissioner Bonino, allowed a greater understanding of relations 
between the different levels of actors, even if the material could not a! ways be 
directly used for the thesis. The EC accession period, although well covered by the 
literature, included little research on state-domestic relations, and interviews with 
officials based in the Secretariat of State for Relations with the EC during the period 
were used to extract precise information on the domestic negotiating arena from 
1979-86, although their reliability was dubious given the need to depend on the 
memory of civil servants. Other sources were more readily available for the case 
study on cohesion policy, in view of the larger amount of academic research in the 
area, but interviews at regional, central and EC/EU levels were still essential for the 
confirmation of research findings, and for charting the changing relations between the 
different actors in the policy area. The concentration on economic rather than political 
aspects in interviews with officials at the level of central and regional government 
made it difficult to gather material on subnational participation in the policy area. 
However, interviewees in DGXVI of the Commission were far more willing to 
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discuss the political issues, providing anecdotal evidence as well as the DG's most 
recent publications. 
Interviews from February to July 1996 were carried out at an early stage in the 
research process2, and were initially used to determine the choice of case studies, to 
define the scope of the study, to make further contacts, and to gain an understanding 
of the functioning of the policy-making process in Spain. More structured interviews 
aimed at obtaining precise information on events were carried out in September and 
October 1996. Fieldwork in Brussels, Madrid and Andalusia in 1997 involved shorter 
periods of intensive interviewing with key individuals. Former interviewees proved 
helpful, not only agreeing to second interviews but also commenting on drafts of case 
studies3. 
Obtaining interviews at the outset in Madrid was difficult, but once initial interviews 
had been conducted, an extensive database of names of civil servants, politicians and 
regional and sectoral representatives was established. A network of representatives 
and officials was speedily built up for the fisheries case study, providing an indication 
of the nature of the policy area. Key problems, analogous to those faced by any 
researcher, were the reluctance of key civil servants, particularly high-ranking 
officials, to express a view on any controversial questions, the problem of relying on 
the memory of interviewees for information on past events, and, more generally, the 
lack of reliability and objectivity of interview material. As a foreign student, 
interviewing was sometimes more problematic although, on certain occasions, 
interviewees might have felt less ready to give their opinions to an established 
Spanish researcher. A further consideration was the timing of the visit to Madrid just 
after the general elections in March 1996. Many politically appointed PSOE civil 
servants lost their key positions in the administration and had time for interviews 
prior to subsequent appointments. In some cases, interviewees were glad to have the 
opportunity to 'tell their story' and felt they were at last free to speak openly about 
events. However, April-June 1996 was a chaotic period when the administration was 
in flux. New PP officials rapidly took over key positions, were not always informative 
about the whereabouts of their predecessors, and were of limited use themselves for 
my research as they were about to start their term (although some officials 
interviewed in June 1997 provided a useful insight into their first year of office). 
2 A successful application to the European Commission for a Training and Mobility of Researchers 
(TMR) grant to carry out doctoral fieldwork in Madrid from April to October 1996, based at the 
Fundaci6n Ortega y Gasset, enabled the field work to commence earlier than planned. 
3The help given is illustrated by the willingness of a former PSOE Minister to read a draft chapter on 
the EU-Morocco fisheries agreement, giving invaluable advice for the final analysis written . 
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